Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 668South Africa
Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (B39161/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 668 (10 August 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
10 August 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (B39161/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 668 (10 August 2023)
Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (B39161/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 668 (10 August 2023)
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sino date 10 August 2023
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case No: B39161/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
10/08/2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
AKASIA
ROAD SURFACING (PTY) LTD
First Applicant
(Registration number
1996/010877/07)
ACORN
PROPERTIES (PTY)
LTD
Second Applicant
(Registration number
2019/117075/07)
RAUBEX
ROADS AND EARTHWORKS HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
Third Applicant
(Registration number
1997/000224/07)
and
CITY
OF TSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
JUDGMENT
PHOOKO
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This matter is complex and has a long
history relating to disputed outstanding rates and taxes. The
clearance figures throughout
the pleadings do not add up and make
sense. It is difficult to ascertain what is due and what the
amount due relates to.
Consequently, reference will only be
made to the amount that is allegedly due to the Respondent, and to a
limited extent,
other amounts may be referred to.
[2]
This
is an application brought by the First Applicant seeking this Court
to,
inter
alia
,
declare an amount of R2 454 297.91 in respect of disputed outstanding
rates and taxes not due to the Respondent and that the Respondent
be
ordered to issue a rates clearance certificate to the First Applicant
as per section 118(1) of the
Municipal
Systems Act
[1]
(the
Systems Act). The basis for this is that the said rates and
taxes are a historical debt and ought to be excluded from
the
clearance figures that were requested in May 2021.
[3]
The Respondent opposed the application on the basis that it is
inter alia entitled to withhold the First Applicant’s
rates
clearance certificate pending the payment of all outstanding rates,
and taxes and that the
First Applicant seeks to resolve a
February/March 2014 rate and taxes dispute via a February 2020
property sale transaction.
PARTIES
[4]
The First Applicant is Akasisa Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd with a
registration number 1996/010877/07, a company duly registered and
incorporated in terms of the laws of the Republic of South Africa
whose main place of business is at 47 Graf Road, Bon Accord,
Pretoria, Gauteng Province.
[4.1]
The First Applicant was previously known and registered as Bonn Plant
Hire (Pty) Ltd.
[4.2]
The First Applicant is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Third
Applicant.
[5]
The Second Applicant is Acorn Properties (Pty) Ltd with a
registration number 2019/117075/07, a company duly registered and
incorporated
in terms of the laws of the Republic of South Africa and
whose main place of business is at 2[...] M[...] Avenue, Holland
PARK,
Qgebhera, Eastern Cape Province.
[5.1]
The Second Applicant underwent a name change and was previously known
and registered as Raubex Property
Investments (Pty) Ltd. This
name has since been changed to Acorn Properties (Pty) Ltd.
[6]
The Third Applicant is Raubex Roads and
Earthworks Holdings (Pty) Ltd with a registration number
2006/023666/06, a company duly
registered and incorporated in terms
of the laws of the Republic of South Africa and whose main place of
business is at Building
1, H[...] O[...] Park, 5[...] T[...] Avenue,
Highveld, centurion, Gauteng Province.
[6.1]
The Third Applicant is a wholly owned subsidiary of Raubex Group Ltd,
a
Public company listed on
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange since March 2007.
[7]
The Second and Third Applicants are said to
have a direct and substantial interest in this matter as they will be
severely affected
if the property transaction is not finalized.
[8]
The
Respondent is the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality which is
a Metropolitan Municipality with a separate legal personality
duly
established in terms of the Gauteng Provincial Notice 6770 of 2000,
issued in terms of Section 12 of the Local Government:
Municipal
Structures Act
[2]
with
its office and/or principal place of business situated at office of
the City Manager, Tshwane House East Wing, 2
nd
Floor, 3[...] M[...] Street, Pretoria, Gauteng Province.
[9]
The City of Tshwane is vested with the
power and authority by virtue of Chapter 7 of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa,
1996 (the Constitution) to
inter
alia
oversee and enforce, the
Constitution, the Systems Act, and its By-Laws relating to credit
control and debt collection.
THE
ISSUES
[10]
The issues to be determined by this Court are:
[10.1] whether the
relief sought by the Applicants is competent.
[10.2]
whether this Court ought to grant an order declaring the outstanding
municipal debt in respect of the properties name,
R2 454 297.91, as
not due for the purposes of the clearance figures in terms of section
118(1) of the Systems Act.
[10.3]
whether the First Applicant is entitled to clearance certificates to
be issued by the Respondent in terms of s 118(1)
of the Systems Act,
excluding the amount of R 2 454 297.91.
[10.4]
alternatively, whether the First Applicant is entitled to interim
relief pending the finalisation of the disputes lodged
by the First
Applicant.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[11]
The First Applicant is the registered owner of various
properties including Portion 47 of the Farm O[...] 3[...],
Registration Division
JR, Gauteng (Portion 47) and Portion 50 of the
Farm O[...] 3[...], Registration Division JR, Gauteng (Portion 50)
which are part
of the dispute relating to outstanding rates and
taxes.
[12]
The aforesaid properties have various municipal accounts for
utilities and/or levies linked to them in the following manner,
[12.1] Accounts
5[...] and 5[...] are linked to Portion 47.
[12.2] Accounts
5[...] and 5[...] are linked to Portion 50.
[13]
During February/March 2014, a dispute arose
between the First Applicant and the Respondent wherein the Respondent
had levied and
charged the First Applicant an amount of R 1 119
811.80 for rates and taxes as well as consumption of water and
electricity on
account number
5[...] and/or 5[...] of Portion
50.
[14]
According to the First Applicant, the
attempts to resolve the dispute with the employees of the Respondent
after the receipt of
the outstanding rates and taxes for the period
of March 2014 have yielded no positive results.
[15]
On 10 September 2014, the First Applicant’s
former attorneys wrote to the Respondent and inter alia stated that
they had not
received a computation of figures linked to Portion 50
and that as of December 2013, the First Applicant did not owe the
Respondent,
and that on March 2014 amounts of R227 135.64, R68,
879.50, R1, 119, 8111.80 and R66, 810.82 were added to the First
Applicant’s
account without explanation. Consequently, on
10 September 2014, the First Applicant raised another dispute in
terms of section
95(f) read together with section 102(2) of the
Systems Act.
[16]
According to the First Applicant, on 3
November 2016, the Respondent's rights, title, and interest under
case numbers 73276/2014
and 89809/2015 were sold in execution because
of the Respondent’s failure to pay the First Applicant’s
cost orders
under the aforesaid case numbers. According
to the First Applicant, the sale in execution extinguished the
Respondent’s
claim for debts allegedly owed by the First
Applicant under account 5[...] of Portion 50.
[17]
On 26 July 2017, the First Applicant
received a final demand from the Respondent about an amount of R 1608
905.79 that was due and
payable under account 5[...]. However, the
First Applicant replied to the effect that the matter was resolved
through litigations
and that the debt was no longer outstanding.
[18]
On
or about 4 February 2020, the First Applicant sold the properties to
Raubex Property Investments (Pty) Ltd (Raubex Property),
and Raubex
Property took occupation on 28 February 2020. According to the
First Applicant, the aforesaid properties form
part of a Broad-Based
Black Empowerment transaction.
[3]
[19]
On
18 May 2021, the First Applicant applied for clearance figures from
the Respondent and received them on 15 June 2021.
[4]
[20]
As of 22 July 2022, the closing balance on
account number 5[...] was R2 454 209.00 which is R88.91 less
than the balance provided
to the First Applicant as the clearance
figure of R 2 454 297.91 issued on 11 July 2022 by the Respondent.
[21]
The First Applicant lodged a dispute in terms of section
102(2) of the Systems Act relating to inter alia account number
5[...]
which is linked to Portion 50.
[22]
The Respondent declined to provide the
First Applicant with the rate clearance certificate until all the
debts relating to rates
and taxes as indicated in the clearance
figures have been settled.
[23]
The First Applicant’s case is that
the amount of R 2 454 297.91 which is linked to account number 5[...]
and/or 5[...] is
older than 2 years preceding the date that the First
Applicant applied for clearance figures in terms of section 118(1) of
the
Systems Act and therefore should be excluded from the rate
clearance figures that have been furnished to the First Applicant by
the Respondent.
APPLICABLE
LEGAL PRINCIPLE
[24]
The Systems Act provides a framework for
the registration of immovable property, issuance of rates and taxes
certificate, and collection
of municipal services fees including
property rates. Section 118(1) provides that:
“
A
registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of property except
on production to that registration officer of a prescribed
certificate –
(a)
issued by the municipality or
municipalities in which that property is situated; and
(b)
which certifies that all amounts due in
connection with that
property for municipal
service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal
taxes, levies and duties
during the two years preceding the date
of application for the certificate have been fully paid
”
(own emphasis added).
[25]
A simple reading of the aforesaid provision
entails that the Respondent is in law entitled to recover any current
debt owed to it
by the First Applicant and that debt should not be
older than two years preceding the date of the application for the
certificate.
However, a debt that falls outside the scope of
two years preceding the two years of the date of application for the
certificate
is not covered by the aforesaid provision. In other
words, a historical debt cannot be included in the two years
preceding
the date of the application for the certificate.
[26]
Does
it mean that the Respondent has no other mechanisms to recover a
historical debt that is not covered by the provisions of section
118(1) of the Systems Act? The quick answer is no. The Systems Act
provides a mechanism for the Respondent to recover any of its
outstanding debt. As was correctly found in
Jordaan
and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others
[5]
where
the Constitutional Court held that:
“
And
the statute does indeed provide a full-plated panoply of mechanisms
enabling efficient debt recovery in the cause of collecting
publicly
vital revenue. Here the parts of section 118(3) that are
uncontested are integral. These are the charge on
the property
against the existing owner, and the municipality’s preference
over registered mortgagees. During argument
the municipalities
conceded, correctly, that the provision enables them to enforce the
charge against the existing owner up to
the moment of transfer –
and to do so above and before any registered mortgagees. And
they were constrained to concede,
also correctly, where there are
unpaid municipal debts, that the charge enables them to slam the
legal brake on any impending transfer
by obtaining an interdict
against transfer”.
[27]
The above paragraph reveals that there are
legal channels that are available to the Respondent to recover any
debt that has not
prescribed against a consumer of municipal services
as per section 118(3) of the Systems Act.
[28]
Similarly,
it is now settled that “
upon
transfer of a property, a new owner is not liable for debts arising
before transfer from the charge upon the property under
”
[6]
section 118(3) of the Systems Act.
[29]
I now turn to consider the circumstances of
this case taking into consideration the written and oral submissions
of the parties
including evidence before this Court to ascertain
whether the First Applicant has made out a case for the relief
sought.
FIRST APPLICANT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[30]
The First Applicant’s submissions were brief and could
be summarized as follows:
[30.1]
Section 102(1)(c) of the Systems Act authorises a municipality to
implement any of the debt collection and credit
control measures for recovery of any arrears on any of the accounts.
However,
section 102(2) of the System Act further provides that
section 102(1)(c) does not apply where there is a dispute between the
municipality
and a consumer of services about any specific amount
claimed by the municipality from that person.
[30.2]
Relying on
Real
People Housing (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town
[7]
,
the First Applicant inter alia contended that the amount which the
applicant for a clearance certificate had to pay to be issued
with a
clearance certificate was limited to a period of two years preceding
the date of application for the said clearance certificate.
Furthermore, the First Applicant argued that the Respondent was
obliged, on request, to provide the First Applicant with
such
itemised billing for municipal fees due for payment during the
two-year period preceding the date of application for the required
certificate, and to issue the First Applicant with the required
clearance certificate when the amount due had been paid.
[30.3]
Additionally, the First Applicant argued that section 118(1)(b) of
the Systems Act prohibits the
Respondent from including historical
amounts older than two years preceding the date the application for
clearance figures was
made for the purposes of obtaining a clearance
certificate.
[30.4]
The First Applicant argued that the statements provided by the
Respondents resulted in the First
Applicant seeking a detailed
computation of the outstanding balance and several disputes that were
lodged by the First Applicant.
For example, the First Applicant
contended that account number “
5[...] outstanding balance
increased from R651 220.61 to R2 452 297.91
”.
[30.5]
Furthermore, the First Applicant argued that the disputed amounts
date back as far as February/March
2014.
[30.6]
The
First Applicant contended that the
Respondent's rights, title, and were sold in execution because of the
Respondent’s failure
to pay the First Applicant’s cost
orders. Consequently, the First Applicant submitted that the
sale in execution extinguished
the Respondent’s claim for debts
allegedly owed by the First Applicant.
[31]
Based on the above, the First Applicant submitted that a
proper case was made out for the relief sought as per the notice of
motion.
RESPONDENT’S
SUBMISSIONS
[32]
Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the relief sought by the
First Applicant was incompetent as the
requirements for declaratory
relief were not met.
[33]
Further, counsel argued that the Respondent, as part of its
administrative role, conducted various “
investigations, made
decisions and provided detailed feedback and figures to the First
Applicant
” regarding the outstanding debt. As a
result, counsel argued that this was the basis for withholding a
clearance certificate.
[34]
Counsel further submitted that this court was not in a position to
declare the debt not due as sought by
the First Applicant. In
addition, counsel for the Respondent submitted that there was an
“unfounded assumption that section
118(1) of the Systems Act
somehow expunges the outstanding debt preceding the two years to
transfer of the property; alternatively,
that the debt has been
extinguished by the sale in execution”.
[35]
The Respondent confirmed that this case is “an old matter going
back to 2014”. Furthermore, counsel
for the Respondent
submitted that the First Applicant was “attempting to resolve a
2014 dispute through a February 2020 transaction”
in that they
sought clearance figures almost 18 months after the alleged sale of
the property.
[36]
Relying on
Jordaan
and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others,
counsel
submitted that municipalities are entitled by the provisions of
section 118(3) to legally stop the transfer of property
where there
are unpaid municipal debts.
[8]
[37]
Ultimately, counsel advanced a
tax
law argument to the effect that the First Applicant must “pay
now, argue later”.
[38]
Therefore,
the Respondent argued that the First Applicant’s case had no
merit and ought to be dismissed.
EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
AND SUBMISSIONS
[39]
The
First Applicant and the Respondent in unambiguous terms admitted that
the dispute in respect of the amount allegedly owed by
the First
Applicant originates from February/March 2014. This alone settles
this case. Accordingly, there is no need to venture
into an
interpretative exercise about what section 118(1) of the System Act
entails save to cite with approval the decision of
the Supreme Court
of Appeal in
City
of Cape Town v Real People Housing (Pty) Ltd (77/09)
[9]
where
the court held that:
“…
indeed,
any proviso that would have the effect
of entitling the City to withhold a certificate until all debts were
paid – would nullify
the express language of the section and it
might just as well not be there
. I do
not think it is necessary to cite authority for the trite proposition
that a term cannot be implied in a statute if it would
contradict its
express terms.
Had it been intended not
to limit the period to two years then the words would not have
appeared at all
” (own emphasis
added).
[40]
The
fact of the matter is, that the debt claimed by the Respondent is
older than 2 years preceding the date of application for clearance
figures and therefore the amount of
R2
454 297.91
should
be excluded when computing the correct clearance figures. In
other words, the said amount is not due only for the purposes
of the
two 2 years preceding the date of application for clearance figures
as per section 118(1)(b). Anything beyond the two-year
time frame
remains a pending dispute between the parties. In my view, this
cannot be regarded as an unjustified intrusion into
the terrain of
the Respondent. As was correctly held in
National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and
Others
[10]
albeit in a different context that:
“
in
a dispute as the present one, this does not mean that an organ of
state is immunised from judicial review only on account of
separation
of powers.…”
[41]
In addition, a simple reading of section
118(1) and (3) does not reveal any statutory power whatsoever
conferred on the Respondent
to withhold the clearance certificate.
The Respondent is resorting to self-help something that is
impermissible in our constitutional
democracy.
[42]
I also fail to understand the basis for
withholding the clearance certificate because there were disputes
lodged regarding the amount
in dispute. This is contrary to
section 102(1)(c) of the Systems Act which provides that section
102(1)(b) of the Systems
Act does not apply where there is a dispute
between the municipality and a consumer of services about any
specific amount claimed
by the municipality from that person.
[43]
Concerning
the “
pay
now, argue later
”
principle, it is difficult to appreciate how a principle that is
applicable in tax disputes found its way into the current
dispute.
Regrettably, counsel for the Respondent did not refer this Court to
any authority to substantiate this submission. Therefore,
I
agree with counsel for the First Applicant in that this submission is
misplaced.
[44]
Concerning
the Respondent's contention that municipalities are entitled by the
provisions of section 118(3) to legally stop the
transfer of property
where there are unpaid municipal debts, I agree with this submission.
If this was not the case, municipalities
would be crippled and
thereafter unable to render municipal services within their
jurisdictions. The Respondent, if it so wished,
had an opportunity of
obtaining an interdict
[11]
against the intended transferor but did not do so. Instead, it
resorted to self-help. I need not say more about self-help.
[45]
Concerning the sale in execution that
supposedly extinguished the Respondent’s claim for debts
allegedly owed by the First
Applicant, again the Respondent
presumably knows the avenues that are available to them to challenge
that judgment if they are
not satisfied with it. But for
reasons known to this Court, they have not done anything.
[46]
About
the First Applicant being entitled to a declaratory order, the First
Applicant correctly submitted that this argument was
not raised in
the Respondent’s answering affidavit, and therefore should not
stand. I agree. The argument is
not evidence, and it is
not given under oath.
[12]
The
heads of argument do not serve as answering affidavits. Therefore,
the Respondent must stand or fall by averments made
in its answering
affidavit. Furthermore, “an owner cannot be expected to
tender payment if he or she has no knowledge
of what is due”.
[13]
In my view, the Applicant is entitled to the relief that it
seeks.
[47]
Regarding
the granting of the relief, to order the Respondent to issue the
clearance certificate pending the finalisation of the
pending
dispute, this Court should exercise a degree of caution and be
careful not to unjustly venture into the terrain of the
Respondent.
To do so may have unintended consequences that will limit the
powers of municipalities in recovering debt. I
am aware that
the First Applicant has tendered security that was paid
[14]
into
the trust account of their attorneys in the amount of R 2 454,
297.91. Consequently, they seek this Court to order the
Respondent to issue the clearance certificate. The Respondent
had sought such security to be paid into their attorneys’
trust
account too. I am of the view that this Court is not able to
grant such a relief when the current and unclear debt
during
the two years preceding the date of application for the certificate
have not been fully paid
as per the provisions of section 118(1)(b) of the Systems Act.
[48]
The First Applicant and the Respondent are
at liberty to revisit a possibility of an arrangement about to whom
security should be
furnished if they so wish to enable the transfer
to unfold pending the finalization of the dispute. It is not
for this Court
to decide whose trust account is best suited to keep
security.
[49]
To
grant an order against the Respondent to issue the clearance
certificate will in my view amount to judicial overreach as this
court will delve into debt-collecting measures that fall in the
purview of the Respondent. In
City
of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and Another
[15]
,
the Constitutional Court held that:
“…
Intrusion
into the sphere of operation reserved only for the other arms of
State is an exercise not to be unreflectingly or over-zealously
carried out by a court of law. It calls for deeper reflection
and caution. The State operates better when due deference
is
shown by one branch to another, obviously without approaching its
obligations so timidly as to incorrectly suggest that there
is an
undue measure of self restraint. That said, an attitude that is
dismissive of the constitutional fire-wall around the
powers of other
arms of State is not conducive to the proper observance of separation
of powers and exhibits disregard for comity
among the branches of
Government”.
[50]
Consequently, this Court will be slow to
condone issuing of clearance certificates outside the prescripts of
the Systems Act and
pending the issuance of clearance figures
for the two years preceding the date of application for the
certificate
excluding the historical
debt of R 2 454, 297.91. This may open floodgates for litigants to
seek clearance certificates when outstanding
debts have not been paid
as per section 118(1)(b) of the Systems Act.
[51]
Notwithstanding the above, I am of the view
that the First Applicant has made out a case for the other forms of
relief mentioned
at the end of this judgment.
COSTS
[52]
From the onset, it was clear that the
amount in dispute originated from February/March 2014. This is
something that is known
to both the First Applicant and the
Respondent. However, for unknown reasons, the Respondent
persisted with the inclusion
of a debt falling outside the parameters
of section 118(1)(b) of the Systems Act when the current clearance
figures were sought.
[53]
The
Respondent also on more than one occasion failed to provide an
explanation of how the outstanding balance on rates and taxes
was
arrived at. Different figures were provided and later
changed. There were also countless discrepancies with
the
figures. For example, on 14 October 2015, the First Applicant
owed the Respondent an amount of R73.06 but there was an
interest
charged in the amount of R 9 579.48 on that balance.
[16]
Again, there was no explanation for this exorbitant interest on
a mere debt of R73.06. There has been an inexcusable
failure by
the Respondent to provide an explanation of its outstanding charges.
[54]
It
must also be noted that the First Applicant has never disputed that
he owes the Respondent. The concern has been how the
figures
were calculated. I do not think that the First Applicant should
be out of pocket because of the Respondent’s
inability to
explain its computation methods. In any case, the First
Applicant has been to a large extent been a successful
party in these
proceedings. Accordingly, there is no basis as to why the costs
should not follow the results.
[17]
ORDER
[55]
I, therefore, make
the following
order:
(a)
The amount of R2 454 297.91 reflected as
“Outstanding Amounts” on the Written Statement issued in
terms of section 118(1)
of the System Act dated 11 July 2022 in
relation to account number 5[...] is declared not due in connection
with the property only
for purposes of section 118(1) of the Systems
Act.
(b)
The
Respondent is ordered and directed to issue the First Applicant
with full and itemised particulars of the amounts which
became due
for payment in respect of municipal service fees, surcharges on fees,
property rates, and other municipal taxes, levies,
and duties (and
which remain unpaid) for a period of two years prior to the date of
the request in respect of account numbers(s)
5[...] and/or 5[...]
owed by the First Applicant excluding the historical debt of R2 454
297.91 within 30 (thirty) days of the
order granted by this Court.
(c)
The
Respondent is ordered and directed, on receipt of payment of such sum
tendered specifically for the purpose of discharging that
indebtedness, to issue to the applicant a certificate as contemplated
in section 118(1) of the systems Act within 7 (seven) days
of the
order granted by this Court.
(d)
The
Respondent is ordered and directed to resolve the dispute(s) which
form(s) the subject of this application within 60 (sixty)
calendar
days of the date of granting this order, and to provide such
resolution by way of an affidavit to be transmitted to the
First
Applicant’s attorneys of record.
(e)
That,
upon receipt of the resolution of the dispute, the First Applicant is
afforded 30 (thirty) calendar days within which to launch
appropriate
legal proceedings to impugn the resolution, if necessary.
(f)
Should
the First Applicant fail to launch legal proceedings as contemplated
in paragraph (e), the amount found to be due in the
resolution is to
be paid over to the Respondent within 7 (seven) days of the expiry of
the period in paragraph (d).
(g)
The Respondent is ordered to pay the costs
of this application on an attorney and client scale.
M R PHOOKO
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT, DIVISION, PRETORIA
Delivered: This
judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 10 August 2023.
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicants:
Adv N.
Snellenburg SC & Adv J.J. Buys
Instructed
by:
York
Attorneys’ INC
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv K
Mvubu
Instructed
by:
Lekhu
Pilson Attorneys
Date
of Hearing:
2 May
2023
Date
of Judgment:
10
August 2023
[1]
32
of 2000.
[2]
Act
117 of 1998.
[3]
Some of the issues, such as the
Broad-Based
Black Empowerment has become moot due to the passage of time which
required the property sale to be completed before
28 February 2023.
Consequently, they will not be dealt with in this judgment.
[4]
CaseLines: 003 at item 10.
## [5]2017
(11) BCLR 1370 (CC) at para 54.
[5]
2017
(11) BCLR 1370 (CC) at para 54.
[6]
Jordaan
and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others
at para 81.
[7]
2010 (1) SA 411
(C) AT paras 30 and 31.
[8]
See
above fn. 5 at
para
54.
## [9][2010]
2 All SA 305 (SCA) at para 14.
[9]
[2010]
2 All SA 305 (SCA) at para 14.
[10]
2012
(6) SA 223
(CC) at paras 63-64.
[11]
Jordaan
and Others v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and Others
at
para 54.
## [12]Maboho
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs(833/2007,
1128/2007) [2011] ZALMPHC 4 at para 13.
[12]
Maboho
and Others v Minister of Home Affairs
(833/2007,
1128/2007) [2011] ZALMPHC 4 at para 13.
[13]
Real
People Housing (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town
at para 17.
[14]
Caselines: 003 at Item 73.
[15]
ZACC 19;
2016 (9) BCLR 1133
(CC) at para 70.
[16]
Caselines: 003, Item 32 at page 003-242.
[17]
Neuhoff
v York Timbers Ltd
1981
(1) SA 666
(T).
sino noindex
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