Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1159South Africa
State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Forensic Data Analysts (Pty) Ltd (19130/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1159 (8 September 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
8 September 2023
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1159
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Forensic Data Analysts (Pty) Ltd (19130/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1159 (8 September 2023)
State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Forensic Data Analysts (Pty) Ltd (19130/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1159 (8 September 2023)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPPHC/Data/2023_1159.html
sino date 8 September 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
Case
Number: 19130/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES /
NO.
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /
NO.
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
8/9/2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
STATE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGENCY SOC LTD
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 1999/001899/07)
Applicant
and
FORENSIC
DATA ANALYSTS (PTY) LTD
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 1999/023867/07)
Respondent
In
Re:
FORENSIC
DATA ANALYSTS (PTY) LTD
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 1999/023867/07)
Plaintiff
and
STATE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AGENCY SOC LTD
(REGISTRATION
NUMBER: 1999/001899/07)
First Defendant
MINISTER
OF POLICE
Second Defendant
MINISTER
OF TELECOMMUNICATION AND POSTAL
SERVICES
Third Defendant
JUDGMENT
POTTERILL
J
[1]
This matter was set down as a special motion for two-days of hearing.
The papers compromise
more than 736 pages. The heads of argument of
SITA is a hefty 84 pages and that of FDA 53 pages. This matter is a
prime example
of “
where
the procedures permitted by the Rules of the Court to facilitate the
pursuit of the truth are used for purposes extraneous
to that
object.”
[1]
[2]
The State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd [SITA] is the
defendant in an action
for a claim for damages instituted by Forensic
Data Analysts (Pty) Ltd [FDA]. In the matter before me SITA launched
two Rule 30
applications in terms of the Uniform Rules. In the
first Rule 30 application SITA seeks that FDA’s summons and
particulars
of claim be set aside as nullity. The reasons for this
application is fourfold: the summons was not correctly issued;
the
Rule 41A was not served simultaneously with the summons; no
notice was given to the State Departments before the summons was
issued, and the particulars of claim [POC] did not comply with Rule
18(10). This Rule 30 application is out of time and SITA seeks
condonation for the late filing of the application. FDA opposed the
granting of condonation submitting that SITA had not shown
good
cause.
[3]
Pursuant to this application FDA filed a counter-application for
condonation for the
signing of the summons absent a statement
regarding the attorney’s right of appearance and a copy of his
relevant certificate.
Condonation for the late filing of the Rule 41A
notice is also sought. Simultaneously FDA applied to be afforded a
10-day period
to deliver a notice of intention to amend paragraph 19
of the particulars of claim conditional upon the court finding that
FDA’s
calculation of its lost profits was not set out in
accordance with Rule 18(10). Condonation was also sought for the late
delivery
of FDA’s replying affidavit in the
counter-application.
[4]
In the second Rule 30 application SITA seeks to set aside the notice
of bar that FDA
served on SITA. In response to this application FDA
has in terms of Rule 6(15) filed an application that certain
paragraphs of
SITA’s founding affidavit and relevant annexures
be struck out.
The
Rule 30 application to set aside the summons and particulars of claim
Were
the POC attached to the summons when it was issued by the registrar?
[5]
Condonation for the one-day late filing of this Rule 30 application
is granted. Counsel
for FDA did not belabour the point in oral
argument and this application is standing in the way of the claim
being finalised, one
way or another. Condonation for the late
filing of FDA’s replying affidavit in the counter-application
is granted on
the same basis. Both parties in reply put new
evidence before the Court. I have entertained both parties new
evidence resulting
in no prejudice to either party.
[6]
The complaint lies therein that FDA’s attorney signed the
summons on 15 April
2021 without the POC being signed by counsel. The
registrar of the court issued the summons on 16 April 2021. FDA’s
counsel
signed the particulars of claim only on 19 April 2021. On
behalf of SITA it was submitted that when the summons was issued it
did
not, and could not, have had the POC attached because counsel had
only signed the POC on 19 April. A candidate attorney, Ms Tyzack
of
SITA’s attorneys, went to examine the registrar’s file on
7 September 2021. The file contained only the summons
and not the 17
pages of POC and the annexures. The photographs of what she found in
the file was attached to her affidavit. An
affidavit of Mr Makalima
was also filed. He too is an article clerk of the attorneys of SITA
and he attended to the registrar’s
office on 14 September 2021
where a registrar confirmed to him that on the court file, one copy
of the summons and POC is retained.
[7]
The argument went that the summons was thus not compliant with Rule
17(2)(a) which
reads as follows:
“
17(2)(a)
In every case … the summons shall be in accordance with Form
10
of the First Schedule, to which summons shall be annexed
particulars of the material facts
relied upon by the
plaintiff
in support of the claim, which particulars shall
inter
alia
comply with rule 18.”
[8]
In answer to these allegations FDA filed the affidavit of Mr Loch,
their attorney.
He set out that the POC
were drafted on 2 April 2021 and were approved on 12 April
2021. He signed the
summons on 15 April 2021. He further stated that he intended for
counsel to sign the POC. Ms Duncan, the former
article clerk of FDA’s
attorneys confirmed that the summons was issued with the unsigned POC
as counsel was unavailable to
sign the particulars of claim early
morning 16 April 2021. As it was during the COVID period there were
long queues for issuing
and it had to be dispersed to the Sheriff
that was on standby for service on that day.
[9]
Ms Manana, the Registrar who issued the summons confirms that she
issued the summons
and would never issue a combined summons if the
POC were not attached. Mr Kganedi, the Head Registrar, confirms that
in terms of
the directives no combined summons will be issued without
the POC attached. He also sets out that with the utilisation of the
Caselines
system when a document is uploaded onto Caselines then the
initialising party had fully complied with the directive. He stated
that all court papers must be uploaded onto Caselines. He also under
oath stated registrars in the records section are instructed
to
retain only a copy of the summons in the court file, the POC is not
retained in the court file in an attempt to save space in
the
basement section. He also explained that many court documents go
missing from files and one would often encounter an empty
file.
[10]
In reaction to these affidavits being filed, counsel on behalf of
SITA requested this Court to
refer the issue whether the POC were
attached to the summons when it was issued by the registrar to oral
evidence in terms of Uniform
Rule 6(5)(g):
“
Where an
application cannot properly be decided on affidavit the court may
dismiss the application or make such order as it deems
fit with a
view to ensuring a just and expeditious decision. In particular, but
without affecting the generality of the aforegoing,
it may direct
that oral evidence be heard on specified issues with a view to
resolving any dispute of fact …”
[11]
Counsel for FDA argued that in terms of the
Plascon-Evans
[2]
principle. It must be accepted that the POC were attached to
the summons when it was issued.
[12]
I already in court indicated that to refer the issue of whether the
POC were attached to the
summons when it was issued to oral evidence,
trivial, putting form over substance and a technical objection to
hinder the court
in deciding the genuine disputes between the
parties. It was never submitted that SITA suffered any prejudice. I
interpose to exclaim
that it was troublesome to hear arguments from
senior counsel that the Registrars should be taken to task, and if
this Rule 30
is not granted the Court will be complicit in
perpetuating an irregularity.
[13]
The Rule 30 application based on the fact that the POC were not
attached is to be dismissed.
In applying the
Plascon-Evans
rule the Court must accept the version of FDA unless the allegations
do not raise a real, genuine dispute of fact or are so far-fetched
or
clearly untenable that the court is justified in rejecting the
allegations merely on the papers.
[3]
In
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA) at par
[26]
the rule is worded as follows
:
“It is well established under the Plascon-Evans rule that where
in motion proceedings disputes of fact arise on the
affidavits, a
final order can be granted only if the facts alleged by the
applicant’s (Mr Zuma’s) affidavits, which
have been
admitted by the respondent (the NDPP), together with the facts
alleged by the latter, justify such order. It may be different
if the
respondent’s version consists of bald or uncreditworthy
denials, raises fictitious disputes of fact, is palpably implausible,
far-fetched or so clearly untenable that the court is justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers.”
[14]
There is nothing untenable, far-fetched or uncreditworthy in the
allegations of FDA. There is
no basis of this Court to reject the
version of Ms Duncan that the POC were attached to the summons when
the registrar issued the
summons. The fact that 6 months later Ms
Tyzack did not find the POC on the court file is explained by the
registrars of the Court;
the Caselines system was implemented and the
POC’s are not kept on file. Furthermore, documents get lost
from a court file,
a fact that I can take judicial note of having
experienced same for 15 years working at this Court. There was no
argument forwarded
that SITA was prejudiced by being served with an
unsigned copy of the POC. This basis for setting the summons aside is
dismissed.
Is
the summons irregular because the summons was not signed by both
counsel and the attorney?
[15]
SITA argued in the alternative, that even if the summons was
accompanied by the POC,
and signed by Loch on 15 April 2021 the
summons and POC remain irregular because the summons was
non-compliant with Rule 18 in
that it must be signed both by an
advocate and an attorney, or if the attorney has the right of
appearance under the LPC Act, [Legal
Practice Act 28 of 2014] then by
the attorney only:
“
18(1)
A combined summons, and every other pleading except a summons, shall
be signed by
both an advocate and an attorney or, in the case of an
attorney who, under section 4(2) of the Right of Appearance in Courts
Act,
1995 (Act No. 62 of 1995), has the right of appearance in the
High Court, only by such attorney or, if a party sues or defends
personally, by that party.
18(12)
If a party fails to comply with any of the provisions
of this rule,
such pleading shall be deemed to be an irregular step and the
opposite party shall be entitled to act in accordance
with rule 30.”
And reliance was also
placed on Rule 17 of the Uniform Rules of Court:
“
17(3)(a)
Every summons shall be signed by the attorney acting for the
plaintiff
…”
“
17(3)(c)
After paragraph (a) and (b) has been complied with, the summons shall
be
signed and issued by the registrar and made returnable by the
Sheriff to the court through the registrar.”
[16]
SITA cannot dispute that the summons was signed by Mr Loch on behalf
of Charle Rossouw
Attorneys on 15 April 2021. The complaint on behalf
of SITA then morphed to there being no description of FDA’s
attorneys
signing in the capacity as an attorney with rights of
appearance. The reason submitted is that he was not signing by virtue
of
his right of appearance under the LPC Act and in place of counsel,
but as the instructing attorney who signed together with counsel.
As
counsel did not sign there is non-compliance with the rules and the
summons is a nullity that has to be set aside. Fortification
for this
stance was placed on
Fortune v Fortune
1996 (2) SA 550
(C) It
was also submitted that a nullity cannot be condoned and this Court
has to set aside the summons and POC.
[17]
On behalf of FDA it was argued that SITA cannot rely on this new
ground of irregularity
that was not raised in the notice in terms of
Rule 30(2)(b). But, even if it could rely thereon, there is no
practice directive
in this division which requires an attorney who
signs a pleading with a right of appearance to state that he or she
holds such
right. Furthermore, neither Rule 17 nor Rule 18 requires
that the summons must expressly state that the attorney has the right
of appearance. The argument went further that counsel did sign the
POC before the summons was served and there is no prejudice to
SITA.
The non-compliance of the attorney not signing the POC was cured with
counsel’s signature appended on 19 April 2021.
It was
common cause that the attorney does have a right to appearance in
this Court.
[18]
I am satisfied that the attorney for FDA signed the summons. There is
no requirement
in the Uniform Rules that a right to appearance must
ex facie
the summons contain a statement that the attorney has
a right of appearance. There is not such a directive in this Court
and the
directive issued in the
Fortune
matter is not
applicable to this Court. If the attorney signed the summons, then
there was compliance with Rule 18. Condonation
is not required, but
as an aside, a court has a discretion to condone the non-compliance
with Rule 18 as found in
Plascon-Evans supra
and
Minister
van Wet en Orde v Molaolwa
1986 (3) SA 900
(NC).
FDA’s
non-compliance with Rule 41A
[19]
This ground for the Rule 30 was abandoned by counsel and requires no
address.
Did FDA fail to comply
with the provisions of s3(1) of the Institution of Proceedings
Against Certain organs of State Act 40 0f
2002 [the Act]?
[20]
This Act requires notice to be given to an “organ of state”.
On behalf
of SITA it was submitted that SITA is a state-owned company
established and incorporated in terms of section 2 and 3 of the State
Information Technology Act 88 of 1998 [the SITA Act].
In terms of section 17 of
the SITA Act, the State is the sole
shareholder of SITA where the Minister, on behalf of the State,
exercises such rights attached
to the State as a shareholder. SITA is
a state-owned company established and incorporated in terms of
section 2 and 3 of the State
Information Technology Act 88 of 1998
[the SITA Act]. Furthermore, in terms of section 17 of the SITA
Act, the State is the
sole shareholder of SITA where the Minister, on
behalf of the State, exercises such rights attached to the State as a
shareholder.
In acting as an agent of the South African Government
SITA clearly exercises power or performs functions in terms of the
Constitution.
[21]
Section 4(2) of the Act required FDA to take all reasonable steps to
ensure the notice
was received and that a certified copy of the
notice was delivered together with an affidavit from the person who
transmitted the
notice by electronic email. It was argued that FDA
had not done this. The Sheriff’s return of service, so it was
argued,
does no more than state that the sheriff served the notice on
the company secretary and the company secretary informed the Sheriff
that “she is going to e-mail this letter to their Legal
Department in Centurion”. This it was submitted did not serve
as notice in accordance with the Act.
[22]
The Ministers of Police and Telecommunications and Postal Services
were also cited
as defendants but no relief were sought against them
as nominal defendants. No notices in terms of the Act were sent to
these defendants.
SITA contended that the institution of the main
action without giving the Ministers notice in terms of
section 3 of
the Act, constitutes a nullity and an irregular step
because a peremptory jurisdictional pre-condition was flouted.
[23]
SITA defended its bringing of this complaint under Rule 30 instead of
by means of
special plea. It argued that although it has been stated
that Rule 30 applies only to irregularities of form and not to
matters
of substance, this was an oversimplification and it could be
applied to this irregularity.
[24]
On behalf of the FDA it was submitted that this irregularity
complained of cannot be brought
by means of Rule 30, but must be
brought by means of special plea. But, in any event, FDA did not have
to comply with the Act because
SITA is not an organ of state. It was
argued that this is so because SITA’s powers and or functions
only flow from the SITA
Act. The SITA Act was not enacted in the
execution of any provision of the Constitution. The Act does not
apply to all organs of
state, only those exercising a power or
performing a function directly from the Constitution. The fact
that FDA did send
a letter of demand to SITA is a neutral factor.
[25]
The argument that Rule 30 is not the appropriate step for this
complaint is upheld. This complaint
of non-compliance with the Act
cannot be brought by means of Rule 30. Non-compliance with the Act is
to be raised by a special
plea exactly because it is matter of
substance; a jurisdictional pre-requisite before summons can be
issued. Counsel for SITA will
be well aware that special pleas of
exactly this nature are dealt with regularly by means of special plea
in this Court.
[4]
[26] Having said that,
for this complaint not to rear its head again, I find that no
compliance with the Act was required. SITA
is not an organ of state
as it does not exercise a power or perform a function directly from
the Constitution; the purpose of the
SITA Act clearly dispels any
conclusion that it was enacted pursuant to or in the execution of any
provision of the Constitution.
As for the nominal defendants’
no “debt” is claimed from them, no remedy is sought
against them and the Act need
not to have been complied with.
Does the summons and
POC comply with Rule 18(10)?
[27]
Rule 18(10) provides as follows:
“
A plaintiff suing
for damages shall set them out in such manner as will enable the
defendant reasonably to assess the quantum thereof
…”
[28]
In its POC FDA alleged that as a consequence of SITA’s breach,
it
suffered damages in the form of loss profits in the
amount of R95 million, calculated based on estimated gross revenue
for the
period May 2018 to 30 November 2019, less estimated
costs of performance. On behalf of SITA it was submitted that this
paragraph
provides no particularity or a manner that puts SITA in a
position to reasonably assess the quantum of the damages. FDA did not
utilize the 10 days afforded it to cure this lacuna and cannot now
ask the court for a further 10 days to do so.
[29]
On behalf of FDA it was submitted that the fact that there was
reference to claims for only “successfully
completed services”
would indicate a calculation of the remuneration that FDA would have
earned over that period thus providing
some clarity. But, even if the
quantum of damages did not comply with Rule 18(10), the POC is not a
nullity, only excipiable.
[30]
I agree with the submissions on behalf of SITA. The POC does not set
out the quantum of damages
in a manner that SITA can reasonably
assess the quantum thereof and does not comply with Rule 18(10). In
terms of Rule 30(3) a
Court has a discretion to set aside or grant
leave to amend or make such order as it deems fit. I grant FDA 10
days from the date
of judgment to amend the POC in order to comply
with Rule 18(10).
The Rule 30
application to set aside the notice of bar.
[31]
In view of the finding that FDA must amend its POC the notice of bar
must be set aside. I therefore
find it unnecessary to deal with any
of the arguments presented, except in relation to the costs of this
application.
Costs
[32]
SITA’s application for condonation for the late delivery of the
First Rule 30 is granted.
It sought the indulgence and it is to carry
the costs for the condonation application.
[33]
FDA’s condonation for the late delivery of the replying
affidavit in the counter-application
is granted. It seeks an
indulgence and it must carry the costs for the condonation
application.
[34]
No cost order is made pertaining to the striking out application.
[35]
The first Rule 30 application is granted only pertaining to the
irregularity of non-compliance
with Rule 18(10). FDA is granted 10
days from the date of judgment to amend the POC. Although SITA is not
substantially successful,
only one of the complained irregularities
had any merits, the irregularity complained of and found to exist
[Rule 18(10)] did cause
prejudice to SITA as to how to plead and
therefore I will award costs of this Rule 30 to SITA.
[36]
The same fate befalls FDA as to the second Rule 30. In view of it
having to amend its POC the
notice of bar must be set aside and there
is no reason not to award costs to the successful party.
[37]
The nature of this matter only required one counsel. Costs will
be granted for one counsel
only. No order as to costs for the
counter-application of FDA is made.
[38]
I accordingly make the following order:
38.1
The Rule 30 application is granted with costs on the basis that the
particulars of claim do not comply with
Rule 18(10). Costs of one
counsel.
38.2
The Rule 30 application is granted with costs and the notice of bar
is set aside as an irregular step.
Costs of one counsel.
S.
POTTERILL
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
CASE NO:
19130/2021
HEARD ON:
17 July 2023
FOR THE APPLICANT:
ADV. A.R. BHANA SC
ADV. A.W.T. ROWAN
INSTRUCTED BY:
Fasken
(Incorporated in South Africa as Bell Dewar Inc)
c/o Savage Jooste &
Adams
FOR THE RESPONDENT:
ADV. R. MICHAU SC
ADV. C.A.C. KORF
INSTRUCTED BY:
Charle Rossouw
Attorneys
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
8 September 2023
[1]
Beinash
v Wixley
[1997] ZASCA 32
;
1997
(3) SA 721
(SCA) at 734F-G
[2]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
1984
(3) SA 623 (A)
[3]
Wightman
t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
(SCA) par [12]
[4]
Cochrane
v City of Johannesburg
2011
(1) SA 553
(GSJ) par [19]
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
South African Legal Practice Council v Masingi (2023/077988) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1158 (13 September 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1158High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
South African Legal Practice Council v Sebueng (18628/2022) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1167 (15 September 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1167High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
South African Legal Practice Council v Mokgobi (13023/2020) [2023] ZAGPPHC 22 (20 January 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 22High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
South African Legal Practice Council v Molati and Another (2023-038247) [2023] ZAGPPHC 578 (9 June 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 578High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar
South African Legal Practice Council v Langa and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 397; 79330/2018 (31 March 2023)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 397High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)99% similar