Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1862South Africa
Muleya v Minister of Police and Another (20788/20) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1862 (26 October 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
26 October 2023
Headnotes
SUMMARY:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Muleya v Minister of Police and Another (20788/20) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1862 (26 October 2023)
Muleya v Minister of Police and Another (20788/20) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1862 (26 October 2023)
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sino date 26 October 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 20788/20
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES /
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES /
NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES
DATE
26/10/2023
In
the matter between:-
LUDWICK
MATUDZI MULEYA
Plaintiff
VS
MINISTER
OF POLICE
First
Defendant
DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTION
Second
Defendant
Coram:
Kooverjie
J
Heard
on
:
11-13
October 2023
Delivered:
SUMMARY:
26
October 2023 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email,
by being
uploaded to the
Caselines
system of the GD and
by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed
to be 15h00 on 26 October
2023.
Police
officials in arresting and detaining persons should exercise
their discretion within the bounds of rationality.
ORDER
It
is ordered:-
1.
The claim for unlawful arrest is dismissed.
2.
The claim for unlawful detention is upheld.
3.
The claim for assault is dismissed.
4.
The respondents are ordered to pay the costs on a party-and-party
scale, which includes the costs of one counsel.
JUDGMENT
KOOVERJIE
J
[1]
In these action proceedings the plaintiff has instituted a claim for
damages claiming that his arrest and detention was
unlawful. He
further claimed that he was assaulted by members of the South African
Police Services (“SAPS”). He holds
the defendants liable
on the basis that the SAPS officials committed unlawful acts in the
execution of their duties in the course
of their employment.
[2]
The parties have agreed to separate merits and quantum. This court is
therefore only required to adjudicate on the merits.
The issue of
quantum is postponed
sine die
.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[3]
This court is required to determine:
3.1
whether the plaintiff’s arrest was lawful;
3.2
whether the plaintiff’s detention was lawful; and
3.2
whether the plaintiff was assaulted by members of the SAPS.
THE
PLEADINGS
[4]
The plaintiff pleads in his particulars of claim the following: \
“
5.1
On the 8
th
day of April 2017 at approximately 21h00 and at Soshanguve
Police Station the plaintiff was arrested, detained and assaulted
by
unknown members of the Soshanguve Police Station in official
clothing. The plaintiff was detained at Soshanguve SAPS and was
then
taken by the unknown officers to the Soshanguve clinic … on
the 9
th
of April 2017 to treat his injuries. The plaintiff was brought
before the court on the 10
th
of April 2017 whereafter the prosecutor released him on a fixed bail.
5.2
The plaintiff was arrested without a warrant.
5.3
The arrest was made without any reasonable suspicion and was mala
fide in that the arresting officers abused their
powers.
5.4
The plaintiff was assaulted by the abovementioned officers as they
used their hands/fists on the plaintiff in such
a manner that he lost
his consciousness and obtained critical injuries to his one eye and
bodily damages.
5.5
The plaintiff was subsequently arrested and detained at Soshanguve
Police Station SAPS”
[5]
In their amended plea, the defendants’ defence is premised on
Section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. The
following was
pleaded:
“
10.1
The Plaintiff was arrested for crimen injuria, reckless and negligent
driving, resisting arrest and assault.
The Plaintiff’s arrest
and detention were lawful in terms of Section 40(1)(a) of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 on
the following grounds:
10.1.1
The arresting officer was a peace officer as defined in Act 51 of
1977.
10.1.2
The Plaintiff committed the offences he was arrested for in the
presence of the peace officer.
10.1.3
The member of the first Defendant had a reasonable suspicion of
having committed offences of crimen injuria,
reckless and negligent
driving, resisting arrest and assault based on the factors that were
before him at the time of the arrest.
10.1.4
The member of the first Defendant exercised its discretion properly
under the circumstances.
10.1.5
On the basis of the reasonable suspicion and factors before the
member of the first Defendant at the time of
the arrest and in
accordance with section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, the
Defendant’s member was entitled to
effect an arrest of the
Plaintiff, without a warrant of arrest.
10.1.6
The Plaintiff resisted arrest and the assault of the members of the
first Defendant in the process. The Plaintiff
could not be arrested
without the use of reasonable necessary force, the Plaintiff was
restrained. The Plaintiff tried to run but
he fell. The members of
the first Defendant used reasonably necessary force to effect the
arrest but did not assault the plaintiff.
10.1.7
The Defendant’s members in acting as aforesaid followed proper
arrest procedure and acted within the confines
of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.
10.1.7
The first Defendant pleads further that the plaintiff was lawfully
detained on the 6
th
of April until his release …”
THE
PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY
[6]
The plaintiff, Mr Muleya, testified that on 8 April 2017 and around
21h00, he was travelling from Mabopane Station going
to his house in
Soshanguve. Whilst driving, he stopped at the robot and after passing
the robot he saw police officers on the left
side of the road, busy
with the driver of the vehicle they had stopped.
[7]
After passing them he noticed that the police officers switched on
their blue lights and started following him in their
motor vehicle.
He noted that their motor vehicle was marked as a SAPS vehicle. He
explained he did not stop as he feared for his
safety as he believed
that the individuals following him pretended to be SAPS officials.
According to him, it is a well-known fact
that perpetrators,
pretending to be law enforcement officers, commit various crimes,
particularly after dark. It is for this reason
that he drove straight
to the police station and stopped.
[8]
He testified that whilst still in his car, one of the police
officers, a white male, dragged him out of the vehicle and
punched
him on the right eye., which caused him to pass out. He only regained
consciousness whilst in the police cells. He spent
two days in the
cell and was only released on Monday.
[9]
Under cross-examination, he persisted with his testimony that he did
not stop for the police that night as he feared for
his safety.
Reference was made to his statement (which he deposed to shortly
after his arrest). He was questioned as to why he
did not set out his
reasons for not stopping when the police were chasing him. It was put
to him that his version was a fabrication
and thus untrue.
[10]
He further denied the following under cross examination, namely:
skipping a red traffic light, and driving recklessly and/or
negligently, insulting, assaulting the police officials and resisting
arrest, trying to escape when the SAPS officials were in
the process
of handcuffing him and that he was not pulled out of his motor
vehicle.
THE
DEFENDANTS’ TESTIMONY
[11]
On behalf of the defendants, the two police officials, “Kilian”
and “Sithole”, who were involved in
the incident,
testified. At the time both of them were constables. They have since
been promoted as sergeants.
Kilian’s
testimony
[12]
Sergeant Kilian explained that he was assigned to do vehicle checks
with Constable Sithole on 8 April 2017. Around 21h00 he
saw a white
Quantum taxi skipping a red traffic light and almost knocking a
pedestrian. They cautioned the plaintiff to stop. Since
the plaintiff
refused to stop, they followed him in their vehicle with the blue
lights switched on.
[13]
He explained that thereafter the plaintiff was driving recklessly and
did not proceed directly to the police station. Instead
he went in
another direction, skipping stop signs thus endangering other road
users. Kilian was driving whilst Sithole was calling
for backup from
other police officers performing crime prevention duties in the area.
The plaintiff was eventually cornered near
the police station by
another SAPS vehicle.
[14]
When he could go no further, Kilian testified that Sithole approached
the plaintiff at the driver’s side and that Kilian
was behind
him. The plaintiff got out of the vehicle and was aggressive towards
Sithole. Sithole and the plaintiff got into a scuffle.
Kilian then
intervened. In this process, the plaintiff slapped him and scratched
his arm. They eventually managed to hold the plaintiff
with both
hands, and attempted to cuff him. The plaintiff, however, freed
himself from their grip and attempted to flee. It was
at this point
that Sithole tripped the plaintiff, causing him to fall with his face
down. Kilian explained that this is a technique
where they use
minimum force in order to arrest persons. The plaintiff was then
handcuffed and arrested.
[15]
Kilian further testified that after apprehending the plaintiff, he
called the paramedics. They found the injuries to be superficial
and
did not treat him. Kilian further testified that the plaintiff was
arrested on charges for reckless and negligent driving,
crimen
injuria
, assault (on constable Kilian) and resisting arrest.
[16]
Under cross examination, Kilian affirmed that the charges against the
plaintiff were serious and the plaintiff was justifiably
arrested.
The reason for the arrest was to secure the plaintiff’s
attendance at court, and as an arresting officer he had
carried out
his duties lawfully.
[17]
Further under cross examination it was posed to him that a less
severe means could have been employed to ensure that the plaintiff
was brought to court. Hence the arrest was not justified. He also
testified that tripping the plaintiff did not constitute an assault,
and particularly as no force was used. He further persisted with his
version that Sithole had requested the plaintiff to get out
of his
motor vehicle.
Sergeant
Sithole’s testimony
[18]
Sergeant Sithole’s evidence was aligned to Kilian’s
testimony. He testified that, at the time, he was assigned
with
Constable Kilian on Aubrey Matlala Road, in Soshanguve to conduct
crime and prevention duties at the vehicle checkpoint.
[19]
He further corroborated Kilian’s version that they followed the
plaintiff with their police vehicle, that the plaintiff
drove
recklessly and they continued following the plaintiff until he was
cornered at the police station. He also testified that
the plaintiff
did not stop at the premises but outside of the police station.
[20]
He confirmed that both him and Kilian initially managed to hold the
plaintiff’s hands but before they could place the
cuffs the
plaintiff freed himself from their grip and attempted to run away.
Sithole tripped the plaintiff. This caused him to
fall on his face,
thereby injuring himself. He confirmed that the paramedics had not
treated the plaintiff. He also mentioned that
the plaintiff was
verbally abusive to both him and more specifically Kilian by making
disparaging racist remarks. He however conceded
that Kilian was
slapped and slightly scratched on his forearm.
[21]
Under cross examination Sithole was also questioned as to whether
there were less severe methods that they could have taken
to secure
the plaintiffs presence in court. It was put to him that a charge for
reckless and negligent driving did not warrant
an arrest and
detention. Sithole testified that the arrest was appropriate as the
plaintiff’s driving could have p[laced
other peoples’
lives in danger.
[22]
Regarding his testimony that he was also assaulted by the plaintiff,
he was questioned as to why he had not laid a charge for
assault
against the plaintiff like Kilian had. Sithole merely answered that
he did not do so.
[23]
Under cross examination, the plaintiff highlighted discrepancies that
emanated from their testimonies, namely: that Kilian
only testified
that he was assaulted and not Sithole; and further why the visit from
the paramedics was not recorded in any statement.
In this regard,
Sithole testified that although same was not recorded in the
‘Occurrence Book’, it could have been
recorded in his
pocket book. His response eventually was that he was unable to
remember since it was an incident that occurred
a long time ago.
[24]
He further persisted with his version that the charges against the
plaintiff were serious and that there was no other method
that he was
aware of securing the plaintiff’s attendance at court. Sithole
further explained that tripping the plaintiff
in order to effect the
arrest did not constitute assault. The plaintiff sustained injuries
due to him falling on his face.
[25]
Insofar as informing the plaintiff his constitutional rights, he
testified that this was complied with. However the plaintiff
refused
to sign the said form. When the plaintiff’s version was put to
him that such form was never given to him to sign,
he denied that
this was the case. It was again put to him that the offences for
which the plaintiff was charged, did not justify
his arrest. In fact,
an alternative method could have been imposed on him to secure his
presence at court.
ANALYSIS
Legal
principles: Arrest
[26]
It is trite that the onus is on the defendant to prove on a balance
of probabilities that the arrest was lawful. In
Hurley
the
court said
[1]
:
“
An
arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of an individual
concerned, and it therefore seems fair and just to require
that the
person who arrested or caused the arrest of another person should
bear the onus of proving that his action was justified
in law.”
[27]
Section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a peace
officer may arrest without a warrant any person who commits
or
attempts to commit any offence in his presence. The jurisdictional
facts necessary for the arrest under Section 40(1)(a) are
the
following:
27.1
The arrestor must be a peace officer;
27.2
an offence must have been committed or there must have been an
attempt to commit an offence;
27.3
the offence or attempted offence must have been committed in his or
her presence.
[28]
In order to determine if the arrest was justified, it is settled law
that the test is objective. In
Scheepers
[2]
,
our courts have stated that:
“
A
police officer may without a warrant arrest any person who commits or
attempts to commit any offence in his presence. In the circumstances,
the issue for determination under this provision requires that there
must be existence of a particular factual situation before
the peace
officer’s power to arrest without a warrant can come into
existence. If the circumstances exist, the arrest can
be made. If
they do not exist the peace officer has no right to embark upon
arrest. Therefore good faith or reasonable mistake
does not help. For
peace officers to arrest in terms of the aforesaid section, they must
first be clear that the action precipitating
the arrest is indeed an
offence. The arresting officer therefore needs to have personal
knowledge of the conduct of the arrested
person and the facts on
which the arrest is based.”
[29]
In this instance, the plaintiff was arrested for the offences of
crimen injuria
, reckless and negligent driving, resisting
arrest and assault. All of the above acts were committed in their
presence. He was,
however, not prosecuted on the said charges. The
fact that the arrested person was thereafter not prosecuted or later
acquitted
does not make the arrest unlawful.
[30]
It cannot be disputed that the jurisdictional requirements in terms
of Section 40(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act were
met. Both
testified that they were peace officers, secondly that the offence
was committed in their presence.
[31]
Once the jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, the peace officer
has a discretion whether to exercise his powers of arrest,
whether
the person should be released and under what conditions, arises at a
later stage. The party who alleges that the discretion
was not
properly exercised, even though the jurisdictional facts are present,
bears the onus of showing that such discretion was
unlawful.
[32]
In my assessment, I am required to make findings on the credibility,
the reliability of the witnesses and the probability of
their
versions.
[3]
[33]
It is evident that the versions of both parties are conflicting. The
court in
National Employers General Insurance Co Ltd v Jagers
1984 (4) SA 437
(E) at 440E - 441A said:
“…
where there are two
mutually destructive stories,
he can only succeed if he
satisfies the court on a preponderance of probabilities that his
version is true and accurate and therefore
acceptable, and that the
other version advanced by the defendant is therefore false or
mistaken and falls to be rejected
. In deciding whether
that evidence is true or not the court will weigh up and
test
the plaintiff’s allegations against the general probabilities
.
The estimate of the
credibility of a witness will therefore
be inextricably bound up with a consideration of the probabilities of
the case and, if the
balance of
probabilities
favours the plaintiff, then the Court will accept his version as
being probably true
. If, however, the probabilities are
evenly balanced in the sense that they do not favour the plaintiff’s
case any more than
they do the defendant’s, the plaintiff can
only succeed if
the Court nevertheless believes him and is
satisfied that his evidence is true, and that the defendant’s
version is false
.”
(My emphasis)
[34]
Having considered the evidence of both parties, I am of the view that
the plaintiff’s version of the events that night
is probably
not true. In respect of the events that transpired on that particular
night, Kilian’s version was corroborated
by Sithole. They
testified due to the plaintiff’s failure to stop at the robot,
he was charged for reckless and negligent
driving.
[35]
I find it prudent to highlight the approach endorsed by our courts
pertaining to the officials’ discretion. The court
in
Sekhoto
[4]
reaffirmed the approach in
Duncan
v Minister of Law and Order
,
namely that the discretion of the peace officer must be properly
exercised.
Sekhoto
is
further authority for the following propositions:
35.1
if the officer exercises the discretion to arrest knowingly for
purposes not contemplated by the Legislator, the
arrest will be
unlawful. The decision to arrest must be made to bring the arrested
person to justice. Hence arrest for an ulterior
purpose, particularly
to threaten or harass the suspect or in instances where the arrestor
knows that the State would not prosecute
are examples of such
ulterior motive;
35.2
further the arrest must be exercised in an objective, and rational
manner. The court pointed out that the standard
of rationality is not
breached because an officer exercises the discretion in a manner that
a court does not deem it to be optimal;
[5]
35.3
the discretion to arrest must be exercised with regard for the limits
of the particular statute read together with
the prescripts of our
Constitution.Therefore upon an arrest has been effected, an officer
must bring the arrestee before
a court. Once this is done, the
authority to detain that is inherent in the power to arrest has been
exhausted. Ultimately the
purpose of the arrest is to bring the
suspect to trial. The arrestor is not required to determine whether
the suspect ought to
be detained pending a trial;
35.4
the court further remarked that where serious crimes were committed,
an arrest would be justified and in a matter
where the offence is
trivial, it would be irrational to arrest.
[6]
[36]
In
Sekhoto
,
the court held that the rationality test should not be applied
strictly. The court remarked that peace officers are entitled to
exercise their discretion as they see fit, provided that they stay
within the bounds of rationality. The standard is not breached
because an officer exercises the discretion in a manner other than
that deemed optimal by the court. A number of choices may be
open to
him, all of which may fall within the range of rationality. The
standard is not perfection, or even the optimum, judged
for the
vantage of hindsight. As long as the discretion is exercised within
this range, the standard is not breached.
[7]
[37]
The plaintiff contended that his arrest was unlawful, more
particularly as the offences for which he was charged were not of
a
serious nature. On the contrary, the defence testified that they were
serious and the arrest was justified.
[38]
In being guided by the principles enunciated in
Sekhoto
,
I am of the view that the arrest was lawful. The evidence reflects
the particular circumstances under which the arrest took place.
In
summary, the plaintiff was aggressive. He was not only physically but
verbally abusive as well. He refused to stop when cautioned
to do so,
he drove away from the police officials and even attempted to flee
when he was to be arrested. The officials were left
with little
option but to arrest him. Even though the offences that he was
charged for may not have been serious, I take cognisance
of the
circumstances the police officials found themselves in. From the time
the plaintiff spotted the police, he not only failed
to stop but
resisted his apprehension. It may not have been the optimal choice at
the time, but I find that their decision to arrest
was rational.
DETENTION
[39]
The defendant pleaded that the plaintiff was lawfully detained until
his release. The enquiry into whether the detention was
lawful or
not, constitutes a separate enquiry from that of the arrest. In
Mvu
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
[8]
the court emphasized:
“
A
claim is based, not only on alleged unlawful assault, but also upon
alleged unlawful detention. That there is an important distinction
between the two is, in my respectful opinion, not properly understood
by many – and it is not only police officers who have
erred in
this regard. Both the power to arrest and the power to detain an
arrestee at the police station after an arrest are statutory
authorities expressly granted. A police officer, insofar as detention
is concerned, is required again to apply his or her mind
to the
circumstances relating to the person’s detention and to
consider whether the detention is necessary or not.”
[40]
It is settled law that police officers have the power to detain an
arrestee at the police station after an arrest. The issue
for
determination is whether such detention was justified. It was argued
that the police officials failed to apply their minds
in detaining
the plaintiff in the police cells. Police officials hold a legal duty
not to unduly and unlawfully inhibit a person’s
right of
freedom. It is common cause that the plaintiff was detained from 8 to
10 April 2017.
[41]
It is further common cause that Kilian and Sithole were not stationed
at the Soshanguve Police Station. I am in agreement with
the
plaintiff that it remained the duty of the SAPS officials stationed
at the SAPS station to apply their minds as to whether
the detention
was justified. It was argued that the officials who took over from
Kilian and Sithole were required to consider the
circumstances that
led to the plaintiff’s arrest, namely that he refused to stop
as he feared for his safety.
[42]
Again the general principle approved by our authorities is that a
police officer is required to apply his or her mind to the
circumstances relating to a person’s detention. An enquiry has
to be made whether the detention was necessary at all.
[9]
[43]
I have noted from the “Statement Regarding The Interview With
The Suspect”, recorded the day after the arrest,
that is 9
April 2017 at 15h00, that the plaintiff was not willing to divulge
anything to the officer assigned to take his statement.
Therein the
plaintiff agreed to make a statement. He opted to do so for the
court. As a result the officer was not privy to circumstances
that
led to the arrest at the time.
[44]
Even though the officer was not made aware of the said circumstances,
I find that it was still necessary for him to apply his
mind
independently from the officials who arrested the plaintiff. He
should have had regard to the offences that he was charged
for, and
found that detention was not justified. Such offences did not warrant
imprisonment. A lesser invasive manner could have
been imposed in
order to secure the plaintiff’s attendance at court. The
plaintiff could have been released and reprimanded
to appear in
court. In the premises, the detention was unlawful.
ASSAULT
[45]
The police officials persisted with their versions that they had not
assaulted the plaintiff and neither was it their intention
to do so.
[46]
Counsel for the defendants argued that in terms of Section 49(2) of
the Criminal Procedure Act, reasonable force can be used
in order to
effect the arrest. Section 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act
provides:
“
(2)
If any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists
the attempt, or flees, when it is clear that
an attempt to arrest him
or her is being made, and the suspect cannot be arrested without the
use of force, the arrestor may, in
order to effect the arrest, use
such force as may be reasonably necessary and proportional in the
circumstances to overcome the
resistance or to prevent the suspect
from fleeing …”
[47]
In
Matlou
[10]
the court recognized as one of the grounds for a successful defence
is when the person resists an arrest or has taken flight.
[48]
I find the version of the defendants on the balance of probabilities
as being probably true, namely the explanation that the
police
officials were required to use minimum force to apprehend the
plaintiff. The injury was caused due to the plaintiff falling
after
being tripped. The force therefore used in the circumstances was
necessary and reasonable.
[49]
Having regard to the evidence before me, I find that there was no
intention to assault the plaintiff at the time. The version
of the
defendants, particularly Kilian’s version is corroborated by
Sithole, namely that the plaintiff had resisted the arrest
and
attempted to run away. I find the version that Sithole tripped him in
order to stop him to be probable. The plaintiff’s
allegation
that he was physically assaulted and as recorded in the J88 should be
considered in context. The information set out
in the J88 was
obtained from the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
[50]
In summary, I find the following:
50.1
the arrest was not unlawful;
50.2
the detention was unlawful;
50.3
the claim for assault cannot succeed. In my view the elements for
assault, namely the intention proviso has
not been proved.
COSTS
OF TWO COUNSEL
[51]
On the issue of costs, I am required to exercise my judicial
discretion. The plaintiff has succeeded in the claim for unlawful
detention. The plaintiff seeks costs of two counsel. I am of the view
that the evidence and pleadings were not voluminous, the
issues for
determination was relatively straight forward and the legal
principles involved have been entrenched by our courts over
time.
[52]
In the premises, I do not deem it justified to award costs of two
counsel. Costs should therefore be awarded for costs of one
counsel.
H
KOOVERJIE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
:
Counsel
for the Plaintiff: Adv.
H Mpe
Adv. J Makhene
Instructed
by: Gildenhuys
Malatji Inc.
Counsel
for the Defenda
nt
:
Adv.
ST Pilusa
Instructed
by: The
Office of the State Attorney
Date
heard: 11-13
October 2023
Date
of Judgment: 26
October 2023
[1]
Minister
of Law and Order v Hurley1986 (3) SA 568A at 589E-F (“Hurley”)
[2]
Scheepers
v Minister of Safety and Security
2015 (1) SACR 284
ECG at paragraph
[17] and [18]
[3]
T
he
Supreme Court of Appeal in the seminal judgment in
Stellenbosch
Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd and another v Martell et Cie and
others
2003
(1) SA 11
(SCA) at 14J - 15E, set out on how to approach such a
situation. It was stated:
“
To
come to a conclusion on the disputed issues the court must make
findings on (a) the credibility of the various factual witnesses;
(b) their
reliability
; and (c) the
probabilities
. As to (a), the court’s
finding on the credibility of a particular witness will depend on
its impression of the veracity
of the witness. That in turn will
depend on a variety of subsidiary factors, not necessarily in order
of importance, such as
(i) the witness’ candour and demeanour
in the witness box, (ii)
his bias, latent
and
blatant, (iii) internal contradictions in his evidence, (iv)
external contradictions
with what was pleaded
or put on his behalf, or with established fact or with his own extra
curial statements or actions, (v)
the
probability or
improbability of particular aspects of his version
,
(vi) the calibre and cogency of his performance compared to that of
other witnesses testifying about the same incident or events.
As to
(b), a witness’ reliability will depend, apart from the
factors mentioned under (a) (ii), (iv) and (v) above, on
(i) the
opportunities he had to experience or observe the event
in question and (ii) the
quality, integrity and
independence of his recall
thereof. As to (c),
this necessitates an analysis and evaluation of the probability or
improbability of each party’s version
on each of the disputed
issues. In the light of its assessment of (a), (b) and (c) the
court will then, as a final step, determine
whether the party
burdened with the onus of proof has succeeded in discharging it…
But when all factors are equiposed
probabilities prevail
”
. (My emphasis)
[4]
Minister
of Safety and Security v Sekhoto
2011 (1) SACR 315
(SCA) paragraph
[29]
[5]
Paragraphs
[32] to [39] of Sekhoto
[6]
Paragraphs
[4.2] to [4.4]
[7]
Paragraph
[39] of Sekhoto
[8]
Mvu
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
2009 (6) SA 82
(GSJ)
paragraph [9]
[9]
Mvu
v Minister of Safety and Security supra
[10]
Matlou
v Makhubedu
1978 (1) SA 946A
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