Case Law[2023] ZAGPPHC 1903South Africa
Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC v South African National Roads Agency Ltd and Others (32095/2020) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1903 (14 November 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
14 November 2023
Headnotes
by the State and any information that is held by another person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights.”.[6] The present application is not a review of the refusal by SANRAL to furnish OUTA with the documents that it requested but
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC v South African National Roads Agency Ltd and Others (32095/2020) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1903 (14 November 2023)
Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse NPC v South African National Roads Agency Ltd and Others (32095/2020) [2023] ZAGPPHC 1903 (14 November 2023)
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sino date 14 November 2023
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)
Case No. 32095/2020
(1) REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3) REVISED: NO
DATE: 14 November
2023
SIGNATURE:.
In
the matter between:
ORGANISATION
UNDOING TAX ABUSE NPC
APPLICANT
And
SOUTH
AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY LTD
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ALLI,
NAZIR
THIRD
RESPONDENT
MOTAUNG,
DANIEL
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
MACOZOMA,
SKHUMBUZO N.O
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
N3
TOLL CONCESSION (RF) (PTY) LTD
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
Coram:
Millar
J
Heard
on
:
10
October 2023
Delivered:
14
November 2023 - This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the parties' representatives by email, by
being
uploaded to the
CaseLines
system of the GD and by
release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be
09H00 on 14 November 2023.
JUDGMENT
MILLAR J
[1]
This is an application in which the
applicant (OUTA) seeks an order against the first respondent (SANRAL)
to furnish certain information
(in documentary form) said to be in
its possession or under its control, to it. The sixth respondent
(N3TC) intervened in the application
and opposed the furnishing of
certain of the documents.
[2]
OUTA
describes itself as a “
proudly
South African non-profit civil action organisation, comprising of and
supported by people who are passionate about improving
the prosperity
of our nation. OUTA was established to challenge the abuse of
authority, in particular the abuse of taxpayers’
money.”
[1]
[3]
SANRAL
is the state-owned entity established in terms of the South African
National Roads Agency Limited and National Roads Act.
[2]
It is
inter
alia “responsible for, and is hereby given power to perform,
all strategic planning with regard to the South African
national
roads system, as well as the planning, design, construction,
operation, management, control, maintenance and rehabilitation
of
national roads for the Republic, . . .”.
[3]
[4]
N3TC is a private company with whom SANRAL
contracted, and which has over the last 24 years to attend to
inter
alia
the construction, operation,
management and control of a section of the N3 highway. The
information which OUTA has requested
from SANRAL, all relates to the
contract between SANRAL and N3TC.
THIS
APPLICATION
[5]
The
present proceedings are brought by OUTA in terms of the Promotion of
Access to Information Act
[4]
(PAIA) for access
[5]
to copies of documents relating to a tender awarded to N3TC for the
construction and management of a portion of the N3 highway
between
Heidelberg South in Gauteng and Cedara in KwaZulu Natal. Included in
this construction and management is also the collection
of tolls at
various points from users of the road concerned.
[6]
The application is brought by OUTA against
SANRAL. While SANRAL is a public body in terms of PAIA, N3TC is not.
It is a private
company.
[7]
PAIA
is the means whereby effect is given to “
the
constitutional right to access information held by the State and any
information that is held by another person and that is
required for
the exercise or protection of any rights.
”.
[6]
The present application is not a review of the refusal by
SANRAL to furnish OUTA with the documents that it requested but
rather a reconsideration
de
novo
of the request.
[7]
The reconsideration of the request is not limited to what was before
SANRAL at the time that the request was made but must
now be
undertaken on what is presently before the Court.
[8]
[8]
It is not in issue between the parties that
at least insofar as OUTA and SANRAL are concerned, OUTA is entitled
to request access
to information in terms of PAIA. In issue between
the parties is whether all the information which has been requested
should be
furnished. There is no dispute in respect of certain of the
information which SANRAL has agreed to provide and had already
provided
by the time this application was heard.
[9]
Initially, OUTA sought an order in two
parts – Part A and Part B, in the following terms:
“
PART
A
1.
A copy of The Concession Contract
No. SAPR N0304102/1, for a portion of National Route 3 from Cedara in
Kwazulu-Natal to Heidelberg
South interchange in Gauteng as a toll
Highway (hereinafter referred to as the N3TC Concession Contract)
duly signed on the 27
th
of May 1999;
2.
A copy of all
Annexures
and Addenda
to the N3TC
Concession Contract;
3.
A copy of all
Amendments
and Addenda
(if any) to the N3TC
Concession Contract;
4.
A copy of all Operation and
Maintenance contracts entered into between the Concessionaire and the
O&M Contractors, relating
to the N3TC Concession Contract;
5.
A copy of the Operational and
Maintenance Manual pertaining to the N3TC Concession Contract;
6.
A copy of the contracts entered into
with the Independent Engineer(s), pertaining to the N3TC Concession
Contract, as specifically
stipulated in clause 6.1;
7.
A copy of all the Independent
Engineer(s) Reports submitted to SANRAL, pertaining to the N3TC
Concession Contract;
8.
A copy of all Construction Work
contracts entered into by the Concessionaire relating to the N3TC
Concession Contract, as set out
in Clause 8.5.2;
9.
A copy of all “Performance
Certificates” issued, relating to the Construction Works
contracts entered into by the Concessionaire
(as referred to in item
8, above);
10.
A copy of all “Taking Over
certificates” that have been issued in terms of the N3TC
Concession Contract, as set out
in Clause 9.2;
PART B
1.
Copies of N3TC’s complete
financial statements for each fiscal year, submitted to SANRAL in
terms of the N3TC Concession Contract
(as from 1999/2000 financial
year to present) as specified in Clause 16.3.1(a);
2.
Copies of all reconciliations of
N3TC’s Profit & Loss Accounts, together with their proposed
budgets for each fiscal year,
submitted to SANRAL, from 1999/2000
fiscal year to present in terms of the N3TC Concession Contract, with
specific reference to
Clause 16.3.1(d);
3.
Copies of all Annual Reports
submitted to SANRAL, pertaining to the N3TC Concession Contract (as
from the 1999/2000 financial year
to present), issued by the N3TC’s
appointed auditors, certifying that the computation of the Highway
Usage Fee for the previous
year was correctly calculated, as
specified in Clause 16.3.1(e);
4.
Copies of the lists, submitted to
SANRAL in terms of the N3TC Concession Contract (as from 1999 to
present), of N3TC’s lenders
and creditors to which N3TC owns a
sum in excess of the equivalent of R10 000 000 (ten million
Rand), including the amounts
due to each of them, as stipulated in
Clause 16.3.2(c);”
[10]
Initially, the information sought by OUTA
in its request was not furnished, in part because N3TC had not agreed
to this. By the
time this application was heard, however:
[10.1]
In respect of PART A:
[10.1.1]
The furnishing of items 1, 2, 5 and 6 was no longer opposed and was
tendered.
[9]
[10.1.2]
In respect of items 3, 4, 7 and 9, SANRAL asserted that it did not
have this information
in its possession and for this reason it could
not be furnished; and
[10.1.3]
In respect of item 8, the furnishing of this was opposed.
[10.2]
In respect of PART B:
[10.2.1]
The furnishing of items 1, 2, 3 and 4 was opposed.
BACKGROUND
[11]
OUTA asserts that it conducted an
investigation into a series of irregularities “
following
a concessionaire agreement entered into between SANRAL and N3TC.”
OUTA sought to give some indication of
what this investigation had revealed. It contended, somewhat
illogically, that:
“
Without
elaborating on the merits of the above-mentioned agreement, OUTA has
established that the agreement will lapse during the
course of May
2029. Notwithstanding, SANRAL has continued to implement the
agreement, in the absence of justifiable extension to
that effect,
potentially in contravention of the Public Finance Management Act,
1999 (“PFMA”).
[12]
The agreement has not yet run its course
and so self-evidently, there is no need for any extension for the
continued performance
of obligations in terms of the agreement. OUTA
went on to assert that the legality of the agreement entered into
between SANRAL
and N3TC could only be established upon consulting all
relevant annexures and addenda to the agreement.
[13]
It
is not necessary for purposes of the request in terms of PAIA,
[10]
to
furnish any reason for which the information is required. However,
the reference by OUTA to both the investigation as well as
to
specific clauses in the agreement (in the relief sought in PARTS A
and B) make it apparent that OUTA at the time it brought
the present
application already had the agreement, or at least substantial parts
of it, in its possession. N3TC asserted
that this was already
publicly available and hence the withdrawal of its opposition to the
furnishing of certain of the information.
[14]
It
bears mentioning at this stage, that despite the entire application
being predicated on item 1 of Part A – the main contract
–
being made available, OUTA, although it was apparently already
publicly available, did not disclose this in its application.
What it
did disclose through the request, was its knowledge of specific parts
of the main contract. Of the 14 items requested in
Parts A and B, 8
of the items are specifically referenced in the main contract.
[11]
[15]
It is access to the information that was
not publicly available before OUTA’s request to SANRAL on 30
July 2019, that is the
crux of this application – items 3, 4,
7, 8 and 9 in Part A and items 1 to 4 in Part B.
[16]
It is OUTA’s case that
notwithstanding the refusal of access to the information which has
not been tendered, that this Court
should nevertheless, and having
regard to the public interest override set out in s 46 of PAIA, order
SANRAL to make all the information
it has requested, available to it.
CONDONATION
[17]
There
was initially some concern about whether or not the present
application had been brought timeously. The genesis of this arose
out
of the apparent failure on the part of SANRAL to update its PAIA
manual
[12]
on its website to reflect the correct details of its Information
Officer.
[18]
The
date on which the request was made and the failure on the part of
SANRAL to communicate a decision within 30 days of the request,
[13]
obfuscated when it had actually been received. This had a
consequential effect. One consequence was that OUTA embarked upon an
internal appeal process in respect of the deemed refusal on the part
of SANRAL and another was the joinder of the third and fifth
respondents, Mr. Alli and Mr. Macozoma respectively.
[19]
It
bears mentioning that the initial request, which was made on 30 July
2019, was forwarded by SANRAL to N3TC which in turn had
communicated
its agreement to the furnishing of certain documents and objection to
the furnishing of others. SANRAL for its part
failed to respond to
the request of OUTA timeously. SANRAL did not refuse the request in
express terms or provide reasons and hence
the failure to communicate
its decision resulted in it being a deemed refusal.
[14]
[20]
In consequence of this, OUTA sought
condonation in respect of its non-compliance with the 180-day period
referred to in s 78(2)(c)(i)
of PAIA, insofar as there may have been
any non-compliance, for the bringing of this application.
[21]
The
reasons for the bringing of the present application when it was, make
plain that there was no tardiness on the part of OUTA
in its pursuit
of this matter. However, neither Mr. Alli nor Mr. Macozoma ought to
have been joined in these proceedings even though
no relief was
sought against them. I am of the view that condonation, insofar as it
may be required, should be granted,
[15]
and also that the references to both Mr. Alli and Mr. Macozoma in
these proceedings be struck out.
[22]
The
grounds of refusal, although not furnished before the institution of
this application, have now been furnished by SANRAL.
[16]
There are two main grounds – firstly, that information has been
requested from SANRAL that is not in its possession
and secondly,
that information that is in its possession is confidential and that
it is entitled to refuse access to that information.
OUTA for
its part argues that notwithstanding the confidentiality, disclosure
should be ordered in the public interest. I propose
dealing with each
of these in turn.
[23]
It
is at this juncture and before dealing with the reasons for the
refusal, to deal briefly with what are considered to be “adequate
reasons” for the refusal of access to information. In the
present matter, the reasons proferred fall squarely within the
provisions of s 36 alternatively s 38 of the Act. In the present
matter, the reasons for the refusal of the request have been cogently
set out.
[17]
THE
DOCUMENTS THAT SANRAL DOES NOT HAVE
[24]
It was the case for both SANRAL and N3TC
that items 3, 4, 7 and 9 of the information requested in Part A was
not in its possession
and for that reason, could not be furnished to
OUTA.
[25]
The specific documents are:
[25.1]
Item 3 - “
amendments and addenda (if any) to the main
contract”.
The possibility that the document/s requested
does not exist was recognised by OUTA in its request.
[25.2]
Item 4 - contracts entered into between N3TC and third parties.
[25.3]
Item 7 - independent engineers reports submitted to SANRAL in respect
of the N3TC concession contract.
[25.4]
Item 9 - a copy of all “performance certificates” which
were issued relating to the construction
works undertaken by N3TC.
[26]
On consideration of the items reflected in
paragraphs [25.1], [25.3] and [25.4] above, it is readily apparent
that if, insofar as
any of those documents were to exist and have
been submitted to SANRAL, this would have fallen squarely within the
knowledge of
both SANRAL and N3TC.
[27]
Since both SANRAL and N3TC deny that SANRAL
is in possession of these specific items of information, there is no
obligation upon
SANRAL to furnish to OUTA that which it does not
have. It was argued for OUTA that the contention that the specific
documents were
not in the possession of SANRAL should not be
accepted.
[28]
While
it may not suit the case for OUTA that SANRAL either no longer has
documents it once had in its possession or has never been
furnished
with documents by N3TC, these are operational issues falling within
the exclusive purview of both SANRAL and N3TC. This
Court is in no
position, absent a case being made out for it, to not accept
this.
[18]
[29]
Insofar as the documents referred to in
paragraph [25.2] above are concerned, it is the case for SANRAL and
N3TC that SANRAL does
not have these documents in its possession. In
any event, those contracts are private contracts entered into between
N3TC and other
parties. SANRAL is not a party to those private
contracts.
[30]
PAIA
does not require that the party from whom information is requested
must embark upon a process to obtain information or documents
that
are not already in their possession.
[19]
REFUSAL BY SANRAL IN
TERMS OF THE ACT
[31]
SANRAL refused to furnish item 8 of Part A
– “
a copy of all
Construction Work contracts entered into by the concessionaire
relating to the N3TC Concession Contract, as set out
in clause
8.5.2”
.
[32]
It similarly also refused to furnish any of
the items referred to in Part B. All the items in Part B relate to
the financial records
of N3TC and OUTA relies upon specific clauses
in the concession agreement for its contention that SANRAL is in fact
in possession
of this information.
[33]
The refusal by SANRAL to furnish OUTA with
the disputed documents is predicated on the fact that it either does
not have the documents
in question in its possession alternatively
that it is obligated to refuse access in consequence of the objection
in doing so by
N3TC.
SECTIONS 36(1)(b) and
(c) of PAIA
[34]
Section 36(1) provides that access to a
record must be refused if it contains:
“
(b)
financial, commercial, scientific or technical information, other
than trade secrets,
of a third party, the disclosure of which would
be likely to cause harm to the commercial or financial interests of
that third
party; or
(c)
information supplied in confidence by a third party, the disclosure
of
which could reasonably be expected –
(i)
To put that third party at a
disadvantage in contractual or other negotiations; or
(ii)
To prejudice that third party in
commercial competition.”
[35]
In
SA
Metal and Machinery Company v Transnet Ltd,
[20]
the Court held that:
“
to
cause harm to the commercial and financial interests of the third
party by disclosure of the information, the information must
obviously have an objective market value. This will be the case where
the information sought is ‘important or essential to
the
profitability, viability or competitiveness of a commercial
operation.’”
[36]
In addition to the argument that the
disclosure of the records would cause harm to N3TC. Although it was
not necessary for it to
do so, it demonstrated clearly and
unequivocally to my mind, that the disclosure of its commercial or
financial information fell
squarely within the ambit of the section.
[37]
It argued
inter
alia
that it would within the next few
years be required to undertake and perform a competitive arm’s
length tender process when
the main contract came up for renewal
besides concluding other contracts before then. Given the
particularly small and competitive
market within which it operates,
its private financial information which, if disclosed to a
competitor, would likely cause harm
to it had not even been disclosed
to SANRAL.
[38]
Furthermore,
the disclosure of commercial records in their raw form would
prejudice N3TC in its ability to tender fairly and competitively.
Insofar as its financial records are concerned, besides the records
relating to the day-to-day operations, N3TC had had to develop
a
bespoke and discreet financial model that could accommodate the
specific financing requirements of the main contract to enable
it to
perform its obligations in terms thereof. This information, if
disclosed, would especially cause commercial and financial
harm to
N3TC.
[21]
[39]
It
was also argued that the request for the disclosure of these
confidential documents, given the reasons proferred by OUTA for
bringing the application, after having already conducted an
investigation, was nothing more than an attempt to compel
pre-litigation
discovery – a situation which PAIA specifically
provides in s 7(1)(a).
[22]
[40]
It
was argued by OUTA that insofar as SANRAL had refused access on the
basis of the confidentiality of the disputed information,
that if
there were a confidentiality clause and it were relied upon, this
would negate the spirit and purpose of PAIA. I agree
with this
proposition.
[23]
[41]
However, s 36 expressly enjoins SANRAL to
refuse access if N3TC does not consent to its furnishing and that is
precisely the situation
that prevails in the present matter.
[42]
N3TC asserted that insofar as information
and documentation relating to its operations but also contract/s with
third parties had
been furnished by it to SANRAL, this had been done
on the basis that its confidentiality would be kept.
[43]
In
South
African History Archive Trust v South African Reserve Bank
,
[24]
it was held:
“
[40]
Section 37(1)(b) gives rise to a discretionary refusal as opposed to
a mandatory one. The
discretion must be based on facts before
it can be said to have been properly exercised. First, the
record must consist of
information which was supplied in confidence
by a third party. Secondly, it must be proved that the
disclosure could reasonably
be expected to prejudice the future
supply of similar information or information from the same source.
Thirdly, it must be
in the public interest that such information, or
information from the same source should continue to be supplied.”
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
OVERRIDE – SECTION 46 OF PAIA
[44]
It was argued for OUTA that it “
wishes
to evaluate the legality of an agreement that is of public interest,
however, OUTA will only be in a position to do so upon
the production
of the records referred to in its request. Should OUTA determine that
SANRAL had acted unlawfully in the implementation
of its agreement
with N3TC, OUTA ultimately wishes to institute the relevant
proceedings in a court of law.”
[45]
Section 46 of PAIA provides for the:
“
Mandatory
disclosure in the public interest – Despite any other provision
of this Chapter, the information officer of a public
body must grant
a request for access to a record of the body contemplated in section
34(1), 36(1), 37(1)(a) or (b), 38(a) or (b),
39(1)(a) or (b), 40,
41(1)(a) or (b), 42(1) or (3), 43(1) or (2), 44(1) or (2) or 45, if –
(a)
The disclosure of the record would
reveal evidence of –
(i)
a substantial contravention of, or
failure to comply with, the law; or
(ii)
an imminent and serious public
safety or environmental risk; and the public interest in the
disclosure of the record clearly outweighs
the harm in the provision
in question.”
[46]
OUTA
argued that having regard to s 195
[25]
and s 217
[26]
of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, which deal with
basic values in principles governing public administration
and
procurement, respectively. It was argued that the reliance by SANRAL
on s 36(1)(b) and (c) of PAIA as the basis for refusing
to make the
information in its possession available is at odds with its
constitutional obligations.
[47]
It
was argued for SANRAL that neither s 195 nor s 217 are actionable (in
the sense that they cannot ground a cause of action) and
the
principle of subsidiarity in any event prevented OUTA from relying
directly on the provisions of these sections in the present
application.
[27]
[48]
SANRAL AND N3TC argued that there is no
basis for the application of the public interest override provided
for in s 46 of PAIA.
[49]
In
Centre
for Social Accountability v Secretary of Parliament,
[28]
it was held that:
“
[92]
In order to give effect to the constitutional right of access to
information held by the State,
qualified only by the limitation
clause 36 of the Constitution and other rights, the restrictive
wording used by s 46 of PAIA must
be read subject to s 81 of PAIA.
Section 81 stipulates that the rules of evidence applicable in civil
proceedings apply to the
proceedings on application in terms of s 78.
This is an application under s 78 and the civil onus for the
discharging of the burden
of proof referred to in s 81(2) is proof on
a balance of probabilities. It follows that the applicant in this
case must prove on
a balance of probabilities that the disclosure of
the schedules would reveal evidence of a substantial contravention
of, or failure
to comply with, the law.
[93]
. . .
[94]
In these circumstances a requestor is called upon to show on a
balance of probability that the disclosure
would reveal evidence of
the required contravention or failure – not that the disclosure
would, as a fact, show such contravention
or failure.”
[50]
There is an onus on OUTA to show on a
balance of probabilities that the disclosure would reveal evidence of
either a substantial
contravention of or failure to comply with the
law, imminent or serious public safety or environmental risk or that
the public
interest in the disclosure would clearly outweigh the
harm.
[51]
The entirety of the argument made by OUTA
on this score was predicated on its “
evaluation
of the legality of the agreement”
and
a determination in consequence of such evaluation as to whether or
not SANRAL had “
acted unlawfully
in the implementation”
of the
agreement.
[52]
In argument I was directed by OUTA to the
provisions of s 80(1) of PAIA which provides that:
“
Despite
this Act and any other law, any court hearing an application, or an
appeal against a decision on that application, may examine
any record
of a public or private body to which this Act applies, and no such
record may be withheld from the court on any grounds.”
[53]
Notwithstanding
the invitation to call for any of the disputed documents, OUTA
inexplicably failed to place before the Court, when
it was clearly
able to do so, the main agreement or portions thereof that it had in
its possession. The highwater mark of OUTA’s
argument that the
disputed contract/s and financial records ought to be furnished in
the public interest was the argument and conclusion,
made and reached
in
vacuo
without any basis
[29]
having
been laid for it
[30]
that:
“
The
competitive tender process must be understood in the context of South
Africa’s small and competitive construction and
toll operation
sectors, particularly so when having regard to the recent demise of a
number of participants.”
And
“
The
astronomical profit made by the concessionaire cannot be said to be
cost effective. The motoring public are not furnished with
timeously
accessible and accurate information, and yet they have to pay these
increases on the say so of SANRAL, whom, 99% of the
time, accepts the
recommendation given to them by the consultant”.
[54]
Both
SANRAL and N3TC argued that OUTA failed to demonstrate that the
non-disclosure of N3TC’s confidential financial information
would reveal either “
a
substantial contravention of, or failure to comply with, the law; or
an imminent and serious public safety or environmental risk”;
[31]
and
that “
the
public interest in the disclosure of the record clearly outweighs the
harm contemplated in the provision in question.”
[32]
[55]
OUTA’s claim that the disclosure of
the disputed documents is in the public interest is, properly
construed on the case before
me, predicated entirely, not upon any
irregularity with the contract that was concluded in 1999 between
SANRAL and N3TC but rather
upon on the perception, after an
investigation conducted some 20 years after the fact, that N3TC in
the performance of its obligations
in terms of the contract may well
have made profit.
[56]
There is no provision in our law that any
private third party which contracts with the State is prohibited,
within the confines
of a lawfully made and awarded tender, to make a
profit. In its terms, s 46 of PAIA applies only to contraventions or
failure to
comply with the law or public safety or environmental
risk. None of these apply in the present case.
[57]
However, does the public interest in the
disclosure of the contract/s and confidential information of N3TC
which is ancillary to
the main contract, outweigh the harm to N3TC’s
present and future financial interests and would it prejudice them in
their
future commercial endeavours?
[58]
In
the
Health
Justice Initiative v Minister of Health,
[33]
the public interest override was found to be of application in
respect of contracts that had been negotiated by the Ministry of
Health for the provision of Covid-19 vaccines. In that case, the
Minister of Health had been compelled to agree to onerous
confidentiality
clauses which shrouded the entire procurement and
contracting process in secrecy. In that case, even the identities of
the parties
with whom the Ministry and contracted, were withheld in
terms of the confidentiality clauses.
[59]
The circumstances of the present case are
entirely distinguishable. The main contract for which SANRAL issued
and awarded a tender
was already a public document by the time the
present proceedings were brought. Having found that OUTA already had
the main contract
or at least substantial portions of it, it is
apparent that the present application has nothing to do with the
award of that contract.
[60]
The present case concerns the
implementation of the contract. It was neither argued nor was any
case made out that N3TC had failed
to comply with its obligations in
terms of the main agreement and to deliver that for which it had been
contracted. The making
of profit, in a private company, is an
everyday commercial consequence and is not in and of itself a matter
which requires disclosure
in the public interest.
[61]
For the reasons set out above, I find that
the public interest override finds no application in respect of the
disputed documents
and accordingly the application fails.
COSTS
[62]
All the parties who appeared in this matter
were
ad idem
that in the event that they were successful, that a punitive order
for costs should be awarded against the losing party.
[63]
OUTA
argued that the refusal to furnish the information that it had sought
from SANRAL together with N3TC’s refusal to consent
was to be
construed as “
nefarious”
and nothing other than an attempt to subvert the operation of PAIA
and to hide wrongdoing from public scrutiny. It was argued by
OUTA
that the fact that it even had to bring an application evidenced
this.
[34]
[64]
It was argued by SANRAL and N3TC that
should the Court find that the application brought by OUTA was
without merit, that a punitive
order for costs should be made against
them. OUTA for its part argued that in the event that it did not
succeed, since it was acting
in the public interest, there ought to
be no costs order against it.
In my view, the costs
should follow the result. However, notwithstanding that OUTA was in
possession of the main contract or parts
thereof before these
proceedings were instituted, it only became aware when the respective
answering affidavits were delivered
by SANRAL and N3TC of the reasons
for the refusal of the disputed documents. For this reason, the
institution of the proceedings
was not unreasonable. I am of the view
that a punitive order for costs is, in the circumstances, not
warranted. However, given
the nature and importance of the disputed
information, the engagement of more than one counsel by N3TC was
appropriate and hence
the order for costs that will follow.
ORDER
[65]
It is ordered: -
[65.1]
The applicant is granted condonation for non-compliance with the
180-day
period referred to in s 78(2)(c)(i) of PAIA.
[65.2]
All references in the present application to the third and fifth
respondents
are struck out.
[65.3]
The application is dismissed.
[65.4]
The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the respondents who
opposed
this application on the scale as between party and party,
such costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment of two
counsel, where so employed.
A MILLAR
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
HEARD ON:
10 OCTOBER 2023
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON:
14 NOVEMBER 2023
COUNSEL FOR THE
APPLICANT:
ADV. E PROPHY
INSTRUCTED BY:
JENNINGS INCORPORATED
REFERENCE:
MR. A JENNINGS
COUNSEL
FOR THE
1
ST
,4
TH
& 5
TH
RESPONDENTS:
ADV. A
MILOVANOVIC-BITTER
INSTRUCTED BY:
ENS AFRICA ATTORNEYS
REFERENCE:
MR. T MODUBU
COUNSEL FOR THE 6
TH
RESPONDENT:
ADV. B LEECH SC
ADV.
T MPHALWA
INSTRUCTED BY:
WERKSMANS ATTORNEYS
REFERENCE:
MR. B MOTI
[1]
A
self-description set out in paragraph 2 of a letter sent by OUTA to
the Information Officer of SANRAL on 30 July 2019.
[2]
7
of 1998.
[3]
Ibid
s
25(1).
[4]
2
of 2000 and in particular s 78(2) read together with s 82 which
permit a party who has been unsuccessful in procuring the
information sought to apply to Court.
[5]
Brummer
v Minister of Social Development and
Others
2009 (6) SA 323
(CC) at paras [62] to [63] in which the Court said
“
access
to information is crucial to the right of freedom of expression
which includes freedom of the press and other media and
freedom to
receive or impart information or ideas.”
[6]
The
part of the preamble to PAIA relevant in this matter.
[7]
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd
2012 (2) SA 50
(CC) paras [13] – [14].
[8]
Transnet
Ltd and Another v SA Metal Company Co (Pty) Ltd
2006 (6) SA 285
(SCA) para [24].
[9]
A
complaint was made by OUTA that the tendered documents had not been
received from SANRAL sufficiently far in advance of the
hearing by
OUTA to enable it to consider them and to make further submissions
in respect of the disputed documents. I invited
the parties to make
further submissions in writing which invitation was accepted by
OUTA, SANRAL and N3TC. Those submissions
were considered together
with all the other papers filed of record and the arguments advanced
at the hearing in the preparation
of this judgment.
[10]
Section
11(3)(a) of the Act provides that: “
A
requester’s right of access contemplated in subsection (1) is,
subject to this Act, not affected by- (a) any reasons the
requester
gives for requesting access.”.
[11]
In
Part A, item 6 refers to clause 6.1, item 8 refers to clause 8.5.2,
item 9 refers to clause 8, item 10 refers to clause 9.2
and in Part
B, item 1 refers to clause 16.3.1 (a), item 2 refers to clause
16.3.1(d), item 3 refers to clause 16.3.1(e) and item
4 refers to
clause 16.3.2(c).
[12]
In
terms of sections 14 and 51 of PAIA, it is required to update its
manual annually.
[13]
Section
25 of the Act.
[14]
Section
27 of the Act.
[15]
Section
82(e) of the Act.
[16]
In
terms of s 25(3)(a) of the Act, when access is refused, the party
refusing access is required to “
state
adequate reasons for the refusal, including the provisions of the
Act relied upon.”.
[17]
For
this reason, the present matter is distinguishable from
CCII
Systems (Pty) Ltd v Fakie and Others NNO
2003 (2) 325 (T) para [16];
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M & G Media Ltd
2011
(2) SA 1
(SCA) para [19];
South
African History Archive Trust v South African Reserve Bank and
Another
2020
(6) SA 127
(SCA) para [36].
[18]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634–635.
[19]
Section
23 provides that if a record cannot be found or does not exist then
an affidavit must be furnished setting out that it
is not possible
to give access to the record. In the present matter, SANRAL has
confirmed on oath that it does not have certain
of the documents in
its possession. Insofar as those documents do exist, N3TC has
confirmed that it has the documents but
objects on the grounds that
it has stated to the furnishing of those documents.
[20]
[2003]
1 ALL SA 335
(W) para [12]. See also
Transnet
Ltd and Another v SA Metal Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd
2006
(6) SA 285
(SCA) para [42];
Van
der Merwe v National Lotteries Board 2014 JDR 08
44
(GP) para [32]-[36].
[21]
BHP
Billiton PLC Incorporated v De Langa
[2013] ZASCA 11 (SCA).
[22]
This
section provides that PAIA does not apply to records for criminal or
civil proceedings if “
(a)
that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil
proceedings.”
See
also
Unitas
Hospital v Van Wyk
[2006] ZASCA 34
;
2006
(4) SA 436
(SCA) para [21]-[22];
Inkatha
Freedom Party v Truth and Reconciliation Commission
2000 (3) SA 119
(C) at 135E-136A.
[23]
SA
Airlink (Pty) Ltd v Mpumalanga Tourism and Parks Agency and Others
2013 (3) SA 112 (GSJ).
[24]
2020
(6) SA 127
(SCA) para [40].
[25]
These
are set out in s 195(1) and are in terms of s 195(2)(b) applicable
to organs of state.
[26]
S
217(1) provides that when contracting for goods or services, an
organ of state “
must
do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable,
transparent, competitive and cost effective.”
[27]
My
Vote Counts v The Speaker of the National Assembly and
Others
2016 (1) SA 132
(CC) para [44]-[66].
[28]
2011
(5) SA 279
(ECG) paras [92] and [94].
[29]
Somewhat
belatedly and in reply, OUTA sought to rely, 7 years after the fact,
on an article published in the Sunday Times Newspaper
on 25 November
2012 in which issue had been taken with the main contract concluded
13 years earlier.
[30]
Mostert
v FirstRand Bank t/a RMB Private Bank
2018 (4) SA 443
(SCA) para [13].
[31]
De
Lange and Another v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others
2012
(1) SA 280
(GSJ) para [40].
[32]
ibid
para [40].
[33]
2023
JDR 3132 (GP).
[34]
On
this specific point the Court was referred to
Bato
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and
Tourism and Others
2004
(4) SA 492
(CC).
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