Case Law[2022] ZAGPPHC 606South Africa
Morgan Creek Properties 311 (Pty) Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (36664/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 606 (3 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
3 August 2022
Headnotes
as follows at 356 E – H:
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Morgan Creek Properties 311 (Pty) Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (36664/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 606 (3 August 2022)
Morgan Creek Properties 311 (Pty) Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (36664/2022) [2022] ZAGPPHC 606 (3 August 2022)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case Number :
36664/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
DATE: 3 August 2022
In
the matter between:
MORGAN CREEK
PROPERTIES 311 (PTY)
LTD
Applicant
and
THE CITY OF TSHWANE
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
Respondent
JUDGMENT
JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN J:
[1] This is an
urgent application to prohibit the respondent from terminating the
electricity supply to the applicant’s property
situated at
[....] E[....] S[....], Koedoespoort , Pretoria (“the
premises”)
Background
[2]
The threat by the respondent to terminate the electricity supply to
the
applicant’s premises is based on an alleged outstanding
balance of R 2 106 566, 20 under three different account numbers,
to
wit [....], [....] and [....].
[3]
During the period 2014 to 2018 a dispute (“the 2018 dispute”)
arose between the applicant and the respondent in respect of
electricity consumption and charges under the applicant’s
account
number [....]. The parties were unable to resolve the dispute
and the dispute was referred to the National Energy Regulator of
South Africa during April 2018.
[4]
I pause to mention that the referral is in terms of By-Law 9 of the
respondent’s
Standard Electricity By-Laws, which By-Laws were
published in the Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, (No. 234 of 25
June 2003),
Authority Notice 1132 (as amended in 2013) and reads as
follows:
“
If at any time
any difference or dispute arises between the Municipality and the
consumer about the construction, meaning or effect
of these By-Laws
or about the rights,
obligations
or
liabilities
of the consumer or Municipality under the By-Laws, the difference or
dispute
must
be referred to the NERSA for a decision, failing which the difference
or
dispute
must
be settled by arbitration in terms of the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1964 (Act 42 of 1965).”
(own
emphasis”)
[5]
Notwithstanding the aforesaid referral, the respondent continued with
its threat to terminate the electricity supply to the applicant’s
premises. This forced the applicant to launch an urgent
application
in June 2018 for an interim interdict prohibiting the respondent from
terminating the supply.
[6]
On 19 June 2018 the applicant obtained an interdict in the following
terms
against the respondent:
“
The
respondent is interdicted from implementing its debt collection and
credit control measures by terminating any of the services
of the
applicant that are rendered to the applicant on the immovable
property known as [....] E[....] S[....], Koedoespoort, Pretoria
in
respect of account [....] – [....];”
[7]
Despite the court order and the pending dispute submitted to NERSA,
the
respondent continued to include the disputed amount in the
monthly invoices rendered to the applicant under account number
[....].
To add insult to injury, the respondent also added interest
on the disputed amount on a monthly basis.
[8]
Due to the aforesaid and notwithstanding regular payments in respect
of
the monthly fees charged for electricity consumption on the
premises, account number [....] (“the old account”)
reflected
an arrear amount of R 1 828 532, 00 on 1 March 2022.
[9]
Unbeknownst to the applicant, and during February 2022, the
respondent
opened a new prepaid account under account number [....]
(“the new account”) for the applicant. Invoices were
rendered
on the new account from 1 March 2022.
[10]
The applicant being unaware of the new account, continued to make
monthly payments in respect
of municipal charges into the old
account. Notwithstanding the aforesaid, the account still reflects an
outstanding balance of
R 1 828 532, 00 during June 2022. The
applicant disputes the arrear amount and contends that the amount
does not take the payments
it has made since March 2022 to date into
account.
[11]
The applicant only became aware of the new account when its
electricity supply was disconnected
on 10 June 2022. At that stage
the new account was in arrear in the amount of R 749 443, 00.
Although the account is in respect
of municipal services for the
period March to June 2022, the account also does not reflect the
payments the applicant had made
in respect of such services. It is at
this stage unclear what happened to the payments made by the
applicant in the aforesaid period.
[12]
Despite several attempts to clarify the obvious discrepancies in
respect of the two accounts,
the applicant received a notice from the
respondent on 6 July 2022, informing the applicant that the power
supply to its property
will be discontinued within 7 days if the
outstanding amount of R 2 106 566, 20 on account number [....], the
third account is
not paid.
[13]
The notice was, however, accompanied by an invoice under the new
account, which invoice
reflected an arrear amount of R 110 302, 39.
[14]
Having made regular payments towards the municipal charges on the
premises, the applicant
disputed (“the 2022 dispute”) the
arrear amount and lodged a written request to resolve the dispute in
terms of section
95(f) read with
section 102(2)
of the
Local
Government: Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000
, on 6 July 2022.
[15]
In terms of
section 102(2)
the respondent may not implement any debt
collection or credit control measures until the dispute is finalised.
OPPOSTION
Point in limine
[16]
The respondent raised a point
in limine
that the deponent to
the applicant’s founding affidavit, Hendrick Spoelstra
(“Spoelstra”), does not have authority
to institute legal
proceedings on behalf of the applicant. Although Spoelstra alleged in
the founding affidavit that he has such
authority, a resolution of
the applicant was not annexed to the papers.
[17]
In pursuance of the point, the respondent delivered a
rule 7(1)
notice in terms of which the applicant was informed that the
respondent:
“…
disputes
the authority of the Applicant’s Attorney of record to act on
behalf of the Applicant and therefore request the Applicant’s
Attorneys to provide a written Power of Attorney as a proof of
authority to act..”
[18]
The applicant’s attorneys duly filed a power of authority in
terms of which
Spoelstra in his capacity as director of the
applicant, nominated, constituted and appointed the applicant’s
attorneys.
[19]
During the hearing of the matter Mr Kwinda, counsel for the
respondent, stated that a resolution
by the directors of the
applicant should have been attached to the power of attorney. Mr
Kwinda referred to the CIPC company search
of the applicant that is
attached to the founding papers and which clearly indicates that the
applicant has two directors, to wit
Spoelstra and Raymond Taxi Mashau
(Mashau”). Mr Kwinda emphasised that it is not the lack of
authority of Spoelstra to depose
to the applicant’s founding
affidavit that is in dispute, but Spoelstra’s lack of authority
to institute the application
on behalf of the applicant.
[20]
In
Poolquip Industries (Pty) Ltd v Griffin
1978 (4) SA 353
W,
the court also dealt with the lack of authority to institute legal
proceedings. The court held as follows at 356 E – H:
“
It is usual and
desirable for the resolution of the board of directors of a company,
authorising the litigation, to be annexed to
and proved by the
founding affidavits. When it is not, but the probabilities indicated
by the allegations in those affidavits justify
the conclusion that
the company has authorised the application, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the failure to annex
the resolution need
not result in the dismissal of the application.
In Mall (Cape) (Pty)
Ltd v Merino Ko-operasie Bpk
1957
(2) SA 347 (C)
WATERMEYER
J said at 352A:
"The best
evidence that the proceedings have been properly authorised would be
provided by an affidavit made by an official
of the company annexing
a copy of the resolution but I do not consider that form of
proof is necessary in every case. Each
case must be considered on its
own merits and the Court must decide whether enough has been placed
before it to warrant the conclusion
that it is the applicant which is
litigating and not some unauthorised person on its behalf." See
also Dowson and Dobson Ltd
v Evans and Kerns (Pty) Ltd
1973
(4) SA 136 (E)
at
137H - 138A; African Land and Investment Co Ltd v Newhoff and Others
1929 WLD 133
; Geldenhuis Deep Ltd v Superior Trading Co (Pty) Ltd
1934 WLD 117
; Hocken v Union Trawling Co
1959
(2) SA 250 (N)
at
252G. Mr Browde relied on Griffiths and Inglis (Pty) Ltd v Southern
Cape Blasters (Pty) Ltd
1972
(4) SA 249 (C)
for
his contentions. That application was founded simply on an allegation
that the deponent to the main supporting affidavit was
the managing
director and majority shareholder. There was no mention of
authorisation by the company. In the reply it was alleged
that he was
authorised in that the other directors were aware of the application
without stating when they became aware and gave
authority. That did
not constitute the "minimum of evidence" of authority”.
[21]
In
casu
Spoelstra stated in the founding affidavit that he is
the director of the applicant and that he is duly authorised to
depose to
the affidavit on behalf of the applicant. He further stated
that he is duly authorised to represent the applicant in the
proceedings.
[22]
Spoelstra did not deal with the lack of authority point in his
replying affidavit.
[23]
In the premises, this court does not know whether the other director
of the company, Mashau,
is aware of the litigation and/or whether he
supports the application. A company can only act through a resolution
of its directors
and the respondent’s point
in limine
must
be upheld.
[24]
This is, however, not the end of the matter. A court may at any stage
during the proceedings
of the matter, afford a party whose authority
has been challenged an opportunity to provide the necessary proof of
its authority.
[25]
I am of the view, that I should grant the applicant such an
opportunity in the circumstance.
My view is premised on the
following:
[25.1]
although the aforesaid point was taken
in limine
the parties
proceeded to address me in full on the merits of the matter;
[25.2] the
matter is clearly urgent and the issue between the parties should, in
the interests of justice, be adjudicated
upon speedily and without
undue delay.
Order
In the premises, I issue
the following order:
1.
The respondent’s point
in limine
is upheld with costs.
2.
The applicant is afforded a period of three days from date of
this
order, to file proof of its authority to institute these proceedings.
3.
Judgment is reserved.
N. JANSE VAN
NIEUWENHUIZEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE HEARD PER
COVID19 DIRECTIVES:
26 July 2022
DATE DELIVERED PER
COVID19 DIRECTIVES:
3 August 2022
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant:
Adv
Voster
Instructed by:
Albert
Hibbert Attorneys Inc
For the Respondent:
Adv
T Kwinda
Instructed by:
JL
Raphiri Inc
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