Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 376South Africa
Wentzel v Banxso (Pty) Ltd and Others (23249/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 376 (22 August 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Provisional winding-up of Company - Application of the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam.
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Wentzel v Banxso (Pty) Ltd and Others (23249/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 376 (22 August 2025)
Wentzel v Banxso (Pty) Ltd and Others (23249/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 376 (22 August 2025)
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sino date 22 August 2025
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amended version: 4 September 2025
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FLYNOTES:
FLYNOTES:
COMPANY – Winding up –
Illegal
business model –
Applicant
lost investment – Condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam –
Vast amounts of clients’ funds transferred
to interrelated
bank accounts of Banxso – Large amounts converted to
cryptocurrency – Deepfake advertisements
designed to lure
client under false pretenses – Promise of unrealistic
returns on such investments – Applicant
established on prima
facie basis that the Banxso business model is illegal –
Banxso placed under provisional liquidation.
Republic
of South Africa
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN]
Case no: 23249/2024
In
the matter between:
CAROL
MARGARET WENTZEL
Applicant
And
BANXSO
(PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
THE
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Second
Respondent
FINANCIAL
SECTOR CONDUCT AUTHORITY
Third
Respondent
NATIONAL
DIRECRTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Fourth
Respondent
HASSEN
KAJIE N.O
Fifth
Respondent
And
In
the matter between:
DAVID
VAN DER MERWE
First
Intervening Party
NICK
RICHARD WEGGELAAR
Second
Intervening Party
LEON
ALBERTUS DE MAN
Third
Intervening Party
SAUL
GEOFFREY RUDOLPH
Fourth
Intervening Party
BAREND
UYS VAN NIEKERK
Fifth
Intervening Party
CORNELIA
MAGDALENA HUMAN
Sixth
Intervening Party
THEO
JOHAN SCHOEMAN
Seventh
Intervening Party
MARIANA
MARYNA DUVENHAGE
Eight
Intervening Party
ENGELBRECHT
LENZZ NEETHLING
Ninth
Intervening Party
MARLEEN
SMIT
Tenth
Intervening Party
CHRISTIAAN
THOEDORE BRUYNS
Eleventh
Intervening Party
Coram: LE
GRANGE J
Delivered:
Electronically on 22 August 2025
Summary:
Provisional winding-up of Company -
Application
of the
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam.
Judgment
LE
GRANGE, J:
Introduction:
[1]
In this matter the Applicant, Mrs Wentzel (Wentzel) seeks a
provincial winding-up
order against the First Respondent, Banxso
(Pty) Ltd (Banxso), on the grounds that: Firstly, Banxso is unable to
pay its debts
as contemplated in s 345 of the Companies Act 61 of
1973 read with item 9 of Schedule 5 of the
Companies Act, 71 of 2008
;
secondly, it would be just and equitable to do so as contemplated in
section 344(h)
of the of the 1973
Companies Act with
item 9 of
Schedule 5 of the
Companies Act, 71 of 2008
, alternatively in terms
of
s 81(c)(ii)
and or section 81(1)(d)(iii) of the 2008
Companies
Act; and
, thirdly it would be just and equitable to wind-up Banxso as
it is promoted for the purpose of perpetrating fraud or deception on
investors.
[2]
Wentzel, a pensioner lost approximately R500 000 as an investor in
Contracts for Difference
(CFD)
[1]
on a platform managed by Banxso. At the heart of Wentzel’s
application is the allegation that all her and other investors
transactions with Banxso are null and void
under
the
condictio
ob turpem vel iniustam causam,
(condictio
ob turpem)
[2]
.
According
to Wentzel,
Banxso
operated as a criminal enterprise with an unlawful and illegal
business model designed to defraud investors. Wentzel further
alleges
that although she has no knowledge of other creditors, concurrent or
otherwise, more than 7000 investors including the
intervening
parties, were scammed and all of them have claims against Banxso.
According to Wentzel it will therefore be reasonable
to conclude that
Banso liabilities exceeds its assets by far.
[3]
Banxso is a financial service provider (FSP) with a licence to act as
intermediary
and opposed the relief sought. Banxso denies it is
insolvent or operating a criminal enterprise and regards Wentzel’s
application,
and that of the intervening parties, as an abuse of
process as it has the necessary liquidity to pay all the alleged debt
contained
within the present application. Banxso has also offered to
secure the claimed debt of Wentzel and all intervening parties.
According
to Banxso it had over R 26 million in its operational
account and a stakeholder transferred R500 000 into its
attorneys trust
account as security for Wentzel’s claim pending
the successful prosecution thereof and the withdrawal of the current
application.
A stakeholder has also offered R57 125 588.80
in security on behalf of Banxso, being the total value of the
intervening
parties claim pending the successful prosecution of those
claims.
[4]
It is common cause that Third Respondent (FSCA) which oversees the
conduct of FSP’s
provisionally withdrew Banxso’s FSP
licence on 15 October 2024 and finally on
4 July 2025. The latter
occurred whilst judgment was pending.
[5]
Before dealing with crux of the matter, the interlocutory
applications launched by
the relevant parties will be considered
first.
The
intervening parties
:
[6]
The intervening parties sought leave to intervene in these
proceedings as co-applicants
and creditors as contemplated in s
346(1)(b) of the 1973
Companies Act. David
Van Der Merwe (Van der
Merwe) the first intervening party, filed an affidavit. According to
him Banxso, is not acting in the best
interest of all its investors
as it
offered security for the applicant’s
claim on condition that she does not persist with the liquidation
application. Van der
Merwe further recorded that Banxso wants to
enter into settlement agreements with individual complainants which
could frustrate
investors who support the liquidation but are not
party to these proceedings, if accepted. Van der Merwe further
detailed
how
Banxso success managers traded in his name and
caused him to suffer losses in the amount of R1 500 000. It was
further alleged
that Banxso allowed him to continue trading on its
platform despite knowing the FSCA provisionally withdrew its FSP
licence on
15 October 2024.
[7]
Banxso, opposed the application on the basis that it is an abuse of
process. According
to Banxso it has given an undertaking to the
intervening applicants attorneys that it would furnish security to
the aggregate value
of the intervening parties’ net deposit in
the sum of R57 125 578,80 which was rejected. Banxso rejected Van der
Merwe’s
claim that he never conducted trade in his own name. A
copy of his trading statement in support thereof was attached to the
papers.
According to Banxso, van der Merwe’s trade was complex,
erratic and needed high-level support due to his high-volume trading
activity. Banxso has also denied that funds deposited by Van der
Merwe after 16 October 2024 have been lost. According to Banxso,
the
full value of his deposits will be available for him to trade or to
withdraw when Banxso transfers his account to a new FSP.
[8]
Counsel for the intervening parties argued that they have established
prima facie
proof of their interest and thus entitled to join these
proceedings in terms of
Rule 12
[3]
of the rules of this Court.
[9]
Counsel for Banxso disagreed and argued that: the failure by the
intervening parties
to furnished security for wanting to intervene,
is fatal to their application; they also failed to show a direct and
substantial
interest in the matter which could be prejudiced by the
judgment of this Court; moreover, Van der Merwe’s failed
to
set out a basis for his claim and his claim is reasonably
disputed; Van der Merwe also failed to allege he was a creditor of
Banxso.
[10]
The argument by Banxso’s counsel is unpersuasive. It
is not in
dispute that the intervening parties invested in Banxso. It
appears on the allegations made by the first, second, fourth, fifth
and seventh Intervening Parties, they all have existing liquidated
claims against Banxso for repayment of the amounts they deposited
after the provisional withdrawal of Banxso's FSP license on the basis
that, all transactions post 15 October 2024, according to
Banxso were
simulated and all client funds in relation to those trades,
irrespective of purported losses, are still available.
It further
appears that Mr. CT Bruyns, the eleventh intervening party, has an
undisputed contractual claim for repayment, which
is due and payable.
Furthermore, if the allegations are correct that Banxso conducted its
business illegally and the transactions
between Banxso and its
investors were void then all those investors, including the
intervening parties, have claims against Banxso
for repayment of the
amounts that they invested.
[11]
It follows that each individual intervening party do not have to
furnish security
as they do not seek to launch separate applications
for the winding - up of Banxso. They want to be co-applicants in
accordance
with section 346(1)(b) of the 1973
Companies Act which
contemplates that one or more of a company's creditors may be the
applicants in an application for the winding up of the company.
In
the present instance there is only one application, as contemplated
in
s 346(3)
and since Wentzel provided security, no further security
is required from each co-applicant.
[12]
In my view the Intervening Parties have established a legally
recognisable interest in the outcome
of this case and leave to
intervene as co-applicants with the existing applicant should be
granted.
The
Striking out:
[13]
The
Applicant and intervening parties sought the
striking out of parts of Banxso’s affidavits due to their
apparent scandalous
and vexatious nature and being irrelevant. Banxso
accuse the attorneys of the applicant and intervening parties (M&B)
of being
the main driving force behind the application for their own
interest and not for legitimate creditors or their clients. M&B
was further accused of unprofessional conduct (touting) by creating a
website to lure clients on the premise that they will recover
money
who register on the website. It was also alleged the FSCA was
unlawfully collaborating with M&B to seek its liquidation.
[14]
On the other hand, Banxso sought the striking out of parts of the
applicant’s affidavit
in reply relating to transcripts of
telephonic conversations between Banxso’s clients, that of the
applicant and transcripts
of interviews that the FSCA had with
representatives of Banxso. According to Banxso the transcripts raised
new matter which is
impermissible and some of the allegations in
reply are also scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant. More
importantly, Banxso holds
the firm view that the FSCA was not legally
obliged to comply with the
subpoena duces tecum
as such is not
permitted in motion proceedings.
[15]
It is trite that in terms of
Rule 6(15)
of this Court’s Rules,
two requirements must be met before a striking out application can
succeed: firstly, the matter sought
to be struck out must be
scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant; and secondly, the court
must be satisfied that if such a matter
is not struck out the party
seeking such relief would be prejudiced
[4]
.
The words ‘scandalous’, vexatious, irrelevant and
prejudice are used frequently in courts. Their meaning is
defined in
the Shorter Oxford English as follows: “Scandalous”
allegations are those which may or may not be relevant
but which are
so worded as to be abusive or defamatory; a “vexatious”
matter refers to allegations which may or may
not be relevant but are
so worded as to convey an intention to harass or annoy; and
“irrelevant” allegations do not
apply to the matter in
hand and do not contribute one way or the other to a decision of that
matter.’
[5]
The test for
determining relevance is whether the evidence objected to is relevant
to an issue in the litigation.
[6]
[16]
On the papers filed, M&B
only became involved
after the applicant had lodged a complaint with Banxso. The Applicant
approached the attorneys and not the
other way. At all relevant
times, M&B have been acting on the instructions of the applicant
and, later, the Intervening Parties.
It is also common cause that M&B
became involved on the instructions of the applicant before the
investigation of the FSCA,
the steps taken by them and other agencies
against Banxso. For instance, The FSCA had been investigating Banxso
since 2023 and
had already received approximately 70 complaints
against Banxso from members of the public and provisionally suspended
its operating
license; the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) had
also done an analysis of Banxso’s bank accounts and taken
certain steps
against it; The South African Reserve Bank had also
taken steps against Banxso; the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, had
obtained a preservation order in terms of
section
39
of the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act, 121 of 1998
, against
Banxso although it was later set aside. Furthermore, the suggestion
that M&B and some liquidators are behind the liquidation
for
their own gain and not for the interest of legitimate creditors or
clients, is simply vexatious. The reliance by Banxso on
a newspaper
article and interim liquidation and distribution account from another
matter, where B&M was involved, to support
its claim, is simply
vexatious and irrelevant. There is no evidence to suggest that
M&B was the attorneys of record in
the application for
liquidation in that matter or involved in the appointment of the
liquidators. M&B was only appointed
in that case after the
liquidators were appointed by the Master. Furthermore, the factual
content of the article is being disputed
by B&M. In any event,
Banxso’s allegations of collusion and self-serving litigation
by M&B and liquidators do not
contribute to the resolution of the
real issues.
[17]
On the issue of touting. Firstly, on the papers filed, M&B
admitted that upon further investigation
into the affairs of Banxso,
a website where affected clients of Banxso can inter alia register
their details and provide the amount
of money they invested and lost
was created. As at 5 November 2024, it was alleged that a total of
130 investors had registered
and a total amount of R133 286 078.49
was lost by them in dealings with Banxso. Touting is clearly unlawful
and a contravention
of
rule 49.17
for the Rules of the Attorneys
Profession
[7]
and code of
conduct of the Legal Practice Council. On a proper reading of the
relevant rules, I cannot find any contravention of
the Attorneys
Profession and or Legal Practice Council’s Rules by B&M. It
simply created a website not to improperly
solicit clients but to
enquire if there are clients of Banxso that had similar experiences
like Wentzel. On the data extracted
from the webpage, no promise was
made by B&M that it will recover monies upon registration. On the
papers filed B&M did
not improperly sought or by unfair means,
business from Banxso clients. The fact that the Banxso clients may or
may not become
clients of B&M was a matter of their own choice.
[18]
In view of the abovementioned,
the allegations to be struck
are nothing more than reckless and offensive generalisations which
should find no space in a proper
court process. These
assertions or conclusions by Banxso are not robust engagements but
scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant
as contemplated in
Rule 6(15)
and need to be struck out.
[19]
Banxso’s striking out application is mainly premised on the
communication between
B&M and the FSCA, including the subpoena
B&M obtained to get hold of the interview transcripts between the
FSCA and the
Banxso’s employees. Banxso, alleges the FSCA
undertook that the interviews will remain confidential and unlawfully
disclosed it to M&B to seek its liquidation via the backdoor.
Banxso further alleges the subpoena was invalid and the FSCA was
under no obligation to disclose the information. Banxso also holds
the view that the transcripts obtained is new matter and Wentzel
cannot make out a new case in her replying affidavit.
[20]
The FSCA, although a party to the proceedings adopted a neutral
stance and neither
opposed nor supported the application for
liquidation, although it filed a replying affidavit and denied the
assertion that it
acted unlawfully or in collusion with B&M to
liquidate Banxso. According to the FSCA it acted within the law when
it provided
the relevant material to B&M.
[21]
The criticism levelled against the FSCA, is in my view unwarranted.
It
is well established in our law that in action or trial proceedings,
the Registrar of the court may issue a subpoena duces tecum
as
provided for in
Rule 38
of the rules of this court. Rule
38(1)(a)(iii) and (c) of the Uniform Rules make provision for various
procedures to procure evidence
for a trial. In addition, Rule 38
makes provision for the manner in which evidence would be adduced at
a trial. It does not ordinarily
deal with motion proceedings, as Rule
6(5)(g) does not permit a party on his own authority to cause the
Registrar to subpoena a
witness to appear at the hearing of the
application. That authority only vests in the Court, which may grant
leave for a person
to be subpoenaed.
[8]
[22]
In this instance, Wentzel elected to issue a subpoena duces tecum,
without leave
of the Court. It is trite that ‘
the
rules are not an end in themselves to be observed for their own sake.
They are provided to secure the inexpensive and expeditious
completion of litigation before the courts and where one or other of
the parties has failed to comply with the requirements of
the rules
or an order made in terms thereof and prejudice thereby being caused
to the opponent, it should be the court’s
endeavour to remedy
such prejudice in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, always
bearing in mind the objects for which the
rules were designed.
’
[9]
[23]
In
these circumstances, the mere issuing of the subpoena by the
Registrar, without leave of the court, does not automatically
invalidate
it. It remains a binding legal instrument to be complied
with until properly set aside by a court.
[10]
The FSCA was therefore not acting in cahoots with M&B. It was
under a legal obligation to comply with the subpoena. Moreover,
the
FSCA is not a witness but a party to the proceedings and also subject
to rule 35(11) which provides that:
‘
The
court may, during the course of any proceeding, order the production
by any party thereto under oath of such documents
or tape recordings
in such party’s power or control relating to any matter in
question in such proceeding as the court may
deem appropriate, and
the court may deal with such documents or tape recordings, when
produced, as it deems appropriate
.’
As liquidation matters
are ordinarily urgent, the furnishing of the documents by the FSCA to
M&B made imminently sense as it
was an expeditious and
inexpensive way to bring the matter to finality then risking an
unnecessary interlocutory application and
wasting of scarce judicial
resources.
[24]
On the issue of prejudice, Banxso’s main argument was the
evidence was unlawfully
obtained. In my view there is no merit in any
of this. Firstly, the evidence was not unlawfully obtained, and
secondly, Banxso
made extensive use in its supplementary answering
affidavit to deal with the evidence. In fact, it also relied on part
of the documents
in support of its own case.
[25]
Turning to the issue of the new evidence in reply. The approach
adopted by our Higher
Courts to admit further evidence in reply has
been settled by the Supreme Court of appeal in
Drift
Supersand (Pty) Ltd v Mogale City Local Municipality and another
[11]
wherein it held that:
‘
As
this Court recently stated in
Lagoon
Beach
[12]
, not
only must a court exercise practical, common sense in regard to
striking out applications but there is today a tendency
to permit
greater flexibility than may previously have been the case to admit
further evidence in reply. Consequently, as stated
in
Nkengana
[13]
,‘if
the new matter in the replying affidavit is in answer to a defence
raised by the respondent and is not such that it should
have been
included in the founding affidavit in order to set out a cause of
action, the court will refuse an application to strike
out’.
[26]
Applying the abovementioned approach, the new evidence does not
amount to creating
or making out a fresh cause of action in reply. It
mainly deals to disprove Banxso’s defence and to support the
allegations
made out in Wentzel’s founding affidavit. It
follows that there is no reason either to strike out the explanation
made in
reply or to ignore it.
[27]
For all the abovementioned reasons it follows Banxso’s
application to strike
out cannot succeed.
Provisional winding-up
[28]
It is trite that
in
an opposed application for provisional liquidation, an applicant must
establish its entitlement to an order on a prima facie
basis, meaning
that the applicant must show that the balance of probabilities on the
affidavits is in its favour.
[14]
This would include the existence of an applicant’s claim where
such is disputed. Even if the applicant establishes
its claim on a
prima facie basis, a court will ordinarily refuse the application if
the claim is bona fide disputed on reasonable
grounds. The rule that
winding-up proceedings should not be resorted to as a means of
enforcing payment of a debt the existence
which is bona fide disputed
on reasonable grounds, is part of the broader principle that the
court’s processes should not
be abused. In the context of
liquidation proceedings, the rule is generally known as
the
Badenhorst
rule
[15]
.
[29]
A distinction is ordinarily drawn
between factual disputes relating to the respondent’s
liability
to the applicant and disputes relating to the other requirements for
liquidation. At the provisional stage, the other
requirements must be
satisfied on a balance of probabilities with reference to the
affidavits. In relation to the applicant’s
claim, however, the
court must consider not only where the balance of probabilities lies
on the papers but also whether the claim
is bona fide disputed on
reasonable grounds; a court may reach this conclusion even though on
a balance of probabilities the applicant’s
claim has been made
out.
[16]
However, where the
applicant at the provisional stage shows that the debt prima facie
exists, the onus is on the company to show
that it is bona fide
disputed on reasonable grounds.
[17]
[30]
At the heart of this winding-up application is the claim that Banxso
is a criminal
enterprise, designed to defraud members of the public.
In support of its claim, Wentzel relies heavily on the affidavits
filed
by the following: the investigation by the FSCA to
provisionally suspended Banxso’s operating license; the
analysis
of Banxso’s bank accounts by Financial Intelligence
Centre (FIC) and the steps taken against it; The steps the South
African
Reserve Bank had taken against Banxso
[18]
,
including the affidavits filed in the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, preservation order against Banxso although, as
stated
previously, it was later set aside.
[31]
Apart from the allegation that the winding-up application is an abuse
of process,
Banxso believes that the security tendered for the
applicant and intervening parties is a demonstration of its
commercial solvency;
the claims of Wentzel and intervening parties
have been reasonably disputed, including the enrichment claim under
the
condictio ob turpem
.
[32]
The central question is whether the applicant on a balance of
probabilities has established
the transactions with Banxso were null
and void and has a claim for those funds under the
condictio ob
turpem
.
[33]
The requirements premised on the enrichment claim under the
condictio
ob turpem
are
the following:
[19]
(i) a
transfer of money between plaintiff and defendant, ie ownership must
have passed with the transfer; (ii) an illegal and prohibited
contract; and (iii), the defendant’s unjustified enrichment.
[34]
Wentzel’s complaint can summarised as follows: she at the time
of investing
was a 60 year old pensioner who retired in 2015 after a
career of 30 years in the retail environment. The funds that she
entrusted
to Banxso formed a substantial portion of her life savings
and her provision for retirement. Before the investment with Banxso
she became increasingly concerned that the provision made for her
retirement was insufficient, considering the escalation of living
costs in recent years. During or about early July 2024, she
came across an online advertisement, which included a videoclip
purportedly of a television interview between an SABC presenter and
Elon Musk, discussing an amazing investment opportunity through
an
entity called ‘
Immediate Matrix
’. The interview
inter alia advised that, by investing an amount of R4 700, one could,
within a week, receive R34 300.00.
She clicked on the registration
option on the advertisement and completed an online registration form
by providing her name and
contact details. Almost instantly, she
received a telephone call from a lady who identified herself as
Akona, working for Banxso.
Subsequently, another Banxso agent, called
the applicant where the following exchange transpired:
‘
(The
applicant)“is this the
ad
which Elon Musk
or
– and all that ads? It is on Facebook. The Agent:
Ja,
ja,
that
was the ad that you saw, right. The applicant: Okay’. The Agent
‘
Ja,
ja, that was the ad that you saw, right, so I am calling you so that
we can help you to download the app
.
The app is the one that you are going to use to keep check of how
much profit you make on the investment. And then I will also
show you
how you can withdraw your profits once you have them …’
[35]
The agent
informed the applicant that she
could make an initial deposit of
R1 800 and that she could make a
profit of about R800 or R900 per week depending on the market. On or
about 13 July 2024, the applicant
received a telephone call from
another agent at Banxso.
He provided her
with the banking details of Banxso, a Standard Bank account, into
which she paid a sum of R1800.00. He also advised
her that a ‘success
manager’ was allocated to her and would in future be her
contact person at Banxso. She
was further advised the success
manager would explain to her how she should login to her Banxso
online platform account and what
trades she should execute
.
On 29 July 2024, the success manager
contacted her for the first time and informed her that she had
already made a profit of approximately
R900.
[36]
According to Wentzel, she had absolutely no idea how any of the
available transactions worked and was completely
reliant on advice.
She states the success manager was aware of it. A
transcript of the following telephonic exchange between them on 3
September 2024,
reflects the following:
‘
The
applicant“you must remember I don't understand anything about
the markets and about these things and you are taking me
by the hand
and I am very grateful about that, do you know what I am trying to
say?”
Success Manager: “Yes
I know.”’
[37]
On 19 August 2024, she informed the success manager due to the
success on her initial
investment, she wished to make a further
deposit of R30 000.00. Numerous telephone and WhatsApp conversations
occurred between
them. According to Wentzel, the success manager
started to place increasing pressure on her to urgently deposit R30
000 as the
market was doing well and if she did not make the deposit
within a few days, she would not receive as good a return as before.
He furnished her with Banxso's Capitec Bank details and on 25 August
2024 she deposited R10 000. On 27 August 2024 she deposited
a further
sum of R20 000 into that account. She made a further profit in the
amount of R5 000.
[38]
Subsequently, Wentzel received numerous phone calls from the success
manager who
increasingly insisted that she make further investments
with Banxso. She was also referred to the Banxso’s referral
scheme.
According to the Banxso website a referral bonus is earned
according to the number of persons referred as follows:
(a) One to five persons –
15% of the initial amount deposited.
(b) Six to ten persons –
20% of the initial amount deposited.
(c) Ten or more persons –
30% of the initial amount deposited.
[39]
According to Wentzel, the success manager became increasingly
insistent, and under
the promise of enormous returns on her
investment, she deposited a further amount of R470 000 into Banxso's
Nedbank account on
6 September 2024. After the deposit of R470
000, the applicant saw the following day on the online Banxso
platform that she
had made a profit of R200 000. According to the
Banxso platform she was continuously making profits on trades, and
she felt assured
that her investment was in good hands.
[40]
On or about 24 September 2024, the applicant opened her Banxso online
trading platform
and noticed that the so-called margin levels were
becoming quite low. She directed enquiries to the success manager
with a requested
to withdraw her funds from Banxso. She was informed
by him not to withdraw her capital. Moments later he contacted her
telephonically
and informed her that his manager had proposed giving
her a recovery bonus of R45 000 to fix the margin levels. He further
advised
that, before the recovery bonus could be processed, she
needed to complete a form which was e-mailed to her. On 24 September
2024
she returned the completed form via WhatsApp as she was unable
to send it via e-mail due to network issues at the time. The success
manager advised her to leave the form for now and the account as is,
until the next day. Later that evening, she received
alert
notifications from the Banxso app on her cell phone. She immediately
logged into her Banxso account and saw that her entire
capital
investment had been wiped out in apparent trading losses.
[41]
The next day, 25 September 2024, she was informed the reason for the
losses was that she did not send the aforesaid
form to them via
e-mail and that Banxso did not accept the form via WhatsApp.
The R45 000 recovery bonus could therefore not
timeously fix the margin levels, which resulted in the loss of all
her money.
[42]
On 26 September 2024, Wentzel received a call from the success
manager, who informed
her that he had spoken with his manager and
that they would be able to make up for her losses with further
trading, should she
deposit a further R500 000. She attempted to
access her online trading platform but was unable to do so. It
appeared that access
to her account was blocked. After further calls
to Banxso, she was only met with a response to invest further funds
to make up
the loss of her monies. She ultimately decided on 23
October 2024 to consult with her attorneys of record.
[43]
So, what is Banxso’s Business model? According to Banxso it
operates as a ‘Straight
Through Processor’. This means it
operates between the client and the liquidity provider. As Banxso
explains:
’
A
client uses the Banxso platform. Banxso, prior to 16 October 2024,
was a licensed Category 1 Financial Services Provider (FSP).
On that
platform, the client enters into a Contract for Difference (CFD) with
these off-shore LPs. A CFD is, in essence, a speculative
trading
position as to the fluctuation in price of a particular commodity
(currency, shares or indices). If the client's position
is that the
price will go up, and it does, they win and make a profit.
Conversely, if the client bets that the price will go down,
and it
goes up, the client loses and occasions a trading loss. These CFDs
are intermediated by Banxso and placed with the offshore
LPs, who
acts as the counterparty, principal and market maker to the trading.
As such, the LP is responsible for the profit and
loss
reconciliation. Accordingly, if the client wins, the LP pays Banxso,
and Banxso credits the client's account accordingly.
If the client
loses, Banxso pays the client's money to the LP
.’
[44]
Banxso’s General Terms and Conditions, attached to the founding
papers, recorded
the following:
’
You can enter a
leveraged CFD transaction with us by placing an order on the Trading
Platform (the "Order"). The Order
shall state your
"position" - "buy" (long) or "sell"
(short), the size of the Transaction, the leverage
rate, and the Rate
(as defined below). . . .The Client deposits funds with the Company
and places an order via a trading platform,
which is managed by the
Company and the Company is responsible for safeguarding of the
clients' funds. Upon receipt of the order,
it is immediately opened
by the third party through the company's trading platform. In this
respect, the Company executes the client
order by acting as a broker
(STP broker
)’.
[45]
According to Banxso, it acts like an agent and the enrichment which
derives from Wentzel’s
and the other claimant’s loss, if
any, is not with them but lies with LP. Banxso further
explained that if there are
any shortcomings in its business model,
it will be working hard with the FSCA, to regulate its business.
[46]
In practice Banxso alleges it employs the use of a Metaquotes MT4/5
trading platform. This platform
is apparently an industry-standard
software, ensuring that live pricing feeds (drawn from market data)
are reflected in respect
of the commodities offered by the company.
Neither Banxso nor the liquidity provider determines trading margins
between buy and
sell arbitrarily but instead these are predetermined
being subject to live trading data as influenced by market
conditions.
[47]
A client will enter into a CFD with an offshore LP. The CFDs are thus
intermediated by Banxso
and placed with offshore LPs who act as the
counterparty, principal and market maker to the trading. As such, the
LP is responsible
for the profit and loss reconciliation.
Accordingly, if the client wins, the liquidity provider pays Banxso
and Banxso credits
the client’s account accordingly. If the
client loses, Banxso pays the client’s money to the liquidity
provider. In
its further answering affidavit Banxso explained that it
is ‘
an intermediary, and the liquidity provider is the
market maker. As such, while the liquidity is provided by the
liquidity provider,
it is Banxso who has an agreement with the
client
.’
[48]
According to Banxso it employed the services of three different LPs
from time to
time depending on whichever provided the best pricing
and most effective trading to clients. The LPs are the following:
(a)
Flamingo Clearing House Limited (FCH), registered
in the Comores;
(b)
Flamingo Capital Services LLC (FCS), registered in
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines;
(c)
Eclat Technologies Limited (Eclat),
registered in Mauritius.
In its answering
affidavit, Banxso provided a schedule of alleged payments to Flamingo
Clearing House via FiveWest OTC Desk Pty
(Ltd) and Blockkoin.
Banxso’s attorneys explained it as follows:
‘
Following
periodical reconciliation of client profits and losses, the company
remits funds to its offshore LP (FCH) at its instruction
and
direction and moreover, to its nominated account. In doing so, funds
are deposited with Fivewest - in ZAR and by EFT to Fivewest's
nominated bank account (the local account confirmations being
herewith enclosed, marked as annexure
"A6")
-
where the LP holds an account. As such, Fivewest accepts these funds
on behalf of the LP and, in turn, remits them abroad through
its
global payment service and treasury management offering (please see:
https://www.fivewest.co.za/international-payments).
For purposes of the
aforesaid, both Banxso and the LP have separate accounts with
Fivewest, in order to streamline the remittance
of these funds.
Notably, Banxso does not have any specific service level agreement
with Fivewest (nor Blockkoin) for the aforesaid
functionality and
instead is subject to Fivewest's standard terms and conditions.
Accordingly, it Fivewest's services much like
any other corporate
client. In respect of the remittance of funds, the LP then issues
Banxso with receipts, which is kept for record
and accounting
purposes.’
[49]
In clarification, Banxso recorded that it transfers money into an
account named “FiveWest OTC
Desk (Pty) Ltd and Blockkoin (Pty)
Ltd who in
turn transfer the fiat money (into cryptocurrency)
to Banxso’s liquidity provider, as
it does
not have an account in its own name with FiveWest.
[50]
In Banxso’s standard terms and conditions Banxso’s
clients are informed that: ‘”
Liquidity provider”
means ”
a third-party company that underwrites or
provides the financing for transactions and makes a market for a
given asset”.
”
The Liquidity Provider is the sole
Execution Venue for the execution of Client Orders. The Company acts
as an agent on the Client's
behalf, and the sole Execution Venue for
the execution of Client Orders is the Liquidity Provider”.’
The
FSCA
[51]
The FSCA investigation established that the sole shareholder of
Banxso, is Mr. Sekler,
an Israeli based attorney. He is also
the shareholder and beneficial owner of the three LPs allegedly used
by Banxso.
[52]
The investigation by the FSCA also established that Eclat was not
allowed to provide
LP services to third parties and that Banxso did
not place any of its clients’ business with them. In respect of
FCS, it
was established that it is a limited liability company and
does not regulate LPs. Moreover, the FSCA uncovered the FCS’s
business description bears no relevance to the activities of LPs as
it was a business advisory and solutions firm. With reference
to FCH,
it was established that only two payments of R 100 000 each were
made during April 2024 to FCH, whilst during the
period January 2022
to April 2024 more than R 880 million was received by Banxso from
clients. According to the FSCA, the flow
of monies is not consistent
with FCH being a LP during the relevant period.
[53]
The FSC ultimately expressed a view that that Banxso has materially
contravened numerous
financial sector laws and it will be in best
interest of the clients that the funds be transferred to the control
of an independent
person pending the outcome of a final decision.
Banxso was not oppose to utilizing a local LP, to appease the FSCA.
[54]
The FSCA has in detail set out the reasons why it decided to
provisional withdrew Banxo’s
FSP license. The allegations
underpinning the complaints by Banxso’s clients were the
following:
(a) The complainants saw
various advertisements that were circulating on social media,
including a news article which purported
to be from the South African
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) relating to an investment platform
known as Immediate Matrix. The
news article stated that Tesla/Elon
Musk launched a new platform, called Immediate Matrix, (IM) which was
an automated trading
platform aimed at helping families become
wealthier;
(b) The news article and
advertisements (videos) referred to a minimum investment deposit of
R4 700, with a promised return
of R34 300 within a week.
This equated to a return of approximately 730% in one week:
(c) the IM webpage
reflected that prospective investors would be contacted but it did
not explain who would be contacting the prospective
investors.
However, after the prospective investors submitted their details,
within minutes; they were contacted by one of Banxso’s
agents
through SMS, email or telephone call;
(d) in addition to the
promotional videos and news articles with a link, Immediate Matrix
also had a website. On IM’s website,
prospective investors were
requested to submit their personal details. However, the process
differed slightly on the website compared
to the advertisements, in
that on the website, once the details were captured and the ’submit’
button clicked, the
website redirected the prospective investors to a
‘thank you’ webpage. On the ‘thank you’
webpage, another
button called ’continue to account’
popped up. After clicking the ‘continue to account’
button, it redirected
the prospective investors to Banxso’s
website, with another pop-up to make a deposit into the newly created
account with
Banxso;
(e) the Banxso agents
assisted them with opening trading accounts and solicited the initial
deposit from the prospective client
as advertised by IM. After making
the deposits, the agents directed the investors to enter specific
trades derivatives, which ultimately
led to massive trading losses;
(f) the consultants used
aggressive and high-pressure sales techniques to convince investors
to invest additional funds;
(g) the complainants were
lured by the deepfake videos featuring celebrities / prominent
persons and which promised high returns;
(h) they also alleged
that once they invested with Banxso, Banxso failed to process their
withdrawal requests timeously and did
not disclose material
information such as swap fees and the risks associated with trading.
[55]
The FSCA, ultimately recorded that having regard to the complaints,
and its own investigation,
including an analyses of Banxso’s
bank accounts, it established that: The deepfake advertisements
appeared to have been created
by IM, a fictitious entity with no real
corporate persona; the identities of the celebrities and prominent
persons featured in
the deepfake videos were fraudulently used; The
videos and news articles contained electronic links that led to an IM
webpage,
through which prospective investors could provide their
personal details, as well as their contact details; when the
prospective
clients clicked on the link on the deepfake
advertisements, they were redirected to Banxso’s website. The
clients’
funds were then transferred into Banxso’s bank
account. The products offered by Banxso were similar to the ones on
the deepfake
advertisement. The client deposits into the various
Banxso bank accounts were consistent with the investment
opportunities advertised
through the deepfake advertisements; the IM
webpage reflected that prospective investors who submitted their
personal information
would receive a call from a person who would
assist the prospective investors in setting up their trading accounts
in derivatives.
The prospective investors were contacted by Banxso
agents who fulfilled the commitments made by IM in the deepfake
advertisements;
Banxso agents contacted clients and confirmed that
they were calling because the prospective clients showed interest in
the IM
product or in connection with the advertisements which
featured the prominent persons; the deposits into Banxso’s bank
accounts
increased significantly when the deepfake advertisements
gained prominence; and a high number of clients confirmed that they
invested
with Banxso because of the deepfake advertisements.
[56]
Banxo denied any association with the IM scheme and disputes the
FSCA’s findings.
According to Banxso it did not act
fraudulently or unlawfully and intends to traverse the FSCA’s
findings in the appropriate
forums. It admitted that its website
called for an industry standard deposit of roughly 250 US dollars,
translating to approximately
R 4 700 (at the time) and is a
figure which IM also used in their marketing material.
[57]
Banxso explains that IM has no affiliation to them and have operated
parasitically
on its platform causing it great prejudice. According
to Banxso, it found that many complaints were not genuine IM scheme
related
but rather disgruntled clients who might have experienced
some loss or other issue on the Banxso platform. The original number
was accordingly whittled down from over a hundred to seventy
complaints. Banxso recorded it since has paid out
R67 574 002.47
worth of refunds of which R14 million was
identified as being IM scheme related.
[58]
The FSCA, investigated five different bank accounts utilized by
Banxso during the
relevant period. There were three different
accounts at Standard Bank. One at Nedbank and one at Capitec. The
FSCA commented as
follows:
Standard Bank account
no. xxxxxx592
[59]
It is a separate account designated for client funds; clients who
took up products
through Banxso, should have deposited their funds
into this account. These funds were supposed to be remitted to a
product provider,
in this case the issuers of Contracts for
Difference, which the clients believed were their investment
products. During the period
from January 2022 to April 2024,
approximately R945 million was deposited into this account. This
amount comprised clients’
deposits of approximately R736
million. Transfers of approximately R99 million from Banxso Standard
Bank account number xxxxxx000;
and approximately R110 million
transfers from Banxso Standard Bank account number xxxxxxx001. During
the abovementioned period,
payments including cash withdrawals of
approximately R912 million were made from this account. The most
notable payments and transfers
were the following: approximately R94
million which appeared to be paid to clients; approximately R608
million transferred to Banxso
Standard Bank account number xxxxxx000;
approximately R162 million transferred to Banxso Standard Bank
account number xxxxxx001;
approximately R4 million paid to FiveWest
(Pty)Ltd (FiveWest), an authorized crypto asset service provider.
According to Banxso,
they deposited funds to FiveWest’ s bank
account because it is where the liquidity provider holds an account.
Banxso claimed
that FiveWest accepts the funds on behalf of the
liquidity provider and remits them abroad to the liquidity provider
through their
(FiveWest) payment system. The analysis of this bank
account showed an amount of approximately R43 million worth of
personal/business
payments. The personal/Business payments were made
at, inter alia, Vodacom, Woolworths, Pick ʼn Pay, Bay Hotel and
the Bar
Keeper. From the analysis of these accounts, it appears that
a significant number of clients’ funds were used for personal
and or business-related expenses.
Standard Bank Account
Number xxxxxx5083
[60]
During the period from January 2022 to April 2024, approximately R941
million was
deposited into this account. This amount comprised of
approximately R608 million transfers from Standard Bank account
number xxxxxx592;
approximately R293.5 million credit card
transactions; approximately R17 million from various entities;
approximately R16 million
transfers from Banxso Standard Bank account
number xxxxxxx001; R 6 million was direct deposits from clients.
[61]
The FSCA commented that the account was not a separate account
designated to receive
clients’ funds although the bulk of the
monies (R608 million) in the account were transferred from such an
account of Banxso.
The FSCA recorded that during the abovementioned
period, payments, cash withdrawals and transfers of approximately
R933 million
were made from this account. The most notable payments
and transfers were the following: approximately R581 million paid to
FiveWest;
approximately R99 million transferred to Banxso Standard
Bank account number xxxxxx592; approximately R52.5 million was paid
to
what appeared to be clients; approximately R1.5 million was
transferred to other Banxso bank accounts; approximately R162 million
was paid to various entities such as Sars and service providers like
Toshiba, Pointline and Red House; approximately R5.3 million
worth of
credit card transaction; approximately R5 million were personal and
or business transactions; approximately R3.75 million
was paid to the
General Manager of Banxso, who filed the answering papers on its
behalf; and approximately R100 000 was paid
to Flamingo
Clearing House.
[62]
The FSCA holds the view that upon the analysis of this account, some
client funds
were used for personal and or business-related payments.
Standard Bank Account
Number xxxxxxx001
[63]
During the period from June 2023 to March 2024, approximately R156
million was deposited
into this account. This amount comprised of
approximately R149 million transfers from Banxso Standard Bank
account number xxxxxx592
and approximately R5.5 million transfers
from Banxso Standard Bank account number xxxxxx083. Most of the funds
in this account
were clients’ funds. According to the FSCA
records, this account was not a separate account designated for
client funds.
[64]
During the abovementioned period, transfers of approximately R126
million were made
from this account. The transfers comprised of
approximately R110 million to Banxso Standard Bank account number
xxxxxx592 and approximately
R16 million transferred to Banxso
Standard Bank account number xxxxxx083.
Nedbank Account Number
xxxxxxx486
[65]
During the period from April 2022 to April 2024, approximately R137
million was deposited
into this account. Approximately R136 million
of the above total appeared to be direct deposits from clients.
According to the
FSCA’s records, this account was not a
separate account designated for client funds.
During the abovementioned
period, payments of approximately R62 million were made from this
account. The most notable payments were
the following: approximately
R23.6 million paid to Fivewest; approximately R18 million transferred
to Banxso Standard Bank account
number xxxxxx592; approximately R5.5
million paid to Blockkoin (Pty)Ltd, also a crypto asset service
provider); approximately R6.6
million was paid to what appeared to be
clients funds; and approximately R100 000 was paid to Flamingo
Clearing House.
Capitec Account Number
xxxxxxx004
[66]
During the period from April 2024 to September 2024, approximately
R12 million was deposited into Banxso Capitec account number
xxxxxxx004. Approximately R11 million of the above total appeared to
be direct deposits from clients and the balance of approximately R1
million appeared to be transfers from other Banxso bank accounts.
According to the FSCA records, this account was not a separate
account designated for clients’ funds. It needs to be mentioned
that Banxso did not deny the South African Reserve Bank instructed
Capitec to block certain funds held in one of Banxso’s
accounts, due to the transaction being of a suspicious nature. The
suspicious transaction was a transfer of R 1, 322, 446.00 to
a Cyprus
registered entity XF Solutions Ltd which is owned by Mr. Sekler, a
director of Banxso. According to the FSCA, payments
of
approximately R169 000 were made from this account during the
above-mentioned period, and the payments appeared to be made to
clients.
[67]
From the above analysis of Banxso’s bank accounts, the FSCA
concluded that:
not all clients’ funds were invested; funds
were co-mingled with business funds and client funds were not easily
and or readily
discernible. Moreover, Banxso transferred clients’
funds to other Banxso bank accounts which were not designated
accounts
to hold such funds and clients’ funds were
misappropriated and used for personal and business expenses.
Furthermore, no significant
payments were made to product providers
or liquidity providers who were supposedly the issuers of the CFDs.
[68]
The FSCA further recorded that although approximately R615 million
was paid to FiveWest
and Blockkoin, direct payments made to liquidity
providers were minimal. The FSCA, also stated that according to
Fivewest and Blockkoin,
they did not make payments to the liquidity
providers. What Banxso did was to deposit and or transferred fiat
currency to them
with the intention to purchase crypto assets (USDT).
The USDT was then transferred on the Blockchain to Banxso’s
crypto wallets.
[69]
According to FSCA, several of the General Code of Conduct for
Authorised Financial
Services Providers and Representatives were
contravened by Banxso, including sections of the
Financial
Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001
, in that Banxso, a
financial institution, failed to exercise proper care and diligence
when handling trust property held in the
separate account designated
to hold clients’ funds; section 8A(a) of the FAIS Act
[20]
and section 139(5) of the FSR Act
[21]
.
[70]
In the supplementary founding papers, it was further recorded that a
total of 130
of Banxso’s investors registered on the online
portal w[...] as at 5 November 2024. According to the webpage a total
amount
of R 133, 386, 078,49 was invested and loss through dealings
with Banxso; numerous clients of Banxso were provided with an ABSA
account purportedly in the name of (AS BANXSO) with and account
number; it was later established the actual account holder of the
account is in fact a company called Ahead Start (Pty) Ltd (Ahead
Start); Banxso also utilized an FNB account which clients were
led to
believe was in the name of AS Banxso (Pty) Ltd; it was however
established the actual account holder is a company called
Valor Vault
(Pty) Ltd (Valor Vault).
[71]
Banxso denied the clients funds were comingled and recorded in its
papers the following
bank accounts containing client funds:
(a)
Standard bank account xxxx592 (containing
R8 069 138.20);
(b)
Standard bank account xxxx001 (containing
R25 221 694.69);
(c)
Nedbank account xxxx486 (containing
R23 363 196.45); and
(d)
Capitec account xxxx004 (containing
R12 718 266.77).
[72]
The following bank accounts were recorded holding operational funds:
(a)
Standard bank accounts xxxx083 (containing
R23 047 183.54);
(b)
Capitec account xxxx008 (containing R88 732.00);
and
(c)
Capitec account xxxx545 (containing R9 992.66).
[73]
Banxso does not dispute it made use of call agents. It apparently
employed internal
call agents for some time, however in April 2024
the entire department was retrenched. According to Banxso, it has
since been making
use of outsourced call agents and the majority of
these outsourced call agents are complying with its policies, not
providing financial
advice, and not employing high-pressure sales
techniques.
[74]
Banxso also alluded to its marketing strategies that apparently are
accurate, provide
reliable information, and referred inter alia, to
Google, Facebook, News24 and Moneyweb, including the sponsoring of a
famous South
African MMA fighter, and the national football team, in
support of its claim.
Legality of the
Business
[75]
Banxso’s business is dependent upon the participation of a
legitimate LP. It
is therefore important to look at Banxso’s
business operation as a whole, considering the statutory framework in
which it
must operate. Looking past the veneer, the legality of
Banxso’s business model and the claim it operates as a Straight
Through Processor is highly questionable.
[76]
Although Banxso denies there was an intention to benefit off the IM
scheme, and only
70 complaints related thereto, the evidence shows
differently. The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that deposits
into Banxso’s
bank accounts increased significantly when the
deepfake advertisements gained prominence. Numerous clients confirmed
that they
invested with Banxso because of the deepfake
advertisements. Banxso’s claim is also inconsistent with the
statement of a
key individual and internal compliance officer at
Banxso at the time. According to his testimony before the FSCA,
clients that
came from IM was difficult to track because they came
through a normal onboarding process.
[22]
But more importantly, irrespective of who was behind the IM scheme
there can be no bona fide dispute that Banxso have benefited
enormously through the onboarding of clients who were lured to its
platform via the IM scheme. Furthermore, the service agents
of Banxso
did not correct a new client when it was clear that the client was
lured through the IM scheme but continued to onboard
clients until
October 2024 when the license was provisionally withdrawn,
notwithstanding becoming aware of the IM scheme as long
ago as
December 2023. It follows, Banxso paid mere lip service to prevent
its agents from onboarding clients lured through the
IM scheme. The
undertaking by Banxso to have better oversite over these agents is
unlkely as most are working at outsourced call
centers stationed in
foreign countries. It is also difficult to understand how Banxso will
be able to have proper oversight control
and disciplinary over agents
if most are working at outsourced call-centers stationed in different
foreign countries.
[77]
The contention by Wentzel that she was lured by the deepfake IM
scheme can therefore
not be discarded as highly improbable. There is
also no objective evidence that she otherwise willingly connected
through an internal
Slava funnel to sign up, as suggested by Banxso.
On the papers filed, there is no reference of an internal Slava
funnel at Banxso.
It follows, Wentzel’s version is plausable.
[78]
The claim by Banxso that it settled and refunded clients also came
under the spotlight.
The evidence of Banxo’s clients does not
fully support its claim. According to some of Banxso’s clients
once an internal
complaint has been lodged, normally after the loss
of their initial investment, the success manager will furnish the
client with
a bonus application, which in essence provides the client
with a trading credit. The main complaint by the clients was that the
credit only allows further trading and if a withdrawal is allowed it
will be a relatively small amount. The clients’ complaint
is
supported by Banxso’ bank accounts. Small amounts were paid to
them whereas vast amounts were deposited into Banxso’s
bank
accounts.
[79]
The denial by Banxso that there were no co-mingling of funds or funds
used for personal
and or business-related expenses, is also not
supported by objective facts. Banxso failed to deal properly with the
allegations
that certain of its accounts were separate and designated
to receive clients’ funds. Vast amounts of clients’ funds
were transferred to interrelated bank accounts of Banxso. A
disturbing feature in all of this is the relative small amount of
monies paid to investors in relation to their initial investment,
whilst hundreds of millions of rands flowed through Banxso’s
bank accounts to be converted into cryptocurrency.
[80]
The explanation provided by Banxso that it would transfer money into
an account named
’FiveWest and Blockkoin’” who in
turn transfer the fiat money (into cryptocurrency) to Banxso’s
liquidity
provider, does not accord with the evidence established by
the FSCA. According to the FSCA, FiveWest and Blockkoin denied making
payments to LPs. According to FiveWest and Blockkoin, what Banxso did
was to deposit and or transferred fiat currency to them with
the
intention to purchase crypto assets (USDT). The USDT was then
transferred on the Blockchain to Banxso’s crypto wallets.
The
latter is in stark contrast to what Banxso said that: ‘
all
trades are conducted with an off-shore liquidity provider who acts as
the counterparty and market maker in respect thereof
’.
[81]
There is also no evidence to support the extent to which the LP
performed as market
maker or how and when the LP provided liquidity
to Banxso’s clients to trade. The alleged proof of payments to
FCH as an
LP via FiveWest and Blockkoin are equally unsatisfactory.
There is no explanation who prepared the documents, the source of the
information and the wallets into which the USDT cryptocurrency was
deposited. There is also great uncertainty whether investors
were
properly underwritten by an LP.
[82]
Another area of concern is the extent to which Banxso received
payments for its alleged
intermediary services. There is no
indication on the papers filed that an LP paid Banxso for such
services rendered. In fact, the
General Terms and Conditions of
Banxso
[23]
shows the rate
displayed on the website is determined by it and includes a certain
margin between the buy and sell rate which ultimately
constitutes the
profit Banxso makes from each transaction. The latter is different to
Banxso’s version, that neither it nor
the liquidity provider
determines trading margins between buy and sell arbitrarily but are
predetermined by live trading data as
influenced by market
conditions. The latter cannot be correct because in order for
Banxso to make a profit the trading rates
needed to be manipulated.
Banxso’s evidence that it only functions as an intermediary and
does not derive a right to the
monies in its bank accounts is
therefore unlikely. It is obvious Banxso benefits directly when an
investment took place whether
the client suffer a loss or not.
[83]
Banxso’s other functions of inter alia, retaining investors
funds to do reconciliation
before paying the liquidity provider,
paying trading and referral bonuses to clients, providing negative
balance protection and
replenishes clients’ accounts to zero to
avoid them having to pay the full value for their losses, do not
support the contention
of a ‘Straight Through Processor’
in the true sense of the word.
[84]
On a conspectus of all the evidence, Wentzel and the Intervening
Parties complaint
that Banxso’s business model is illegal and
does not operate within the confines of the law, is not without
merit. Prima
facie it has been established that prospective investors
were contacted by Banxso agents who fulfilled the commitments made by
IM in the deepfake advertisements; Banxso agents contacted clients
and confirmed that they were calling because the prospective
clients
showed interest in the IM product or in connection with the
advertisements which featured the prominent persons; a high
number of
clients confirmed that they invested with Banxso because of the
deepfake advertisements and undoubtedly, Banxso profited
handsomely
from their investments. The deepfake advertisements were clearly
designed to lure client under false pretenses to invest
their moneys
in products with a promise of unrealistic returns on such
investments. There is also no doubt that agents gave investment
advice to clients contrary to Banxso’s FSP license.
[85]
The contention that the enrichment which derives from Wentzel and the
other claimant’s
loss, lies with the liquidity provider, is
also unpersuasive. Banxso, in my view did all the functions of a LP,
despite the multiple
off-shore entities it listed as LPs. In any
event, Sekler is a shareholder of Banxso and FCH. The losses of
Banxso’s clients
are the profit of a LP. Banxso has acquired
and transferred cryptocurrency to FCH in the amount of R 319, 985,
959, 00 for the
period 17 April 2023 to 29 December 2023. For the
year 2024 a further total of R672 192 435 was transferred in this
manner. This
equates to a handsome profit of just over R 990 million
that were pocketed from the misfortunes of Banxso’s clients. In
addition,
further deposits by investors found its way in bank
accounts of AheadStart and Volor Vault that remains unexplained by
Banxso.
[86]
Another disturbing feature of Banxso is despite that its license was
suspended, it
continued trading. Banxso advanced the following
explanation: “no live trading can take place, because there is
no flow of
funds between the client and counter-party to any CFD.
Simply put, no profit or loss reconciliation can and/or has been done
and
as such, no profit or loss allocation can be attributed to any
client’s account. Any indication to the contrary, is merely
a
visual illustration and amounts to what can be regarded as a
“simulated” or “demo” trading environment.
This is symptomatic of the fact that the MT4 trading platform has
remained active and cannot be fully switched off, as it would
adversely affect client’s open positions which have already
been impacted by the temporary freeze of the accounts.”
This
explanation is seriously worrying as it goes to the heart of Banxso’s
business model. What it shows is that Banxso’s
clients were
trading on a simulated or demo trading environment not knowing about
it. These clients were therefore brought under
a false pretense that
they were doing live trading. The latter is nothing but a deception
in the true sense of the word. The fact
that monies may be paid back
does not undo the deceptive conduct. Furthermore, according to Banxso
it determines the trading rates
to make a profit. The question thus
arises how Banxso did it in these circumstances if it was only a
simulated training environment,
as investors lost their initial
investments. This is a further illustration that it is highly
unlikely that Banxso operated as
a “Straight Through
Processor”.
[87]
On a conspectus of all the evidence, I am satisfied that Wentzel has
established on a prima facie basis, that Banxso does not
operates within the confines of the law, and its business model is
illegal.
It follows the refusal by Wentzel and the Intervening
Parties to accept the provision of security via a stakeholder of
Banxso cannot
be seen as an abuse of process.
[88]
Wentzel, like all other investors, including the Intervening Parties
has thus a prima
facie claim under the condictio ob turpem.
[89]
In view of the abovementioned,
the way Banxso
solicited investments from the public and the manner in which the
losses occurred, militate against the exercise
of a discretion in its
favour. It follows that Wentzel made a case out for the relief sought
in the notice motion.
[90]
In the result the following order is made.
1.
The order ‘X made order of this Court.
Le
Grange, J
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant &
Intervening parties:
R van Rooyen SC
MM van
Staden
Instructed
by:
Mostert & Bosman
For the first
respondent:
J Muller SC
B
Prinsloo
J
Aspeling
Instructed
by:
Hanekom Attorneys
For the third
respondent:
S Miller SC
R
Fitzgerald
Instructed by:
Robert Chanles Inc
X
Republic of South
Africa
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
[WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN]
Before the Honourable
Judge Le Grange
At Cape Town on 22
August 2025
Case
no: 23249/2024
In the matter between:
CAROL
MARGARET WENTZEL
Applicant
And
BANXSO
(PTY) LTD
First
Respondent
THE
FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE
Second
Respondent
FINANCIAL
SECTOR CONDUCT AUTHORITY
Third
Respondent
NATIONAL
DIRECRTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
Fourth
Respondent
HASSEN
KAJIE N.O
Fifth
Respondent
And
In
the matter between:
DAVID
VAN DER MERWE
First
Intervening Party
NICK
RICHARD WEGGELAAR
Second
Intervening Party
LEON
ALBERTUS DE MAN
Third
Intervening Party
SAUL
GEOFFREY RUDOLPH
Fourth
Intervening Party
BAREND
UYS VAN NIEKERK
Fifth
Intervening Party
CORNELIA
MAGDALENA HUMAN
Sixth
Intervening Party
THEO
JOHAN SCHOEMAN
Seventh
Intervening Party
MARIANA
MARYNA DUVENHAGE
Eight
Intervening Party
ENGELBRECHT
LENZZ NEETHLING
Ninth
Intervening Party
MARLEEN
SMIT
Tenth
Intervening Party
CHRISTIAAN
THOEDORE BRUYNS
Eleventh
Intervening Party
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1.
The Intervening Parties are granted leave to intervene as applicants
in this application
and, in future documents in this application,
shall be referred to as the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Eight,
Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Applicant respectively. The
Applicant shall be referred to as the First Applicant.
2.
The striking out application of the Applicant and Intervening Parties
is granted and
the following parts of the First Respondent’s
affidavits shall be struck out:
2.1
The First Respondent’s answering affidavit: Paragraphs 113-120,
293.1 (the portion
which reads ‘I refer to what I have set out
above concerning the touting activities of the applicant’s
attorney.’)
312.4; and the annexures referred to in these
paragraphs.
2.2
The First Respondent’s further answering affidavit: Paragraphs
5.2, 5.4 (the portion
which reads, ‘have touted their way to
twelve disgruntled Banxso clients. ’), 6-11, 12 (the portion
which reads, ‘Those
offers are rejected out of hand by M&B.’),
17 (the portion which reads, ‘and/or proceeded to give this bad
advice
to their clients thereafter.’), 18,21-22,31 (the portion
which reads, ‘It appears that the FSCA was asked for these
items and proceeded to advise M&B to simply issue them with a
subpoena as a “cover” for being able to justify their
delivery.’), 195 (the portion that reads, ‘M&B has
proceeded in this liquidation for their own interests.’),
196
(the portion which reads, ‘given that Ms Wentzel et al appear
to be M&B proxies.’), and the annexures referred
to in
these paragraphs.
3.
The First Respondent’s striking out application is dismissed.
4.
The First Respondent is placed under provisional liquidation.
5.
A rule nisi do issue calling upon the First Respondent and all other
interested
parties to give reasons, if any, on 17 October 2025 why:
5.1
The First Respondent should not be finally liquidated.
5.2
The costs of this application should not be costs in the liquidation
of the
Respondent, which costs
are to include the costs of two counsel, with scale C to apply in
respect of senior counsel and scale B
in respect of junior counsel.
6.
Service of this order be effected by:
6.1.
one publication in each of the Cape Times and Burger newspapers and
the government gazette.
6.2.
service on the South African Revenue Service at 1[...] L[...] L[...]
Street, Cape Town.
6.3.
service on the Respondent at the Respondent’s registered
address being 2
nd
Floor H[...] W[...], 1[...] S[...]
Street, De Waterkant, Cape Town,
6.4.
service on the Respondent’s employees, if any, at the
Respondent’s business address
being 2
nd
Floor
H[...] W[...], 1[...] S[...] Street, De Waterkant, Cape Town,
by affixing a copy of the application and order to any
notice board
to which the employees have access inside the Respondent’s
premises or, if there is no access to the premises
by the employees,
by affixing copies to the front gate, if applicable, failing which,
to the front door of the premises.
6.5.
service on all registered trade unions, if any, representing the
Respondent’s employees.
By Order of the court
Court Registrar
[1]
A CFD
is an essence a speculative trading position as to the fluctuation
in price of a particular commodity (currency, shares
or indices). If
the client's position is that the price will go up, and does, they
will win and make a profit. Conversely, if
the client bets that the
price will go down, and it goes up the client loses and suffers a
trading loss.
[2]
In
Afrisure
CC v Watson NO
[2008] ZASCA 89
;
2009
(2) SA 127
SCA at para 5, the CSA held that: the central requirement
of the
condictio
ob turpem vel iniustam causam,
is
that the amount claimed must have been transferred pursuant to an
agreement that is void and unenforceable because it is illegal,
ie
because it is prohibited by law;
Chevron
SA (Pty) Limited v Wilson t/a Wilson's Transport and Others
(CCT
88/14)
[2015] ZACC 15
; (5 June 2015).
[3]
Rule
12. Intervention of persons as plaintiffs or defendants: Any person
entitled to join as a plaintiff or liable to be joined
as a
defendant in any action may, on notice to all parties, at any stage
of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as a
plaintiff or a
defendant. The court may upon such application make such order,
including any order as to costs, and give such
directions as to
further procedure in the action as to it may seem meet. By virtue of
the provisions of Rule 6(14) this rule
is also applies to
applications.
[4]
See
Rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules of Court;
Helen
Suzman foundation v President RSA
2015
(2) SA 1
15 CC at para 28.
[5]
Vaatz
v Law Society of Namibia
1991
(3) SA 563
(Nm) at 566 C-E.
[6]
See
Helen Suzman supra.
[7]
The
Rule provides the following: . . .
no
tout for professional work
.
A member will be regarded as being guilty of touting for
professional work if he or she either personally or through the
agency
of another, procures or seeks to procure, or solicits for,
professional work in an improper or unprofessional manner or by
unfair
means, all of which for purposes of this rule will include,
but not be limited to: 49.17.1 the payment of money, or the offering
of any financial reward or other inducement of any kind whatsoever,
directly or indirectly, to any person, in return for the
referral of
professional work; or 49.17.2 directly or indirectly participating
in an arrangement or scheme of operation resulting
in, or calculated
to result in, the member's securing professional work solicited by a
third party. For purposes of this rule
49.17 "professional
work", in addition to work which may by law or regulation
promulgated under any law be performed
only by a practitioner, means
such other work as is properly or commonly performed by or
associated with the practice of a practitioner.
[8]
Campbell
and another v Kwapa and another
2002
(6) SA 379.
See also
Steyn
v Meyer
(59537/2021)
[2022] ZAGPPHC (13 October 2022);
SP
v SB
(2025/05447)
[2025] ZAWCHC 253
(19 June 2025).
[9]
Federated
Trust Ltd v Botha
1978
(3) AD at 654 C.
[10]
Oudekraal
Estate (Pty) Ltd v Ciy of Cape Town
2004
(6) SA 222 (SCA).
[11]
[2017]
4 All SA 624
(SCA) at para 10.
[12]
Lagoon
Beach Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Lehane NO and another
2016 (3) SA 143
(SCA)
at para 16.
[13]
Nkengana
and another v Schnetler and another
[2011] 1 All SA 272
(SCA) at
para 10.
[14]
(
Kalil
v Decotex (Pty) Ltd
1988
(1) SA 932
(A)
at 975J-979(F).
[15]
Badenhorst v Northern
Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
1956
(2) SA 346
(T)
at 347H-348C.
[16]
Payslip Investment
Holdings CC v Y2K Tec Ltd
2001
(4) SA 781
(C)
at 783G-I.
[17]
Hülse-Reutter &
Another v HEG Consulting Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
1998
(2) SA 208
(C)
at 218D-219C.
[18]
The South African
Reserve Bank instructed Capitec to block certain funds held in one
of Banxso’s Standard Bank accounts,
due to the transaction
being of a suspicious nature. The suspicious transaction was a
transfer of R322 446.00 to a Cyprus registered
entity XF Solutions
Ltd which is earned by Mr. Sekler, being a director of Banxso.
[19]
See
National Credit Regulator v Opperman
2013 (2) SA 1
CC, para 15.
[20]
Banxso
no longer complies with the fit and proper requirements relating to
honesty and integrity in that Banxso misled and provided
false
information to clients regarding inter alia; its association with
Immediate Matrix, the contents of the deepfake videos,
the
unrealistic returns promised to investors, the use of the clients’
funds which ended up misappropriated.
[21]
by
providing the investigators with false and/or misleading information
which Banxso knew was false and/or misleading. Banxso
informed
investigators that the company was neither associated with Immediate
Matrix not the deepfake videos. In fact, Banxso
claimed it was a
victim of a scam or cyber-attack by Immediate Matrix, when in fact,
they (Banxso) were the main beneficiary
of the Immediate Matrix
marketing campaign. As already discussed, Banxso’s denials
were false.
[22]
The
recording reads as follows: “When you come to land on our
website and you sign up, we do not know where you come from.
We know
you just came to our website”.
[23]
The
General Terms and Condition; reads as follow at 5.11- 5.14’5.11.
By placing an order, you represent that you have fully
understood:
5.12. the risks involved in the transaction (including but not
limited to those detailed in our Risk Disclosure Policy);5.13.
that
by entering a Transaction you are not gaining any access or right to
the Underlying Assets; and 5.14
.
that all transactions are entered into and closed in accordance with
the rate as displayed on the Website (the “Rate”),
which
we determine at our sole discretion. You acknowledge and agree that
such right does not reflect any ‘market price’
or rates
quoted by any third party. The Rate is determined by us in such a
way as to include a certain margin between the “Buy”
and
“Sale” Rates which constitutes our profit from each
Transaction.”
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