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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Reggio and Another v Regional Magistrate, Bellville and Another (Leave to Appeal) (18554/23)
[2025] ZAWCHC 538 (20 November 2025)
Reggio and Another v Regional Magistrate, Bellville and Another (Leave to Appeal) (18554/23)
[2025] ZAWCHC 538 (20 November 2025)
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sino date 20 November 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
No: 18554/23
In the matter between
LUCA
REGGIO
1
st
APPLICANT
MICHELA
MORONI
2
nd
APPLICANT
AND
REGIONAL
MAGISTRATE, BELLVILLE
1
st
RESPONDENT
DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, WC
2
nd
RESPONDENT
CORAM: THULARE J;
MTHIMUNYE AJ
Date of Hearing :
09 October 2025
Date of Delivering :
20 November 2025
JUDGMENT ON
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
THULARE J
ORDER
(a)
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
[1] This is an opposed
application for leave to appeal against the judgment of this court
which dismissed a review application brought
by the applicants
against a judgment of the 1
st
respondent. The applicants
face criminal charges before the 1
st
respondent instituted
by the 2
nd
respondent. The applicants served a notice
requesting further particulars in terms of section 87 of the Criminal
Procedure Act,
1977 (Act No. 51 of 1977) (the CPA). The 2
nd
respondent responded to the request. According to the applicants,
they received incorrect and incomplete documents. The 2
nd
respondents answer was that the complainant company files were kept
by the first applicant and that after diligent search of the
complainant company premises after the 1
st
applicant left,
the company was unable to find the documents sought by the
applicants. On other documents sought, the response
was that 1
st
applicant did not provide the company with the description of his
monthly expenses, was responsible and handled the general ledger
and
the complainant company did not find any other documentation or
general ledger after he left.
[2] It was the provision
of further information sought by the applicants, including those
documents, which occasioned postponements
and upon which the
applicants brought the section 342A of the CPA application. The
applicants submit that they would be unable
to defend themselves as
the 2
nd
respondent failed to comply with their section 87
notice by providing further and better particulars essential for
their defence
and that as a result the applicants were left
completely empty-handed and had no means to mount a defence.
[3] The matter before us
was a review and not an appeal. Section 87 is an intervention for
more particulars concerning the offence
that the State intends to
prove against an accused as will be necessary for a thorough
preparation of their defence [
R v Moyage & Others
1958 (3)
SA 400
(A) at 413B]. The purpose is to inform the accused of the case
against them [
R v Mokgoetsi
1943 AD 622
at 627]. At this
stage, and on review, it is impossible to determine whether the
absence of the particulars sought, against the
background of the
explanation provided by the 2
nd
respondent, are
prejudicial to the accused such that they would cause a failure of
justice which would result in them not receiving
a fair trial [
Jaca
v Minister of Justice & Others,
an unreported judgment GNP
case no A405/13 delivered on 11 November 2013].
[4] The prosecution
cannot be expected to provide particulars which they do not have [
S
v Alexander & Others
1964 (1) SA 249
(C) at 252C;
S v
Nghixulifa & Others
2016 (2) NR 356
(HC) at para 5]. South
Africa may be alive with opportunities, but it would be bad
jurisprudence if for instance, the facts were
to establish that an
accounting officer simply did not keep records, or walked away with
or disposed of records showing criminality
on their part when they
were caught out, and could avoid prosecution at the instance of a
judge, by demanding that the prosecution
provide records he did not
keep, walked away with or disposed of in anticipation of a criminal
prosecution. In this matter, the
State did not deny the applicants
the further particulars sought. The State alleged that it cannot
provide the further particulars
sought. The information sought was
not available to the State. Adv. Seroto, on behalf of the
prosecution, held the view that the
State was ready to try the
accused. Whether it was true that the complainant company had
documents, correspondence and evidence
that could prove the
applicant’s innocence, which was deliberately being withheld
from the applicants, as Adv. King SC argued,
cannot be determined
from the papers. Upon review of the docket contents and analysis of
the evidentiary material in comparison
to the charge sheet Adv. King
SC held the view that the matter was not properly investigated. These
disputes and arguments cannot
be resolved in review and on papers,
without the benefit of evidential material. The applicants may favour
Adv. King SC and celebrate
him as of superior logic to Adv Seroto,
but that is how far they can take it. For a court to accept his
opinion, the court must
consider the facts.
[5] The allegations
include those that relate to the first applicant’s role as
managing director of the complainant during
the period in which he
stood accused. The allegations against the accused include pocketing
too much salary at own instance and
claiming travel expenses that
they were not entitled to. They were summarily dismissed and barred
further access to the complainant
company resources. What is also
clear is that the information sought by the accused in this matter
was not particulars sought and
which were necessary to inform the
accused about the case against him. What is sought is evidence that
may be led to prove or disprove
the commission of the offence [
S v
Alexander
at 251H]. The State has an obligation to provide
particulars of material facts which it intends to prove and no
obligation rests
on the State to disclose the evidence by means of
which such material facts are to be proved [
S v Boekhoud
2011
(2) SACR 124
(SCA) at para 61]. In
Key v Attorney-General, Cape
Provincial Division and Another
[1996] ZACC 25
;
1996 (4) SA 187
at para 13 it was
said:
[13]
In any democratic criminal justice system there is a tension between,
on the one hand, the public interest in bringing criminals
to book
and, on the other, the equally great public interest in ensuring that
justice is manifestly done to all, even those suspected
of conduct
which would put them beyond pale. To be sure, a prominent feature of
that tension is the universal and unceasing endeavour
by
international human rights bodies, enlightened legislatures and
courts to prevent or curtail excessive zeal by State agencies
in the
prevention, investigation or prosecution of crime. But none of that
means sympathy for crime or it perpetrators. Nor does
it mean a
predilection for technical niceties and ingenious legal stratagems.
What the Constitution demands is that the accused
be given a fair
trial. Ultimately, as was held in
Ferreira
v Levin,
fairness is an issue which has
to be decided upon the facts of each case, and the trial Judge is the
person best placed to take
that decision. …
[6] I understand the law
differently to the applicants legal representatives, including Adv.
King SC. At para 110 of their note
on this application for leave to
appeal, the following was said:
110. Furthermore, in
S
v Van der Westhuizen
2011 (2) SACR 26
(SCA), the Supreme Court of
Appeal, when referring to the South African Code of Conduct for
members of the National Prosecuting
Authority regarding criminal
discovery, affirmed that prosecutors should, as soon as reasonably
possible, disclose to the accused
all relevant information, whether
prejudicial or beneficial, in accordance with the law and the
requirements of a fair trial. In
the light of the foregoing, it is
insufficient for the Second Respondent to merely assert that they do
not possess the documents
sought by the appellants. The law imposes
an obligation on the Second Respondent to act fairly and to uphold
the principles of
trial fairness. In this instance, this duty
requires the Second Respondent to obtain the relevant documents from
the Complainant
and to disclose them to the Appellants.
The SCA in
Van der
Westhuizen
, in dealing with the concept of the impartiality of
the prosecutor in criminal proceedings, emphasized that the concept
was not
used in the sense of not acting adversarial, but in the sense
of acting even-handedly, including avoiding discrimination but to
also act without fear, favour or prejudice [para 10]. The court said
it is the obligation of a prosecutor firmly, but fairly and
dispassionately, to construct and present a case from what appears to
be credible evidence, and to challenge the evidence of the
accused
and other defence witnesses, with a view to discrediting such
evidence for the very purpose of obtaining a conviction [at
para 11].
[7] I am unable to trace
the law upon which the duty which the applicants argue exists in our
law, which requires the prosecution
to obtain documents from the
complainant, which the complainant said they do not have in their
possession, and to disclose those
unavailable documents to an
accused. The legal position, to my understanding, is that the request
for further particulars will
clearly not be interpreted to
contemplate that information which is unknown and/or which is
unavailable to the party against whom
it is directed and which it is
impossible for them to furnish, must be furnished on pain of facing
serious consequences. Impossibility
of complying with the request is
an answer to the request. A party to whom the request was made, may
in response answer that the
information sought is unavailable or
unknown to them [
Houtlands Investments Ltd v Traverso Construction
Ltd
1976 (2) SA 261
(C) at 265-266]. A request for further
particulars must be interpreted to mean that the requestor was
entitled to particulars referred
to in the request, to the extent
that the prospective supplier was able to furnish them [
Wilson v
Die Afrikaanse Pers Publikasies (Edms) Bpk
1971 (3) SA 455
(T) at
462FE-F]. The word deliver in section 87 can mean no more than bring
and hand over to the requestor. One cannot deliver
what one did not
have.
[8] The principle to be
applied on the question whether the relief sought by the applicants
should be granted is that a court will
make the order if the
applicant is likely to be prejudiced by the refusal. When the
question of particulars is considered what
must be determined is
whether the charge sufficiently informs the accused person of what
the case is that he must meet. [
Behrman v Regional Magistrate, S.
Tvl & Another
1956 (1) SA 318
(T) at 319-320]. An accused is
entitled to be told the facts which the prosecution proposes to
prove, and not the evidence by which
those facts will be proved. He
is entitled to all the necessary information to be able to instruct
his attorneys and counsel and
to prepare his defence [
Behrman
320-321]. The ordinary principle is that an accused person must
be given such particulars as he properly requires for the purpose
of
preparing his case before he is called upon to plead and enter upon
his defence. It seems to me that there may be instances,
like the
present, where the availability of such evidence and the ability of
the prosecution to furnish the particulars asked for,
and the
prejudice by reason of the absence of the particulars may not clearly
appear at the time that the application is made and
the relief to
pressure furnishing thereof is pursued. In these instances, in my
view, the proper approach would be to allow the
accused to renew his
application in the course of the trial if it could be established
that he would in fact be prejudiced by reason
of the absence of the
available particulars [
Green v Assistant Magistrate, Johannesburg
1954 (4) SA 580
(T) at 584;
Behrman
at 321;
S v Du
Plessis
1963 (3) SA 168
(O)]. I remain persuaded that the
Magistrate exercised her discretion judicially on the matter before
her, and on our decision
on review. For these reasons I was not
of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of
success or that
there was some compelling reason why the appeal
should be heard, and the order was accordingly made. For these
reasons I was not
of the opinion that the appeal would have a
reasonable prospect of success or that there was some compelling
reason why the appeal
should be heard, and the order was accordingly
made.
DM THULARE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
I agree
S
MTHIMUNYE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
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