Case Law[2024] ZAWCHC 26South Africa
Odendaal v South African Reserve Bank (2271 / 2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 26 (7 February 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Odendaal v South African Reserve Bank (2271 / 2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 26 (7 February 2024)
Odendaal v South African Reserve Bank (2271 / 2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 26 (7 February 2024)
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sino date 7 February 2024
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
Number: 2271 / 2022
In the matter between:
BERDINE
ODENDAAL
Applicant
and
THE
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK
Respondent
Coram: Wille,
J
Heard: 1
February 2024
Delivered: 7
February 2024
JUDGMENT –
[LEAVE TO APPEAL]
WILLE, J:
Introduction
[1]
This was an application for leave to appeal against (as I understood
it) a portion
of the order (and, therefore) the judgment I delivered
during the middle of last year. I made myself available to hear
this
application last year. Still, due to the unavailability of
the senior counsel retained by both parties, the hearing of this
application took some time. Thus, more than six months have
passed since the adverse ruling against the applicant.
The
applicant seeks leave to vacate the order against her through this
application. I dismissed her initial application with
costs.
[2]
Initially, the applicant sought, among other things, mandatory
interdicts against
the respondent for the specific performance of
alleged undertakings given by the respondent. This was
allegedly in terms
of an agreement struck with the respondent.
The applicant sought an order directing the respondent to permit her
to receive
payment of R150,000,00 (per month) from certain funds
subject to an attachment under ‘blocking orders’ issued
at the
respondent's instance and, in addition to this, her reasonable
legal fees.
[3]
Initially,
the relief was sought (so says the applicant) based
on an alleged agreement between the parties and relying on an alleged
breach
of the applicant's constitutional rights. The
constitutional ingredient to her application (such as it was) does
not form
part of this application for leave to appeal in that the
applicant has abandoned this argument. Further, as I understand
it, the applicant has also abandoned her claim for her reasonable
legal fees over and above the monthly allowance of R150,000.00.
[4]
This application for leave to appeal is now solely focused on the sum
of R158,000.00,
which has been retained by the respondent following
my order and remains in the ringed-fenced blocked funds under the
respondent's
control. The sum of R158,000.00 is made up of one
tranche of R150,000.00 allegedly due to the respondent in terms of
the
agreement struck with the respondent. The remaining sum of
R8000,00 is the only remaining tranche in these blocked funds under
the control of the respondent, representing the last portion of these
ring-fenced funds. This then, is what this application
for
leave to appeal was about.
Grounds
of appeal
[5]
The core complaint concerns my determination of the issue of
‘
repudiation
’
in the peculiar circumstances where a contracting party demands the
specific performance of an alleged asserted contractual
right, which
right itself is the subject of a dispute. The applicant
initially advanced that she had the right to
claim for
her reasonable legal fees over and above the monthly allowance of
R150,000.00.
[6]
The applicant averred that because she advanced an application
seeking specific performance
of a term of the agreement with the
respondent (which term she alleges existed) different from the ‘true’
agreement
between the parties, she was not signifying an unequivocal
intention not to perform an obligation resting on her in terms of the
‘true’ agreement. This could not (so she says)
conceivably constitute a repudiation of her ‘
obligations’
regarding the contract with the respondent. This was her case
from inception. After that, surprisingly, during the
argument
advanced, the applicant contended that no obligations rested on her
in terms of the agreement with the respondent concerning
the
allocation of these blocked funds. This was a belated and
dramatic shift from the initial argument advanced by the applicant.
Consideration
[7]
On
the contrary, the respondent contended that
an obligation refers to the requirements or actions the parties must
fulfil to meet
their contractual obligations. These may include
making payments, delivering goods or services, or maintaining
confidentiality.
The respondent submitted that an obligation is
also the legal requirement to obey the entire contract.
[8]
Put another way, obeying the entire contract also includes adhering
to other terms
and conditions, such as timelines, warranties, dispute
resolution procedures, and any other provisions specified in the
contract.
[9]
Essentially, obeying the entire contract means abiding by all the
terms and conditions
outlined in the agreement, including but not
limited to fulfilling obligations. It is crucial to consider
and comply with
all aspects of the contract to ensure that it is
fully enforced and that all parties' rights and obligations are
respected.
[10]
It serves to be emphasized that the applicant initially launched an
application only to release
‘reasonable legal funds’ to
her from the funds blocked by the respondent. This portion of
the relief has now
been abandoned. By way of an amendment, the
applicant sought to ‘re-instate’ the release of
R150,000.00 (per
month) from the blocked funds to her, which amounts
she had been historically receiving in terms of the agreement she had
struck
with the respondent.
[11]
Significantly, if the applicant believed that uncertainty existed
regarding some of the terms
of the agreement, it was open for her to
proceed by way of a declarator. In the circumstances, a
declarator could not be
considered to constitute a breach of the
contract. I say this because a declarator is a legal action
taken by a party to
a contract to seek a court's declaration or
determination of the party's rights, obligations, or the
interpretation of contract
terms. It is a safe means to clarify
the contract's terms or resolve any disputes arising from its
interpretation.
[12]
Conversely, an application for specific performance could constitute
a breach of contract, which
could occur when one party fails to
fulfil their obligations as outlined in the contract without a legal
justification. It
involves a violation or non-performance of a
material term or condition of the contract. So, while a
declarator is a legal
action seeking clarification or resolution, it
will not ordinarily constitute a breach of contract.
[13]
Instead, it is a tool to address disputes or uncertainties concerning
the contract. It
does not directly address a breach of
contract. Thus, it seeks to establish the legal rights and
obligations of the parties
involved and aims to resolve uncertainties
or disputes regarding the interpretation or validity of the contract
itself.
[14]
The applicant elected not to proceed by way of a declarator while
this procedure was always open
to her. The respondent would
have been hard pressed to stop the monthly payments to the applicant
in the face of a declaratory
remedy. Instead, like
Oliver
Twist
, the applicant elected to make the demand for ‘
more’
money through litigation. This in the context where the
applicant is not subjected to poverty. Further, she does not
experience harsh living conditions and her predicament does not shed
light on the social inequalities and injustices of the Victorian-Era
(in England). I refrain from making any references to any other
dramatis personae
in this celebrated novel by Charles Dickens.
[15]
Undoubtedly, the answer to all these questions was fact-driven.
I believed the respondent’s
facts were good, and the
applicant’s facts were not good. Turning for a moment to
the legal issues. My findings
on the issue of ‘
repudiation’
did not affect reversing any judicial precedent, did not create new
law, and did not lead to an incorrect result. The applicant
was
obliged to abide by all the material terms of the agreement with the
respondent. In addition, the very trust between
the parties was
not promoted by the application for specific performance incorrectly
chartered by the applicant.
[16]
In summary, I remain unpersuaded that a court of appeal could arrive
at a different conclusion
based on a dispassionate evaluation of the
facts and our jurisprudence.
[1]
I believe there is no reasonable prospect that an appeal court
will find that repudiation does not occur when a contracting
party
unequivocally intends not to comply with his or her material
contractual obligations, without lawful excuse.
[17]
On the undisputed facts, the applicant had already received over R1.7
million from her blocked
account, which was (at the time of the
application) nearly depleted. The applicant's reasonable
expenses must, therefore,
have included her legal fees, as she had
her own income to cover her living expenses. This according to
her initial list
of expenses submitted to the respondent for
consideration.
Order
[18]
For all these reasons, the application for leave to appeal is
refused. I make the following
order:
1.
The application for leave to appeal is refused.
2.
The applicant shall be liable for the costs of the application
(including the
costs of the retained senior counsel) on the scale.
between party and party. as taxed or agreed.
_________
E.D.
WILLE
(Cape
Town)
[1]
Ramakatsa
and Others v African National Congress
[724/2019]
[2012] ZASCA 31(31 March 2021)
para [10].
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