Case Law[2024] ZAWCHC 40South Africa
Terblanche v S (A04/2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 40 (12 February 2024)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Terblanche v S (A04/2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 40 (12 February 2024)
Terblanche v S (A04/2022) [2024] ZAWCHC 40 (12 February 2024)
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sino date 12 February 2024
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Policy
In the High Court of
South Africa
(Western
Cape Division, Cape Town)
Case
No: A04/2022
In
the matter between:
EMILE
TERBLANCHE
APPELLANT
And
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
Heard:
20 October 2023
Delivered:
12 February 2024
JUDGMENT
LEKHULENI
J
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal against conviction on four counts of sexual assault
and three counts of rape
as well as against the resultant sentence of
life imprisonment imposed against the appellant by the Parow Regional
Court. The appellant
was convicted by the Regional Court on five
counts of sexual assault in contravention of section 5(1) and on
three counts of sexual
penetration in violation of
section 3
of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32
of 2007
, respectively. The appellant pleaded not guilty at the trial
and exercised his right to remain silent. Before the trial commenced,
the sentencing provisions of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (‘CLAA’) were explained to
the
appellant, who understood.
[2]
The State alleged on count 1 that the appellant was guilty of
contravening section 21(3) of Act
32 of 2007, exposure and
self-masturbation, in that on or about 2016 to 2018 at or near Parow,
the accused unlawfully and intentionally
forced the complainant, a
female minor aged 14, to look at him while he was performing
self-masturbation. Concerning count 2, it
was alleged that from 2016
to 2017, the appellant unlawfully and intentionally violated the
complainant by touching her breast.
Regarding count 3, it was alleged
that during 2016 and 2017, the appellant unlawfully and intentionally
violated the complainant
by touching her vagina. On the fourth count,
it was alleged that during 2016 and 2017, the accused unlawfully and
intentionally
violated the complainant by licking the complainant's
vagina. In count 5, it was alleged that during 2016 to 2017, the
accused
unlawfully and intentionally violated the complainant by
rubbing his penis against her vagina on more than one occasion.
[3]
Concerning count 6, the State alleged that during the period 2016 and
at near Parow, the appellant
unlawfully and intentionally committed
an act of sexual penetration with the complainant by pushing his
penis into her mouth without
her consent. Count 7 and 8 also involved
charges of sexual penetration. It was alleged in count 7 that during
2017 and 2018, the
appellant unlawfully and intentionally committed
an act of sexual penetration with the complainant by inserting his
penis in her
vagina without her consent. In count 8, it was alleged
that during the same period as in count 7, the appellant unlawfully
and
intentionally committed an act of sexual penetration with the
complainant by pushing his fingers into her vagina on more than one
occasion without her consent.
[4]
The prescribed minimum sentence in terms of the CLAA for counts 6 to
8 was life imprisonment because
the complainant was under 16 years of
age when the alleged offences were committed. (Offences were
committed before the 2022 amendments).
However, the Regional
Magistrate found substantial and compelling circumstances meriting a
deviation from the prescribed minimum
sentence. The trial court took
the three counts of sexual penetration together for the purposes of
sentence. It imposed a sentence
of life imprisonment in respect of
those counts.
[5]
The court a
quo
imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment
in respect of count 1. The court took the four counts of sexual
assault together
for the purposes of sentence. It imposed a sentence
of five years direct imprisonment in respect of those counts. In
terms of
section 103(1)(g)
of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
,
the trial court declared the appellant unfit to possess a firearm.
The court also made an ancillary order in terms of
section 50
of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32
of 2007
. It directed that the appellant's name be entered in the
Sexual Offences Register.
[6]
Discontented by this decision, the appellant exercised his automatic
right of appeal in terms
of section 309(1)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA), seeking a reversal of the
conviction and sentence imposed
by the court a
quo
. The
appellant avers that the Regional Magistrate misdirected herself in
finding that the State has discharged its onus and proven
the guilt
of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant seeks an
order in this court that sets aside the conviction
against him as
well as the resultant sentence.
Background
Facts
[7]
To fully comprehend the pertinent issues that must be determined in
this appeal and the view I
take in this matter; it is necessary to
sketch out a brief background of the facts underpinning the reasons
that fortify my conclusion.
The State called three witnesses in a
quest to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant testified
and did not call witnesses to testify in his
defence. Several documentary pieces of evidence, including the
medical expert report
and witnesses' statements, were handed in by
agreement as exhibits. To the extent necessary, I will summarise the
evidence led
at the trial and not repeat the evidence verbatim. Where
necessary, I will refer to the exhibits handed in during the hearing
at
the court below.
[8]
The State tendered the evidence of the complainant. At the time of
giving evidence, she had already
reached the age of majority and was
18. To prevent the likelihood of prejudice to the complainant, on the
application of the State,
the court directed that she testifies
through a close circuit television in terms of section 158(3) of the
CPA. In summary, the
complainant testified that she knew the
appellant as he was in love with her mother. The complainant and her
mother moved in and
lived with the appellant on Kompanje Street in
Avondale, Parow in 2015. The complainant lived with the appellant and
her mother
at this place from 2015 to September 2018. From there, she
went to live with her father in Viking Palace.
[9]
When they moved in to live with the appellant, her mother was working
but later lost her job.
The witness testified that in 2016, the
appellant started to touch her a lot and tickled her incessantly. In
the beginning, the
appellant touched her on top of the clothing, but
later, he started to touch her under the clothes on her body. The
first time
was in 2016/ 2017, in which the appellant placed her on
his lap and then rubbed his penis against her vagina. When this
happened,
she was on her back, and the appellant was on top of her.
After that, the appellant stood up and ordered her to place her mouth
over his penis. According to the complainant, the alleged rape
happened from 2017 to 2018. These incidents happened in her room
and
her mother's room. The appellant would take advantage when her mother
was not around.
[10]
She testified that in her mother's room, the appellant would remove
her trouser and would rub his penis against
her vagina, and he would
lick her vagina. When so doing, the appellant would tell her she
could ask him any time to stop. However,
when she told him to stop,
he continued saying he had convinced her. The appellant would tell
her how much he loved her and her
mother. She never told her mother
what the appellant did to her as she feared that if she told her, the
appellant and her mother
would fight, and her mother would have ended
up not having a place to stay.
[11]
The complainant further explained that the appellant touched her
breast, her stomach as well as her legs.
Around 2016 and 2017, the
witness testified that the appellant licked her vagina and placed the
front part of his penis in her
mouth. In 2017/ 2018, the appellant
placed the front part of his penis inside her vagina. The appellant
also rubbed his penis against
her vagina and placed his fingers
inside her vagina and making up and down movements.
[12]
According to the complainant, her ordeal usually happened after work
between 17h00 and 18h00 when her mother
was asleep or taking a shower
or when she was out shopping or at work. Her mother was aware that
the appellant would creep into
her bed; however, she testified that
nothing happened in the mornings. Her mother would fight with the
appellant over that. This
happened in the year 2018. The complainant
also described an incident where they had placed a mattress in their
living room. She
slept on the right, the mother on the left, and the
appellant in the middle. When her mother fell asleep, the appellant
placed
his fingers inside her vagina.
[13]
She moved out from the appellant's premises as her mother, and the
appellant fought a lot. She went to stay
with her father. She did not
tell her father what the appellant did to her as she did not think
the father would believe her. She
only told her friend. She told him
that the appellant was touching her a lot and that he was making her
uncomfortable. According
to her, she did not tell her friend how the
appellant was touching her. Her alleged ordeal became known because
she wrote a poem
that had to stay private or a secret. She wrote the
Poem on Poetry Amino, a place where one could write poetry
anonymously. The
relevant part of the poem stated:
“
I still feel your
hands on me every single day. I no longer feel free in my whole body.
You think I did it willingly. You pushed
me down. I was not asking
for it. You said we can stop anytime.”
[14]
The witness testified that she wrote this poem in September 2018
while living with her father. She felt safe
posting the poem as her
mother told her that she had deleted the
app
(Poetry app). Her
mother saw the poem and called her. The complainant's mother asked
the complainant if she was referring to the
appellant in the poem,
and she answered yes. The mother then informed the complainant's
father, and they contacted the police.
At that time, the
complainant's mother had already moved from the appellant's place and
was staying with her friend. They went
to the police and later went
to the doctor.
[15]
During cross-examination, she testified that she has a good
relationship with her father and mother. The
witness testified that
her mother is always there for her, and she can tell her everything.
She added that the fight between her
mother and the appellant made
her heart sore. They fought regularly, and her mother cried a lot. It
was her testimony that she
had a good relationship with the appellant
except for the allegations she levelled against him. They would play
games or watch
movies together. She also gave him a Father's Day
card.
[16]
When she was asked as to when the first time was that the appellant
placed his finger inside her vagina and
she asserted in response that
due to the trauma she went through, she could not specifically
remember whether it was in 2016/2017.
According to her, her
molestation happened after work and, at times, over weekends. She
also confirmed during cross-examination
that in 2017 and 2018 was
when the appellant placed the front part of his penis inside her
vagina. This happened not more than
three to four times. Most of the
time, it happened when her mother was in bed sleeping as she suffered
from cancer and had to undergo
chemotherapy.
[17]
She also emphasised the incident where the appellant allegedly placed
his penis in her mouth. According to
her, when this incident happened
(oral sex), her mother was not around because the witness' bedroom
door was open. She conceded
that in the two statements she made to
the police, she did not mention the appellant forcing her to give him
oral sex. However,
when the court asked her questions, she stated
that the statement, particularly A18, was not read back to her. It
was written,
and she was just asked to sign. She explained this
to the prosecutor when she consulted with her in preparation for the
hearing.
She could not answer the differences in her statement and in
her testimony and her statement where she indicated that one morning,
the appellant pulled her pants and pushed his tongue into her private
parts.
[18]
When she was quizzed on how she reported to her friend, she testified
that she must have told her friend
telephonically that the appellant
touched her in a way that made her uncomfortable. However, she did
not tell her friend everything.
It was put to her that the appellant
did not rape her or sexually assault her as she alleged. In response,
she was adamant that
the appellant touched her breast, inserted his
fingers in her vagina more than once and forced her to have oral sex
with him. She
further reaffirmed that the appellant masturbated in
her presence in front of her and even inserted his penis in her
vagina.
[19]
The complainant's friend, C[…] G[…], also came to
testify. This witness testified that he was
in the same school as the
complainant, and they were friends. In June 2018, the complainant
told him that the appellant touched
her a lot and stared at her a
lot. One time, when he was on a call with her, the complainant told
her that the appellant was staring
at her so much that she told him
she was feeling uncomfortable. The complainant was quiet the
following day at school until the
second break. He asked her what the
problem was, and the complainant did not tell her anything. During
that time, he observed that
the complainant was very emotional and
withdrawn. It was only after she reported the case that she said to
him that she was molested.
[20]
The complainant told him in September 2018, after the case was
reported, that the appellant penetrated her
through his penis and
with his fingers. The complainant also said to him that the appellant
had oral sex with her. She did not
agree or consent to what happened
and never permitted him to do so.
[21]
Under cross-examination, the witness testified that the complainant
reported the alleged offences to her
after she reported the case to
the police. When he was quizzed as to precisely what the complainant
told him, he stated that the
complainant said to him that the
appellant penetrated him vaginally through his fingers and through
his penis. She never permitted
him to do that to her.
[22]
The complainant's mother, Ms J[…], testified that he was in a
relationship with the appellant. Their
relationship started in 2014
and ended on 1 September 2018. The complainant lived with her up
until she began chemotherapy in 2018.
Before her diagnosis, she was
on anti-depressant, sleeping medication and anti-anxiety medication.
She testified that in September
2018, she sent the complainant an
SMS, and the latter did not reply. She then went to read poems on
Imena
because she missed her.
[23]
She found a newish poem that described how she went through sexual
abuse. She phoned the complainant and
confronted her about it. She
asked the complainant whether it was the appellant that she was
referring to in the poem because what
the abuser said to the
complainant, as stated in the poem, was similar to two things that
the appellant used to say to her. These
are words to the effect that
you are ‘easy to convince’. From the poem, she gathered
that the complainant was abused
orally, and this is what the
appellant was obsessed with in their relationship.
[24]
She asked the complainant what happened, and the latter told her she
was with the father and did not want
to talk then. The witness then
asked to speak to the father. She explained the poem that the
complainant wrote to the father and
sent him a screenshot of it. The
latter promised to talk to the complainant to get to the bottom of
the matter. The complainant
did not give her the details of the
alleged abuse, but she just told her the poem was about the
appellant. She later gave the full
details of the alleged sexual
assault and rape on her 18th birthday. It was the first time she
described in detail what happened
to her. During cross-examination,
it was asked what the complainant told her, and she stated that the
complainant mentioned that
the appellant did not fully penetrate her.
However, he only penetrated her with the tip of his penis.
[25]
Dr Donovan Andrews, who examined the complainant, also came to
testify. On 04 October 2018, he examined the
complainant and
completed a medical report (J88 form). He examined the complainant
and found that the hymen and the vagina were
intact. He recorded in
his report that the absence of injuries does not rule out rape or
sexual assault. The doctor also explained
that the complainant had an
elastic hymen, which would only tear with childbirth. During
cross-examination, he testified that he
could not find any indication
of penetration. However, when asked by the court whether it was
possible or not with an elastic hymen
like that of the complainant to
find any sign of penetration, if there was any, his answer was no.
[26]
On the other hand, the appellant put up the following version in his
defence: he confirmed that he had a
relationship with the
complainant's mother, Ms J[…]. He explained that the
complainant and her mother moved into his place
in May 2016. The
appellant explained his relationship with the complainant and said
they got along well with each other. The complainant
showed him games
on the cell phone and even downloaded some games to his cell phone.
He would regularly assist the complainant
with her homework. He
taught the complainant how to make smoke bombs and helped her with
her schoolwork, particularly school projects
like science and maths.
[27]
The appellant testified that he would wake the complainant up in the
morning and take her to school. Sometimes,
he would take her to her
friends. The complainant was enjoying staying with them, and she
would invite friends who would come,
and they would play games. The
complainant would also ask him to watch movies with him or play
games. Regularly, the complainant
sought his company. They would
watch movies, and at times, they would engage in pillow fights. The
complainant and her mother have
a mother-and-daughter relationship.
According to the appellant, his relationship with the complainant's
mother near the end of
2018 got a little bit rough as they fought a
lot, and the environment was an uncomfortable one. He could see that
it was affecting
the complainant.
[28]
The appellant disputed the allegations the complainant levelled
against him. He also explained the Christmas
bed incident in which
they took matrasses and placed them in the lounge in front of the TV.
They would all congregate in front
of the TV, eat snacks, watch
movies, have tickle fights, or play around until they all fell
asleep. When it came to sleeping time,
the complainant's mother would
sleep in the middle, the appellant would sleep on one end, and the
complainant would sleep on the
other. It was his evidence that he had
no idea of all the charges levelled against him, and he had no idea
why the complainant
would do this. It hurts him deeply to hear this.
[29]
Under cross-examination, the appellant stated that he ended the
relationship with the complainant's mother
as they had a big fight,
and he told her he could not continue the fight. At that time, it was
about a month or two that the complainant
left them and was living
with her father. When he was asked why the complainant no longer
visited them after she left, he stated
that before she left, the
complainant stated that she was struggling with the fighting between
him and her mother, which negatively
affected her schoolwork.
Notwithstanding the fights between him and the complainant's mother,
his relationship with the complainant
remained good.
[30]
After they separated, the complainant's mother lived with her friend.
At that time, he never had any contact
with the complainant. He only
had contact with the complainant while she was living with them.
According to him, he suspects the
complainant was upset about his
breakup with her mother. The appellant also confirmed that the
complainant's mother was sick and
was using anti-depressant
medication as she was exhausted and not motivated. Due to the
depression, she did not give him and the
complainant attention.
She was tired and slept most of the time.
[31]
When it was put to him that due to her state, his attention moved
away from the complainant's mother to the
complainant, he disputed
this. He stated that they were still intimate sometimes, but not a
lot. The main problem was that she
argued a lot and fought a lot. He
denied during cross-examination that he masturbated in front of the
complainant or that he touched
the complainant or penetrated her
vaginally through his penis or his fingers. He confirmed that the
complainant wrote little stories
and poems.
The
findings of the trial court
[32]
After considering the conspectus of the evidence, the trial court
made favourable credibility findings regarding
the evidence of the
complainant, who was a single witness. It held that the complainant
gave a reasonable version to the court
about what had transpired from
the time she and her mother went to reside with the appellant at his
residence. The trial court
found that the complainant's version was
credible and trustworthy and was corroborated by the evidence of her
friend, Connor G[...].
To the contrary, the court found that on the
totality of the evidence, the version of the appellant that he did
not sexually abuse
the complainant as alleged by the State, was false
beyond reasonable doubt and that his version of a bare denial is
merely to protect
himself.
The
grounds of appeal
[33]
The applicant raised various grounds of appeal on conviction and
sentence. The grounds of appeal as discernible
from the notice of
appeal may, in a nutshell be summarised as follows:
[34]
The trial court erred in finding that the State had proved the
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
particularly in that the
court a
quo
failed to attach the necessary weight to the
vagueness of the complainant's testimony as she was incapable of
giving a coherent
timeline of the alleged incidents and could not
specify how frequently the incident occurred, nor could she recall
when and how
the incidents occurred.
[35]
That the trial court erred and misdirected itself in failing to
approach the complainant's evidence with
the critical scrutiny when
considering the application of the cautionary rule of a single
witness. That the court a
quo
summarised the evidence but that
there was no indication that an analysis of the evidence whilst
exercising great caution was done.
That the trial court erred and
misdirected itself by failing to attach sufficient weight to the
inconsistencies between the complainant's
testimony in court and her
two written statements and that the trial court incorrectly applied
the evidence of the State in its
rejection of the appellant's version
and therefore misdirected herself.
[36]
Regarding sentence, the appellant contended that the trial court
failed to consider the findings of the Correctional
Officer and the
Probation Officer in their reports who found that the appellant would
be a suitable candidate for correctional
supervision. The appellant
further contended that the Regional Magistrate correctly found that
there were substantial and compelling
circumstances; however, she
erred in imposing a prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment
on the applicant. The trial court
failed to consider the appellant's
personal circumstances properly but merely provided lip service to
his circumstances.
Applicable
Legal Principles and Discussion
[37]
It is settled law that in a matter such as the present, this court's
powers to interfere on appeal with the
findings of fact of the trial
court are limited in the absence of demonstrable and material
misdirection. Where there is no misdirection
on fact, the presumption
is that its findings are correct, and the appellate court will only
interfere with them if it is convinced
that they are wrong. This
principle was restated in S
v
Jochems
[1]
as follows:
“
It is a
time-honoured principle that once a trial court has made credibility
findings, an appeal court should be deferential and
slow to interfere
therewith unless is convinced on a conspectus of the evidence that
the trial court was clearly wrong.
R v
Dhlumayo and Another 1948(2) SA 677 (A)
at 706;
S v Kebana
[2010] 1 All SA 310
(SCA) para12. As the saying goes, he was steeped
in the atmosphere of the trial. Absent any positive finding that he
was wrong,
this court is not at liberty to interfere with his
findings.”
[38]
However, in
Minister
of Safety and Security & others v Craig & Others NNO
,
[2]
Navsa
JA, stated that although courts of appeal are slow to disturb
findings of credibility, they generally have greater liberty
to do so
where a finding of fact does not essentially depend on the personal
impression made by a witness’ demeanour, but
predominantly upon
inferences and other facts and upon probabilities. In such a case, a
court of appeal with the benefit of a full
record may often be in a
better position to draw inferences.
[39]
Against this backdrop, I turn to evaluate the merits of this appeal.
[40]
The issue for determination in this appeal is whether the appellant's
guilt was established beyond reasonable
doubt. At the hearing of this
appeal, Mr Scholzel, who appeared for the appellant, submitted that
the court below had misdirected
itself firstly by ignoring the
inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony when measured against
the two statements she made
to the police and that there was no
guarantee of truth in the evidence of the complainant. Moreover, Mr
Scholzel submitted that
the complainant's evidence is that of a
single witness, was not satisfactory in all material respects, and
had not been corroborated
by other state witnesses. He submitted that
if these aspects had been correctly considered by the court below, it
would have concluded
that the State had not discharged the onus of
proving the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or that the
version of the
appellant was reasonably possibly true in the
circumstances and therefore entitled to be acquitted of the charges
levelled against
him.
[41]
On the other hand, Mr Koti, the State's Counsel, argued that the
court a
quo
correctly weighed up the complainant's evidence
and found her to be a credible, reliable, and honest witness. Mr Koti
further submitted
that the court a
quo
found that the evidence
of the complainant was corroborated by the evidence of Mr G[...] and
the evidence of the doctor. He implored
the court to dismiss the
appeal both on conviction and sentence.
[42]
It is well established in our law that the duty to prove an accused's
guilt rests fairly and squarely on
the shoulders of the State. The
accused need not assist the State in any way in discharging this
onus.
[3]
In assessing whether
the State has discharged the onus of proving its case against the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it must
consider all the evidence
in concluding whether to convict or acquit an accused. In other
words, a court's conclusion must account
for all the evidence
presented before it.
[4]
[43]
The complainant in this matter is a single witness. The complainant
was 14 years old at the time of the commission
of the alleged
offences. She was 18 when she testified at the trial. Her evidence
was given through a close circuit television
in terms of section 158
of the CPA. The complainant was a single witness thus, her evidence
must be evaluated cautiously.
[44]
Section 208 of the CPA provides that an accused person may be
convicted of any offence on the single evidence
of any competent
witness. The testimony of a s
ingle
witness should be clear and satisfactory in all material aspects. The
exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace
the exercise of
common sense.
[5]
T
he
approach to the evidence of a single witness was enunciated in
S
v Sauls and Others,
[6]
where Diemont JA said:
There is no rule of thumb
test or formula to apply when it comes to a consideration of the
credibility of the single witness (see
the remarks of Rumpff JA in
S
v Webber
1971 (3) SA 754
(A) at 758). The trial Judge will weigh
his evidence, will consider its merits and demerits and, having done
so, will decide whether
it is trustworthy and whether, despite the
fact that there are shortcomings or defects or contradictions in the
testimony, he is
satisfied that the truth has been told. The
cautionary rule referred to by De Villiers JP in 1932 may be a guide
to a right decision
but it does not mean "that the appeal must
succeed if any criticism, however slender, of the witnesses' evidence
were well
founded" (Per Schreiner JA in
R v Nhlapo
(AD 10
November 1952) quoted in
R v Bellingham
1955 (2) SA 566
(A) at
569). It has been said more than once that the exercise of caution
must not be allowed to displace the exercise of common
sense.’
[45]
In the present matter, the trial court was faced with two mutually
destructive versions of two single witnesses
based on the evidence of
the complainant and the appellant. In
S
v Pietersen,
[7]
the court noted that the question that must be asked is whether there
is not a reasonable possibility that the version of the accused
may
be substantially true, especially in the light of the fact that the
magistrate was faced with the evidence of a single witness
and that
two mutually destructive versions were placed as evidence before the
court.
[46]
In a relatively terse judgment and without a proper assessment of the
evidence, the trial court rejected
the appellant's version as
nonsensical and dishonest. Thus, this court will assess the evidence
to determine if the court a
quo
was indeed correct in
rejecting the appellant’s version and finding that the State
proved its case against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt.
[47]
It is common cause that the complainant and her mother moved in to
stay with the appellant in 2015. It is
also common cause that the
appellant acted as a father figure to the complainant. The
complainant looked to the appellant as her
father figure, albeit she
bought him a Father's Day card. The appellant was in a position of
authority and trust towards the complainant.
The complainant looked
to the appellant for support and guidance. This version was
corroborated by the appellant, who testified
that he assisted the
complainant with schoolwork, and in doing school projects like
science as well as maths.
[48]
However, from 2016 onwards, the complainant testified that the
appellant started to touch her a lot in an
inappropriate manner. Her
evidence was that the appellant began by masturbating in front of her
and later touched her breast on
top of her clothes. The appellant
progressed in the assault, touched her breast underneath her clothes,
and after that, licked
her vagina, and thereafter caused her to have
oral sex with him and later vaginally had sex with her.
[49]
The evidence showed a trust relationship between the appellant and
the complainant. In my view, the appellant
employed a non-violent
technique to gain access and control the complainant. The State’s
evidence reveals that the appellant
cunningly gained the trust of the
complainant with the sole intent of committing sexual acts with her.
The inappropriate
touching of her breasts on top of her clothes and,
thereafter, underneath her clothes was intended to lure or to groom
the complainant
to be pliable to sexual acts. The evidence of the
complainant reveals that the appellant seduced her over an extended
period until
the said seduction reached its pinnacle, and that was
when the appellant raped and sexually assaulted her. I repeat, the
grooming
of the complainant happened over time, and hence, the reason
the complainant could not clearly explain specific dates when the
alleged incidents occurred.
[50]
It has been argued in this court that the fact that the complainant
cannot remember the specific dates is
an indication that she is
untruthful. I do not agree with this proposition. It must be borne in
mind that the complainant was still
very young when these offences
were committed. She was still 14 years old. This was not a once off
event. It happened at home where
the complainant was living with her
mother and the appellant. The appellant created an impression towards
the complainant’s
mind that he loves and care for her. There
was nothing unusual at home to serve as a landmark or a source of
reference for the
complainant. Moreover, the complainant was asked
when the first time was that the appellant placed his finger inside
her vagina;
she asserted in response that due to the trauma she went
through, she could not specifically remember whether it was in
2016/2017.
[51]
The relationship between the appellant and the complainant's mother
was not good. The fights between the
appellant and the complainant's
mother had a severe impact on the emotional well-being of the
complainant. It affected her emotionally
and even her performance on
her schoolwork. This was the reason that caused her to leave the
appellant and her mother two months
before her mother and the
appellant could separate. Her evidence was that the appellant touched
her a lot several times such that
she could not precisely remember
the dates when it happened.
[52]
In my view, the suggestion that because she could not remember the
specific date of the incident, she was
lying is unsustainable.
Notwithstanding, the complainant used their school event as a source
of reference when the alleged rape
took place. Her evidence was that
the alleged rape happened after the Boeresport event at their school,
which was between the end
of 2017 and the beginning of the year in
2018. Notably, she was abused by a person she knew and trusted. I
repeat, it was not a
once-off event, but it progressed from one stage
to the other over an extended period.
[53]
Furthermore, the complainant was young and vulnerable. When these
incidents happened, her mother was sick
and slept most of the time.
The appellant was the person she could look up to for support. The
appellant corroborated her version
in this regard. In his evidence,
the appellant asserted that the complainant's mother suffered from
depression and was admitted
for about a month at Tygerberg clinic.
She used anti-depressant medication, and she was exhausted and not
motivated. It was also
difficult for him to keep her uplifted.
[54]
According to him, the complainant's mother was in a Zombie State. As
a result of the depression, she did
not give them any attention. This
also made him tired, and it was onerous for the complainant. In my
view, the evidence that when
all these offences were committed
against the complainant, her mother was sick and, most of the time,
was sleeping in his room
is corroborated by the appellant.
[55]
The argument that other State witnesses did not corroborate the
complainant's evidence is incorrect. The
complainant's evidence must
not be looked at in isolation or in a piecemeal fashion. Two basic
principles should be considered
whenever evidence is evaluated:
evidence must be weighed in its totality and not on a piece-meal
basis, and probabilities must
be distinguished from conjecture or
speculation. An appraisal of all the evidence is required. Reliable
evidence should be weighed
alongside such evidence as may be found to
be false. Independently verifiable evidence, if any, should be
weighed to see if it
supports any of the evidence tendered.
[8]
[56]
In my view, the complainant's evidence was largely corroborated by
Mr. G[…]'s evidence. Mr G[…]'s
evidence was that in
June 2018 (before the case was reported), the complainant told him
that the appellant touched her a lot and
stared at her a lot.
Crucially, this report to Mr G[…], was made when the
complainant was still living with the appellant
and her mother. In
one instance, the complainant was in the lounge with the appellant,
the witness (Mr G[…]) and the complainant
were on a call.
During their discussion, the complainant told him that she was
feeling very uncomfortable because the appellant
stared at her so
much. After that, they ended the call.
[57]
The next day at school, the complainant was very uneasy and
uncomfortable until the second break. Mr G[…]
observed that
the complainant was withdrawn and emotional. She asked the
complainant what had happened, and the latter did not
tell him what
had happened. He then concluded that the touching the complainant was
referring to was a bit worse than what she
was telling him. He spoke
to the complainant a lot about this incident and stated that it came
from her own to tell her parents.
Later, after she opened the case,
the complainant said to him that the appellant penetrated her with
his fingers and penis.
[58]
I am of the opinion that Mr. G[…]'s evidence corroborates the
evidence of the complainant in all material
respects. The appellant
was touching the complainant and abusing her sexually, so much so
that this affected the complainant emotionally.
Mr G[...] observed
this. I consider Mr G[...] an independent witness with no interest in
the matter. The complainant reported to
him her alleged ordeal long
before she could report to her parents or even before she could open
a case with the police.
[59]
I must emphasise that the complainant told Mr G[...] that the
appellant was uncomfortably touching her when
she was still staying
with the appellant. In my view, the complainant was vulnerable. She
was immature in age and in a very toxic
and uncomfortable
environment. Her mother and the appellant constantly fought. Her
mother was sick and spent most of the time sleeping.
In the process,
the appellant took advantage of her vulnerability, seduced her over
an extended period, and thereafter eventually
raped her.
[60]
As correctly pointed out by the prosecutor during cross-examination,
when the complainant's mother became
sick in 2016, the appellant's
attention shifted from the complainant's mom to the complainant. He
took advantage of the vulnerability
and dependence of the
complainant. He groomed and lured the complainant by touching her,
masturbating in front of her, licking
her vagina, and later inserting
his penis into her vagina.
[61]
It was argued during the hearing of this appeal that there is no
guarantee of truth in the complainant's
evidence. Further, it was
suggested that the medical evidence the State produced did not
support the complainant's evidence. I
do not agree with this
proposition. As previously stated, it is incumbent on this court to
eschew a piecemeal process of reasoning.
It should assess the
evidence before it holistically. The evidence of Dr Andrew's was that
the complainant has an elastic hymen,
which would only tear with
childbirth. According to him, with enough force, one could tear it.
However, with intercourse or with
digital or penal penetration, it
would not tear. He further stated that, as such, there was no
indication of penetration. However,
when questioned by the court
whether, with a hymen like that, one could still find any sign of
penetration, his response was no.
[62]
In my view, with this evidence, the fact that there were no injuries
or sign of penetration does not mean
that the complainant was not
raped. In any event, in his clinical findings, Dr Andrews noted that
the absence of injuries does
not exclude rape. Moreover, the
complainant cannot be expected to have suffered physical injuries
when the appellant inserted his
penis in her mouth or touching her
breast and licking her vagina.
[63]
In addition to the above, the evidence of the complainant's mother
and that of the appellant corroborates
the complainant's version. The
appellant and the complainant's mother confirmed that the
complainant, young as she was, is a writer.
She wrote poems and
little stories. During cross-examination, the appellant stated that
the complainant had written little stories
and poems. To express her
suppressed emotions, the complainant put pen to paper and wrote a
poem. Her mother discovered this poem.
I find this part of the poem
relevant. It states as follows:
“
I still feel your
hands on me, every single day.
I no longer
feel free, in my own body.
You think I did it
willingly, you pushed me down. I was not asking for it. You said, we
can stop anytime…Stop. I feel your
breath over my legs. I feel
your lips over my stomach. I feel everything. It is like you are
still here,
and I am paralysed in fear because
of you
. I cannot stand the thought of
something that was supposed to be special, because of you I do not
want people to touch me. Because
of you and the screams.” (“my
emphasis’)
[64]
This poem, in my view, expresses emotions and the effect of grief
that the complainant suffered and continues
to suffer because of the
abuse. It also expresses the humiliating as well as the traumatic
experience which violated her dignity
and pride as a girl child. The
poem also expresses the pain the complainant was subjected to and its
deleterious effect on her.
I find it highly improbable that the
complainant would express such grief as she did if nothing at all
happened to her. Importantly,
the grief and emotions poured out in
the poem were observed by Mr G[...] when he met the complainant at
school. According to him,
after the complainant told him that the
appellant was inappropriately touching her, the complainant at school
was distraught and
emotionally withdrawn.
[65]
Significantly, the complainant's mother stated that when she read the
poem, she noted two things similar
to what the appellant said to her.
For instance, that you are easy to convince and the oral sex. Her
evidence was that the appellant
was obsessed with oral sex during her
relationship with him.
[66]
Mr Scholzel challenged the evidence of the complainant, especially
that in her two statements (A1 and A18), she
did not mention that the
appellant forced her to have oral sex with him. He also relied on the
contradiction between the statement
of the complainant and the
evidence in court as to whether the appellant ever molested her in
the mornings. During her evidence
in court, the complainant explained
that the appellant did not molest her in the mornings. At the same
time, in the statement,
it is stated that he molested her. From
a careful reading of the record, one notes that when the appellant's
legal counsel
laid the basis to cross-examine the complainant on her
alleged statements, the complainant was not asked whether she was
asked
to confirm the correctness of her statements and whether,
having done so, she was asked to sign the two statements. Instead,
the
complainant was adamant that the statements were not read back to
her when she gave and signed them. As far as the A1 statement
was
concerned, when the court wanted to find out from her if the
statement was read back to her after it was taken, she stated
that
not on the same day.
[67]
As far as the A18 statement is concerned, she stated that it was
taken and not read back to her. It was only
read back to her by the
prosecutor during consultation in preparation for the hearing. She
also cannot read the handwriting of
the officer who wrote the
statements. During consultation with the prosecutor, the contents of
the statements were explained to
her. This, in my view, explains the
reason why the forced oral sex is not in her statement. It also
explains the alleged contradiction
of her evidence in court and her
statement that the appellant did not abuse her in the morning.
[68]
Notwithstanding this finding, I am of the opinion that it is
necessary to remind ourselves that the purpose
of a police statement
is to obtain details of an offence so that a decision can be made on
whether or not to institute a prosecution.
The statement of a witness
is not intended to be a precursor to that witness' evidence in court.
[69]
In
S
v Mafaladiso en Andere,
[9]
the Supreme Court of Appeal set out the approach to be adopted in
cases where there is a contradiction between the police statement
of
a witness and the evidence of such witness or where there is no
reference in a police statement to what can be an essential
aspect of
that witness' testimony as is the case in this matter. Among others,
the court noted that the mere fact that there are
self-contradictions
must be approached with caution by a court. Importantly, the court
noted that it must be kept in mind that
not every error by a witness
and not every contradiction or deviation affects the credibility of a
witness. Thus, the contradictory
versions must be considered and
evaluated on a holistic basis. Thus, the contradictory versions must
be considered and evaluated
on a holistic basis. The court must weigh
up the previous statement against the
viva
voce
evidence,
consider all the evidence, and decide whether it is reliable or not
and whether the truth has been told despite any shortcomings.
[70]
In the present matter, the complainant has given a plausible
explanation of the differences. She was adamant
in court that the
appellant did not molest her in the morning. Moreover, she was not
asked in court if she confirmed the correctness
of the statement. The
discrepancy, in my view, has been adequately explained. She explained
that the appellant forced her to have
oral sex with him. I have no
reason to reject the evidence of the complainant. Although she could
not remember specific dates,
the complainant was truthful and candid
with the court. She did not implicate the appellant falsely. She
confirmed the appellant's
version that he would creep into her bed in
the mornings. According to her, nothing happened in the mornings. If
indeed she wanted
to implicate the applicant falsely, she could have
done so when the appellant crept into her bed in the morning, but she
did not.
[71]
On the other hand, the appellant raised a bare denial. He disputed
all the allegations levelled against him.
He, however, confirms the
version of the complainant that he would creep into her bed in the
mornings. The appellant further confirmed
the version of the
complainant that they would sometimes watch television as a family.
According to him, during sleeping time,
he would sleep at one end,
the complainant would sleep at the other, and the complainant's
mother would sleep in the middle.
[72]
In my view, the bare denial of the appellant is implausible for the
following reasons: The appellant's evidence
was that he had a perfect
relationship with the complainant. They had pillow fights and, at
times, tickle fights. The appellant
assisted the complainant with
homework and school projects. The relationship appeared to be that of
father and daughter. The appellant
painted a picture of a wonderful
relationship. The complainant even bought him a Father's Day card.
[73]
Surprisingly, in June 2018, while the complainant and her mother were
still living together with the appellant,
the complainant raised the
question of sexual abuse with Mr G[...]. She told Mr G[...] that the
appellant was inappropriately touching
her a lot. This caused the
complainant to be reserved and emotionally withdrawn at school. In my
view, this piece of evidence defeats
the version that the appellant
proffered. If indeed, everything was pleasant and hunky-dory as the
appellant suggests, it is highly
strange that the complainant would
implicate him to her friend Mr G[...].
[74]
In my judgment, the complainant reported her ordeal to Mr G[...]
because the appellant was sexually abusing
her. Undoubtedly, the
complainant could not have reported to Mr G[...] that the appellant,
who was of great help to her with her
schoolwork, was abusing her if
there was nothing that the appellant was doing to her. She reported
to him because she was being
abused by the person she trusted. In my
view, the complainant was a candid and truthful witness, and the
record certainly lends
itself to that conclusion. It cannot be
suggested that the complainant was influenced to make a case against
the appellant.
[75]
Regarding the appeal on the sentence, it is trite law that sentencing
is pre-eminently a matter for the discretion
of the trial court. The
power of a court of appeal to interfere with a sentence imposed by
the trial court is circumscribed. Interference
with a sentence on
appeal is not justified in the absence of a material misdirection or
irregularity or unless the sentence imposed
is so startlingly
inappropriate as to create a sense of shock.
[10]
Thus, an appeal court will only interfere with a sentence on
appeal if it appears that the trial court has exercised its
discretion improperly or unreasonably.
[11]
[76]
In the present matter, the essential enquiry is whether the court a
quo
in imposing the sentence of life imprisonment had
exercised its discretion properly and judicially. It was argued that
the trial
court failed to consider the appellant's personal
circumstances properly but merely paid lip service to his
circumstances. It was
also argued that the trial court did not
consider the Correctional Officer's report, which recommended
correctional supervision.
[77]
In my opinion, the court a
quo
misdirected itself on sentence.
The following reasons bear out this finding. The appellant was
convicted of three counts of rape
that attracted life sentences. Upon
convicting the appellant on these counts, the court a
quo
was
bound to impose the prescribed sentence unless there were substantial
and compelling circumstances to deviate from that sentence.
The trial
court found that since rehabilitation of the appellant is possible,
this should solely count as a substantial and compelling
factor to
deviate from the prescribed sentence. I find the reason advanced by
the trial court very flimsy and insubstantial to
warrant a deviation
from the prescribed sentence. Notwithstanding, the State did not
challenge the sentence imposed by the court
a
quo.
[78]
Crucially, despite its finding that there were substantial and
compelling circumstances warranting a deviation
from the prescribed
sentence, the trial court still imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment in terms of section 51(1) of the CLAA.
In my view, in
doing so, the court below erred. The jurisdiction of the Regional
Court to impose a life sentence is circumscribed
in section 51(1) of
the CLAA. Once the court found substantial and compelling
circumstances as envisaged in section 51(3) of the
CLAA, it could not
impose a sentence of life imprisonment in terms of section 51(1) of
the Act. Instead, it was at large
to exercise its discretion
and impose a lesser sentence. The need to impose a lesser sentence
was no longer under the prescribed
minimum sentencing mechanism.
In a nutshell, the court a
quo
could not deviate from the
prescribed minimum sentence due to the existence of substantial and
compelling circumstances warranting
such deviation and still impose
the prescribed sentence.
[79]
What compounds the conundrum, in this case, is that the court a
quo
imposed
a globular sentence in respect of the three rape charges. The court
took the three counts of rape together for purposes
of sentence and
imposed one sentence of life imprisonment. While it is widely
accepted that there is no law which prohibits or
provides for the
imposition of a globular sentence, our courts have on various
occasions expressed some misgivings about such sentences
particularly
where an accused was convicted after having pleaded not guilty but
subsequently having the conviction on some counts
set aside on
appeal.
[12]
[80]
Notwithstanding, in
S
v Rantlai (supra),
the Supreme Court
of Appeal noted that there is no absolute bar against imposing
globular sentences. However, there seems to be
some unanimity in our
courts that, depending on the facts of each case, it can be
effectively used in exceptional circumstances.
[13]
This is because there will be circumstances where, for instance, it
can be used to ameliorate the effect of sentences that may
appear
shockingly inappropriate.
[81]
As discussed above, the court a
quo
erred in imposing a life
sentence despite its finding in terms of section 51(3) of the CLAA.
Such misdirection demands the intervention
of this court.
Consequently, this Court faces the duty of imposing a sentence on the
appellant. In considering an appropriate sentence,
I must mention
that the appellant's personal circumstances were set out in detail
before the trial court. They are not repeated
in detail in this
judgment to avoid prolixity.
[82]
At the hearing of the matter, the appellant was 39 years old,
unmarried, and had no children or dependents.
He was born in
Bloemfontein in 1983 and is the eldest of three children. He was
diagnosed with encephalitis, which is an inflammation
of the active
tissues of the brain caused by an inflammation or an auto immune
response. Due to his condition, the appellant had
to attend a special
need school. His parents divorced while he was in Grade 10, and his
father moved out of the common home. As
a result, the appellant and
his sister had to leave school to seek employment to financially
assist in maintaining the household
and his mother, who was
unemployed.
[83]
Later, the appellant registered for a course in computer studies at
Dynamic Computer Training Centre in Tygervalley,
where he completed
his course and is a certified professional. The appellant was
previously employed by Royal Gutters for two to
three years. He has
no contact with his father. The appellant supported his mother as
well as the complainant’s mother. He
had no previous
convictions. The appellant previously lived at Parow but relocated to
live with his mother on a farm in Klapmuts.
He was unemployed for a
year before his arrest. The appellant has a good relationship with
his mother. The Probation Officer reported
that the appellant’s
income formed a significant part of the family’s day to day
income. The Probation Officer also
reported that the appellant is a
pillar of support to his 71-year-old mother.
[84]
Having considered the personal circumstances of the appellant
discussed above, and in the various reports
presented as evidence,
the interest of society, the seriousness of the crimes committed by
the appellant, the impact that this
ordeal had on the complainant, I
am of the view that there are substantial and compelling
circumstances for the court to deviate
from the prescribed minimum
sentence. I am further of the view that the imposition of three life
sentences in the present case
would be startlingly and disturbingly
inappropriate. Moreover, the sentence that the court should impose
should be a sentence that
will be deterrent, retributive and, at the
same time, reformative.
[85]
Lastly, one of the grounds of appeal is that the court a
quo
did not
consider correctional supervision as a sentencing option. In my view,
correctional supervision as a sentencing option would
be improper and
disproportionate to the gravity and severity of the offence the
appellant was convicted of.
[14]
It must be stressed that the appellant invaded the dignity and the
privacy of the complainant. As the trial court found, this ordeal
left the complainant with emotional scars that she will live with for
the rest of her life. To this end, we need to remind ourselves
that
our Constitution, as well as international treaty obligations,
require the government and the courts to take special steps
to
protect the public in general and women in particular against violent
crime.
[15]
Hence,
section
12(1)(c) of the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freedom
and security which include the right to be free from
all forms of
violence from either public or private sources.
[86]
Given all this these considerations, I am of the view that a sentence
of imprisonment of 18 years for each
rape count (counts 6, 7, and 8)
is appropriate in the circumstances. To ameliorate the cumulative
severity of the sentence, I would
propose that the sentence of 18
years imprisonment in respect of counts 7 and 8 and the prison
sentence imposed by the trial court
in respect of the sexual assault
counts (counts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) be ordered to run concurrently with
the sentence in count 6.
Order
[87]
In the result, I would propose the following order.
87.1
That the appeal on conviction be dismissed.
87.2
The sentence imposed by the trial court in respect of counts 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 be confirmed.
87.3
That the sentence imposed in respect of counts 6, 7, and 8 be set
aside and be replaced with the following
sentence:
87.4
The appellant is sentenced to 18 years imprisonment in respect of
count 6,
87.5
18 years imprisonment in respect of count 7, and
87.6
18 years imprisonment in respect of count 8. In terms of section
280(2) of the CPA, the sentence of imprisonment
in respect of count
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 would run concurrently with the sentence of
imprisonment in count 6.
87.7
The appellant is effectively sentenced to serve a term of 18 years
imprisonment.
87.8
In terms of section 282 of the CPA, the sentence imposed above is
antedated to 30 March 2022.
LEKHULENI
JD
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree and it so ordered:
KUSEVITSKY
D
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For
the Appellant:
Mr
Scholzel
Instructed
by:
Mia
Attorneys
Suit
1, Saratoga Court
Kenilworth
Cape
Town
For
the Respondent (State):
Mr
Koti
Instructed
by:
Director
of Public Prosecutions
115
Buitengracht Street
Cape
Town
[1]
1991(1) SACR (A) at 211 E-G.
[2]
2011(1) SACR 469 (SCA) para 58.
[3]
S v
Mathebula
1997
(1) SACR 10 (W).
[4]
S v Van
der Meyden
1999
(1) SACR 447
(WLD) at 449h.
[5]
S v
Artman and Another
1968
(3) SA 339(SCA).
[6]
1981 (3) SA 172
(A) at 180E-H.
[7]
[2006] JOL 16082
(SCA) para 5.
[8]
S v
Trainor
2003
(1) SACR 35
(SCA) para 9.
[9]
2003
(1) SACR 583
(SCA) at 593E - 594H
.
[10]
S
v Moosajee
[1999]
2 All SA 353
(A), para 8.
[11]
S v
Gerber
[1998]
4 All SA 315
(NC).
[12]
S v
Rantlai
(1178/2016)
[2017] ZASCA 106
(13 September 2017) at para 9;
S
v Young
1977
(1) SA 602
(A) at 610E.
[13]
S v
Nkosi
1965
(2) SA 414
(C) at 416C.
[14]
S v
Mngoma
2009
(1) SACR 435 (E).
[15]
S
v Abrahams
2002
(1) SACR 116
(SCA) para 30.
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