Case Law[2023] ZAWCHC 42South Africa
W.R.T v M.C.T (16886/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 42 (3 March 2023)
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## W.R.T v M.C.T (16886/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 42 (3 March 2023)
W.R.T v M.C.T (16886/2022) [2023] ZAWCHC 42 (3 March 2023)
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sino date 3 March 2023
FLYNOTES:
RELOCATION AND SPECIAL NEEDS CHILD
FAMILY
– Children – Relocation – Child with special
needs – Mother obtaining better employment –
New
location enabling family support – Mother paying for child’s
needs with little support from father –
Opportunity for
professional growth and more beneficial employment terms –
Reasonable and bona fide reasons for relocation
– In best
interests of child.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE
DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
CASE NO: 16886 /
2022
In the matter between:
W
R
T
Applicant
And
M
C T
Respondent
Coram:
Wille, J
Heard:
21 February 2023
Delivered:
3 March 2023
JUDGMENT
WILLE, J:
Introduction:
[1]
This matter initially involved an application by the applicant for an
order for the
respondent to return the party's minor child to his
place of habitual residence.
[1]
Further, upon such return, the minor child was to remain in the
respondent's care, alternatively be placed in the applicant’s
care pending further directions. An order was also sought to
reinstate the applicant’s contact with the minor child
immediately and for him to be reinstated to his school and
extra-mural activities historically attended by him. The
applicant
also sought further alternative relief as may be
recommended by a nominated clinical psychologist.
[2]
[2]
The parties are involved in divorce proceedings. One child is
born of the marriage
and is currently three years and six months
old. The minor child has special needs as he was born with a
rare genetic disorder
characterized by skeletal abnormalities,
dysmorphic facial features, growth retardation and developmental
delay.
[3]
After a regrettable domestic violence incident, the parties separated
over a year
ago. The respondent and the minor child left the
former matrimonial home and subsequently obtained an interim
protection
order against the applicant. Since the separation,
the minor child has remained in the respondent’s primary care
and
has had supervised contact visits with the applicant.
Initially, the respondent instituted an application for interim
relief
in which she sought an order regulating the interim care and
contact arrangements in respect of their minor child. Further
she sought an order for maintenance
pendente lite
for their
minor child
.
Context:
[4]
Upon the hearing of the interim relief application by agreement, an
order was granted
providing for the following: (a) the appointment of
a clinical psychologist to conduct a care and contact assessment and
make recommendations
as to the care and contact arrangements that
would be in the minor child’s best interests; (b) the applicant
would continue
exercising supervised contact with the minor child at
specified agreed times; (c) the applicant would undergo random drug
and alcohol
screening; (d) the applicant was required to pay for the
minor child’s school fees, medical aid premium and quarterly
cancer
screening and blood tests to the extent not covered by the
respondent’s medical aid scheme and; (e) the applicant was also
required to pay a small once-off amount as a contribution to the
minor child’s past maintenance needs in respect of which
he did
not contribute for a period of about five months.
[5]
Accordingly, the respondent remained responsible for most of their
child’s financial
maintenance needs. Historically, the
applicant’s only contribution to their minor child’s
maintenance was paying
a portion of his medical aid premiums.
Further, the applicant does not contribute to the respondent’s
maintenance.
A few months after this order was granted, the
respondent experienced difficulties with her erstwhile employer
because she
missed more than a month’s work due to their minor
child’s medical condition.
[6]
The then medical condition of their minor child placed severe strain
on and complicated
the respondent’s working relationship with
her erstwhile employer. This situation was exacerbated because
the respondent
had to facilitate supervised access by the applicant
to their minor child. This is by transporting him to and from
his contact
sessions with the applicant. The respondent had to
leave work early in the afternoons to ensure she could drop off their
minor child for his contact sessions with the applicant.
[7]
The respondent’s continued absence from work affected her
ability to keep up
with her duties at work and allegedly harmed the
company culture. Her colleagues could not be afforded the same
indulgences,
creating difficulties in her workplace.
[8]
The respondent’s former employer was unwilling to allow her to
leave work early
and ultimately informed her that they could no
longer accommodate her requests for indulgences to attend to her
minor child’s
medical issues, coupled with her involvement in
arranging the supervised access to their minor child by the
applicant.
[9]
The respondent was presented with an ultimatum by her erstwhile
employer to strictly
adhere to her employment terms which meant that
she would no longer have any flexibility in her working hours.
Further, she
would be obliged to take unpaid leave to care for her
minor child. Alternatively, she was offered a severance
package.
[10]
Faced with the possibility of being unable to meet her monthly
financial obligations and having
no funds to care for her minor
child, she relocated with her minor child.
[3]
She had an employment opportunity available to her upon her
relocation. She also had a family support system available
to
her upon her relocation. The applicant launched an urgent application
in which he sought to compel his minor child to return
with or
without the respondent. This is how this application found me.
[11]
The respondent opposed the application because, amongst other things,
she would lose her current
employment, had no prospects of
immediately securing new employment and no longer had any
accommodation for herself and their minor
son should she be ordered
to return. She did not want her minor child to return without her
bearing in mind the supervised access
regime.
[12]
After some consideration, I granted an order in the following terms:
(a) the respondent was ordered
to institute a counter application for
relocation within ten days from the date of the order; (b) the
applicant would enjoy liberal
contact with his minor son via the
medium of a virtual platform daily, at mutually convenient times; (c)
the mandate of the clinical
phycologist was extended to continue with
her assessment of the minor child, and she was required to deliver a
comprehensive report
dealing with the issue of the minor child’s
relocation and if this relocation was in the best interests of the
minor child;
(d) the costs of this further assessment would be paid
by the respondent; (e) the interim financial relief application was
postponed
to be heard and determined after or together with the
relocation application; (f) pending the determination of the
relocation application
and the interim financial relief application
the applicant would not be required to make payment of the minor
child’s medical
aid contribution or his quarterly cancer
screening and blood tests and; (g) the respondent was required to pay
for the applicant
to exercise in person contact with his minor son
which contact was required to be supervised at the respondent’s
expense.
Consideration:
[13]
At the outset, I must emphasize that I do not find favour in how the
respondent re-located with
the minor child. That being said,
the core issue for determination is what is in the minor child's best
interests.
In addition, the views and interests of the
custodial parent seeking relocation must also be accorded the
appropriate weight.
Finally, the remaining parent's views and
competing interests must also be considered, among other concerns.
[14]
Ultimately, the test for allowing relocation is an enquiry as to
whether; (a) the decision to
relocate was
bona fide
and
reasonable and; (b) in the best interests of the minor child. Thus,
I must consider the reasonableness of the custodian
parent's decision
to relocate coupled with the practical and other considerations on
which such a decision was based.
[15]
I also have to consider the extent to which the custodian parent has
adequately considered the
advantages and disadvantages of the
proposed relocation. Once I have considered these issues, I
need to embark on the most
challenging journey regarding what is in
the minor child's best interests and whether the relocation will
serve the child's best
interests.
It is alleged that
the minor child has been in the respondent’s primary care since
birth. The applicant disputes this.
What is not disputed
is that the minor child has been in the respondent’s primary
care since the parties separated more than
a year ago. The
respondent was historically the breadwinner in the family and was
required to pay most of the parties’
household expenses.
In addition, the respondent continues to be responsible for most of
the minor child’s maintenance
requirements.
[16]
The applicant enjoys no formal stable employment and receives a
monthly stipend from his parents.
[4]
This stipend emanated from a property that his parents had sold
and were receiving the purchase price by way of monthly instalments.
This property has now been paid for and he will no longer receive
this amount from his parents. In addition, the applicant
earns
an undisclosed income from brewing artisanal beers at home.
Upon separation, the applicant did not contribute towards
maintaining
the respondent or his minor child, hence the application for interim
financial relief. Only when the interim
financial relief
application was enrolled for hearing did the applicant agree to an
interim order in which he would contribute
to the maintenance of his
minor child. The applicant for reasons left unexplained to this
court has elected not to seek remunerative
employment, which would
enable him to contribute towards the maintenance of his minor son
meaningfully. The financial responsibility
of maintaining the
party’s minor child falls almost exclusively on the
respondent. This is exacerbated by the demands
on the
respondent for the medical requirements of the minor child.
[17]
The respondent says she was desperate, and that is why she
relocated. The respondent says
she needed secure permanent
employment to care for herself and her minor son. The respondent took
up a regional managerial position
with her new employer and is
required to oversee and manage the opening of new retail stores in
the province to which she relocated.
Her employment package was
secure, and her earning prospects were good. The respondent
avers that faced with the possibility
of earning no income at all,
the offer received from her current employer was generous in the
circumstances.
[18]
The respondent’s case is that she will also not incur the same
level of expenses that she
had to foot before her relocation.
By elaboration, she alleges that she does not have to pay rent for
six months, and after
that, her sister has agreed to pay her monthly
rental for another six months. The respondent and her minor son
reside in
a spacious three-bedroomed, secure lifestyle estate with
many amenities. On the contrary, the applicant’s case is
that
his ability to contribute towards maintaining his minor son
largely depends on his parents continued financial support.
This
is temporary in nature. The applicant seems unable to
maintain his minor son without his parents’ financial
assistance
and has offered the respondent no interim maintenance.
This does not sit well with the court.
[19]
Moreover, the
respondent contends that the
flexibility offered in her new position has allowed her to take her
minor child to all his medical
appointments and to take time off to
care for him if he is ill. Although the respondent has
specified fixed working hours,
she is not required to remain at her
place of work for the entire period of her specified working hours.
She can perform
certain functions remotely and makes up additional
work hours in the evenings at home.
When
it has been necessary for her to attend any appointments with her
minor son, she has been able to do so freely and without
any concerns
being raised by her new employer. Simply put, her new employer
has allowed her the flexibility to care for her
minor son.
[20]
In addition
,
the respondent avers that her current position offers her the
opportunity for further career advancement as her current employer
is
actively expanding the business, and she is responsible for this.
The argument is that the respondent is entitled to pursue
her career
to the full extent available to her. By elaboration, she avers
that her current role offers the opportunity for
professional growth
and more beneficial employment terms than those offered by her
erstwhile employer. Thus, it is argued
that the respondent’s
reasons for wanting to remain in her current role are
bona
fide
and reasonable. On this, I
agree.
[21]
The respondent contends that her relocation offers the added benefit
of receiving support from
her mother and sister, who all reside close
to her. The respondent’s mother regularly spends time
with her and her
minor son and can readily assist her if necessary.
The respondent and her minor son can spend time with their extended
family
regularly. Her minor son has a close bond with the
respondent’s mother and sister.
[22]
The applicant complains that his minor son’s relationship with
his maternal grandmother
is being prioritized above his relationship
with his minor son. As a matter of pure logic, it must be in
his minor son’s
best interests that the respondent can receive
emotional and physical support from her family members.
Further, there is
no evidence that the respondent has sought to
replace the applicant with her mother.
[23]
The minor child has been enrolled in a school near the respondent’s
rented accommodation.
All indications are that the minor child
has adjusted well to his new school. His class teacher has
confirmed that he has
settled and is comfortable and happy in his new
surroundings. The respondent’s case is that her
minor child’s
medical care, education and day-to-day routine
are currently such that they will not harm his standard of living or
general well-being.
The expert in her extensive reports
supports this view.
[24]
The applicant’s core complaint is that the respondent allegedly
excludes him from his minor
child’s life and has sought
relocation to further this ulterior motive. This bears scrutiny
having regard to the facts
of this case.
[25]
The respondent amended her relief in her application for the
protection order insofar as it related
to the minor child and the
applicant. Further, the respondent sends the applicant updates
regarding their minor child’s
progress and medical treatments.
The applicant has been given the contact details of their minor
child’s doctors and
teachers. Most importantly, the
applicant’s consent was sought for a tonsillectomy which the
minor child urgently required.
Despite being afforded ample
opportunity to engage with the relevant professionals, the applicant
historically refused to
grant this consent. Belatedly, this
consent was provided on the day of the hearing.
[26]
The respondent facilitates daily video calls between the applicant
and their minor child. The
applicant was invited to arrange a visit
to see his minor son and view his new school, meet his teachers, and
attend his school
concert towards the end of last year. The
respondent offered to arrange for the applicant to exercise holiday
contact over
the festive period. Most significantly, the
respondent has indicated that she is amenable to following the
expert’s
recommendations regarding the applicant’s future
contact if the relocation is allowed. Finally, the respondent
offered
to forego any maintenance payments so that the applicant may
utilize these funds for travel to exercise contact with his minor
son. It is hard to discern how the respondent is excluding the
applicant from his minor child’s life, given the abovementioned
efforts by the respondent.
[27]
To a certain extent,
I must be guided by
the expert's recommendations. The expert submitted two
reports. In her first report, she recommended
that the minor
child should remain in the respondent’s primary care and that
he should primarily reside with her, subject
to the applicant’s
right to have unsupervised contact with his son for a period of three
hours twice per week and a further
period of five hours every
weekend.
[28]
After extending her mandate, she wrote a report on the proposed
relocation. Her second
report confirms that the minor child
should remain in the respondent’s primary care. Most
significantly, she opined
that the proposed relocation would benefit
the respondent as she will undoubtedly benefit from the social
capital, social support,
employment, and career opportunities
presented at the relocation destination. Further, she indicates
that the respondent
undertook the necessary due diligence regarding
the minor child’s educational, medical, and alternative
childcare needs.
The respondent secured accommodation and
employment, allowing her flexibility to respond to her minor child’s
medical
and developmental needs.
[29]
Although it may have been better for the minor child if the
relocation was delayed until he reached
the age of four, he was
nevertheless found to be positively and securely attached to the
applicant. She does not believe
that the proposed relocation
would necessarily result in long-term damage to the minor child’s
developmental and psychological
functioning. Furthermore, it
would be unnecessarily disruptive for the minor child if he was
ordered to return, only to relocate
once more in the foreseeable
future. Significantly, she expresses that the respondent cannot
reasonably be prevented from
relocating ‘inter-provincially’
indefinitely. Finally, she made various recommendations
regarding the applicant’s
future contact with his son if the
respondent’s relocation was permitted.
[30]
It is significant to record that the respondent pays for all the
financial needs of the minor
child with little or no contribution by
the applicant. It was against this background that it was
difficult to discern why
the applicant had overly concerned himself
with the extent of the respondent’s financial position
concerning her relocation.
[31]
Nevertheless, my core focus was to determine what was in the minor
child's best interests.
That having been said, our apex court
has confirmed that a child’s best interests do not always
outweigh or trump other competing
rights.
[32]
However, what is in the best interests of a minor child is also
subject to limitations and cannot
automatically assume dominance over
other constitutional rights or considerations.
[5]
Each case falls to be decided on its particular facts. In the
context of relocation applications, the following penchant
remarks
are apposite:
‘…
It
would likewise be incorrect to categorically hold that because it is
generally in the best interests of a child to form a physical
bond
with, and experience the love, affection and care of both parents,
that a parent who intends to relocate with the children
to a
different town, or country, is precluded from relocating …’
[6]
[33]
A
court will not
lightly
refuse to grant an order for a child to relocate if the decision of
the ‘custodian’ parent is shown to be
bona
fide
and reasonable.
[7]
It is
so that relocations have been refused for lack of planning of
practicalities. This was not the case in this matter.
I
say this because the respondent’s plans were settled. The
respondent enjoyed the financial backing, social support
and social
capital to implement her plans. Most (if not all) of the
arguments advanced by the applicant were technical arguments
that did
not deal with the core issues of the proposed relocation.
[34]
Accordingly, I was persuaded that the respondent’s proposed
relocation was
bona fide
and reasonable. This was also
in the minor child’s best interests.
I
need to stress the importance of due recognition of the realities of
any relocation and the dangers of obstructing the reasonable
proposals of the primary caregiver. In this case, it seemed
abundantly clear to me that the relocation at this stage would
be in
the minor child's best interests. However painful this may be,
the applicant has got to grasp and appreciate this fact.
[35]
I thoroughly appreciated that the applicant would be less than human
if he felt aggrieved given
the relocation order being granted.
This may well spill over into a sense of resentment against the
respondent. If
this has happened, he should reflect upon his
minor child's happiness and stability. This is one of the core
factors that
had to be given great weight when assessing the various
factors that arose when this court decided whether or not to grant
the
relocation order.
[36]
Put in another way, if I do not grant the relocation order, I would
undoubtedly put a blight
on the potential for the serenity and
happiness of the minor child. This would have been manifestly
contrary to the welfare
of the minor child. This is a reality
that a court determining an application for relocation must
consider.
Besides, the
appointed expert reported and recommended the broad terms of the
court order to be granted upon relocation.
[37]
Given
all these factors, in my view,
the applicant’s decision to relocate was
bona
fide
and genuine. I appreciated
that the relationship between the applicant and the minor child would
be prejudiced if the relocation
order was granted. However, the
advantages of the relocation far outweighed the disadvantages of the
relocation. I
also failed to understand the applicant’s
prime motivation for opposing the relocation.
[38]
The applicant made a tender prior to the hearing essentially in the
form of short-term financial
relief to the respondent should she
return with the minor child. This tender was in real terms
short-term financial assistance
to the respondent by the parents of
the applicant. This tender, in my view, had no significant
influence on the core issue
for my determination namely if the
respondent’s relocation was in the best interests of the minor
child. I am also
guided by the expert who opined that if I were
to order the return of the respondent with the minor child at this
stage it would
undoubtedly have a disruptive effect on the well-being
of the child, and this would not be in the interests of the minor
child.
Order:
[39]
In all the circumstances, the following order is granted.
1.
The applicant’s application for the
return of the minor child is dismissed.
2.
The respondent shall be liable for the
applicant’s costs of and incidental to the ‘return
application’ on the
scale between party and party as taxed or
agreed.
3.
The respondent’s counter application
to relocate with the minor child is granted.
4.
The applicant shall be liable for the
respondent’s costs of and incidental to the relocation
application on the scale between
party and party as taxed or agreed.
5.
The relocation of the minor child is
subject to the following terms and conditions:
(a)
The minor child, accompanied by the
respondent, is to spend at least two weeks annually, in Cape Town for
unsupervised contact with
the applicant and his paternal family,
which should include the Christmas period of 2023 and every second
Christmas after that.
(b)
All supervision requirements and other
contact restrictions between the applicant and his minor child are
suspended.
(c)
In 2023, the minor child should have
contact with the applicant during these trips for at least six
consecutive hours per day on
at least five days per week, with at
least one sleepover per week with the applicant. This should include
Christmas eve and Christmas
day every second year.
(d)
In 2024, the minor child should spend at
least two consecutive nights per week with the applicant, and from
2025, at least two consecutive
nights twice a week, with the
applicant while in Cape Town.
(e)
The applicant should have contact with his
minor son at least four times a year in Gauteng, for a minimum period
of three days and
a maximum period of two weeks each time, depending
on the applicant’s availability. The minor child should
have contact
with the applicant for at least six hours per day, on at
least five days per week, with at least one sleepover per visit.
(f)
From 2024, the minor child should spend two
consecutive nights with the applicant per visit. Suppose the
minor child has school
or any other therapy or medical appointment
during these visits, the applicant should have the opportunity, and
be encouraged,
to accompany his minor son and meet his teachers,
doctors and therapists.
(g)
At any other time that the applicant can
travel to Gauteng, he should be given reasonable unsupervised access
to his minor son,
considering his school, therapy, and other
commitments and routines.
(h)
The applicant must be
directly included in all emails and
WhatsApp communications between the respondent and the minor child’s
school, doctors,
and therapists. The applicant should similarly
make direct contact with all professionals involved in his minor
son’s
life, establishing a collaborative and positive
relationship with them, and opening appropriate communication. Direct
email communication
between the applicant and the respondent should
be enabled, with the assistance of a parenting co-ordinator.
(i)
The applicant must have access to Face Time
contact with his minor son four days a week, for at least fifteen
minutes, at a specified
time. This should not require the
presence of a third party, and the respondent need not interact
directly with the respondent
during these calls. These calls
should occur wherever the minor child is at that time even if he is
not home. If load
shedding makes this contact impossible, the
contact should be rescheduled as soon as possible, considering the
minor child’s
regular bedtime. The respondent must
specify a thirty-minute period, during which the applicant may
contact his minor son
via Face Time for up to fifteen minutes four
days a week.
(j)
In addition to the four days a week, the
applicant and his minor son should have Face Time contact for at
least fifteen minutes
on his minor son’s birthday, the
applicant’s birthday, Father’s Day and Christmas day.
(k)
The costs of travel and accommodation for
the contact between the applicant and his minor son are to be
included in updated maintenance
calculations wherein the applicant
and the respondent share all expenses of their minor son on a
reasonably equitable basis, with
verification that both are employed
or self-employed permanently with a fixed and predictable minimum
monthly income.
(l)
An appropriately qualified and experienced
medical professional should be identified and appointed in Gauteng,
by agreement between
the parties, as the minor child’s primary
healthcare practitioner. In cases where the applicant and the
respondent
dispute any medical test, referral, prescription, or
procedure about their minor son, this doctor is authorized to make
the final
decision to avoid further disputes.
(m)
A parenting co-ordinator should be
appointed, to whom all disputes should be directed for mediation and
recommendation. The
parenting co-ordinator may also facilitate
optimal and regular communication between the parties and ensure that
critical decisions
about the minor child are not unnecessarily
delayed.
(n)
If either party has a concern regarding
alcohol or other substance use by the other party while caring for
their minor son or driving
with him, they should report it to the
parenting co-ordinator, who is authorized to insist on random and
immediate appropriate
tests and screening.
6.
The balance of the interim financial relief
application is postponed to a date to be arranged between the parties
for a further
hearing before
Justice
Wille
.
7.
Both the applicant and the respondent are
authorized to file supplementary papers in the interim financial
relief application (as
may be necessary) to reflect, among other
things, their respective current financial position, employment
status and the costs
associated with implementing the terms and
conditions of this relocation order.
E. D. WILLE
Judge of the High Court
Cape Town
[1]
In
Cape Town.
[2]
Ms.
Toni Raphael.
[3]
To
Johannesburg at the end of September 2022.
[4]
In
the sum of R10 000, 00 per month.
[5]
S v M
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)
[2007] ZACC 18
;
2008 (3) SA 232
(CC) at paras [12] to [26].
[6]
MK v MC
(
15986/2016)
[2018] ZAGPJHC 9 (29 January 2018) at para [37].
[7]
F
v F
2006
(3) SA 42
(SCA) at para [9].
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