Case Law[2022] ZAWCHC 15South Africa
Todd v Magistrate, Clanwilliam and Others (19247/19) [2022] ZAWCHC 15; 2023 (1) SACR 481 (WCC) (23 February 2022)
Headnotes
an inquest and made findings in terms of section 16(2)(d) of the Inquests Act 58 of 1959 (“the Act”). Among others, the magistrate found that although there were no witnesses to give direct evidence as to how the incident occurred, the available circumstantial evidence strongly indicates foul play and the only person this foul play points at is the applicant. It is aspects of these findings that the applicant seeks to have reviewed and set aside. More specifically, the first respondent’s findings made in terms of section 16(2)(d) of the Act in so far as he found that ‘the death of the deceased Ms Theresa Wampach-Todd was brought about by an act or omission that prima facie involves or amounts to an offence on the part of Mr Sean Todd.
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Todd v Magistrate, Clanwilliam and Others (19247/19) [2022] ZAWCHC 15; 2023 (1) SACR 481 (WCC) (23 February 2022)
Todd v Magistrate, Clanwilliam and Others (19247/19) [2022] ZAWCHC 15; 2023 (1) SACR 481 (WCC) (23 February 2022)
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sino date 23 February 2022
In the High Court of
South Africa
(Western Cape
Division, Cape Town)
Case
No: 19247/19
In
the matter between:
SEAN
TODD
Applicant
and
MAGISTRATE
CLANWILLIAM
First Respondent
THE DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTION
WESTERN CAPE
Second Respondent
KENDAL VICTOR
(FORMERLY WAMPACH)
Third Respondent
Date of
Hearing: 4
February 2022
Date of Judgment
(electronically): 23 February 2022
JUDGMENT
LEKHULENI
J
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This application arises from an unfortunate incident which occurred
on 14 January
2016 at the Cedeberg Mountains in the district of
Clanwilliam. On that fateful day, the deceased one Ms Terry
Wampach-Todd fell
from a cliff in a mountainous area and later died
due to the injuries she sustained. When this tragic incident
happened, the deceased
was in the presence of her husband, the
applicant in this matter and the only witness of this disastrous
incident.
[2]
Pursuant to that unfortunate incident, the first respondent, a
magistrate in the district
of Clanwilliam held an inquest and made
findings in terms of section 16(2)(d) of the Inquests Act 58 of 1959
(“
the Act
”). Among others, the magistrate found
that although there were no witnesses to give direct evidence as to
how the incident
occurred, the available circumstantial evidence
strongly indicates foul play and the only person this foul play
points at is the
applicant. It is aspects of these findings that the
applicant seeks to have reviewed and set aside. More
specifically, the
first respondent’s findings made in terms of
section 16(2)(d) of the Act in so far as he found that ‘the
death of the
deceased Ms Theresa Wampach-Todd was brought about by an
act or omission that prima facie involves or amounts to an offence on
the part of Mr Sean Todd.
[3]
In his review application, the applicant impugned this decision and
seeks an order
that it be set aside and be substituted with an order
that it has not been established that the death of the deceased was
brought
about by any act or omission prima facie involving or
amounting to an offence on his part or on the part of any person. The
review
application was not opposed by any interested party. The first
and the second respondent elected to abide the decision of this
court.
[4]
This application among others,
relates
to the manner in which the inquest into the deceased's death was
held. Stated more broadly, the inquest raises the question
whether
the first respondent committed an irregularity that vitiated the
inquest proceedings by holding a non-public inquest
into the
deceased's death based solely on affidavits and without recourse to
oral evidence?
In addition, the applicant’s
counsel, Mr Tredoux, contended that the magistrate neglected or
disregarded material evidence
that was placed before him and this in
his view amounted to an irregularity which enjoins this court to
review the first respondent’s
findings. If the magistrate
considered all the evidence that was placed before him, so it was
argued, the magistrates could have
reached a different conclusion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[5]
The factual matrix of this matter gleaned from the statements of
witnesses can succinctly
be summarised as follows: The deceased and
the applicant were married to each other and they lived together as
husband and wife
for six years. The deceased was an accomplished
athlete with numerous achievements in various fields of cycling. In
January 2016,
the applicant and the deceased visited the Sanddrift
Holiday Resort in Cederberg in the district of Clanwilliam. It was
their practice
to visit this place. On 14 January 2016 early in the
morning they set off with their mountain bikes from their cottage and
cycled
on the mountain bike trail. The applicant avers that
approximately 40 minutes later they reached a cliff face where they
stopped
to take photos. He took a photo of the deceased sitting on
the edge of the cliff. After the photo was taken she got up and the
applicant told the deceased that he was going to walk further.
[6]
Applicant left his bike and carried walking and suddenly he heard a
scream. The deceased
yelled and when he turned around, he saw her
falling forward into the cliff. He never saw if she fell along the
rock on the way
down to the foot of the ravine. The deceased fell 80
to 100 meters from the top of the cliff to the ground. He then found
a way
to go down to her and he found her lying in the ravine. At that
time, the deceased was making choking suffocating sounds. Saliva
and
blood was oozing out her mouth. He tried to open her jaw with his
hands and the deceased’s teeth clenched shut and she
grabbed
him on his arms and suddenly went lame. He later realized that the
deceased was dead. He then went back to the Chalet to
get assistance.
Upon arrival at Sanddrift Holiday resort where they were based, he
reported the incident to the receptionist Ms
Fortuin and pointed to
her on the map where the incident happened. After that he returned to
his wife. Two hours later the rescue
team arrived and they certified
the deceased dead. Police came and investigated the scene and later
the deceased was airlifted
from the ravine.
[7]
Corrine Fortuin the receptionist of the Sanddrift Holiday resort
declared in her statement
that indeed on the day in question the
applicant came to the reception around 09h00 and asked for
help. According to her,
the applicant was exceptionally calm and had
no sense of panic. The applicant told her that his wife fell off her
bicycle and he
thought that she was dead as she had no pulse and her
limbs were broken. She then called the mountain rescue teams for
help. She
alluded to the fact that the applicant and the deceased
stayed in this resort numerous times over the last few years.
[8]
Shaheed Osmon employed by the EMS rescue services attended the scene
where the deceased
allegedly fell. He has been in the emergency
services for 25 years. He averred in his statement that when they
initially received
the call regarding this incident, the report was
that the deceased was still alive. Later, they were informed that she
was not
breathing anymore. He went to the scene in the company of his
colleague Anthony Hall. Upon arrival at the scene, they found the
deceased lying at the bottom of the ravine and she was dead. Anthony
climbed the ravine to the spot where the deceased fell and
took
photos. According to him, due to the step like shape of the cliff,
the injuries that the deceased sustained did not seem consistent
with
someone who has slipped down from the top of the cliff to the bottom.
If indeed she slipped down that terrain he would have
expected more
injuries on the deceased.
[9]
At the scene, he asked the applicant as to what happened that led to
the deceased’s
death. The applicant informed him that he and
the deceased stopped to take photos. The applicant informed him that
he was further
up the road from where the deceased was and he
suddenly heard the deceased screaming and when he turned around the
deceased was
gone. They retrieved the body of the deceased after the
necessary photographs were taken. From his observation, the deceased
suffered
injuries on her left arm and both legs. He also heard the
applicant say that when he had returned to his wife after reporting
her
fall at reception, the deceased was still alive and struggling to
breath.
[10]
Anthony Hall a volunteer rescue climber restored with Skymed
Helicopter attended the scene and assisted
to recover the body of the
deceased from the ravine with the Skymed helicopter. Upon his arrival
at the scene, the applicant gave
him the description of the incident.
He then prepared diagrams of the scene and a geographical layout of
the place where the incident
occurred. The layout he prepared formed
part of the inquest record and indeed reflected the step like shape
of the cliff from the
top to the bottom of the ravine.
[11]
Grant Jennings a medical scientist of 20 years experienced based at
UCT also provided a statement.
He studied the photos of the deceased
and the layout of the place where the deceased fell and in his view,
he has never seen a
body in such a good condition from a cliff fall,
though this is possible if the deceased did not have multiple
strikes.
[12]
The investigating officer Ms Inez Wales also filed a statement. She
attended the scene together with
her colleague Mr Goeieman. The scene
was a place which formed a deep ravine which was approximately 25
meters from top to bottom.
She observed mountain biking trails that
went around the ravine and carried on. At the bottom of the ravine
she saw the deceased
lying on her back. She found the applicant and
the rescue team at the scene. She asked the applicant what happened
to the deceased
and the applicant informed her that they had stopped
at the top of the cliff to take photos of each other with their
cellphones
because the sun looked very pretty.
[13]
The applicant told her that he took a photo of the deceased sitting
on the edge of the cliff and he
then walked on a sandy path which led
to an outcrop of rocks. He stood there and suddenly he heard the
deceased screaming and when
he turned he saw her body falling over
the edge of the cliff. She averred that she then went to the sandy
path which the applicant
pointed to her and she noticed that there
were no footprints at all on this path. When the applicant saw her
taking pictures of
the path, the applicant suddenly started walking
along the path towards her and she stopped him and warned him not to
do so.
[14]
She averred that the applicant had deep scratches under his right
eye. The applicant’s legs were
also covered in thin scratches.
The applicant told her that he fell twice trying to get to the
deceased. She then took a
statement of the applicant at the top
of the cliff near the spot where the deceased had fallen.
Subsequent thereto, they
left the cliff and went to the resort where
the applicant was based. The applicant told her that their marriage
had been sublime
however going through their cellphones, she found
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. That was in short her evidence
as contained
in her sworn statement. There were other statements
which were obtained by the investigation officer which in my view are
not relevant
for the purposes of this review application.
GROUNDS OF REVIEW
[15]
The applicant did not clearly set out the grounds of review in his
notice of motion upon which he impugns
the decision of the
magistrate. However, from the reading of the applicant’s
founding affidavit, the grounds of review can
succinctly be
summarized as follows:
1. That
the magistrate erred in dispensing with viva voce evidence at the
hearing of the inquest.
2. That
the magistrate failed to consider material evidence placed before him
and made a finding in circumstances
where there was no admissible
evidence at all to justify such finding.
APPLICABLE LEGAL
PRINCIPLES AND DISCUSSION
[16]
For the sake of convenience, I will consider the grounds of review
set out above ad seriatim.
Did the magistrate
err when he dispensed with viva voce evidence at the hearing of the
inquest?
[17]
The applicant impugns the decision of the first respondent for
holding the inquest on affidavits and
for not hearing oral evidence.
From the inquest record, it must be mentioned that the original
magistrate (Ms Duimelaar) who was
assigned to attend to the inquest
decided to hold the inquest proceeding in open court and to hear viva
voce evidence. She also
directed that a number of witnesses be
subpoenaed for the hearing of the inquest. Indeed, witnesses were
subpoenaed for court for
the 15 June 2018. On 15 June 2018, rights to
legal representation were explained to the applicant and the matter
was postponed
for the applicant’s attorney to 06 August 2018.
[18]
Subsequent thereto, the designated magistrate was not available and
the inquest proceedings was allocated
to the first respondent. After
perusing the available statements of witnesses, the first respondent
decided not to hear oral evidence
but to base his decision on the
affidavits filed. The first respondent was of the view that a formal
inquest was not necessary.
The matter was heard in an open court and
after listening to arguments from the daughter of the deceased and
written arguments
from both the prosecutor and the applicant’s
counsel, the first respondent made a finding that there was prima
facie evidence
implicating the applicant.
[19]
It is trite that if criminal proceedings are not instituted in
connection with death arising from unnatural
causes, an inquest is
held in order to determine the circumstances and the cause of the
death in question. In other words, an inquest
can only commence once
the Director of Public Prosecution (“
the DPP”
) or
his representative has decided that no criminal proceedings are to be
instituted. A
n
inquest is not a replacement or a substitute for criminal
proceedings. It is aimed at making a determination whether or not the
prosecution of any person for having brought about the death of the
deceased is called for, and to consider and make an assessment
of the
available evidence for that purpose.
[20]
In
Timol
and Another v Magistrate, Johannesburg and Another
1972(2)
SA 281 (T) at 287 H to 288 (A), the Appellate Division observed that
‘
for the administration of
justice to be complete and to instil confidence, it is necessary
that, amongst other things, there should
be an official investigation
in every case where a person has died of unnatural causes, and the
result of such investigation should
be made known.’ Meanwhile
in
De'Ath
(Substituted by Tiley) v Additional Magistrate, Cape
Town
1988
(4) SA 769
(C) at p775G,
it
was said an inquest is not aimed at proving anyone's guilt, but is
most certainly aimed at ensuring that, if possible, where
guilt
exists it will not remain hidden.
[21]
Section 16(2) of the Act enjoins a judicial officer holding an
inquest to record a finding
of
the identity of the deceased person; the cause or likely cause of
death; the date of death; and
whether
the death was brought about by any act or omission prima facie
involving or amounting to an offence on the part of any person.
The
purpose which is served by an inquest was aptly described by the
Appellate Division in
Marais
N.O. v Tiley
[1990] ZASCA 40
;
1990 (2) SA 899
(A) at
901 F-G as follows:
‘
The
underlying purpose of an inquest is to promote public confidence and
satisfaction; to reassure the public that all deaths from
unnatural
causes will receive proper attention and investigation so that, where
necessary, appropriate measures can be taken to
prevent similar
occurrences, and so that persons responsible for such deaths may, as
far as possible, be brought to justice.’
[22]
Section 10 of the Act provides that
unless
the giving of oral evidence is dispensed with under this Act, an
inquest shall be held in public. The injunction envisaged
in this
section that an inquest shall be held in public clearly implies that
oral testimony must be heard. In
Marais
NO v Tiley
(
supra
)
the Appellate Division found that it would be purposeless to hold an
inquest in public if only affidavits are to be admitted (in
terms of
s 13(1)) and no viva voce evidence is led. The court stated
that the fact that oral evidence and a public inquest
go hand in
glove is also apparent from the wording of section 10. Properly
interpreted, in the context of the Act, section 10 in
effect provides
that as a rule there should be a public inquest with oral evidence.
[23]
Section 13(2) of the Act gives a presiding officer an unfettered
discretion to dispense with viva voce
evidence. For the sake of
completeness, the section provides:
‘
The judicial
officer may in his discretion cause the person who made such
statement to be subpoenaed to give oral evidence at the
inquest or
may cause written interrogatories to be submitted to him for reply,
and such interrogatories and any reply thereto purporting
to be a
reply from such person shall likewise be admissible in evidence at
the inquest.’
[24]
It must be stressed that an exercise of that judicial discretion
deputed to the presiding officer must
be exercised judiciously and
not arbitrarily or capriciously. It must be exercised in such a
manner that will assist the court
to unravel the truth. The presiding
officer must always bear in mind that justice must not only be done
but must be seen to be
done. In my view, an exercise of such
discretion must be infused with constitutional values and must
reflect the Bill of Rights
in particular the right of access to
courts envisaged in section 34 of the Constitution. Notably, section
39(2) of the Constitution
enjoins the courts, tribunals or forums
when interpreting any legislation, to promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill
of Rights. This provision
inter alia
,
requires judicial officers to read legislation, where possible, in
ways which give effect to its fundamental values and in conformity
with the Constitution. (See
Investigating Directorate: Serious
Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors: In Re
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty)
Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others
2000 (10) BCLR 1079
(CC) at para 22). In my view, this should be
the starting point for every judicial officer when making a
determination whether or
not he should dispense with oral evidence in
terms of section 13(2) of the Inquest Act.
[25]
I
n this case, the DPP decided
not to institute criminal prosecution but directed that an inquest be
held and the DPP recommended
to the magistrate to hear viva voce
evidence. The DPP also informed the applicant’s legal
representative that they are entitled
to attend the hearing of the
inquest, to lead evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. In
addition, the DPP advised the applicant
that he can make submissions
to the magistrate regarding the finding that should be made.
[26]
In my view, the recommendation of the DPP to the magistrate to hear
viva voce evidence was in terms
of section 8(1) of the Act which
provide as follows:
8. Witnesses and
evidence at inquests.
‘(1) The judicial officer who
is to hold or holds an inquest may, of his own accord or at the
request of any person
who has a substantial and peculiar interest in
the issue of the inquest, cause to be subpoenaed any person to give
evidence or
to produce any document or thing at the inquest:
Provided
that the said judicial officer shall, if so requested by the
attorney-general within whose area of jurisdiction the inquest
is to
be held or is being held, cause persons or any particular person to
be subpoenaed to give oral evidence in general or in
respect of any
particular matter at the inquest.’ (My emphasis)
[27]
In my opinion, the plain reading of this provision makes it
abundantly clear that where a
judicial officer is requested by
the DPP to hear oral evidence, it becomes peremptory for him to hold
a formal inquest. He cannot
dispense with oral evidence in those
circumstances.
[28]
In this case,
the magistrate informed the parties
at the hearing of the inquest that he had decided to conduct an
informal inquest and to decide
the matter based on the statements of
witnesses. He requested the parties to make oral submissions in open
court. The daughter
of the deceased who was in attendance, made oral
submissions and contended that the applicant had a hand in the death
of the deceased.
She implored the court to consider hearing viva voce
evidence so that the applicant can be examined under oaths. In
response, Mr
Tredoux who appeared on behalf of the applicant opposed
this request and informed the court that the hearing of oral evidence
would
not change anything as the only witness who really knew what
happened is the applicant. He further told the magistrate that the
version of the applicant was not going to differ from what the
magistrate had in front of him.
[29]
When these submissions were made, the applicant’s counsel was
fully aware of all the allegations
that were levelled against the
applicant by the various witnesses who are referred to by the first
respondent in his written finding.
The first respondent accepted the
submissions of the applicant’s counsel and decided the matter
on the papers before him.
[30]
I am of the view that the decision of the magistrate to hold an
informal inquest in this case despite
the recommendations of the DPP
and the request by the daughter of the deceased was wrong and
mistaken. The first respondent was
ordinarily under an obligation
deputed to him by section 8(1) of the Act to call for oral evidence.
To this end, I am in full agreement
with the views expressed in
Marais NO v Tiley
[1990] ZASCA 40
;
1990 (2) SA 899
(AD) p. 5,
where the court stated that
it
is axiomatic that public confidence and satisfaction would normally
best be promoted by a full and fair investigation, publicly
and
openly held, giving interested parties an opportunity to assist the
magistrate holding the inquest in determining not only
the
circumstances surrounding the death under consideration, but also
whether any person was responsible for such death.
[31]
Notwithstanding, I must however emphasise that the fact that the
first respondent failed to comply
with the provisions of the Act does
not mean that his decision must be reviewed by this court. The
inquiry does not end there.
The non-compliance with the statutory
provision of the Act in my view does not in itself vitiates the
inquests proceedings before
the first respondent. Something more is
required. The onus rests on the applicant to satisfy this court that
the exercise of the
first respondent’s discretion was so
unreasonable, and so capricious such that it infringed on his
fundamental rights. To
this end, the dictum of Brink J in
De Vos v
Die Ringkommissie van die Ring van die N.G Kerk, Bloemfontein en
Ander
1952 (2) SA 83
(O) at p.101 still hold sway. The court
said:
‘
Die
person wat beweer veronreg te wees moet verwys dat hy daardeur
benadeel is en dat hy ‘n burgerlike reg of belang het wat
deur
die oortreding geskend word en wat die beskerming van die hof
belang.’
[32]
It must be stressed that
this
court will not on review interfere with the decision of the first
respondent merely because in its opinion the decision was
wrong or
unreasonable. It will only do so only if the possible inference is
that the decision was arbitrary or mala fide –
See
Claassens
v Landdros, Bloemfontein
1964(4) SA 4
(OFS) at 9B-D. Even if there was a technical breach of the statute
the court will not interfere on review unless the
applicant or any
interested party can show prejudice. In my view, the applicant has
not shown that he has suffered any prejudice
pursuant to the decision
of the first respondent to hold an informal inquest. This finding is
fortified among others, by the fact
that the applicant requested the
first respondent to dispense with viva voice evidence. When making
this submission, the applicant
was duly assisted by his attorney and
legal counsel.
[33]
In addition, when these submissions were made, the applicant was
aware of the evidence that was levelled
against him by all the
witnesses who were referred to by the first respondent in his written
findings. Most importantly, the averments
of these witnesses are
based on what the applicant informed them on what happened to the
deceased at the cliff. The first respondent
decided to hold an
informal inquest which decision was supported by the applicant. The
first respondent subsequently made his findings
based on the
statements of witnesses which the applicant possessed. In my judgment
and taking into account the totality of the
facts before court, the
applicant’s first ground of review must fail. This leads me to
the last review ground.
Did the magistrate
fail to consider material evidence placed before him?
[34]
It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the first respondent
came to a wrong conclusion in respect
of his finding that the death
of the deceased was brought about by an act or omission prima facie
evidencing or amounting to an
offence on the part of the applicant.
It was further contended that the only reasonable inference to be
drawn from the fact that
the DPP decided not to institute a
prosecution against the applicant in 2017 was because it was of the
view that the evidence constituting
the prosecution’s case was
insufficient to establish a prima facie case of a crime having been
committed by the applicant.
Based on the DPP’s decision, it was
submitted that the magistrate was wrong in finding on the exact same
evidence that a
prima facie case was established against the
applicant.
[35]
This argument in my view misses the point. It should be borne in mind
that this is not an appeal but
a review application. There exists no
right of appeal against the findings in an inquest. The standard of
proof applicable in inquest
proceedings is poles apart to the
standard of proof applicable in criminal matters. In criminal matters
the state must proof its
case beyond reasonable doubt. (See
S v
Jackson
1998 (1) SACR 470
(SCA). While in inquest proceedings the
question is whether a judicial officer holding the inquest is of the
opinion that there
is evidence available which could at a subsequent
criminal trial be held to be credible and acceptable and which, if
accepted,
could prove that the death of the deceased was brought
about by an act or omission which involved or amounted to the
commission
of a criminal offence on the part of some person or
persons. (See
In re Goniwe and others
(2)
1994 (2) SACR 425
(SE).
[36]
In my view, having considered all the affidavits filed by the
witnesses, the findings of the first
respondent cannot be faulted. I
am of the view that the first respondent was correct in finding that
there is a prima facie case
against the applicant. In addition, to
the reasons the first respondent gave, I must stress the fact that
the applicant gave conflicting
versions of what transpired at the
ravine. He made his first report to Ms Fortuin a receptionist at the
Sanddrif Holiday Resort
immediately after the alleged incident. He
told her that his wife fell off her bicycle and he thinks that she
may be dead because
he felt her pulse and there was nothing and her
limbs were also broken.
[37]
Subsequent thereto, on the same morning he told other witnesses
including the police, the rescue team
in particular Mr Osmon that the
deceased fell into the cliff after he took her photo. When Mr Osmon
asked him to explain what happened,
the applicant told him that they
stopped to take photos and he was further up the road from where the
deceased was. He was not
standing by her and then he just heard her
screaming and when he turned around she was gone. Ms Fortuin the
receptionist and to
whom the first report was made, averred in her
affidavit that while she was in an adjoining office, she was
surprised when she
heard the applicant telling everyone that the
deceased fell into a cliff while they were taking photos and there
was no mention
of her falling off a bike. The version the applicant
gave to other witnesses was diametrically opposed to the version he
gave the
receptionist when he came for the first time seeking for
help.
[38]
The applicant has not given a plausible explanation on what really
caused the deceased, an accomplished
sportswoman to fall into the
cliff. The deceased was a cyclist of note who won numerous
competitions in the world including America.
She was medically sound
and physically fit. Her fall into the cliff was mysterious and
demands an answer. She was with the applicant
and he is the only one
who can clearly explain what happened to the deceased.
[39]
I must emphasise the fact that in his founding and supplementary
affidavit, the applicant could not
explain what really caused the
deceased to fall into the cliff on such a clear and sunny day. The
weather condition was good. The
applicant averred that the wind was
mild and there was nothing major. In my view, the applicant has to
answer as to what caused
the deceased to fall into the ravine.
According to the applicant, they had a very good relationship. There
is nothing that suggests
that the deceased intentionally threw
herself in the ravine. Something surely caused her to fall into the
cliff and it is the applicant
who must explain this in the right
forum.
[40]
Most importantly, the investigating officer averred in her statement
that she asked the applicant to
explain to her what he remembered.
The applicant told her that he took a photo of the deceased sitting
on the edge of the cliff
and then he walked away from the deceased on
a sandy path which lead to an outcrop of rock and he stood there when
he suddenly
heard the deceased just screaming and when he had turned,
he saw her body falling over the edge of the cliff. When she
investigated
the sandy path which the applicant pointed to her she
observed that there were no foot prints at all. She took pictures of
the
path and the applicant started to walk on the path. She stopped
him from doing so.
[41]
Furthermore, the applicant could not give a credible explanation of
the two deep scratches under his
eye which were observed by the
investigating officer who arrived at the scene whilst the deceased
was still lying in the cliff.
Taking
into account the facts of this case, I am of the view that there is
no basis whatsoever warranting the setting aside of the
decision of
the first respondent.
ORDER
[42]
In the result, I propose the following order:
The applicant’s
application to review the findings of the first respondent is hereby
dismissed.
LEKHULENI
J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
I agree and it is so
ordered
ALLIE
J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
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