Case Law[2023] ZAKZDHC 9South Africa
Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Limited and Another v Richards Bay Coal Teminal (Pty) Limited and Others (D531/2023) [2023] ZAKZDHC 9 (1 March 2023)
High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)
1 March 2023
Headnotes
in the OCT as well as the business of OCM were preserved in terms of s 38 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998.
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Kwazulu-Natal High Court, Durban
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAKZDHC 9
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Limited and Another v Richards Bay Coal Teminal (Pty) Limited and Others (D531/2023) [2023] ZAKZDHC 9 (1 March 2023)
Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Limited and Another v Richards Bay Coal Teminal (Pty) Limited and Others (D531/2023) [2023] ZAKZDHC 9 (1 March 2023)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAKZDHC/Data/2023_9.html
sino date 1 March 2023
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE
NO: D531/2023
In
the application for leave to intervene by:
NATIONAL
UNION OF MINEWORKERS
Intervening Party
In
re:
The
matter between:
OPTIMUM
COAL TERMINAL (PTY) LIMITED
First Applicant
(in
business rescue)
OPTIMUM
COAL MINE (PTY) LIMITED
Second Applicant
(in
business rescue)
and
RICHARDS
BAY COAL TERMINAL (PTY) LIMITED
First
Respondent
TEMPLAR
CAPITAL LIMITED
Second Respondent
LIBERTY
COAL (PTY) LIMITED
Third Respondent
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, and released to SAFLII.
The
date for hand down is deemed to be 01 March 2023 (Wednesday) at
10:30am
ORDER
The
following order shall issue:
1.
The application by NUM for urgent interim relief in paragraph
4(a),
(b) and (c) of the notice of motion is dismissed with costs,
including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
JUDGMENT
Chetty
J:
[1]
The applicant in this matter, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)
launched an
urgent application to intervene in the main dispute
between Optimum Coal Mine (OCM), Optimum Coal Terminal (OCT) and
Richards Bay
Coal Terminal (RBCT) and in which it sought interim
relief pending the determination of the main application. This
application
was issued on Thursday, 2 February 2023 and set down for
hearing on Monday, 6 February 2023. The papers were served on the
first
respondent (RBCT) on 2 February 2023. RBCT was the only
entity that opposed the application. At the same time, various other
voluminous affidavits were filed in the main application involving
OCM, OCT, the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) as well as
the
second and third respondents, being Templar Capital and Liberty Coal
respectively. When the matter came before my colleague,
Balton J, in
the motion court on 6 February 2023, the papers had expanded to being
in excess of 6 000 pages. It was impossible
for all of these papers
to have been read over the weekend, and the application was
accordingly adjourned by consent of the parties,
who were able to
secure an earlier date of 16 February 2023 for the hearing of the
matter on the opposed roll.
[2]
It is perhaps prudent at the outset to record that while access to
the courts is guaranteed
to all to have their disputes adjudicated,
courts are not to be abused by litigants with a deluge of papers at
short notice, only
for the legal representatives to conclude amongst
themselves that it would not be possible for the court to hear the
matter on
the allocated date when it was originally set down.
Litigants are to be mindful of the case load of judges, particularly
where
it is expected that apart from other matters on the motion
court roll, attention should also be given to reading several
thousand
pages at short notice. Convenience to the court and the
judges presiding is an important consideration when deciding to
launch
urgent litigation of this nature. The failure to do so,
in my view, is tantamount to an abuse of the court process.
[3]
As stated earlier, the urgent relief sought by NUM was for it to be
granted leave to intervene as a
‘third party’ in the main
application between OCT and OCM against RBCT. The main application in
essence concerns a
contractual dispute in which RBCT terminated, on
31 January 2023, OCM and OCT’s entitlement to use the
facilities at the
coal terminal in Richards Bay for the purpose of
exporting coal. On 6 February 2023 an order was taken by consent in
terms of which
NUM was granted leave to intervene as an applicant in
the main application and that its founding affidavit in the
intervening application,
be admitted as part of the papers in the
main application. The parties, subject to other procedural issues
concerning the exchange
of further affidavits, agreed to have NUM’s
interim application for a status quo order argued on 16 February
2023. Accordingly,
the issue for determination was that set out in
paragraph 4 of the notice of motion, which reads as follows:
‘
4. That the status
quo (as it existed before 31 January 2023) be preserved by
interdicting RBCT with immediate effect from doing
any of the
following until this court finally determines the urgent relief
claimed in the main application by the first and second
applicants :
a.
interfering with or preventing the first applicant’s
use of the
Richards Bay Coal Terminal (‘the Terminal’) and the land,
buildings, machinery, plant, equipment, and installations
as they
exist at the terminal in the same way as first applicant or its
nominees or agents have been using these facilities at
all material
times before 31 January 2023, for the exportation of coal through the
terminal;
b.
transferring or terminating the first applicant’s
right to use
the Terminal and the land, buildings, machinery, plant, equipment,
and installations as they exist at the terminal
in the same way as
first applicant or its nominees or agents have been using these
facilities at all material times before 31 January
2023, for the
exportation of coal through the terminal; and
c.
initiating a transfer of ownership of
the first applicant’s
shareholder interest (as defined in clause 1.1.52 of the Shareholders
Agreement).’
[4]
By the time the matter came before me, NUM had whittled down the
papers to just over 800 pages, which
it contended were relevant to
the determination of the relief it sought. RBCT on the other hand
contended both in its answering
affidavit and in its heads of
argument that the relief sought by NUM could not be determined in a
silo, and divorced from the main
application. For that reason, RBCT
contends that the application is intrinsically linked to the main
application pursued by Optimum
[1]
,
and therefore this application by NUM is either to be dismissed or
adjourned for determination at the time of the main application
being
heard. At the request of RBCT’s legal representatives, a
further set of documents was filed, increasing the volume
of
documents in excess of 2 500 pages. In either eventuality (of
the application being dismissed or adjourned to be heard
with the
main application), RBCT contends that it should be awarded its costs
in opposing the application. NUM on the other hand
contends that the
relief which it seeks, described as ‘interim interim relief’
is urgent in light of the impact that
the contractual dispute between
the parties in the main application, has for their members, and the
adverse impact on their right
to earn a livelihood.
[5]
At the hearing on 16 February 2023, counsel for the applicants in the
main application as well as those
appearing on behalf of the business
rescue practitioners were present, but did not participate in the
merits of the application.
Conspicuously, there was no appearance for
the NPA, which had secured an order in the Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria on 23 March
2022, in terms of which all shares held in the
OCT as well as the business of OCM were preserved in terms of
s 38
of
the
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998
.
[6]
The judgment of the Gauteng High Court by Justices Fourie and Mbongwe
further prevented the disposal
of the business of OCM unless the
curator bonis appointed by the court (Mr P F van den Steen) and the
business rescue practitioners
in respect of OCM and OCT agreed to do
so in writing, or where the court has issued an order authorising
such disposal. Importantly,
in terms of the order referred to above,
the curator bonis was authorised to ‘assume control of the
property’. To the
extent that the curator was clothed with the
necessary authority with regard to the shares and shareholding
forming part of OCT
and OCM, the order directed that the curator ‘act
as shareholder in place and stead of the relevant owners’.
[7]
In their opposing affidavit, RBCT pointed out that neither the NPA
nor the curator were joined as parties
in the application brought by
NUM. To this end, it was contended by RBCT’s counsel that the
court is entitled to take into
account what the NPA (who have been
granted leave to intervene as a party in the main application) stated
in its affidavits in
the main application. Similarly, it was
contended that regard could be had to the report filed by the curator
pursuant to the order
of the Gauteng High Court. During the course of
his argument, counsel for NUM referred to extracts from the NPA’s
affidavit,
which it submitted supported NUM’s claim to the
relief it seeks in this application. That was disputed by RBCT.
Reference
will be made below to those particular aspects of the NPA’s
affidavit.
[8]
Prior to the commencement of the hearing RBCT filed an application in
terms of Uniform
rule 7(1)
challenging the authority of those
representing NUM to bring the present proceedings. In this regard a
supporting affidavit to
the challenge contended that on the basis of
a newspaper article, the deponent to the affidavit filed by NUM,
namely Mr Richard
Zenzile Mguzulu (Mr Mguzulu), did not have the
necessary authority to launch the application to intervene,
particularly as the
branch which he purports to represent, no longer
exists. In
Ganes
and another v Telecom Namibia Ltd
2004
(3) SA 615
(SCA)
para 19 the court held:
‘
.
. .The deponent to an affidavit in motion proceedings need not be
authorised by the party concerned to depose to the affidavit.
It is
the institution of the proceedings and the prosecution thereof which
must be authorised.’
[9]
A resolution taken by the leadership of NUM, however, confirmed that
Mr Mguzulu was indeed duly authorised,
and that the attorneys acting
in the present application, were also duly authorised to do so. After
considering the proof of authority,
I was satisfied that the
challenge in terms of Uniform
rule 7(1)
had been properly met.
[10]
It is not necessary to set out in any great detail the interrelated
web of the Optimum business entities, save
to record that both OCT
and OCM have been placed into business rescue. OCM operates a mine
while OCT is a shareholder and derives
an entitlement to use the RBCT
facility to export coal, on the assumption that it is not in breach
of any provision of the Shareholders
Agreement. Since being placed
into business rescue, OCM has effectively outsourced the mining
activities to mini-pit operators,
who employ miners, the latter being
members of NUM. It is in this context that NUM essentially contends
that the actions by RBCT
have a ‘knock-on’ effect for its
members, depriving them of their right to a livelihood. The founding
affidavit goes
a step further, contending that the conduct of RBCT
‘directly and irreversibly affects the rights and interests of
thousands
of NUM members’. Of particular importance is that the
business rescue practitioners (BRPs) of OCM have agreed to pay
outstanding
salaries and retrenchment packages owing to NUM’s
members on an ongoing basis. In this respect it is contended that the
mini-pit
operators pay a royalty to OCM, with the remuneration earned
in this process enabling the BRPs to pay the former employees
approximately
R10 000 per month. If the status quo order is not
granted, so it was contended, this impedes on the business of the pit
operators
to export their coal using RBCT’s facilities,
effectively placing in jeopardy the ability of the BRPs to continue
paying
the monthly retrenchment tranches to NUM’s members. It
is further contended that the area in which the miners reside is
economically
depleted, with no alternatives to earn a livelihood.
[11]
The main application between Optimum and RBCT (with the NPA and NUM
being granted leave to intervene) relates to
the entitlement of
Optimum to export coal through the use of the facility at RBCT.
According to RBCT, Optimum’s entitlement
came to an end on 31
January 2023 and therefore no basis exists in law for a contract to
be created by the court to reinstate one
which has come to an end by
effluxion of time. See
Absa Ltd v Moore and another
2016 (3)
SA 97
(SCA) para 42.
[12]
Moreover, the relief which NUM seeks in this interim application in
paragraph 4 of the notice of motion essentially
mirrors the relief
which Optimum seeks in the main application. It is for this reason
that RBCT contends that there is no self-standing
relief which NUM
seeks in this application in its own right, and that it has no real
and substantial interest in the relief sought
in the main
application. It was further contended on behalf of RBCT that NUM is
not a party to the contractual relationship between
Optimum and RBCT.
It is not disputed that NUM is not a shareholder in RBCT. Ordinarily,
it would follow that NUM would have no
entitlement of its own to
demand performance by RBCT. RBCT relies in this regard on
National
Gambling Board v Premier of KwaZulu-Natal and others
[2001] ZACC 8
;
2002 (2)
BCLR 156
(CC) para 41 where the court held:
‘
An
applicant for an interim interdict must show a
prima
facie
right
to the main relief pending which the interim
interdict is sought
.’ (Footnote omitted, my
underlining.)
## [13]
The same point was stressed inEskom
Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd and
others[2022]
ZACC 44 where in the minority judgment, Unterhalter AJ, states the
following with regard to the approach in determining whether
to grant
interim relief:
[13]
The same point was stressed in
Eskom
Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd and
others
[2022]
ZACC 44 where in the minority judgment, Unterhalter AJ, states the
following with regard to the approach in determining whether
to grant
interim relief:
##
‘
[64] A
very long line of cases, stretching back to the authoritative
pronouncement of our modern law in
Setlogelo
,
has made it plain that a
prima
facie
right, though open to some
doubt, is the standard used to assess the applicant’s prospects
of success in obtaining final
relief. The enquiry is of
necessity provisional because the available evidence is usually
incomplete, untested under cross-examination
(where there are
disputes of fact), and the case may yet be more fully developed.
[65]
What
the standard requires has given rise to no small measure of
difference. According to
Webster
v Mitchell
,
as qualified in
Gool
, the
test is whether the applicant has furnished proof which, if
uncontradicted at trial (here in the review),
would
entitle the applicant to final relief
.
The Court will then consider the case of the respondent to decide
whether it casts serious doubt on the case of the applicant.
If it
does, the standard is not met. In
Ferreira
, a
majority of a Full Court considered this test to be too exacting. It
held that the prospects of success of the claim
for the principal
relief, albeit weak, may nevertheless suffice. This is so
because other requirements for the grant of an
interim interdict
may be strongly grounded and hence compensate for the weakness as to
prospects. This, it was thought better
chimed with the holding
in
Eriksen
Motors
.
More recently,
this
Court, in
Economic Freedom
Fighters
held that—
“
before
a court may grant an interim interdict, it must be satisfied that the
applicant
for an interdict has good prospects of success in the main review
.
The claim for review must be based on
strong
grounds
which
are likely to succeed. This requires the court adjudicating the
interdict application to
peek
into the grounds of review raised in the main review application and
assess their strength
.
It is
only
if a court is convinced that the review is likely to succeed that it
may appropriately grant the interdict
.”
Emphasis added.).’ (Footnotes omitted, my underlining.)
## [14]
Counsel for NUM correctly pointed out that the point of departure
between the judgement of Unterhalter
AJ and Madlanga J (who wrote for
the majority) was whether the residents’ associations were able
to show some right which
they could assert against Eskom, despite
there being no privity of contract between the residents’
associations and Eskom.
On the contrary, it was common cause that the
residents were paying for the provision of electricity. The problem
arose where the
municipalities failed in paying for the supply of
electricity to them by Eskom, resulting in Eskom reducing the supply
of electricity
to the municipalities, thereby causing serious harm to
the residents – described by Madlanga J at para 191 as being
‘subjected
to such abject misery and horrendous violation of fundamental
rights’.
[14]
Counsel for NUM correctly pointed out that the point of departure
between the judgement of Unterhalter
AJ and Madlanga J (who wrote for
the majority) was whether the residents’ associations were able
to show some right which
they could assert against Eskom, despite
there being no privity of contract between the residents’
associations and Eskom.
On the contrary, it was common cause that the
residents were paying for the provision of electricity. The problem
arose where the
municipalities failed in paying for the supply of
electricity to them by Eskom, resulting in Eskom reducing the supply
of electricity
to the municipalities, thereby causing serious harm to
the residents – described by Madlanga J at para 191 as being
‘
subjected
to such abject misery and horrendous violation of fundamental
rights’.
##
## [15]
In a powerful retort to the judgment of Unterhalter AJ, the majority
judgment expressed itself
thus:
[15]
In a powerful retort to the judgment of Unterhalter AJ, the majority
judgment expressed itself
thus:
##
‘
[283]
I am satisfied that the residents put up enough for purposes of
showing a decision that has had an adverse impact on
their rights. I
do not understand the difficulty the first judgment has with
that, especially since it accepts that the
residents have pleaded an
infringement of the right to life, the right to human dignity, the
right of access to water, the right
to basic education and the right
to an environment that is not harmful to health or well-being.
[284] Let
us strip all this to its bare essentials. A decision
substantially reducing the supply
of electricity was taken. That
decision resulted in a “human catastrophe” characterised
by gross violations of
the residents’ fundamental rights. The
residents were not given notice before the decision was taken. No
fair process
of whatever nature preceded the decision. On first
principles, the residents have shown that they have a viable case in
the
intended PAJA review; a case founded on
section 6(2)(c)
read
with
section 4(1)
of PAJA. Why the first judgment
does not see that escapes me. This is a far cry from the
first judgment’s
suggestion that my judgment relies on
nothing more than “
deplorable
social and economic effects” that leave a judicial lacuna
.’
(Footnote omitted.)
## [16]
I am bound by the decision of the majority inEskom Holdings.
However, I do not consider the majority’s reasoning to be on
all fours with the facts of this particular case. InEskom
Holdingsthe decision to reduce the supply of electricity to the
residents of the two townships resulted in what the court described
as a
‘human catastrophe’. The actions taken by
Eskom against the municipalities was intended to extract from them
payment of overdue debts. It was part of a debt collection strategy.
In the present case there is no evidence of ulterior motive
behind
RBCT’s termination of the export entitlement, although it was
contended by NUM that RBCT’s actions have the
effect of driving
OCT and OCM into liquidation.
[16]
I am bound by the decision of the majority in
Eskom Holdings
.
However, I do not consider the majority’s reasoning to be on
all fours with the facts of this particular case. In
Eskom
Holdings
the decision to reduce the supply of electricity to the
residents of the two townships resulted in what the court described
as a
‘human catastrophe’. The actions taken by
Eskom against the municipalities was intended to extract from them
payment of overdue debts. It was part of a debt collection strategy.
In the present case there is no evidence of ulterior motive
behind
RBCT’s termination of the export entitlement, although it was
contended by NUM that RBCT’s actions have the
effect of driving
OCT and OCM into liquidation.
##
## [17]
Further inEskom
Holdings,
the residents based their claim against Eskom on the infringement of
various rights - right to life, to human dignity, access
to water,
basic education and the right to a healthy environment. In the
present case, NUM bases its case speciously on the right
to fair
labour practices under s 23 of the Constitution in circumstances
where RBCT is far divorced from being an ‘employer’
to
the miners purportedly affected by RBCT’s decision of 31
January 2023. InEskom
Holdings,
the residents had constitutionally protected rights, which they
contend could be enforced against Eskom, even if there was no
direct
contractual relationship between the parties.[2]
[17]
Further in
Eskom
Holdings
,
the residents based their claim against Eskom on the infringement of
various rights - right to life, to human dignity, access
to water,
basic education and the right to a healthy environment. In the
present case, NUM bases its case speciously on the right
to fair
labour practices under s 23 of the Constitution in circumstances
where RBCT is far divorced from being an ‘employer’
to
the miners purportedly affected by RBCT’s decision of 31
January 2023. In
Eskom
Holdings
,
the residents had constitutionally protected rights, which they
contend could be enforced against Eskom, even if there was no
direct
contractual relationship between the parties.
[2]
##
## [18]
Of relevance to this debate is the decision of the Constitutional
Court inPretorius
and another v Transport Pension Fund and others2019 (2) SA 37 (CC) where Froneman J, writing for the court,
noted that contemporary labour law takes a broader view of the
fair
labour rights provision in s 23(1) of the Constitution, noting that
fewer people are now in ‘formal employment relationships”.
The court found compelling reasons not to restrict the protection of
s 23 only to those who have contracts of employment. The focus
in
that case was whether there werecontractsof employment which formed the underpinning to rely on a s 23(1)
right. In the present matter, NUM contends that the employment
relationship matters not. NUM’s members have no relationshipwhatsoeverwith RBCT, other than that they work for mini-pit operators who
utilise OCT’s export entitlement.
[18]
Of relevance to this debate is the decision of the Constitutional
Court in
Pretorius
and another v Transport Pension Fund and others
2019 (2) SA 37 (CC) where Froneman J, writing for the court,
noted that contemporary labour law takes a broader view of the
fair
labour rights provision in s 23(1) of the Constitution, noting that
fewer people are now in ‘formal employment relationships”.
The court found compelling reasons not to restrict the protection of
s 23 only to those who have contracts of employment. The focus
in
that case was whether there were
contracts
of employment which formed the underpinning to rely on a s 23(1)
right. In the present matter, NUM contends that the employment
relationship matters not. NUM’s members have no relationship
whatsoever
with RBCT, other than that they work for mini-pit operators who
utilise OCT’s export entitlement.
##
## [19]
In summary, I do not readEskom Holdingsas supporting NUM’s
claim that even in the absence of any relationship to a party –
contractual or otherwise –
that you are entitled to claim
enforcement of a right, which was never in existence prior to a
particular act or specific conduct.
Moreover, Madlanga J did not
suggest that Eskom is not entitled to act in a particular manner to
avert, for example, the collapse
of the electricity grid. But, it
(Eskom) is not a law unto itself – it has to act in accordance
with the Constitution and
the law. In my view, at aprima facielevel, no constitutional obligations to remote third parties can be
said to arise from a contractual termination by RBCT of OCT’s
export entitlement.
[19]
In summary, I do not read
Eskom Holdings
as supporting NUM’s
claim that even in the absence of any relationship to a party –
contractual or otherwise –
that you are entitled to claim
enforcement of a right, which was never in existence prior to a
particular act or specific conduct.
Moreover, Madlanga J did not
suggest that Eskom is not entitled to act in a particular manner to
avert, for example, the collapse
of the electricity grid. But, it
(Eskom) is not a law unto itself – it has to act in accordance
with the Constitution and
the law. In my view, at a
prima facie
level, no constitutional obligations to remote third parties can be
said to arise from a contractual termination by RBCT of OCT’s
export entitlement.
##
## [20]
The crucial enquiry in this application is the right which NUM
contends is deserving of protection
at an interim level, pending the
determination of the main Optimum application, which itself is
concerned with interim relief pending
arbitration proceedings into
the contractual dispute between the parties.
[20]
The crucial enquiry in this application is the right which NUM
contends is deserving of protection
at an interim level, pending the
determination of the main Optimum application, which itself is
concerned with interim relief pending
arbitration proceedings into
the contractual dispute between the parties.
##
## [21]
It is further contended by NUM that the actions of RBCT in
terminating the entitlement to export
coal as of 31 January 2023 will
likely plummet Optimum into liquidation, in circumstances where
neither the creditors nor employees
of Optimum would be paid.
Moreover, the founding affidavit paints a picture that in the event
of a status quo order (restoring
matters to the position as it
existed prior to 31 January 2023) not being granted, it’s
members who number approximately
2 000, would be severely impacted as
their livelihoods will be affected. NUM contends that in so far as a
weighing up of competing
interests (the balance of convenience test)
RBCT is not likely to suffer any prejudice in the event of the order
being granted.
Conversely, if the order is not granted, the impact on
the union’s members and their extended families who rely on
them for
support, will be calamitous.
[21]
It is further contended by NUM that the actions of RBCT in
terminating the entitlement to export
coal as of 31 January 2023 will
likely plummet Optimum into liquidation, in circumstances where
neither the creditors nor employees
of Optimum would be paid.
Moreover, the founding affidavit paints a picture that in the event
of a status quo order (restoring
matters to the position as it
existed prior to 31 January 2023) not being granted, it’s
members who number approximately
2 000, would be severely impacted as
their livelihoods will be affected. NUM contends that in so far as a
weighing up of competing
interests (the balance of convenience test)
RBCT is not likely to suffer any prejudice in the event of the order
being granted.
Conversely, if the order is not granted, the impact on
the union’s members and their extended families who rely on
them for
support, will be calamitous.
##
## [22]
As set out above, the relief which NUM seeks in this application is
identical to that which Optimum
seeks as an interim measure in the
main application. During the course of the hearing I enquired from
NUM’s counsel of the
precise nature of the right which NUM was
asserting against RBCT. In response, MrBadenhorst SCwho
appeared on behalf of NUM, submitted that the rights at risk are
those foreshadowed in paragraph 22 of the founding affidavit,
which
makes reference to RBCT’s ‘unconscionable conduct’
which ‘will infringe the employees’ rights
to fair labour
practices as entrenched in section 23 of the Constitution and those
contained in the BCEA to payment of other remuneration,
and the LRA,
including the right to be the employed and the right to fair labour
practices’.
[22]
As set out above, the relief which NUM seeks in this application is
identical to that which Optimum
seeks as an interim measure in the
main application. During the course of the hearing I enquired from
NUM’s counsel of the
precise nature of the right which NUM was
asserting against RBCT. In response, Mr
Badenhorst SC
who
appeared on behalf of NUM, submitted that the rights at risk are
those foreshadowed in paragraph 22 of the founding affidavit,
which
makes reference to RBCT’s ‘unconscionable conduct’
which ‘will infringe the employees’ rights
to fair labour
practices as entrenched in section 23 of the Constitution and those
contained in the BCEA to payment of other remuneration,
and the LRA,
including the right to be the employed and the right to fair labour
practices’.
##
## [23]
In response, MrVoormolen SCon behalf of RBCT, submitted that
there can be no basis for NUM asserting or attempting to enforce
rights under s 23 of the Constitution
against RBCT in the absence of
an employment relationship between RBCT and NUM’s members.
For this reason, it was argued
that there is no basis in law for NUM
to seek relief against RBCT, as to do so would require the assumption
of an employment relationship
between the parties, alternatively,
creating a contract between the parties where none exists. If NUM’s
members do have a
right, it was submitted, this must be asserted
against the mini-pit operators. Moreover, if any parties are to
assert a contractual
right against RBCT it would be a party to the
Shareholder Agreement. NUM does not fall into this category. For this
reason, amongst
others, it was contended that NUM has failed to make
out a prima facie case for interim relief.
[23]
In response, Mr
Voormolen SC
on behalf of RBCT, submitted that
there can be no basis for NUM asserting or attempting to enforce
rights under s 23 of the Constitution
against RBCT in the absence of
an employment relationship between RBCT and NUM’s members.
For this reason, it was argued
that there is no basis in law for NUM
to seek relief against RBCT, as to do so would require the assumption
of an employment relationship
between the parties, alternatively,
creating a contract between the parties where none exists. If NUM’s
members do have a
right, it was submitted, this must be asserted
against the mini-pit operators. Moreover, if any parties are to
assert a contractual
right against RBCT it would be a party to the
Shareholder Agreement. NUM does not fall into this category. For this
reason, amongst
others, it was contended that NUM has failed to make
out a prima facie case for interim relief.
##
## [24]
In so far as NUM is required to show that it will suffer irreparable
harm if the ‘status
quo order’ is not granted, it bears
noting that the parties intended approaching the Judge President for
an allocation of
a preferment date for the hearing of the main
application, possibly in early March 2023. The proceedings in the
main application
were launched in late January 2023. Those
proceedings, similarly to this instituted by NUM, seek interim relief
pending an arbitration.
The question which arises is what material
prejudice will NUM suffer between 16 February 2023 (when this matter
was heard) and
early March 2023 when the main application is set to
be heard? Counsel for NUM submitted that its members are suffering
continuing
prejudice by not earning an income following the
termination of export facilities at RBCT as at 31 January 2023.
However, if this
is the case, it would follow that the plight of the
affected miners is no different from that of any employee who has
been visited
by an unfair labour practice. There is nothing unique
that escalates the urgency in this matter compared to any other
labour dispute.
In any event, NUM has failed to show the irreparable
harm that its members would suffer between the date when this
application
was heard and the date when the main application is to be
heard. As stated earlier, the difference in time between the two is
probably
three weeks.
[24]
In so far as NUM is required to show that it will suffer irreparable
harm if the ‘status
quo order’ is not granted, it bears
noting that the parties intended approaching the Judge President for
an allocation of
a preferment date for the hearing of the main
application, possibly in early March 2023. The proceedings in the
main application
were launched in late January 2023. Those
proceedings, similarly to this instituted by NUM, seek interim relief
pending an arbitration.
The question which arises is what material
prejudice will NUM suffer between 16 February 2023 (when this matter
was heard) and
early March 2023 when the main application is set to
be heard? Counsel for NUM submitted that its members are suffering
continuing
prejudice by not earning an income following the
termination of export facilities at RBCT as at 31 January 2023.
However, if this
is the case, it would follow that the plight of the
affected miners is no different from that of any employee who has
been visited
by an unfair labour practice. There is nothing unique
that escalates the urgency in this matter compared to any other
labour dispute.
In any event, NUM has failed to show the irreparable
harm that its members would suffer between the date when this
application
was heard and the date when the main application is to be
heard. As stated earlier, the difference in time between the two is
probably
three weeks.
##
## [25]
As to whether NUM’s members have no alternate relief other than
to have approached the
court on an urgent basis, there is a dispute
between the versions of the parties. NUM states that its members are
in desperate
circumstances, as many of them support extended
families. Almost all reside in an area where there are no alternate
employment
opportunities available. On the other hand, RBCT disputes
this contention, relying on an investigation which it conducted in
November
2022 into the operations of OCT and OCM. In this regard RBCT
states in its answering affidavit that it commissioned a technical
assessment by Isandla Coal Consulting, an independent consultant,
into the operations of OCM and the current mini-pit operators.
The
aim of the assessment was to verify the existence of and the scale of
various mining operations, as well as the output of coal.
According
to the assessment, OCM enables coal mining activities by five
mini-pit mining contractors from sites, producing approximately
910
000 tonnes per month. In contrast, according to RBCT’s records,
prior to 31 January 2023, approximately only 300 000
tonnes of
coal per month were exported through its facility, utilising OCT’s
entitlement. This raises the spectre that a
significant amount of
coal is being extracted from OCM mining sites, but which is not
making its way through RBCT’s export
facility. It follows then
that the mini-pit operators, and by necessary implication the NUM
members who are employed at these sites,
are able to secure alternate
sources of income other than through the export of coal via RBCT. The
miners have, it would seem from
the independent report, a significant
source of income on which to rely, other than revenue earned from
coal exported through RBCT.
[25]
As to whether NUM’s members have no alternate relief other than
to have approached the
court on an urgent basis, there is a dispute
between the versions of the parties. NUM states that its members are
in desperate
circumstances, as many of them support extended
families. Almost all reside in an area where there are no alternate
employment
opportunities available. On the other hand, RBCT disputes
this contention, relying on an investigation which it conducted in
November
2022 into the operations of OCT and OCM. In this regard RBCT
states in its answering affidavit that it commissioned a technical
assessment by Isandla Coal Consulting, an independent consultant,
into the operations of OCM and the current mini-pit operators.
The
aim of the assessment was to verify the existence of and the scale of
various mining operations, as well as the output of coal.
According
to the assessment, OCM enables coal mining activities by five
mini-pit mining contractors from sites, producing approximately
910
000 tonnes per month. In contrast, according to RBCT’s records,
prior to 31 January 2023, approximately only 300 000
tonnes of
coal per month were exported through its facility, utilising OCT’s
entitlement. This raises the spectre that a
significant amount of
coal is being extracted from OCM mining sites, but which is not
making its way through RBCT’s export
facility. It follows then
that the mini-pit operators, and by necessary implication the NUM
members who are employed at these sites,
are able to secure alternate
sources of income other than through the export of coal via RBCT. The
miners have, it would seem from
the independent report, a significant
source of income on which to rely, other than revenue earned from
coal exported through RBCT.
##
## [26]
A dispute of fact arises on the papers in that NUM contends that its
members will lose their
jobs ‘if OCM is precluded one day
longer from exporting its coal through the Richards Bay terminal
access to which is wholly
controlled by RBCT’. It further
contends that the ‘affected workers (who are innocent victims)
should not have to endure
such extreme hardship merely because the
main application has not yet been accommodated by the court as a
result of scarce judicial
resources’. Counsel for NUM placed
heavy reliance on the English decision ofAmerican Cyanamid v
Ethicon Ltd[1975] 1 All ER 504 (HL) at 511b-c where the court
stated:
[26]
A dispute of fact arises on the papers in that NUM contends that its
members will lose their
jobs ‘if OCM is precluded one day
longer from exporting its coal through the Richards Bay terminal
access to which is wholly
controlled by RBCT’. It further
contends that the ‘affected workers (who are innocent victims)
should not have to endure
such extreme hardship merely because the
main application has not yet been accommodated by the court as a
result of scarce judicial
resources’. Counsel for NUM placed
heavy reliance on the English decision of
American Cyanamid v
Ethicon Ltd
[1975] 1 All ER 504 (HL) at 511b-c where the court
stated:
##
‘
Where other
factors appear to be evenly balanced it is a counsel of prudence to
take such measures as are calculated to preserve
the status quo. If
the defendant is enjoined temporarily from doing something that he
has not done before, the only effect of the
interlocutory injunction
in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to postpone the date
at which he is able to embark on a
course of action which he has not
previously found it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him
in the conduct of an established
enterprise would cause much greater
inconvenience to him since he would have to start again to establish
it in the event of his
succeeding at the trial.’
[27]
I am not persuaded on the papers before me that the factors to be
taken into account in determining
whether to grant an urgent interim
interdict are indeed ‘evenly balanced’. As stated earlier
there is a dispute of
fact on the papers as to whether NUM’s
members will suffer irreparable harm if an interdict is not granted
in their favour.
There is no direct response from NUM to the
allegations made by RBCT of almost 600 000 tonnes of coal being
unaccounted for in
terms of its point of final destination, and
obviously the revenue derived from such production. In my view, this
throws a shadow
over the allegations of the dire circumstances facing
NUM’s members should this interim relief not be granted. This
aspect
of irreparable harm is also linked, in no small measure, to
the issue of the urgency in launching this application.
[28]
The founding papers are at best ‘thin’ when dealing with
the issue of urgency.
I am mindful that the papers sketch out
the plight of communities and members attributed to RBCT’s
conduct in terminating
the coal export entitlement of OCT.
Inevitably, most litigants who approach the court seek relief to
redress a wrong and
this is generally accompanied by levels of
anxiety for a speedy adjudication. However, the authorities are
explicit that Uniform
rule 6(12)
(b)
requires an applicant to
specifically make out a case for urgency in the founding affidavit.
The applicant must also satisfy the
court that it will not be
afforded substantial redress at the hearing in due course. See
New
Nation Movement NPC and others v President of the Republic of South
Africa and others
2019 (9) BCLR 1104
(CC) para 8. In this case,
it involves a delay of a few weeks until the main application is
heard dealing with essentially the
same issues. Nothing has been
placed before me to indicate the irreparable harm that NUM members
will suffer between 16 February
2023 when the matter was argued and
the hearing of the main application, alternatively prejudice suffered
between 6 and 16 February
2023 when the matter was adjourned.
[29]
In my view, the arguments which NUM raises before me can no doubt be
advanced at the main application
in the dispute between Optimum and
RBCT. There is no compelling reason why NUM could not wait its turn
in the queue, or better
still, have its views ventilated at the main
application. The latter course is one of the options which the first
respondent’s
(RBCT) submitted would be proper in this case in
as much as the interim application is inter-twined with the facts of
the main
application. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the
matter warranted being set down on the extremely shortened notice to
RBCT and for it to have been placed on the motion court roll on 6
February 2023. Although the matter was adjourned to 16 February
2023,
it ought not to have been catapulted ahead of other litigants to be
given preference. Absent any other considerations, I
would have
ordinarily struck it from the roll with costs on 6 February 2023. In
light of the parties having agreed to argue the
matter as an opposed
motion on 16 February 2023, it was incumbent on me to consider the
merits of the application.
[30]
A further factor which, in my view, militates against the granting of
interim relief sought by
NUM is the views expressed by the NPA in its
intervening application. Of particular importance is the affidavit by
Ms Rabaji-Rasethaba,
the Deputy National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Head of the Asset Forfeiture Unit of the NPA. The
NPA have sought leave
for the affidavit to form part of the papers in
the main application. I am uncertain whether such leave has been
consented to by
Optimum. Whatever the position, the affidavit
forms part of the papers before me and different extracts were relied
upon
by both NUM and RBCT, as will appear below. The approach of the
NPA to the main application, which relief mirrors that sought by
NUM
in this application, is evident in paragraph 27 of the affidavit of
Ms Rabaji-Rasethaba. It states the following:
‘
. . .The NPA
support the resolution of RBCT to suspend the export allocation of
OCT. At present, that allocation is being used,
not for the benefit
of OCM or its creditors, but rather to dissipate value from OCM at
the expense of its creditors. Thus, the
current use of the allocation
subverts the purpose of both the preservation order and of the
business rescue process itself. Until
such time as Mr Knoop and his
fellow business rescue practitioners have made new arrangements which
ensure that the export allocation
of OCT is used for the benefit of
OCM, the public interest requires that steps be taken to prevent that
allocation being used to
effect further dissipation of value from
OCM.’
[31]
Ms Rabaji-Rasethaba proceeds to set out a range of options, presented
by the curator, allowing
the use of the OCT allocation, but based on
a pre-requisite that the contracts with the mini-pit operators come
to an end. This
proposal from the curator resulted in him receiving
death threats, leading to him requesting the court to terminate his
appointment.
The affidavit of the NPA is clear that it supports the
position adopted by RBCT as a necessary measure to prevent the
dissipation
of value from OCM.
[32]
On the other hand, counsel for NUM submitted that the contents of
paragraph 31 of Ms Rabaji-Rasethaba’s
affidavit paints the
opposite picture, where she says that:
‘
while
the NDPP supports the imminent suspension of the OCT allocation, it
would not support any steps by RBCT to terminate that
entitlement in
perpetuity. Any determination of the OCT allocation would cause the
loss of billions of rands of value from OCT
and OCM and may well be a
breach of the preservation order for that reason.’
[33]
I do not interpret the contents of paragraph 31 of the NPA’s
affidavit as supporting the
case of NUM (or by implication OCT). On
the contrary, the overriding picture that emerges is that the NPA
supports the position
adopted by RBCT to suspend OCT’s export
allocation through Richards Bay. In any event, this being interim
proceedings, it
is not for this court to make definitive findings in
relation to the main application which is to be heard in due course.
[34]
In light of what has been stated above, I am of the view that NUM has
failed to make out a case
for the urgent interim relief it seeks. I
am not persuaded that the matter was so urgent that it could not wait
to take its turn
to be argued together with the main application.
Moreover, as I have pointed out above, the application for struggles
to
get out of the starting blocks in satisfying the pre-requisites
for interim relief. Even though the facts in this urgent
application and the main application are intertwined, I do not think
that this is a case where a decision as to whether the applicant
has
established a
prima facie
to interim relief, should be
deferred to some other court. As Madlanga J said in
Eskom Holdings
para 251:
‘
There
are legal questions that are capable of easy resolution to any judge
worth their salt. Those must be decided definitively. If,
as a matter of
law
,
the right asserted by the applicant for interim relief is held not to
exist at all, that will be the end of the matter.’
[35]
Counsel for NUM submitted that in the event that the court was
disposed to dismiss the application,
the principles in
Biowatch
Trust
v Registrar, Genetic Resources, and others
2009
(6) SA 232
;
2009
(10) BCLR 1014
(CC).
should
apply and no order of costs should be made. I disagree as there is no
‘
challenge
to the constitutionality of a law or of State conduct’ present
in this matter. Even if this application could be
described as
involving constitutional issues, the
Constitutional
Court in
Lawyers
for Human Rights v Minister in the Presidency and others
2017
(1) SA 645
;
2017
(4) BCLR 445
(CC)
para 18
warned
that t
he
Biowatch
rule
does not mean risk-free constitutional litigation. Having regard
to the character of the litigation, I am of the view
that
Biowatch
does not apply to this case, nor is the losing party to be shielded
from costs consequent of its failure.
Order
[36]
I make the following order:
1.
The application by NUM for urgent interim relief in paragraph
4(a) to
(c) of the notice of motion is dismissed with costs, including the
costs of two counsel where so employed.
M
R
Chetty
Appearances
For the applicant
(NUM):
C Badenhorst SC and
M Desai
Instructed by:
Ulrich Roux and
associates
Address:
15 Chaplin Road,
Sandton
Tel:
011 455 4640
Email:
Ulrich@rouxlegal.com
casper@rouxlegal.com
Ref:
UR/CB/MU2147
c/o
RVB INC Attorneys
Glass House Office
Park
Umhlanga
Tel:
082 853 9714
Email:
ramnanan@rvbinc.co.za
govender@rvbinc.co.za
For the First
Respondent (RBCT)
V Voormolen SC and
S Pudifin-Jones
Instructed by:
Lawtons Attorneys
Address:
140 West Street,
Sandown
Johannesburg
Tel:
011 286 6900
Email:
jeff.buckland@lawtonsafrica.com
Veronica.vurgarellis@lawtonsafrica.com
Bradley.frolick@lawtonsafrica.com
Ref:
J Buckland/ V V
Vurgarells/ 2101-0009
c/o
Sheptone &
Wylie Attorneys
Tel:
031 575 7000
Email:
raman@wylie.co.za
For
First and Second Applicants
(OCT) and (OCM)
DG Wickins SC
Instructed by:
Smit Sewgoolam
Incorporated
Address:
12 Avonwold Road,
Cnr. Jan Smuts Avenue
Saxonworld 2132
Tel:
011 646 0006
Email:
bouwer@smitsew.co.za
parveen@smitsew.co.za
Ref:
BVN/ZJVR/MAT44056
c/o
Johnston &
Partners
Address:
81 Richefond
Circle, Umhlanga Rocks
Tel:
031 536 9700
Email:
andrew@johnstonstonkzn.co.za
Ref:
A Johnston
For the 2
nd
and 3
rd
respondents:
P Stais SC
Instructed by:
Mervyn Taback
Incorporated
Address:
13 Eton Road,
Pinetown
Tel:
011 358 7700
Email:
BT@Tabacks.com
MM@tabacks.com
CM@Tabacks.com
Date
reserved:
16 February 2023
Date
of delivery:
1 March 2023
Judgment
handed down electronically to all parties.
[1]
I use the term ‘Optimum’ to refer to both Optimum Coal
Mine (OCT) and Optimum Coal Terminal
[2]
See
Eskom
Holdings
para
192 where the court says:
‘
.
. .I do so because a
fundamental
flaw permeates the first judgment and is central to the
conclusion my colleague reaches on the
merits
. That
flaw is the idea in the first judgment that the residents should
have asserted and proved the existence of a specific
constitutional
right to be supplied with electricity by Eskom. As I
demonstrate more fully later, that idea is mistaken.
The residents
do not have to rely on any such constitutional right. They
assert several other rights protected by the Bill
of Rights, which I
highlight above. Without question, the residents do enjoy
constitutional protection of those rights.’
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Optimum Coal Terminal (Pty) Limited and Others v Richards Bay Coal Terminal (Pty) Limited and Others (D531/2023) [2023] ZAKZDHC 30 (31 May 2023)
[2023] ZAKZDHC 30High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)100% similar
APM Terminals BV v Transnet SOC Limited and Others (Leave to Appeal) (D3052/2024) [2024] ZAKZDHC 90 (11 December 2024)
[2024] ZAKZDHC 90High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)98% similar
APM Terminals BV v Transnet SOC Limited and Others (Review) (D3052/2024) [2025] ZAKZDHC 64 (10 October 2025)
[2025] ZAKZDHC 64High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)98% similar
APM Terminals BV v Transnet SOC Limited and Others (D3052/2024) [2024] ZAKZDHC 69 (9 October 2024)
[2024] ZAKZDHC 69High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)98% similar
Tongaat Hulett Limited (In Business Rescue) and Others v South African Sugar Association and Others (D4472/2023) [2023] ZAKZDHC 93; [2024] 1 All SA 509 (KZD) (4 December 2023)
[2023] ZAKZDHC 93High Court of South Africa (KwaZulu-Natal Division, Durban)98% similar