Case Law[2026] KECA 134Kenya
Muturi v Director, Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) & another (Civil Appeal 337 of 2019) [2026] KECA 134 (KLR) (30 January 2026) (Judgment)
Court of Appeal of Kenya
Judgment
REPUBLIC OF
KENYA IN THE COURT
OF APPEAL
AT NAIROBI
[CORAM: W. KARANJA, TUIYOTT & NYAMWEYA JJ. A]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 337
OF 2019 BETWEEN
DR. GABRIEL MUKURIA MUTURI
........................................................................
APPELLANT
AND
DIRECTOR, KENYA FORESTRY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE (KEFRI)…....................1ST
RESPONDENT
DR. JANE WANGU NJUGUNA..........................2ND
RESPONDENT
(An appeal from the judgment of the Employment and Labour
Relations Court of Kenya at Nairobi (M. Onyango J.) delivered on
24th May 2019
in
ELRC Judicial Review No. 25 of 2017)
************************
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
1. On 24th May 2019, the Employment and Labour Relations
Court (ELRC) at Nairobi (M. Onyango J.) dismissed a suit
filed by Dr. Gabriel Mukuria Muturi, the appellant herein,
which he had filed in ELRC Judicial Review No. 25 of
2017. The appellant had sought two substantive orders in
the said suit, which was brought by way of a judicial
review application. The first was an order of certiorari to
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quash the decision of the Director, Kenya Forestry
Research Institute (KEFRI), the 1st respondent herein, to
appoint Dr. Jane Wangui Njuguna (the 2nd
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respondent herein) to the position of Senior Deputy
Director Research and Development on 12th September
2017. The second was an order of mandamus to compel
the 1st respondent to re-advertise the position of Senior
Deputy Director Research and Development for the
purpose of fresh recruitment. The genesis of the
appellant’s suit was an advertisement published on 29th
May 2017 by the 1st respondent for the position of Senior
Deputy Director, Research and Development in its
organisation, which set out the necessary qualifications.
The appellant and five other candidates, including the 2nd
respondent, applied for the position. After conducting
interviews, the 1st respondent communicated to the
candidates that they had all scored the threshold
requirement of a 65% pass, and awarded the 2nd
respondent the said position.
2. The appellant’s case was that the 2nd respondent lacked
the minimum qualifications for appointment to the said
position, and in particular, that an audit conducted in 2014
found that the 2nd respondent lacked the 10 years’
experience required for the position she then held of
Deputy Director, Forestry Productivity and improvement,
and therefore could not in 2017 have met the requirement
for the advertised position of 15 years of experience in
research and development; the 2nd respondent’s degree
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was a Bachelor of Science General which was not
equivalent to the required Bachelor’s Degree in Forestry or
other disciplines; and she had not published at least three
(3) scientific papers
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in refereed journal, or a relevant book chapter or policy
briefs, nor was she the first author of two (2) verifiable
papers in a scientific conference/ symposium proceedings
as was required.
3. In response, the 1st respondent, in a replying affidavit
sworn on 1st November 2017 by the then Director, Ben
Chikamai, confirmed that the 1st respondent internally
advertised for the position of Senior Deputy Director
Research and Development on 29th May 2017 in
implementation of its 5th Strategic Plan of 2013-2018, and
6 candidates applied for the advertised position including
the appellant and the 2nd respondent and were all
shortlisted and interviewed. Further, that after the
interviews, the final average score for each candidate
revealed the 2nd respondent as the best candidate with an
average of 82.8%, while the appellant came in 3rd with
76.6%. Therefore, that the 2nd respondent’s appointment
was based on merit, and she was issued with a letter of
appointment on 12th September 2017.
4. The 2nd respondent reiterated the 1st respondent’s
averments in a replying affidavit she swore on 8th
November 2017, and averred that no individual had
proprietary interest in a particular job position, and that
the subject position was advertised, and filled fairly and
competitively based on merit. The 2nd respondent asserted
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that she joined the 1st respondent organisation on 3rd July
1987 after a successful interview,
and had worked in various capacities for a total of 31
years in the
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Research and Development department. She listed the
academic qualifications she had attained, including a
Doctor of Philosophy in Forestry Pathology and Mycology;
certificates in a wide range of Forestry Biology from world
class universities; a Master of Forest Science; and a
Bachelor of Science degree in Botany and Zoology and not
a general degree Bachelor of Science as alleged by the
appellant. The 2nd respondent also averred that she had
published many papers, technical notes, and book
chapters; attended many international conferences and
workshops; received many research grants and her
resource mobilizing strategies have been commended.
5. She asserted that by the time she was appointed to the
position of Deputy Director, Forest Productivity and
Improvement in 2014, she had held various substantive
management positions since 1997 and listed her
achievements while in those positions, whereas, since his
appointment as Deputy Director, Forestry Biodiversity and
Environmental Management, the appellant had attended
very few executive management meetings and he,
therefore, did not have a grip of the issues facing the
research implementation. Additionally, that the audit
report by the Kenya National Audit was a management
letter addressed to the 1st respondent’s Board through the
Director and was irrelevant at that point in time.
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Accordingly, that the appellant’s suit was brought out of
malice and in bad faith and had not demonstrated any
illegality,
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irrationality and impropriety of procedure on the part of
the 1st respondent’s board of management which was the
appointing authority, to warrant the orders sought. On the
contrary, that the appellant sought to get orders by
painting the 2nd respondent as unqualified on account of
his own qualifications, and was asking the court to decide
who is more learned.
6. After hearing the parties, the trial Judge found that no
evidence was produced by the appellant to prove bias and
illegality on the part of the 1st respondent, neither did he
submit any evidence to demonstrate that the 2nd
respondent did not meet the requirements for the job as
advertised, or how the appointment of the interested party
was against legitimate expectation. Further, that the 2nd
respondent met the qualifications and scored the highest
at the job interview, and the appellant’s application did
not, therefore, meet the threshold for the grant of the
orders sought. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the
trial court, the appellant lodged an appeal in this Court and
has raised one ground of appeal in his Memorandum of
Appeal dated 24th July 2019, namely that the trial Judge
erred in law in failing to find that the appointment by the
1st respondent of the 2nd respondent to the position of
Senior Deputy Director, Research and Development was
procedurally unfair, biased, in abuse of discretion, against
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the legitimate expectations, failed to take relevant
considerations, and was against the material
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procedure or conditions prescribed in the career
progression (scheme of
service) guidelines for the 1st respondent’s parastatal and
unlawful.
7. We heard the appeal on this Court’s virtual platform on 4th
December 2024. Learned counsel Mr. Odukenya and Mr.
Makhanu were present appearing for the 1st respondent
and 2nd respondent respectively. There was no appearance
for the appellant, despite his advocates having been duly
served with the hearing notice. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd
respondents informed the Court that the appellant had
since been dismissed by the 1st respondent and had filed
another case for compensation, and they sought dismissal
of his appeal for non- appearance. We however noted that
the appellant’s advocates had filed two sets of
submissions dated 28th February 2020 and 8th June 2020,
which we shall rely on in our judgment. The two learned
counsel who were present proceeded to highlighted their
respective submissions dated 30th June 2020 and 12th May
2020.
8. In commencing the determination of this appeal, we are
mindful of the duty of this Court as a first appellate court,
which was reiterated and set out in the decision of Selle
and another vs Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd &
Others (1968) EA 123. We will therefore reconsider the
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evidence adduced at the trial court, evaluate it, and draw
our conclusions. In addition, we will only depart from the
findings by the trial court if they
were not based on evidence on record; where the said
court is shown to
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have acted on the wrong principles of law as was held in
Jabane vs Olenja [1986] KLR 661, or where its
discretion was exercised injudiciously as was held in
Mbogo & Another vs Shah [1968] EA 93.
9. The issue before us is whether the appellant has
established grounds that warrant our interference with the
trial court’s exercise of discretion in dismissing his judicial
review application. These grounds were set out in the case
of United India Insurance Co. Ltd, Kenindia Insurance
Co Ltd & Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd vs
East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] eKLR as
follows:
“The Court of Appeal will not interfere with a
discretionary decision of the judge appealed
from simply on the ground that its members, if
sitting at first instance, would or might have
given different weight to that given by the
judge to the various factors in the case. The
Court of Appeal is only entitled to interfere if
one or more of the following matters are
established: first, that the judge misdirected
himself in law; secondly, that he
misapprehended the facts; thirdly, that he
took account of considerations of which he
should not have taken account; fourthly, that
he failed to take account of considerations of
which he should have taken account, or fifthly,
that his decision, albeit a discretionary one, is
plainly wrong.”
10. The appellant’s advocates, while reiterating that the 2nd
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respondent did not meet the relevant qualifications,
submitted that the advertisement for the position of the
Deputy Director, Research and Development was made in
light of the 1st respondent’s Career Progression Guidelines
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(Scheme of Service) (Mwongozo) of May 2011, and the
ELRC erred in not taking into consideration the arguments
that the 1st respondent veered off the said guidelines and
neglected the job description when making the
appointment of the 2nd respondent, thereby prejudicing the
appellant. Further, the 1st respondent observed and
acknowledged that the career guidelines were the basis
for the advertisement for the subject position, and
contradicted itself by stating that there had never been
any recruitment under the said guidelines when there had
been prior recruitment of Senior Deputy Directors under
the same, and erred in diluting the requirements on
authorship position of scientific papers. Lastly, that the
requirements for the position of the Deputy Director
Research and Development were adulterated to favour the
2nd respondent, and the interviewing body was not
qualified since the Chief Executive Officer who chaired the
said interviews was illegally in office as was held by
Wasilwa J. in Petition No. 75 of 2016, which decision
was stayed by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 59
of 2016 .
11. The advocates cited various judicial authorities in support
of the position that there should be strict adherence to the
guidelines, that going against the guidelines amounted to
unfairness, selfishness and against the principle of equality
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before the law and which are prohibited by Article 27 (1)
and (4) as read together with Article 10 (2) (b) of the
Constitution; and there was in breach of the appellant’s
right to fair administrative
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action that is expeditious, efficient, and reasonable and
procedurally fair, as guaranteed by Article 47 of the
Constitution and section 4 of the Fair Administrative
Action. The decision in the case of Republic vs National
Social Security Fund Board of Trustee & another ex
parte Town Council of Kikuyu [2014] eKLR was cited
for the submission that as an interviewee, the appellant
had a legitimate expectation that the process would be
fair, done above board, and to this extent there was no
reasonable or justifiable basis for the sudden change in
course of the recruitment process. Reliance was also
placed on the explanation as to when a legitimate
expectation arises, as set out in paragraph 81 of
Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 1 (1) at
page 151 and cited in Kenya Revenue Authority & 2
others vs Darasa Investment Limited [2018] eKLR .
12. The second argument put forth by the appellant was that
the recruitment and ultimate appointment of the 2nd
respondent was not done in conformity with the stipulated
time. Whereas the deadline for applications for the
recruitment to the position of the Deputy Director,
Research and Development lapsed on 16th June 2017, the
2nd respondent’s application was allowed on the 19th June
2017, 3 days post the deadline. Further, that the appellant
raised this issue in the application and affidavit, however,
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neither the 1st nor the 2nd respondent responded and the
trial Judge did not address herself on the issue which
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was thus was not determined . According to the appellant,
the lack of an answer by the respondents creates an
avenue for believing either that it was an inside job, an
oversight, or an admission of error, and that the allowance
given to the 2nd respondent was not transparent. Various
decisions of the superior courts on unprocedural actions
were cited by the appellant in this regard.
13. The 1st respondent’s advocates on their part reiterated that
the 2nd respondent had met the qualification and scored
the highest at the interviews; the appellant had failed to
demonstrate bias, illegality, and how the appointment of
the 2nd respondent was against the legitimate expectation.
On the Career Progression (Scheme of Service) of 1st May
2011, the counsel submitted that 2nd respondent was
appointed after a competitive recruitment and the subject
position was not in the career progression guidelines
adopted by KEFRI on 1st May 2011 and the 1st respondent’s
5th Strategic Plan 2013-2018 specifically provided that
senior positions in the organisation be filled competitively
in accordance with the law. On the constitution of the 1st
respondent’s board, counsel submitted that the issue was
raised in the appellant’s further affidavit in the ELRC as an
afterthought, and while it was true that Wasilwa J. found
in Petition No 75 of 16, that the 1st respondent’s then
Director and Board were illegally in office, the Judge did
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not declare any duties performed by the then Director to
be null and void, and the Court of Appeal stayed
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the Judgment in Civil Appeal No 59 of 2018. In any
event, the sieving of applications was done by the
management and submitted as a report to the Research
and Development Committee and the appellant did not
provide any evidence that the then Director of the 1st
respondent, Dr. Ben Chikamai, chaired the meeting and
was one of the panellists conducting the interviews.
14. While citing the decisions in Republic v the Kenya
National Examination Council exparte Geoffrey
Githinji and 9 others, Civil Appeal No 266 of 1996
and Pastoli v Kabale District Local Government
Council and Others (2008) 2 EA 300 on the
circumstances when orders of certiorari and mandamus
can issue, counsel submitted that the allegation by the
appellant that the 2nd Respondent was appointed through a
biased process against was not proved by any evidence or
at all. In addition, and while citing the decision of the
Supreme Court of Kenya in Communications
Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media
Services Limited & 5 others [2014] eKLR on when an
expectation is legitimate and warrants protection, that the
appellant was never promised that he would be appointed
into the impugned position or at all and no evidence had
been produced of such promise.
15. The 2nd respondent’s counsel submitted that the 2nd
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respondent
produced evidence to prove that she had met the
minimum requirement on publishing and stated that she
handed in her application in time and
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it was stamped 16th June 2017 and not 19th June 2017.
Counsel also pointed out that the issue as to whether the
1st respondent’s Board was properly constituted to recruit
and appoint was not raised in the case filed by the
appellant in the trial Court, and was an afterthought. In
any event, that the Board had been preserved by an order
of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 59 of 2018
when it stayed execution of the judgment in Petition No.
75 of 2016.
16. In responding to the issue of adulterating the requirement
of appointment for the position of the Senior Deputy
Director Research and Development to favour the 2nd
respondent, counsel submitted that the position of Senior
Deputy Director Research and Development was not
provided for under the Career Progression Guidelines
(Scheme of Service) of May 2011 and the appellant
purported to equate the requirements for the position of
Deputy Director Research and Development to that of
Senior Deputy Director Research and Development.
Therefore, that the trial court took into consideration all
relevant evidence including the 2nd respondent’s
qualification to arrive at a just, fair and reasonable
decision as it did, the requirements provided by the
appointing authority as advertised were to be adhered to,
and the issue of the appointment of the 2nd respondent
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being against the legitimate expectation of the appellant
did not arise.
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17. We have given in-depth consideration to the arguments
raised by counsel for the appellant and respondents. In
sum, the appellant’s argument is that the ELRC erred in
not taking into account the requirements of the 1st
respondent’s Career Progression Guidelines (Scheme of
Service) (Mwongozo) of May 2011; not finding that the
skewed qualifications for the advertised position were in
favour of the 2nd respondent, and that her application out
of time. Therefore, that we should return a finding that the
1st respondent was biased and breached the appellant’s
legitimate expectations by appointing the 2nd respondent
to the said position. A preliminary issue has also been
raised by the respondents that some of these facts were
not pleaded by the appellant.
18. In this regard, we note that the grounds for the appellant’s
judicial review application were that the decision of the 1st
respondent in appointing the 2nd respondent for the
position of Senior Deputy Director Research and
Development was biased, unlawful and against legitimate
expectation; procedurally unfair and failed to take into
account relevant considerations; and was in abuse of
discretion and against the material procedure or
conditions prescribed in the 1st respondent’s Career
Progression (Scheme of Service) Guidelines. As regards the
particulars of bias, the appellant set out the alleged
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shortcomings in the 2nd respondent’s qualifications vis-a-
vis his own qualifications and averred that the internal
advertisement for the position was adulterated,
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restrictive and with a requirement of less years’
experience as compared with related positions; and on
illegality, that the 1st respondent’s Director was illegally in
office and its actions were null and void.
19. Further, that the 1st respondent exhibited procedural
impropriety by accepting the 2nd respondent’s application
on the 19th June 2017 three days after the official deadline
for submitting applications and the panel looking at the
status of the applications showed clearly some applicants
never met the requirements sought for within the
prescribed deadline, but it recommended all candidates to
the next stage . the appellant annexed a copy of an
alleged register of the 1st respondent indicating when all
candidates send their job applications to his further
affidavit dated 28th February 2018. We accordingly find
that the issues raised were adequately pleaded by the
appellant in his application, save for the allegations
relating to the Mwongozo Code of Governance for State
Corporations, which was not pleaded in the grounds for the
application. Additionally, for the allegations of illegality of
the Director of the 1st respondent, the appellant relied on a
judgment which was delivered on 31st January 2018 in
ELRC Petition 75 of 2016, after the subject
advertisement dated 29th May 2017, interviews, and
appointment of the 2nd respondent on 12th September 2017
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had taken place. It was, therefore, not only an irrelevant
but also non-existent factor during the said interviews and
appointment.
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20. After a perusal of the evidence availed by the parties, it is
notable that firstly, the subject advertisement for the
position of Senior Deputy Director Research and
Development set out clear requirements as to the
qualifications for the advertised position which the 2nd
respondent demonstrated she had met. In addition, while
the said advertisement made reference to the 1st
respondent’s 5th Strategic Plan of 2013-2018 , there was no
reference made therein to its Career Progression
Guidelines (Schemes of Service) 2011, nor any indication
that the qualifications, if any, in the said guidelines were
applicable. The appellant has also not contested the
respondent’s submissions that there was no position for
Senior Deputy Director Research and Development
provided in the said guidelines. It is also not contested that
both the appellant and 2nd respondent applied for the
position of Senior Deputy Director Research and
Development in response to the internal advertisement
dated 29th May 2017, were interviewed and evaluated with
regard to the qualifications in the said advertisement. Both
were found by the 1st respondent to have met the
threshold with respect to the set qualifications, and the 2nd
respondent attained a highest score after the interviews.
We note that the 2nd respondent went to great lengths to
demonstrate her qualifications in this regard, and that the
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appellant did not indicate nor clarify the source or author
of the
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documents he relied upon to demonstrate bias and
procedural impropriety on the part of the 1st respondent.
21. The document the appellant annexed to his further
affidavit marked a s “GMM 6” and which he alleged was as
a copy of the register of the 1strespondent indicating when
all candidates sent their job applications was neither titled
as such, nor signed by an officer of the 1st respondent and
its source or author is not indicated. In addition, contrary
to the appellant’s submissions, the 1st respondent did
respond to this allegation and stated that “the deadline
for the advertisement was 16th June 2017 upon which 6
candidates had applied for the advertised position herein
above and on 25th June 2017 the 6 candidates who had
submitted their applications were pre-shortlisted by the
panel constituted to look into the status of the
applications” and annexed a copy of the minutes of the
meeting held on 25'" July 2017. On the guidelines the
appellant averred that “KEFRI Career Progression
Guidelines (Schemes of Service) 2011 is the institute's
blueprint for human resource recruitment and career
progression and that the position of Senior Deputy
Director (KEFRI RF14) referred to in this motion is
synonymous to Deputy Director Research and
Development (KEFRI RF 14) in KEFRI Career Progression
Guidelines (Schemes of Service) 2011.”
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22. It is also notable that the trial Judge set out the above
averments and arguments by the appellant in the
impugned judgment and noted that
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“the ex-parte Applicant submitted some untitled
documents at pages 55 to 66 of his bundle and the
career progression Guidelines for KEFRI” , before
concluding that “no evidence was produced by the ex
parte applicant to prove bias and illegality neither did he
produce evidence that the Interested Party (the 2nd
respondent herein) did not meet the qualifications of the
job as advertised. The Interested Party states in her
affidavit that she holds the following qualifications
….She demonstrated the same by attachment of copies
of the certificates.”. We find no reason to fault these
findings.
23. For the same reasons, we cannot fault the finding by the
trial Judge that there was no breach of the appellant’s
legitimate expectations. The Supreme Court of Kenya held
in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others
v. Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others, [2014]
eKLR that for an expectation to be legitimate, it has to be
founded upon a promise or practice by a public authority
that was expected to fulfil the expectation, and stated that
there must be an express, clear and unambiguous promise
given by a public authority; the expectation itself must be
reasonable; the representation must be one which it was
competent and lawful for the decision-maker to make; and
there cannot be a legitimate expectation against clear
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provisions of the law or the Constitution. In the present
appeal, the express and clear promise by the 1st
respondent was that of appointment of the best candidate
in response
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to the advertised position. The 1st respondent
demonstrated that after advertising for the subject
position, it received applications and interviewed all
qualified candidates, and appointed the best qualified
candidate. The 1st respondent therefore fulfilled the
procedural and substantive expectations required of it,
and it must be emphasised in this regard that there was no
legitimate promise or expectation that it would appoint the
appellant, but appoint the best candidate arising from the
process. The appellant may have been legitimately
disappointed that he was not considered the best
candidate, but this is no basis for us to find that there was
a breach of his legitimate expectation.
24. Consequently, it is our view that what the appellant is
essentially seeking in this appeal is a merit evaluation of
his qualifications vis-à-vis those of the 2nd respondent. This
Court has held in various decisions including in Suchan
Investment Ltd vs Ministry of Natural Heritage &
Culture & 3 others [2016] eKLR, Judicial Service
Commission & another vs Njora [2021] KECA 366
(KLR) and Kabundu & another vs County Government
of Mombasa; Clerk County Assembly of Mombasa & 7
others (Interested Parties) [2023] KECA 1330 (KLR)
that in appropriate cases and arising from the grounds for
judicial review now set out in section 7 of the Fair
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Administrative Action Act, an element of merit review may
be required in judicial review, particularly in examination
of whether a decision or action by a public authority is
the legal,
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constitutional and reasonable, as confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Kenya in Dande & 3 others vs
Inspector General, National Police Service & 5 others
[2023] KESC 40 (KLR).
25. The position as regards the nature and extent of merit
review that may be undertaken was extensively addressed
by the Supreme Court of Kenya in Saisi & 7 others vs
Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [2023]
KESC 6 (KLR) as follows:
“75. In order for the court to get through this
extensive examination of section 7 of the
FAAA, there must be some measure of merit
analysis. That is not to say that the court must
embark on merit review of all the evidence.
For instance, how would a court determine
whether a body exercising quasi-judicial
authority acted reasonably and fairly “in the
circumstances of the case”, without examining
those circumstances and measuring them
against what is reasonable or fair, and arriving
at the conclusion that the action taken was
within or outside the range of reasonable
responses. However, it is our considered
opinion that it should be limited to the
examination of uncontroverted evidence. The
controverted evidence is best addressed by
the person, body or authority in charge. To
borrow the words of the Court of Appeal in
Judicial Service Commission & another v Lucy
Muthoni Njora, Civil Appeal 486 of 2019;
[2021] eKLR there is nothing doctrinally or
legally wrong about a judge adopting some
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measure of review, examination, or analysis of
the merits in a judicial review case in order to
arrive at the justice of the matter. Rather a
failure to do so, out of a misconception that
judicial review is limited to a dry or formalistic
examination of the process only leads to
intolerable superficiality. This would certainly
be against article 259 of the Constitution
which requires us to interpret it in a manner
that
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inter alia advances the rule of law, permits the
development of the
law and contributes to good governance...”
26. The question we need to answer in this appeal is whether
it is permissible in undertaking a merit review to analyse
the appellant’s and 2nd respondent’s qualifications and
make a determination as to who was the more qualified
candidate for the advertised position. We are of the view
that it is not permissible for two reasons. Firstly, as further
held by the Supreme Court in Saisi & 7 others vs
Director of Public Prosecutions & 2 others [supra] it
is not the purpose and intent of a merit review in judicial
review to undertake full-fledged inquiry into the merits of a
matter. The Supreme Court explained as follows:
“76. Be that as it may, it is the court’s firm
view that the intention was never to transform
judicial review into to full-fledged inquiry into
the merits of a matter. Neither was the
intention to convert a judicial review court into
an appellate court. We say this for several
reasons. First, the nature of evidence in
judicial review proceedings is based on
affidavit evidence. This may not be the best
suited form of evidence for a court to try
disputed facts or issues and then pronounce
itself on the merits or demerits of a case. More
so on technical or specialized issues, as the
specialised institutions are better placed to do
so. Second, the courts are limited in the
nature of reliefs that they may grant to those
set out in section 11(1) and
Page 39
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
(2) of the Fair Administrative Actions Act.
Third, the court may not substitute the
decision it is reviewing with one of its own.
The court may not set about forming its own
preferred view of the evidence, rather it may
only quash an impugned decision. This is
codified in section 11(1)(e) and (h) of the Fair
Administrative Action Act. The merits of a case
are best analyzed in a trial or on appeal after
hearing
Page 40
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
testimony, cross-examination of witnesses and
examining evidence adduced. Finally, as this
court held in the case of Kenya Vision 2030
Delivery Board v Commission on
Administrative Justice, Attorney General and
Eng Judah Abekah, SC Petition 42 of 2019;
[2021] eKLR, in matters involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, a public officer or
public agency can only be directed to take
action; it cannot be directed in the manner or
the particular way the discretion is to be
exercised.”
27. Secondly, it is our view that the permissible limit of the
courts’ merit view in the circumstances of the present
appeal was to determine whether the decision by the 1st
respondent to appoint the 2nd respondent to the position of
Senior Deputy Director Research and Development was
irrational and unreasonable. In this respect, we find that
the appellant did not meet the required threshold of
demonstrating that the 2nd respondent’s decision was
perverse, outrageous or absurd, as held by various
decisions on the test for unreasonableness, notably
Associated Provincial Picture Houses vs Wednesbury
Corp. (1948) 1KB 223 and Council of Civil Service
Unions vs Minister of Civil Service (1985) 1 AC
374. Our finding is informed by two considerations, the
main one being that both the 1st and 2nd respondents
demonstrated that the 2nd respondent held the necessary
qualifications for the said position, and the impugned
Page 41
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
decision cannot therefore be condemned as being absurd
or outrageous.
Page 42
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
28. The second consideration is that the circumstances of this
appeal do not warrant a heightened merit review in
applying the unreasonableness or irrationality test. As
explained in text on Judicial Review: Principles and
Procedures (2013 Edition) by Jonathan Auburn, Jonathan
Moff and Andrew Harland at paragraphs 17.13 to 17.23,
where the impact of a decision entails interference with
important rights of an individual, the decision will be
subjected to close scrutiny or a heightened merit review in
determining its reasonableness. In such cases “the
heightened scrutiny approach will require the public
body to justify its decision and put forward an
explanation for the interference, with the court assessing
whether it was reasonable for the public body to have
concluded that there was sufficient justification for the
interference. The most substantial the interference the
more that will be required by way of justification before
the court can be satisfied that the decision is a
reasonable one”.
29. On the other hand, in majority of other cases, a less
rigorous approach is adopted in scrutinizing the
reasonableness of decisions of public bodies, which
approach is sometimes referred to as “light touch review”.
One such instance is in challenges of decisions involving
the application of specialist or technical expertise by a
Page 43
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
public body, including decisions on matters of academic or
pastoral judgment. The main reason for adopting the “light
touch review” in such cases is that it is beyond the
Page 44
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
practical competence and constitutional function of the
courts to adjudicate upon the relevant subject matter. It
was in this respect held by the English Court of Appeal in R
vs Ministry of Defense expertise Smith (1996) 1 QB
517 that “the greater the policy content of a decision
and the more remote the subject matter of a decision
from ordinary judicial experience, the more hesitant the
court must necessarily be in holding a decision to be
irrational”. We similarly find that this Court is ill-equipped
to undertake an in-depth merit scrutiny of the
qualifications of the appellant and 2nd respondent for the
advertised position .
30. Therefore, while it may well be that in his own estimation
the appellant had better qualifications for the advertised
position than the 2nd respondent, the courts cannot make a
decision in this respect either way. In other words, it was
not the duty of the court to determine who, as between
the appellant and 2nd respondent, was the better candidate
or had the better qualifications so to speak. In addition,
undertaking such a merit review would entail the court
substituting its decision with that of the 1st respondent,
which is not the province of judicial review. We, therefore,
find no reason to fault the learned Judge of the ELRC for
finding that the 2nd respondent met the qualifications for
the advertised position of Senior Deputy Director Research
Page 45
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
and Development and that the appellant had not
demonstrated bias or illegality, or breach of his
Page 46
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
legitimate expectation by the 1st respondent in the
appointment of the 2nd respondent to the said position.
31. We, therefore, find this appeal not to have merit, and it is
hereby dismissed with costs to the 1st and 2nd respondents.
32. Orders accordingly.
Dated and delivered at Nairobi this 30th day of January,
2026.
W. KARANJA
…………………………………
JUDGE OF APPEAL
F. TUIYOTT
…………………………………
JUDGE OF APPEAL
P. NYAMWEYA
…………………………………
JUDGE OF APPEAL
I certify that this
is a true copy of the
original
Signed
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
Page 47
Judgment- NAI Civil Appeal No 337 of 24
of 2019
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