Case Law[2012] UGSC 15Uganda
Kasamba v Rutalihamwe (Civil Appeal 19 of 2010) [2012] UGSC 15 (12 November 2012)
Supreme Court of Uganda
Judgment
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
[CORAM:
ODOKI, C.J; TSEKOOKO; KATUREEBE; TUMWESIGYE;
KISAAKYE; JJ.SC]
CIVIL APPEAL NO: 19 OF 2O1O
BETWEEN
HENRY KASAMBA APPELLANT
AND
YAKOBO RUTALIHAMWE :: RESPONDENT
[Appeal
from the decislon of the Court of Appeat at Kampala
lEngwau, Kltumba 66
Nshimye,JJA) dated 14th July 2OO9 ln Civil Appeal No. O5 of2OO8!
JUDGMENT OF TUMWESIGYE, JSC
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REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court
of Appeal which
upheld the judgment
of the High Court in a suit Iiled by the
respondent against the appellant in the chief magistrate,s court at
Masindi. In that suit the respondent prayed for an order of specilic
performance in respect of a sale agreement concerning a plot of
Iand which was sold to him by the appellant.
Counsel's submissions
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Court of Appeal
erred by failing to hold that the principles exp ressed in Jenkins v.
Green (supra) applied to the facts of this case; that the principles
are that (a) if in a contract for the sale of land which is not properly
identified or described, and the seller is under a duty to identify it
at a later date by survey, the seller has the first act to do and has
an election to choose which area should be surveyed and the
purchaser cannot choose an area which he prefers and (b) that the
court will issue an order for specific performance for the seller to
make his election and choose which area the purchaser shall take.
Learned counsel further contended that both the High Court and
the Court of Appeal did not make a specific hnding that a survey as
had been provided for in the contract of sale had taken place and
that it was the trial court that found that it had not taken place and
ordered the appellant to act. Counsel also argued that the
respondent admitted to his failure to bring a surveyor which
corroborated the appellant's testimony that he could not demarcate
the land because no surveyor was brought to demarcate it. He
further contended that the evidence overwhelmingly proves that
there was no demarcation or survey of the land as provided in the
agreement.
Counsel for the appellant did not make any submissions on ground
4
I
two.
On ground three counsel submitted that the learned Justices of
Appeal erred in law by making inferences of fact without
justilication.
Counsel disagreed with the inference made by
Kitumba, JA, (as she then was) in her lead judgment
with which the
other two Justices of Appeal agreed, where she stated that the
appellant must have shown the respondent the plot. He contended
that the inference was not supported by evidence on record since
the sa-le agreement did not say that the appellant would show the
respondent the plot but rather provided for demarcation which fact
was proved not to have taken place. He further argued that the land
in dispute was at Kisweka but the balance of the purchase price
was paid at Kisenyi on 18/ 11196 which meant that payment of the
balance was not at the site of the disputed land. Therefore in his
view there was no way payment of the balance would be concurrent
with the showing of the land to the respondent.
5
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Counsel further contended that inferences of fact must be made
from proved primary facts. He argued the respond.ent averred that
he was shown the land by the appellant in the presence of George
Tibabasa, Mary Mbabaai and T\rsiime Joseph, a builder, but that
none of the witnesses were called by the respondent to support his
claim. Counsel argued that this meant that his evidence was as
good as that of the appellant.
Learned counsel further argued that the first appellate court was
alive to its duty of re-evaluating the evidence and relied on the
principles in Pandya v. R [1954
E.A. 3S5. He argued that the
learned Judge considered the respondent's testimony which was to
the effect that he knew the plot very well because it was near his
home at Muhoro and that the appellant showed him the plot in the
presence of other people. Counsel further submitted that when
trespassers invaded the plot, the respondent requested the
appellant to sue them and a suit was successfully fited by the
appellant against the trespassers in Kagadi court. That the
respondent brought building materials to the plot in the presence
and with the knowledge of the appellant and that therefore by his
conduct the appellant was estopped from denying that the land
which the appellant sold to the respondent was known to the
respondent in both size and location.
Consideration of the grounds of
appeal.
I will consider the grounds of appeal in the same order they were
presented and argued by learned counsel for the appellant. counsel
6
In reply counsel for the respondent submitted that the case of
Jenkins v. Green (supra) is distinguishable and the principles laid
down therein do not apply to the instant case. He contended that
the survey was a matter of technicality and would only assist in the
processing of the title for the part of the land the respondent had
bought from the appellant.
for the appellant did not make any submissions on ground two and,
therefore, I will not consider that ground.
I respectfully agree with learned counsel for the respondent that the
case of Jenkins v. Green (supra) is distinguishable and its
principles do not apply to the facts of the instant case. In Jenkins
v. Green the issue was whether the contract for the sale of land
was void for uncertaint5r and who between the vendor and
purchaser had the power of selection of the 3Tacres which had not
7
Ground I
The appellant's argument on this ground is that the learned
Justices of Appeal erred in law not to hold that the legal principles
expressed in Jenkins v. Green (supra) applied to the facts of this
case; that both appellate courts below did not make a specific
finding "that such survey as had been provided in the contract of
sale had taken place" yet in the trial court the court found that
such survey had not taken place. That the respondent himself
admitted that he could not bring surveyors when there was
confusion and that there was enough evidence to prove that there
was no demarcation or survey of the land as was provided in the
sale agreement. Contrary to the argument of counsel for the
appellant, however, the sale agreement does not provide that it is
the respondent's obligation to bring a surveyor to demarcate the
plot. Instead the agreement puts the obligation of demarcation of
the plot squarely on the appellant.
been identified. However, in the instant case this was never the
issue in the chief magistrate's court, in the High Court or in the
Court of Appeal. In all these courts the main issue was whether or
not the appellant showed the respondent the plot on which he built.
Evidence was led by both the appellant and the respondent on this
question. The trial court held that from the evidence adduced by
both parties he was not satisfied that the plot was demarcated, and,
therefore, the respondent had no right to build on the plot on which
he chose to build.
On appeal, however, the High Court judge, Zehurikize, J., after re-
evaluating the evidence reversed the chief magistrate,s findings and
agreed with the evidence of the respondent that the appellant
showed the respondent the plot on which the latter built. The
learned judge stated in his judgment:
"There was no way the plaintiff could have constructed on
a plot that did not form part of the land sold to him and
the defendant kept quiet... My considered view and finding
is that the plaintiff constructed his building on the land
showed to him by the defendant and with his consent.,,
The learned Justices of Appeal concurred with the findings of the
High Court judge. Kitumba, JA, (as she then was) who wrote the
lead judgment
with which the other two other Justices of Appeal
agreed stated:
8
" I
agree with the 7"t appellate court tha,t as the sqle
qgreement
stipulated that the appellont uould. show the
respondent the plot on pagment of the ba,lqnce and the
bq.lance utas paid. on 78/71/7996 the appetlant must hante
shoruun the respondent the plot though technicallg it was
not surueged,."
Since the issue in the three courts below was whether or not the
appellant showed the respondent the plot on which he built, and
the two appellate courts resolved the issue in favour of the
respondent by finding that the appellant showed him the plot, the
principles expressed in Jenkins v. Green clearly do not apply to
the facts of this case.
Moreover, the princip les laid down in Jenkins v. Green for which
the Court of Appeal is being criticized by the appellant for not
applying, were not raised in the trial court and in the two appellate
courts below. The appellant is raising them here for the first time.
While it may be proper for the appellant to raise questions of law in
this court for the first time, he must show that there is sufficient
evidence established to support the principles being raised. See the
case of Connecticut Flre Insurance v. Kavanash (Sl
[19921
A.C.
473 as cited in Warehousing & Forrrarding Co. v. Jafferali
[1969]
E.A. 385. The facts of the instant case and the issues which were
framed by both parties for determination by the trial court do not
support the principles being raised by the appellant in this court.
9
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I find no merit in this ground and it should fail.
The appellant's third ground is that the learned Justices of Appeal
erred in law to make inferences of fact without justification.
Learned
counsel for the appellant in his written submissions to this court
argued that the sale agreement between the two parties did not say
that the appellant would "show" the respondent the plot but rather
provided for "demarcation" which was never done by the appellant.
He further argued that payment of the balance on the purchase
price by the respondent could not have been concurrent with the
appellant showing the land to the respondent since the balance was
paid at Mugumu Kisenyi whereas the land is located at Kisweka.
In the court of Appeal the learned Justices agreed with the first
appellate court (High Court) that the appellant showed the
respondent the plot. In his re-evaluation of the evidence the learned
High Court judge inferred from the evidence adduced in the tria_l
court that the appellant showed the respondent the plot. I will quote
fairly extensively what the learned Judge stated in his judgment.
10
Ground 3
"The appellant (plaintifff in his evidence testified that
after paying the balance of shs. L2S.,OOO/= the respondent
(defendantf showed him the piece of land he had sold to
him in the presence of George Tibabara and the appellant's
wife who is a sister to the respondent. Also present was a
This view is buttressed by the sale agreement of
lllLOl1996 which clearly stated that on payment of the
balance the defendant would demarcate the plot sold to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff paid the balance on 18/ l-L196.l
do believe that although there was no surveyor to formally
or technically demarcate off the plot that had been sold to
the plaintiff the Defendant showed the
plaintiff
the land
he had sold to him..,
It should be noted that the plaintiff brought building
materials and embarked on construction. According to the
unchallenged evidence adduced by the plaintiff the
defendant at first appeared to have supported the
plaintiff
in the construction. The Plaintiff testified that before he
could complete the building some people entered some of
the rooms
-
lockup shops. Since the defendant had not
made the formal transfer of the plot to him, the
plaintiff
approached him and the Defendant instituted a case in
Kagadi court against the trespassers. The defendant never
challenged this evidence...
11
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builder by the name of Tusiime Joseph. The plaintiff knew
the land very well because it was near his home at
Muhoro. This evidence was not challenged either by way of
cross-examination or by any evidence in rebuttal. I do
believe the appellant that the respondent showed him the
land he had sold to him.
There was no way the Plaintiff could have constructed the
building on a plot that did not form part of the land sold
to him and the Defendant kept quiet and merely left the
Plaintiff to be stopped by the Chief Administrative
Oflicer..."
The Court of Appeal agreed with the inference drawn by the Iirst
appellate court that the appellant showed the respondent the plot
the appellant sold him. It noted that the hrst appellate court was
alive to its duty of re-evaluating the evidence and relied on the
principles in Pandva v. R (supra).
I cannot, therefore, agree with learned counsel for the appellant
that the learned Justices of Appeal erred in law to draw an
inference of fact without justification.
The conduct of the appellant
from the time the respondent put building materials on the plot to
/
1,2
In agreeing with the first appellate court the learned Justices of
Appeal considered arnong other things the following: 1. That the
respondent knew the plot very well because it was near his home at
Muhoro.2. That the plotwas shown to him in the presence of other
people. 3. That when trespassers intruded upon his plot, he could
not sue them as the plot had not yet been transferred to him so he
requested the appellant to sue them for trespass which the
appellant did. 4. That the respondent brought building materials to
the plot in the presence and with the knowledge of the appellant.
Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the sale agreement
provided for
udemarcation"
and not "showing" of the plot to the
respondent by the appellant. This may be so but it cannot be a
plausible argument. If a seller showed a purchaser a plot he sold
him after receiving the balance of the purchase price, and the
purchaser constructed a building thereon, it would not be
reasonable for the seller to argue that he has a right to cause the
purchaser to vacate the plot on which he has built because the sale
agreement provided for "demarcation" and not
,,showing,,.
In re-
evaluating the evidence the first appellate court found that there
was sufficient evidence that the appellant showed the respondent
the plot. This was also accepted by the Court of Appeal. The two
appellate courts both stated that although the plot was not
technically surveyed and demarcated this was only for the purpose
of transferring the title into the name of the respondent but that
otherwise the appellant showed the respondent the plot. I
respectfully agree. In his evidence the appellant does not say that
the respondent took more land than he sold him. And from the
evidence on record it is clear that the complaint about the
respondent's construction was mainly from the local authorities
and the complaint from the appellant was belated.
13
the time he constructed the building to near completion, Iends
credence to the respondent's testimony that the appellant showed
him the plot.
I find no merit in the third ground of appeal and it should also fail.
I find no questions of law of great public or general importance that
arise from this appeal and, in my view, it did not merit a third
appeal to this court.
I would dismiss this appeal with costs to the respondent here and
in the courts below.
rh
Dated at Kampala this ...20L2
I
Jotham mwesrrye
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
),4
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a.y or..il.*****r&r.-l I
THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA
(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J,
TUMWESIGYE AND
TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE,
KISAAKYE, JJ. S.C)
CIVIL APPEAL NO 19 OF 2O1O
BETWEEN
HENRY KASAMBA APPELLANT
AND
YAKOBA RUTALIHAMWE RESPONDENT
[Appeal
from the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Engwau, Ktumba
and Nshimye, JJA) dated 14th Juty 20Og in Civil Appeal No o5 of 20081
JUDGMENT OF ODOKI, CJ
I have had the benefit of reading in draft the
judgment of my learned
brother, Tumwesigye JSC, and I agree with him that this appeal
should be dismissed with costs to the respondent in this Court and in
the Courts below.
As the other members of the Court also agree,
dismissed with orders proposed by the learned
Supreme Court.
this appeal is
Justice of the
Dat Kampala this .......1?
B
CHIEF JUSTICE
. day of d..9*.h" .2012
il"
5
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THE REPUBLIG OF UGAI{DA
N mE SUPREME COURI OF IJCTAI\IDA
AT I(AITIPAIA
[Coram:
Odoki, CJ., Tsekaol<o, Kotureebe, Turrwesigte & KkaalEe, JJSC.J
Ciwl Appeal No, 19 of 2010
kwen
15 HENRY KASAMBA
YAKOBO RUTALT}IAMWE
{Appl
ffon the dxi.sioa ot tha hut of ApWl at K*npla (tuSwau, I{ituntu & Nslzimte,
JJA
)
datd 14 JulJl W itz Ciuil Appl No- 6 otffi8. j
30
I agree with his conclusions that the appeal does not concern a
rnatter of law of great public or general irnportance nor do I
consider ttrat the appeaf has any merit. The appeal should be
dismissed with costs to the respondent here and in the three
corrrts below.
nerivened at r{a.rnpala this ...J.e.t.. oay ord.*':.*^bOrz. 35
E<
J.W.N.
Justice of the Supreme Court.
PC.l ,{ I
APPELI.ANT
Aril
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT OF J.W.N. TSEKOOKO. JSC.
25 I have had the advantage of reading in draft the judgrnent of rny
Iearned brother, ttre EIon. IUr. Justice T\rrnwesigze, JSC., which
he has just delivered.
(
)
L
[Appeal from
the decision of the Court of Appeal at Kampala (Enguau, Kitumba &
Nshimye, JJA) dated l4tt,Julg 2OO9 in Ciuil Appeal No. 05 of 2OO8l.
JUDGMENT OF I(ATUREEBE, JSC.
I agree with the judgment of my learned brother Tumwesigre,
JSC., that this appeal has no merit and ought to be dismissed
with costs in this Court and the Courts below.
I wish to observe that this was a third appeal, having originated
from a decision of the Chief Magistrate. It was brought under
section 6(21 of the Judicature Act and Rule 39(1)(a) of the
Supreme Court Rules. Under Section 6(21 of the Judicature Act,
a third appeal may be lodged to the Supreme Court "on the
certlficate of the Cour-t. of Appeal tha:t the appeal concertts a
matter oJ law of great publlc or general lmportance, or lf
1
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT I(AITIPALA
(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO; KATUREEBE; TUMWESIGYE;
KISAAKYE, JJ.SCI
CML APPEAL NO: 19 OF 2O1O
BETWEEN
HENRY I(ASAMBA: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : APPELLANT
AND
YOKOBO RUTALIHAMWE : : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : RESPONDENT
the Supreme Court cottsiders, in its overall dutg to see thqt
Justlce
ls done, that the appeal should be heard.'
It would appear to me that the Court of Appeal would itself have
heard the parties on the point of law in issue and determined
that it is of great public or general importance. The Court of
Appeal would then proceed to issue the certification. In this case
first ground of appeal states as follows:-
"The leqrtted Justlces of Appedl erred in law not to
applg the legal prlnclples pronounced in .IEtrIKIJVS
-Vs.
GREI'IV 54 D.R 772'
There is nothing on record that this case of Jenkins was ever
cited before their Lordships in the Court of Appeal. Indeed
Mr.Tibesigwa, Counsel for the Appellant admitted to us that it
was never cited, never submitted upon, and never decided upon.
I think it is rather unfair to the Court for counsel to have framed
this ground of appeal the way they did. They ought, in my view,
to have stated the point of law that arises and which the lower
court failed to decide on, or decided wrongly. The principles laid
down in Jenkins were not brought before the court, so as to
criticize the court of failure to apply them.
2
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It is in this Court that counsel for the appellant cited the case of
S.L. PATEL & AIVOR
-Vs-
DHANA SING
[1962]
D.A 32 which in
turn cites the Jenkins case (supra). I do not think this is the
proper way counsel should have proceeded. As my brother
Tumwesigre, JSC., has stated in his judgment, the Jenkins case,
7
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clearly, is distinguishable from this appeal for the reasons he has
glven.
Accordingly I concur that the appeal has no merit and ought to
fail
Dated at Kampala this.......l aay ortlr.-.-.:bdrz.
PzZE-/-.-
Bart M. Katureebe
JUSTICE OF'THE SUPREME COURT
3
rr.
-
,\
a
IN THI.] STJPITEME COUITT OF U(;ANI)A AT KAMPAI,A
(CORAM: ODOKI, C.J., TSEKOOKO, KATURIIEBIT, T'UMWESIGYIi ANI)
KISAAKYIJ, .IJ.S.C.)
ctvil, Al,l,EAL No. 19
()F
2010
li[.r'wtil.,N
IIIiNIIY KASAMI}A:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: APPI,]I,I,AN'I'
ANI)
YAKOI!0 RLI'l'Al,lll;\MWE::::::::::::::::::::i:;::::::::::::::::::::::::::: IIUSPONDIIN'l'
lAppealJrom
lhe decisiotr of lhe Courl oJ'lppeul ol Kampulrt (llngnnu, Kitumhu tttd
Nshim),c, JJ.A) dutel I4th Jull'2009 in Civil lppeul No.05 of 201)81
.f t-[x;MIiN't'
()t.'
t)ll. tt. KtsAAKYri ,ts('
lhavc had thc bcncllt olrcading in draft thc Judgment ol'my lcarned brother. Justicc
'l'umwesigye.
JSC.
I concur with him that this appcal has no mcrit and that it should bc dismisscd with costs
in this court and in thc courts below.
Dated al Kampala ttris...l&tday of ... 2012.
\..)c." (
DR. Es't'ilUR KISAAKYU
.IUSI'ICI.] OF''I'I I E ST]PRI!MF] COU R'I'
/
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I ti Rt,],U llt,lc o[' tJ(;AN l)A
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