Johan Harald Christer Abrahamsson vs Exim Bank (T) Limited & Others (Civil Appeal No. 306 of 2024) [2025] TZCA 1243 (8 December 2025)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA ATMWANZA (CORAM: SEHEL, J.A., ISSA, J.A., And ISMAIL, J.A.) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 306 OF 2024 JOHAN HARALD CHRISTER ABRAHAMSSON .................................... APPELLANT VERSUS EXIM BANK (T) LIMITED .................................................... 1 st RESPONDENT DASCAR LIMITED ■■ •••••••••••••••·•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••2" d RESPONDENT YUSUPH SHABANI MATIMBWA............................................. 3 rd RESPONDENT (Appeal from the ruling and drawn order of the High Court of Tanzania, Commercial Division, at Dar es Salaam) (Mkeha, J.} dated the 25 th day of March, 2024 in Miscellaneous Commercial Application No. 117 of 2023 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT 1 st & 8 th December, 2025 SEHEL, J.A.: The appeal before us is against the ruling and drawn order of the High Court of Tanzania, Commercial Division (the High Court) that ordered the current occupiers, namely; the appellant and the 2 nd respondent, to be evicted from a suit property located at Plot No. 16, Jangwani Beach, Kinondoni Municipality in Dar es Salaam held under a Certificate of Title No. 43835 (the suit premises) and the suit premises be handed over to the 3 rd respondent. Disgruntled with that order, the appellant preferred the present appeal.

The genesis of this appeal traces back from Commercial Case No. 51 of 2008 where, the 1st respondent sued the 2n d respondent and the appellant for recovery of TZS. 40,063,788.00 being TZS. 10,000,000.00 as principal sum advanced to the 2n d respondent through overdraft facility; recoverable within six months, and TZS. 30,063,788.00 as interests plus other accrued charges. The appellant was sued as a guarantor of the 2n d respondent. Having heard the parties' case, the High Court decided in favour of the appellant and the 2n d respondent by dismissing the 1st respondent's suit with costs. However, on appeal, the Court reversed the judgment and decree of the High Court and judgment was entered in favour of the 1st respondent. Subsequently, the decree-holder, that is, the 1st respondent, approached the High Court in order to execute the decree by way of attachment and sale of the mortgaged suit premises. According to the records of appeal, on 29th November, 2017, the High Court acting as the executing court issued an order for proclamation of sale in order to satisfy a claim of the decree holder amounting to TZS. 113,489,432.00 including costs and interests. The proclamation categorically stated that the suit premises would be sold by public auction through the appointed broker, one Mr. Makame S. Sengulo t/a MAS & Associates Co. Ltd. 2

Following the proclamation of sale, the auction was advertised through Uhuru Newspaper of 2n d December, 2017, notifying the public that there would be a public auction of the suit premises on 17th December, 2017. At the fall of the hammer, the 3rd respondent was declared the successful bidder and thereby purchased the suit premises for the consideration of TZS. 300,000,000.00. After the purchase price had been paid in full, the sale was confirmed and a certificate of sale was issued to the 3rd respondent, making the sale absolute. The 3rd respondent then proceeded to lodge an application to the Registrar of Titles seeking for registration of the Certificate of Title No, 43835 in his name as the lawful proprietor of the suit premises, whereupon the same was, by operation of law, transmitted and registered in his name. Upon being formally registered, the 3rd respondent instituted a Commercial Application No. 117 of 2023 (the application) before the High Court against the appellant, the 1st and 2n d respondents, the subject matter of the present appeal, wherein he sought delivery of the suit premises, costs of the application, and any other ancillary reliefs as may be granted by the court. The application was preferred under rule 2 (2) of the High Court (Commercial Division) Procedure Rules, Government Notice (G.N.) No. 250 of 2012, rule 4 of 3

the High Court (Commercial Division) Procedure (Amendment) Rules, G.N. No. 107 of 2019, Order XXI rule 93 of the Civil Procedure Code (the CPC) and section 95 of the CPC. On the other hand, the appellant opposed the application by filing a counter affidavit. Although the 2n d respondent was duly served through substituted service by publication, it neither entered appearance nor filed any counter affidavit. On her part, the 1st respondent notified the High Court that she was not opposing the application. She therefore did not file any counter affidavit. The application was disposed by way of written submissions. In its ruling, the High Court observed that there were no more impediments for the grant of the application because the conditions for conditional stay of execution order were not fulfilled by the appellant and the 2n d respondent. It further observed that the Civil Appeal No. 147 of 2020 was struck out on 10th July, 2023 for being time barred. Accordingly, it granted the application as earlier on stated. It is against the said backdrop; the appellant filed the present appeal. The memorandum of appeal contained the following six grounds: "1. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact fo r failure to consider the evidence o f the

appellant when com posing the ruling hence ended up with unjust decision which occasioned m iscarriage o f justice. 2. The learned tria l Judge erred in law by failure to record properly the proceedings during trial, therefore, caused m isdirection in arriving to the proper and ju s t decision hence occasioned injustice to the appellant. 3. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact fo r failure to evaluate properly according to the law the evidence adduced by the appellant before com posing the ruling, and this caused a serious m iscarriage o f ju stice as it resulted into one sided ruling. 4. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact when he struck out the appellant's notice o f prelim inary objection w ithout assigning any reason, therefore denied the appellant's rig h t to be heard. 5. The learned tria l judge erred in law and fact for issuing an invalid and defective eviction order which resulted in m iscarriage o fjustice. 6. The learned tria l Judge erred in law and fact for failure to take notice that the property in dispute has encum brances and the dispute is pending in 5

the Court o f Appeal o f Tanzania fo r determ ination." At the hearing of the appeal, Mr. Emmanuel Augustino, learned advocate, appeared for the appellant, whereas, Messrs. Zacharia Daudi and Sylivanus Mayenga, learned advocates, appeared for the 1st and 3rd respondents respectively. The 2n d respondent was absent though duly served by way of substituted service by publication in the Daily News and Nipashe newspapers both of 21st November, 2025. Pursuant to rule 112 (2) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules (the Rules), we granted leave to the appellant to proceed with the hearing of the appeal in absence of the 2n d respondent. It is noteworthy to point out that, the appellant, the 1st and 3rd respondents filed their written submissions in terms of rule 106 (1) and (7) of the Rules, in support of their respective positions. In arguing the appeal, Mr. Augustino adopted the written submissions and amplified few matters in respect of the grounds of appeal. For the first, third and fifth grounds of appeal which were conjointly argued, Mr. Augustino submitted that the High Court failed to analyse the counter affidavit and skeleton arguments and even failed to analyse the annexures attached to the counter affidavit which showed that there were pending proceedings challenging execution and sale of

the suit premises. Elaborating, he argued that, after the appellant's appeal was struck out for being incompetent by the Court, the appellant sought for leave to appeal out of time and the same was granted as such the appellant was still in the process of appealing again against the execution of the suit premises. He added that while the 3rd respondent claimed to have bought the suit premises from a public auction the same was not auctioned and the said suit premises were incumbered by the Court order for stay of execution. He referred us to case of Hector Sequiraa v. Serengeti Breweries Limited [2024] T7CA 174 for the proposition that the application made by the 3rd respondent, subject of the present appeal, was prematurely filed because the appellant was still pursuing his appeal which was struck out for being incompetent. It was Mr. Augustino's proposition that the decree which was used to attach and sell the suit premises was non-existent as it was quashed by the Court on appeal but the 2n d respondent used the same decree to apply for execution. It was also his view that the eviction order was invalid as it referred to four respondents while there were only three respondents, and that, the 3rd respondent invoked wrong provisions of the law as he cited Order XXI rule 93 of the CPC which deals with the return of purchase money.

On the second and fourth grounds of appeal, Mr. Augustino faulted the High Court for its failure to properly record the proceeding of the application. He asserted that while the proceedings show that the ruling was delivered on 28th March, 2024, the copy of the ruling indicated, it was delivered on 24th March, 2024. He further asserted that the learned trial Judge did not give reasons for overruling the appellant's points of law, but instead, it was recorded that the appellant withdrew the notice of the preliminary objection while it was not true. He added that the striking out of the preliminary points of law suo muto without giving reasons in the ruling was a violation of the basic constitutional right. On this, he referred us to the case of Hashi Energy (T) Limited v. Khamis Maganga [2022] TZCA 517, where the Court stressed that the right to be heard is both fundamental and a constitutional right. It was also Mr. Augustino's submission that there was uncertainty of the parties. He argued that, in the application, the 3rd respondent was referred as "John Harald Christern" instead of "Johan Harald Christer Abrahmamsson". In that respect, he cited the case of NIC Bank Tanzania Limited & Another v. Samora Mchuma Samora Co. Limited [2023] TZCA 76 for his preposition that the uncertainty of the

parties' name bring confusion to the proceedings which should not be left to stand. In the sixth ground of appeal, Mr. Augustino stressed that the suit premises had encumbrances as it was mortgaged to other parties who in turn they failed to adhere to the agreed terms and one of the parties was the 1st respondent. He reiterated that this fact was found in paragraph 5 of the appellant's counter affidavit but the High Court failed to consider it. He reiterated further that the application arose from the proceedings tainted with illegalities which, he alleged, were apparent on the face of the records as the decree and eviction order were illegal. It was his submission that, at the time the execution was filed, there was an order for stay of execution as such, the attachment and sale were both illegal on the eyes of law. In the end, Mr. Augustino invited the Court to reappraise the entire evidence on the record of appeal and arrive at our own conclusion by allowing the appeal with costs. To buttress his invitation for appraisal of the evidence, he referred us to the case of Standard Chartered Bank Tanzania Limited v. National Oil Tanzania Limited & Another [2013] TZCA 228.

When probed by the Court on whether in the record of appeal there was any evidence suggesting that there were pending appeals challenging execution proceedings, Mr. Augustino replied that there were none as they were not relevant to the present appeal. When further probed on the cited provision of the law, he admitted that he was referring to R.E. 2023 but added that the procedural law applies retrospectively even in the appeal at hand. In reply, Mr. Daudi adopted the 1st respondent's written arguments filed in Court and highlighted few matters pertaining to the grounds of appeal. On the first, third and fifth grounds of appeal, he submitted that, the grounds are baseless as there was neither a pending appeal nor order of stay for execution or caveat in respect of the suit premises at the time the 3rd respondent filed the application. He added that the issue whether there was a proper decree in Commercial Case No. 51 of 2008 capable to be executed was supposed to be raised and determined during execution proceedings and not at the latter stage where the sale became absolute. He distinguished the facts in the case of Hector Sequiraa v. Serengeti Breweries Limited (supra) that it dealt with the issue of competency of the application to strike out notice of appeal

having observed that the applicant was also challenging the said notice of appeal in another application for reference. He asserted that this was not the case in the present appeal. Responding to the second and fourth grounds of appeal, Mr. Daudi submitted that, the reason for changing the date for delivery of the ruling was communicated to the parties and that is why both parties were present during its delivery. It was his view that there was no any mischief made by the High Court. Regarding failure to give reasons in the ruling for striking out the notice of the preliminary objection, he submitted that the ruling delivered by the High Court which is subject to the appeal was in respect of the main application and not about the notice of the preliminary objection. He added that, in any event, the said notice was abandoned by the counsel for the appellant before the parties made their submission on the main application. He contended that the cited case of Hashi Energy (T) Limited v. Khamis Maganga (supra) was cited out of context because the Court was dealing with the issue of additional ground of appeal which parties were not given a chance to address it whereas in the appeal before us it was the appellant's counsel himself who abandoned the points of law.

As regards to the name of the parties, Mr. Daudi admitted that there was an omission of a letter "A" in the second name of appellant and an addition of a letter "N" in the third name of the appellant in the application. Nonetheless, he contended that such anomaly did not vitiate the proceedings as the same was due to a typo error. He referred us to cases of Victor Rweyemamu Binamungu v. Geofrey Kabaka & Another [2020] TZCA 290 and John Dickson @ Ngongole v. The Republic [2024] TZCA 144, where the Court held that missing syllable in the names did not go to the root of the matter to vitiate the proceedings; it was a matter of typing error which cannot override the substantive justice. He distinguished the facts in the case of NIC Bank Tanzania Limited v. Samaro Mchuma Samora Co. Ltd (supra) that the Court dealt with the citation of additional party in the appeal who was not a party in the lower court's proceeding. Mr. Daudi strongly opposed the sixth ground of appeal by arguing that paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit alleged there was an order for stay of execution made in Commercial Case No. 64 of 2011 which meant that Commercial Case No. 51 of 2008 had no pending order for stay of execution. In addition, Mr. Daudi stressed that any allegation of irregularities in respect of execution proceedings were supposed to be

challenged through section 38 of the CPC and after the sale became absolute. In the end, he urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. On his part, Mr. Mayenga also opposed the appeal and adopted the written submission filed by the 3rd respondent and joined hands with the submission of Mr. Daudi. He added that the Court of Appeal is not an executing court. Therefore, the High Court which was the executing court is vested with the jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters pertaining to the execution proceedings in terms of section 57 of the CPC. That, there was no proof or any record suggesting there was an injunctive order prohibiting the execution of the decree by the 1st respondent. He further argued that there was no any application filed to the executing court to set aside the sale of the suit premises. Neither was there any appeal preferred by the appellant against the registration of the suit premises in the name of the 3rd respondent who was the bona-fide purchaser. With such brief submission, he urged the Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. Mr. Augustino did not make any rejoinder to the reply submissions made by the counsel for the 1st and 3rd respondents.

Upon a careful consideration of the parties' submissions and a thorough re-examination of the record of appeal, we deem it appropriate to commence with the second and fourth grounds of appeal, in as much as they impugn the propriety of the proceedings before the High Court. At the outset, we find it necessary to express our dismay at the manner in which Mr. Augustino has sought to hypothesize the proceedings of the High Court. As a duly trained and experienced advocate, it was expected of him to acquaint himself fully with the events that transpired during the hearing of the application before the High Court. Indeed, a simple perusal of the record of appeal would have revealed that the learned advocate for the appellant elected to abandon the preliminary points of objection and to proceed with the substantive hearing of the application. This is what transpired before the High Court. It is not true that the points of law were struck out by the High Court. We are firmly of the view that, had the learned advocate made a careful perusal of the record of appeal, he would have refrained from advancing matters that are plainly trivial and vexatious before this Court. This Court cannot therefore entertain any suggestion that the appellant was denied a right to be heard. 14

Similarly, on the issue of the issuance of the date of ruling, it is true that delivery of ruling was initially scheduled on 28th March, 2024 by the Deputy Registrar but as admitted by Mr. Augustino, the date was rescheduled to 25th March, 2024 and parties were notified. On the rescheduled date, the counsel for the appellant and for the 3rd respondent appeared before the High Court and the ruling was delivered in their presence. Given the scenario, we are satisfied that the ruling was delivered on the scheduled date of 25th March, 2025 as reflected in the copy of the ruling. We therefore do not see how the appellant who was present during the delivery of the ruling was prejudiced. As for the misspelling of the parties' name, we entirely concur with the submission of Mr. Daudi that the errors in the proceedings, ruling and drawn order of the application and eviction order were merely typographical in nature and did not go to the root of the dispute between the parties. They occasioned no prejudice to either side and, accordingly, cannot be said to have affected the substantive determination of the application. - see the cases of Victor Rweyemamu Binamungu v. Geofrey Kabaka & Another (supra); John Dickson @ Ngongole v. The Republic (supra) and Issaya Renatus v. The Republic [2016] TZCA 218. In other words, the error

was insignificant to vitiate the High Court's proceedings because the same can be rectified through section 106 of the CPC. Accordingly, we find the second and fourth grounds of appeal are without merit and proceed to dismiss them. We now turn to the first, third and fifth grounds of appeal which challenge the competency of the application. The issue here is whether the application was competent before the High Court. Mr. Augustino impressed upon us to find that it was not competent for the reasons stated in the counter affidavit and most specifically that the suit premises had encumbrances and that there was a pending order for stay of execution. Mr. Augustino complained that the said counter affidavit and its annexures were not fully scrutinized by the High Court. For ease of reference, we find it prudent to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the counter affidavit as hereunder: "4. The contents o f paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 o f the applicant's affidavit are vehem ently disputed. The J d respondent avers that, the execution proceedings were ille g a l in the sense that, there was no valid extracted order o f the Court o f Appeal in C ivil Appeal No. 92 o f 2009 which revoked the decree o f the High Court in Com m ercial Case No. 51 o f 2008 and that, there 16

was no proper execution to ju stify the sale. Copy o f the affidavit o f the Local Governm ent Authority o f KHongawima Kunduchi Ward, Kinondoni D istrict■ , Dar es Salaam, is attached with and m arked as annexure JHA-1. 5. Further to paragraph 4 above, the J d respondent avers that, the su it property attached was incum bered by the order fo r stay o f execution o f the same property in Com m ercial Application No. 64 o f 2011 issued by Hon. Mruma J. dated 24th May, 2016 in (sic.) this Honourable Court. Therefore, the sale was ille g a l fo r the reasons that, the court was dissem bled the facts (sic.) that, the property was incum bered in Com m ercial Case No. 64 o f 2011, and that, there were an appeal and order fo r stay in the same property. A copy o f the said ruling dated 24th May, 2016 is attached here with and m arked as annexure JHA-2 to form p art o f this counter affidavit. 6. The contents o f paragraphs 8 and 9 o f the applicant's affidavit are noted. 7. That, the contents o f paragraph 10 o f the applicant's affidavit are vehem ently denied and the J d respondent further avers that, the term s stipulated in the said application fo r stay o f 17

execution were m et p rio r to the hearing o f the Application No. 21 o f 2016, by depositing to the 1st respondent/decree holder's account the sum o f United States D ollars $ 59,000= (say fifty-nine thousand only) as p art o f the decretal sum o f the decree. Copies o f the deposit/TT transfer form s are collectively attached herein and m arked as annexure JHA-3 to form part o f this counter affidavit. 8. The content o f paragraph 11 o f the applicant's affidavit are noted. 9. The contents o f paragraph 12 o f the applicant's affidavit are strongly disputed. In furtherance, the J d respondent avers that, the appeal was struck out fo r reasons o f technicalities, in the sense that, the certificate o f delay granting leave issued by this Honourable court did not ta lly with the handing over letter, hence, rendered the appeal to be incom petent, but not that it was hopelessly tim e barred and that's why it was not dism issed rather it was struck out. 10. The contents o f paragraph 13 (13.1 and 13.2) inclusive are disputed to their entirety. The J d respondent states that, there is an application 18

pending fo r determ ination as it is averred in the subsequent paragraph number 11. 11. The contents o f paragraphs 14 and 15 o f the applicant's affidavit are strongly disputed to their entirety. Further, the J d respondent states that, after the application fo r review was struck out, fo r reasons o f technicality, im m ediately, the J d respondent file d new Application No. 468/16 o f 2022 fo r extension o f tim e to file review to the Court o f Appeal o f Tanzania in order to challenge the sale and execution proceedings as well. Copy o f the said Application is attached herewith and m arked annexure JHA-4 to form p art o f this counter affidavit too. 12. The contents o f paragraph 16 o f the applicant's affidavit are disputed to their entirety. And the J d respondent states that, the Application is the abuse o f the process o f the Court." From the above extract, the appellant was essentially alleging that there were pending proceedings challenging execution and sale of the suit premises and there was an order for stay of execution. The High Court found that the alleged order for stay of execution was conditional upon payment of security for due performance of the decree but the 19

appellant failed to fulfil the said condition and the pending appeal which was Civil Appeal No. 147 of 2020 was struck out. On our part, having reappraised the evidence on the record of appeal, we observed that the annexure attached to paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit was a ruling in Commercial Case No. 64 of 2011 between the appellant and the 1st respondent, delivered on 24th May, 2016. In that ruling, the High Court ordered a stay of execution of the decree, in which the decree holder was the 1st respondent and the judgment debtor was the appellant. It is, however, not apparent from the ruling what was the controversy between the parties that led to the 1st respondent to obtain a judgment against the appellant. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that Commercial Case No. 64 of 2011 was not relevant to the present appeal, and the High Court was correct in disregarding it. Further, from the record of appeal, we observed that on 30th July, 2019, this Court issued an order for stay of execution in Civil Application No. 21 of 2016. That order was expressly contingent upon the payment of security for the due performance of the decree and was to subsist only until the final determination of Civil Appeal No. 147 of 2020. As correctly noted by the High Court, Civil Appeal No. 147 of 2020 was 20

struck out on 10th July, 2023. Consequently, from that date, the order for stay of execution ceased to exist. In other words, at the time the 3rd respondent lodged his application before the High Court for delivery of the suit premises, there was neither a pending appeal nor an operative order for stay of execution. Yet again, annexure JHA-1, attached to paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit, was intended to suggest that the execution process was not adhered to, while annexure JHA-4, attached to paragraph 11 of the same affidavit, sought to demonstrate that the appellant had filed an application for extension of time before this Court seeking revision of the sale of the suit premises. It was also the complaint of the appellant that the decree used to attach the suit premises was non-existent. On this, we fully associate ourselves with the submissions of learned counsel, Mr. Daudi and Mr. Mayenga, that the appellant ought to have challenged the process of execution before its conclusion. As regards the sale of immovable property, the CPC contains special provisions designed to safeguard the interests of third parties and of a judgment-debtor when his property is sold in execution. These include section 44 and Order XXI rules 59, 83, 89, 90 and 91 of the CPC. 21

Under Order XXI rule 89, a judgment-debtor may apply to have the sale set aside upon depositing in the executing court a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money realized at the sale, together with the amount specified in the proclamation of sale as recoverable, less any sums received by the decree holder since the date of sale. Further, an application to set aside the sale may be made on grounds of material irregularity or fraud in publishing or conducting the sale (Order XXI rule 90), or on the basis that the judgment-debtor had no sellable interest in the property sold (Order XXI rule 91). Where no such application is made, or where one is made and disallowed, the court is bound to confirm the sale and thereafter the sale shall become absolute pursuant to Order XXI rule 92 (1). Rule 94 provides that where the sale of immovable property has become absolute, the court must grant a certificate specifying the property sold and the name of the person who at the time of sale was declared to be the purchaser. In this appeal, it has not been suggested by the appellant that the third parties who claimed interests or possession of the suit premises exercised their rights under Order XXI rule 59 by filing objection proceedings against the attachment. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that, any complaint regarding the execution process has been

raised belatedly, after the eleventh hour, and cannot be relied upon to defeat the rights of the third respondent, a bona fide purchaser, to enjoy the property which he lawfully acquired. We are also of the firm view that the case of Hector Sequiraa v. Serengeti Breweries Limited [2024] T7CA 174 was cited out of context as the pending appeal was struck out by the Court. Accordingly, we find the first, third and fifth grounds of appeal are devoid of merit and proceed to dismiss them. On the sixth ground of appeal, we wish to state, albeit briefly, that from the explanation already given, we are firmly of the view that the ruling, the drawn order, and the eviction order were not tainted with any irregularities. We acknowledge the general principle that where an amendment of the law affects a procedural step or matter only, it operates retrospectively. However, there are recognized exceptions to that rule, particularly where good reason exists for the amendment not to apply retrospectively - see the cases of Municipality of Mombasa v. Nyali Limited [1963] 1 E.A. 371, at 374; Gasper Peter v. Mtwara Urban Water Supply Authority (MTUWASA) [2019] T7CA 28; Lala Wino v. Karatu District Council [2019] TZCA 46 and Jovet Tanzania Ltd v. Bavaria N. V. [2019] TZCA 559. 23

In the present appeal, such an exception arises because, at the time the 3rd respondent filed his application before the Court under Order XXI rule 93 of the CPC (now renumbered as Order XXI rule 95), the Revised Edition, 2023, which effected the renumbering, was not yet in force. Accordingly, this ground of appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances, and for the reasons already stated, we are satisfied that the entire appeal is devoid of merit. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby dismissed. We further order that the 1st and 3rd respondents shall have their costs. It is so ordered. DATED at MWANZA this 8th day of December, 2025. B. M. A. SEHEL JUSTICE OF APPEAL A. A. ISSA JUSTICE OF APPEAL M. K. ISMAIL JUSTICE OF APPEAL The Judgment delivered virtually this 8th day of December, 2025 in the presence of Mr. Emmanuel Augustino, learned counsel for the appellant, Messrs. Zacharia Daudi and Sylivanus Mayenga, learned advocates for the 1st and 3rd respondents, in the absence of 2n d respondent and Mr. Nelson Novati, Court Clerk; is hereby certified as a true copy of the . . . ‘ - f l 7 ^ . Q p n i n a l ' .--‘ v C. M. MAGESA DEPUTY REGISTRAR COURT OF APPEAL 24