Case Law[2025] ZASCA 22South Africa
Medupe and Others v African National Congress and Others (003/2024) [2025] ZASCA 22 (20 March 2025)
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
20 March 2025
Headnotes
Summary: Administrative law – constitution of a voluntary association – interpretation of rule 12.2.4 of the African National Congress constitution – the constitution the rules and regulations issued in terms thereof, constitute an agreement between members and the voluntary association – to be interpreted in accordance with principles applicable to the construction of contracts – legal principles restated.
Judgment
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## Medupe and Others v African National Congress and Others (003/2024) [2025] ZASCA 22 (20 March 2025)
Medupe and Others v African National Congress and Others (003/2024) [2025] ZASCA 22 (20 March 2025)
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sino date 20 March 2025
FLYNOTES:
ADMINISTRATIVE – Voluntary association –
Constitution
–
Interpretation
of rule 12.2.4 of ANC constitution – Contention that
committee impermissibly convened conference after
its term of
office had expired – Impossible to call conference before
expiration of period due to pandemic –
Considered as force
majeure – Rule 12.2.4 provides for such unprecedented force
majeure – Had authority to extend
committee’s term
under exceptional circumstances like pandemic –
Constitutionally justified – Appeal dismissed.
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case
no:003/2024
In
the matter between:
LEBOGANG
MEDUPE
FIRST
APPELLANT
SELLO
MOLEFE
SECOND
APPELLANT
ITUMELENG
MOSWANE
THIRD APPELLANT
and
AFRICAN
NATIONAL CONGRESS
FIRST RESPONDENT
NONO
MALOYI
SECOND RESPONDENT
LAZZY
MOKGOSI
THIRD RESPONDENT
LOUIS
DIREMELO
FOURTH RESPONDENT
VIOLA
MOTSUMI
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SELLO
LEHARI
SIXTH RESPONDENT
SUZAN
DANTJIE
SEVENTH RESPONDENT
MOTLALEPULA
ROSHO
EIGHTH RESPONDENT
WENDY
NELSON
NINTH RESPONDENT
KENETSWE
MOSENOGI
TENTH RESPONDENT
BETTY
KEGAKILWE
ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
TEBOGO
MODISE
TWELFTH RESPONDENT
SALIVA
MOLAPISI
THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT
STELLA
MONDLANA
FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT
SIPHO
DIAL
FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT
MPHO
KHUNOU
SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT
GRACE
MOIPOLAI
SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT
HENDRICK
BOTHA
EIGHTEENTH RESPONDENT
JOSTINA
MKHIZE
NINETEENTH RESPONDENT
ELIZABETH
MOKUA
TWENTIETH RESPONDENT
TEBOGO
MOTASE
TWENTY-FIRST RESPONDENT
NKOTSOE
NKETU
TWENTY-SECOND RESPONDENT
VICTORIA
MAKHAULA
TWENTY-THIRD RESPONDENT
NOMVULYISELO
SOMPA
TWENTY-FOURTH RESPONDENT
DESBO
MOHONO
TWENTY-FIFTH RESPONDENT
PERLITIA
CHWENE
TWENTY-SIXTH RESPONDENT
MARIA
MONNANA
TWENTY-SEVENTH RESPONDENT
NTHABISENG
SHUPING
TWENTY-EIGHTH RESPONDENT
LENAH
MIGA
TWENTY-NINTH RESPONDENT
MORUTSE
MOLEFE
THIRTIETH RESPONDENT
TUMELO
MARUPONG THIRTY-FIRST
RESPONDENT
GEORGE
MANYIKE
THIRTY-SECOND RESPONDENT
BOIPELO
MAREKO
THIRTY-THIRD RESPONDENT
GRACE
MASILO
THIRTY-FOURTH RESPONDENT
CEASER
MOGATUSI
THIRTY-FIFTH RESPONDENT
PRISCILLA
WILLIAMS
THIRTY-SIXTH RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Medupe & Others v
African National Congress & Others
(003/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 22
(20 March 2025)
Coram:
MEYER, MATOJANE, KGOELE and SMITH JJA and BLOEM AJA
Heard
:
26 February 2025
Delivered:
20 March 2025
Summary:
Administrative law – constitution of a voluntary
association – interpretation of rule 12.2.4 of the African
National
Congress constitution – the constitution the rules and
regulations issued in terms thereof, constitute an agreement between
members and the voluntary association – to be interpreted in
accordance with principles applicable to the construction of
contracts – legal principles restated.
ORDER
On
appeal from
: North West
Division
of the High Court, Mahikeng (Djaje DJP, sitting as court of first
instance):
The
appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel
where so employed.
JUDGMENT
Smith
JA (Meyer, Matojane, Kgoele JJA and Bloem AJA concurring):
Introduction
[1]
This appeal concerns a dispute between the African National Congress
(the ANC) and the appellants
regarding the lawfulness of the North
West ANC’s Provincial Conference, which was held from 12 to 14
August 2022. The appellants
contended that the Interim Provincial
Committee (the IPC) impermissibly convened the conference after its
term of office had expired
and that the ANC’s National
Executive Committee (the NEC) violated the ANC constitution by
assuming control of the conference,
thereby usurping the powers and
functions of the Provincial Executive Committee (the PEC). The
interpretation of the ANC’s
constitution is central to the
resolution of that dispute.
[2]
The appellants are members of the ANC, North West Province. The ANC
is the first respondent. The
second to thirty-sixth respondents
were elected as members of the PEC (the second to sixth respondents
as office bearers) at the
impugned Provincial Conference.
[3]
On 25 August 2022, the appellants brought an urgent application in
the North West Division of
the High Court, Mahikeng (the high court),
for an order,
inter alia
: declaring unlawful the Provincial
Conference and the ANC’s decision ‘to usurp’ the
powers and functions of the
PEC at the Provincial Conference; and
compelling the ANC to appoint an IPC in the place of the disbanded
PEC.
[4]
The appellants contended that the term of office of the IPC, which
was appointed by the NEC of
the ANC in August 2019 following the
dissolution of the PEC, expired in April 2020 by virtue of rule
12.2.4 of the ANC’s
constitution. That rule provides,
inter
alia
, that ‘[t]he election of a PEC, which has been
dissolved, shall be called within 9 (nine months) from date of
dissolution’.
The appellants asserted that, reasonably
interpreted, the rule has the effect that the IPC’s term of
office automatically
terminated upon the expiry of the nine-month
period.
[5]
In respect of the alleged usurpation by the NEC of the powers and
functions of the PEC, the appellants
contended that the ANC
constitution does not authorise the NEC to convene or interfere in
the holding of a Provincial Conference.
The Provincial Conference was
therefore convened and conducted unlawfully and in violation of the
ANC’ constitution, so they
contended.
[6]
In its judgment delivered on 23 May 2023, the high court (per Djaje
DJP) found that: the nine-month
period could not be adhered to
because of the national lock-down, pursuant to the declaration of a
national state of disaster in
terms of the
Disaster Management Act 57
of 2002
; the law did not allow a
lacuna
to exist in the
provincial leadership structures for reasons expounded in
Pilane
and Another v Pheto and Others
(
Pilane
);
[1]
the NEC had extended the
IPC’s tenure on various occasions; and the NEC, as the ‘highest
organ of the ANC had to take
all steps necessary to ensure the
fulfilment of the ANC’s objectives.’ The high court
consequently dismissed the application
with costs, including the
costs of two counsel, where so employed. The appellants appeal
against that order with the leave of this
Court.
Factual
background
[7]
The following material facts are common cause. Following a decision
by the NEC in August 2018
to dissolve the PEC for the North West
Province, a Provincial Task Team was appointed on 20 September 2018.
The disbanded PEC thereafter
launched proceedings in the Gauteng
Division of the High Court, Johannesburg, challenging the NEC’s
decisions to dissolve
it and to appoint the Provincial Task Team. The
high court found in their favour and on 5 February 2019, granted an
order declaring
unlawful and setting aside the NEC’s decisions.
[8]
After protracted internal appeal processes, the NEC eventually
appointed the IPC in August 2019.
As stated earlier, the appellants
contend that the tenure of the IPC terminated on 29 April 2022, after
the expiry of the nine-month
period mentioned in
rule 12.2.4.
The
rule reads as follows:
‘
12.2
Without prejudice to the generality of its powers, the NEC shall:
.
. .
12.2.4
Ensure that the Provincial, Regional and Branch structures of the ANC
and the Leagues function democratically and effectively.
(The NEC may
suspend or dissolve a PEC where necessary.) The suspension of a PEC
shall not exceed a period of 3 (three) months.
The election of a PEC,
which has been dissolved, shall be called within 9 (nine months) from
date of dissolution. The NEC must
appoint an interim structure during
the period of suspension or the dissolution of the PEC to fulfil the
functions of the PEC.’
[9]
The ANC asserted that it was impossible for the IPC to call a
Provincial Conference before the
expiration of the nine months period
because of the declaration of a national state of disaster in March
2020, following the outbreak
of the Covid-19 pandemic. The NEC
considered the Covid-19 pandemic as
force majeure
and,
consequently, indefinitely postponed all provincial and regional
conferences as well as bi-annual branch meetings.
[10]
Instead of dissolving the IPC, the NEC adopted various resolutions
during the period July 2020 to May 2022,
purporting to extend the
mandate of the IPC. Between 31 July 2020 and 2 August 2020, the
NEC resolved to ratify a recommendation
from the ANC’s
Secretary-General to extend the mandate of the IPC for a further
three months. It also resolved that the IPC’s
mandate should be
extended indefinitely in line with the decision of the previous NEC.
[11]
In February 2022, the ANC’s National Working Committee (the
NWC) resolved to extend until 31
May 2022, the period within which
the Provincial Conference was to be held. That resolution was
endorsed by the NEC in March 2022.
[12]
On 16 May 2022, national officials recommended to the NWC that the
period within which the election of the
PEC must be held should be
extended to August 2022, subject to the submission of monthly
progress reports. The NEC, on 4 July 2022,
noted this report and
‘supported’ the proposal for the extension.
[13]
The IPC thereafter issued a notice calling a Provincial Conference to
be held from 12 to 14 August 2022.
On 13 August 2022, the appellants,
being of the view that the IPC’s term of office had terminated
upon the expiry of the
nine-month period and that they therefore did
not have authority to conduct elections, launched urgent proceedings
in the high
court challenging the entitlement of the IPC to exercise
voting rights at the Provincial Conference. The high court (per
Snyman
J) granted an order declaring that ‘the first respondent
[the IPC did] not have voting powers in the ANC Provincial
Conference’.
[14]
The ANC resolved not to appeal against that judgment and instead of
appointing another IPC, the Secretary-General
at the time, Mr Paul
Mashatile (Mr Mashatile), issued a statement to the effect that the
Provincial Conference would proceed under
the direction and
leadership of NEC deployees. It is common cause that the Provincial
Conference was postponed for two weeks, whereafter
it proceeded as
planned and elections were held where a new PEC was elected. As
mentioned, the appellants then launched the application
(which is the
subject of this appeal) challenging the validity of those elections
and the resolutions adopted at the impugned Provincial
Conference.
Legal
principles
[15]
The appeal raises two issues:
(a)
whether the IPC had authority to call the Provincial Conference when
it did. Implicit in this
issue is the proper construction of
rule
12.2.4
of the ANC constitution; and
(b)
whether the NEC was empowered by the ANC constitution to take control
of the elections at the
Provincial Conference. This issue also
implicates various rules of the ANC constitution.
[16]
Since both these issues involve the interpretation of the ANC
constitution, it is prudent, at this point,
to give an overview of
our law regarding the construction of the constitutions of voluntary
associations.
[17]
It is established law that the constitution of a voluntary
association, together with all the regulations
or guidelines
promulgated in terms thereof, constitute the agreement between the
association’s members.
[2]
The constitution must,
therefore, be interpreted in accordance with the canons of
interpretation applicable to contracts.
[3]
[18]
In
Ramakatsa
and Others v Magashule and Others
,
[4]
the Constitutional Court,
in interpreting certain rules in the ANC’s constitution, held
that while political parties may not
adopt constitutions which are
inconsistent with s 19 of the Constitution,
[5]
that section ‘does
not spell out how members of a political party should exercise the
right to participate in the activities
of their party. For good
reason this is left to political parties themselves to regulate.
These activities are internal matters
of each political party.
Therefore, it is these parties which are best placed to determine how
members would participate in internal
activities. The constitutions
of political parties are the instruments which facilitate and
regulate participation by members in
the activities of a political
party.’
[6]
[19]
While recognising the important role of political parties in the
country’s democratic processes, the
Constitutional Court
nevertheless emphasised that, ‘[t]he ANC’s constitution
together with the audit guidelines and
any other rules collectively
constitute the terms of the agreement entered into by its members.
Thus, the relationship between
the party and its members is
contractual. It is taken to be a unique contract.’
[7]
[20]
The relevant rules of the ANC constitution must, therefore, be
construed based on the principles enunciated
in
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (Endumeni).
[8]
They must thus be given
meaning and business-like efficacy by having regard to: ‘the
language used in the light of the ordinary
rules of grammar and
syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent
purpose to which it is directed and the material
known to those
responsible for its production’.
[9]
The starting point being the language used, ‘read in context
and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background
to the preparation and production of the document’.
[10]
Interpretation
of rule 12.2.4
The
appellants’ contentions
[21]
As mentioned, the appellants contended that the peremptory injunction
in rule 12.2.4 for the election of
a dissolved PEC to be called
within nine months from the date of dissolution, means that upon
expiry of that period, being 29 April
2022, the IPC’s term of
office had lapsed automatically. For this submission they,
inter
alia
, relied on the
ex tempore
judgment of Snyman J,
in which she held that ‘the word shall implies that there is no
discretion that could be exercised
and that the provisions, as
applied in the constitution should be followed’.
[22]
They also criticised the high court for its reliance on
Pilane
for the finding that there can never be ‘a
lacuna
where
the term of office of a council has expired, to avoid lack of good
governance’. They contended that the judgment is
distinguishable in various respects.
[23]
Regarding the various resolutions adopted by the NEC, purporting to
extend the IPC’s term of office,
the appellants submitted that:
(a)
the first resolution, adopted in March 2022, purported to extend the
IPC’s term of office
until 31 May 2022. The IPC did, however,
not call the Provincial Conference by the end of May 2022. Its term
of office would therefore,
in any event, have expired automatically
on 1 April 2022; and
(b)
the resolution adopted during July 2022 did not purport to extend the
IPC’s term of office
but only ‘the period within which
the election of the North West PEC must be held’. There was,
therefore, in effect,
no valid resolution of the NEC extending the
IPC’s term of office to the end of August 2022. Consequently,
when the IPC gave
the notice of the Provincial Conference to be held
in August 2022, its term of office had already expired, and the
notice was thus
invalid and of no force or effect.
The
respondents’ contentions
[24]
The respondents contended that on a correct interpretation of rule
12.2.4, the IPC remained in office and
retained their authority
despite the expiration of the nine months within which elections for
a new PEC should have been held.
For this submission, they relied on
the principle enunciated in
Ex
Parte United Party Club
,
[11]
that even in the face of an obligation in the constitution of a
voluntary association requiring office bearers to retire, it does
not
necessarily mean that if they do not retire, they are no longer in
office and lose their authority.
[25]
They submitted that it is significant that while the rule specifies a
mandatory obligation for the IPC to
call the elections within nine
months, it does not stipulate what the consequence of an overshoot
would be. The consequences contended
for by the appellants are absurd
and impractical. They would leave the provincial structure rudderless
and would undermine good
governance. Since the consequence of a
failure to call the elections within nine months is nowhere specified
in the rule, it is
a matter for interpretation based on the
above-mentioned canons of construction, so they argued.
The
NEC’s role at the Provincial Conference
The
appellants’ contentions
[26]
The appellants condemned the NEC’s decision to take over the
conduct of the elections Provincial Conference
in the strongest
terms, calling it variously a ‘hostile takeover’ and
‘usurpation’ of the PEC’s constitutional
powers.
This argument was founded on the provisions of rule 17.1 of the ANC
constitution, which reads as follows:
‘
17.1
Subject to the decisions of the National Conference and National
General Council, and the overall guidance of the NEC, the
Provincial
Conference shall be the highest organ of the ANC in each province.’
[27]
The appellants contended that it is clear from the language used in
this rule that the PEC is ‘the
rightful structure authorized to
constitute and run the affairs of a Provincial Conference’.
Furthermore, the ANC constitution,
in particular rules 17.2.2.5 to
17.2.2.8, unequivocally confer on the Provincial Conference the
power,
inter alia
, to appoint the preparatory committee which
must circulate Conference material in advance; determine the
procedure for the election
of delegates; determine its own procedures
in accordance with democratic principles and practices; vote on key
questions by secret
ballot if demanded by a least two-thirds of the
delegates; and vote for the election of the PEC by secret ballot.
[28]
At best for the NEC, it is empowered in terms of rule 10.7 of the
guidelines issued in terms of the ANC constitution
to ‘deploy
NEC members to support and observe Regional and Provincial
Conferences’. However, the role of these NEC
deployees is
limited to support and observer status only.
[29]
The decision of Mr Mashatile or the NEC to take over the powers and
functions of the PEC at the Provincial
Conference, under the
direction and leadership of the NEC deployees, was therefore not
sanctioned by the ANC constitution and is
accordingly unlawful.
Although the ANC is a voluntary association, courts have recognised
that the exercise of internal power by
political parties may have
far-reaching consequences for our constitutional democracy.
[12]
Insofar as the conduct of
the NEC is found to conflict with the Constitution, this Court is
obliged to set it aside in terms of
s 172(1)
(a)
of the Constitution. That
section provides that ‘when deciding a matter within its power,
a court must declare that any law
or conduct that is inconsistent
with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.’
The consequences of
the NEC’s unlawful conduct, namely the
election of a PEC and other officials and committees, are also
accordingly invalid,
of no force or effect, and fall to be set aside.
The
respondents’ contentions
[30]
The respondents joined issue with this interpretation of the ANC
constitution and submitted that rule 12.2
places an obligation on the
NEC to ensure the democratic functioning of the provincial
structures. That rule must be read with
rule 12.2.20 which empowers
the NEC to, ‘[t]ake all steps necessary or warranted for the
due fulfillment of the aims and
objectives of the ANC and the due
performance of its duties’.
[31]
They argued that the NEC, having been confronted with Strydom J’s
order declaring that the IPC did
not have power to exercise voting
rights at the conference, was obligated – in the exercise of
its constitutional mandate
– to take whatever steps may be
necessary to facilitate the holding of the elections. They submitted
that the appellants’
stance that the NEC should have appointed
another IPC to hold the elections is illogical. Another IPC would not
have been an elected
structure. There is accordingly no difference
between the NEC holding the elections and it appointing another
IPC for that
purpose. On a common sense and purposive interpretation
of the ANC constitution, there can be little doubt that the NEC was
obligated
to intervene to ensure that the Provincial Conference took
place, so the respondents argued.
Analysis
and discussion
[32]
Counsel for the ANC compellingly submitted that on a reasonable
consideration of the language used in rule
12.2.4, an IPC’s
term of office is linked to ‘the period of the suspension or
the dissolution of the PEC’ and
not to the nine-month period in
which elections for the new PEC must be called. On this
interpretation, an IPC’s term of
office would not terminate
upon the expiry of the nine-month period but would endure until the
election of a new PEC. It seems,
to me, that this must logically be
so since circumstances beyond the control of either the IPC or the
NEC may arise making it impossible
to call elections within the
nine-month period. The Covid-19 pandemic was such a circumstance. It
is common cause that the ANC
was forced to postpone all conferences
after the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic which compelled the
declaration of a national
state of disaster on 15 March 2020. This
event was unprecedented in the history of humankind and resulted in
severe restrictions
being placed on the movement of people,
gatherings and conduct of businesses, unless they were performing an
essential service.
[33]
In my view, rule 12.2.4 provides for such an unprecedented
force
majeure
,
by imposing on the NEC the duty to appoint an interim structure
‘during the period of the suspension or the dissolution
of the
PEC’. It is ineluctable that that period starts on the day of
the suspension or dissolution of the PEC and endures
until the
election of a new PEC. On this construction, an IPC’s term of
office would continue regardless of whether it had
been able to call
for the election of a new PEC within nine months. This construction
also accords with the principle enunciated
in
Ex
Parte United Party Club.
[13]
Contrary to the
appellants’ contentions, that judgment is still good law and
has been followed in several cases.
[14]
[34]
There are other compelling reasons why this construction must be
preferred above that contended for by the
appellants. On a plain
reading of its text, rule 12.2.4 confers powers and obligations on
the NEC to ‘[e]nsure that the [p]rovincial,
[r]egional and
[b]ranch structures of the ANC and the [l]eagues function
democratically and effectively’. There can consequently
be
little doubt that the overall context of the rule is the preservation
of good governance, prevention of chaos, and promotion
of democracy
in the provincial structures.
[35]
It would be incongruous to interpret the rule as meaning that an
overshoot of the nine-month period, even
for good reason (such as the
Covid-19 lock-down), would result in the expiration of the interim
structure’s term of office.
That such an interpretation would
have serious consequences for good governance in the provinces is
self-evident. In any event,
that construction is simply not consonant
with either the text, context or purpose of the rule.
[36]
I therefore find that, on a reasonable interpretation of rule 12.2.4,
the IPC was still in office until 13
August 2022 (when Strydom J’s
order was granted) and it was thus constitutionally empowered to call
the Provincial Conference.
The issue as to whether the various
resolutions adopted by the NEC had the effect of extending the IPC’s
term of office is
therefore rendered inconsequential, regardless of
whether the NEC was of the view that there was a need for those
extensions.
[37]
The finding that the IPC remained in office until Strydom J declared
it ineligible to exercise voting powers
at the Provincial Conference,
considerably weakens the appellants’ argument that the NEC’s
involvement in the Provincial
Conference violated the ANC
constitution. The logical consequence of that finding is that the
Provincial Conference had been convened
properly. Faced with Strydom
J’s order, the NEC was constitutionally obligated – in
the absence of either an appointed
or elected provincial structure –
to take whatever steps may have been necessary to ensure that the
elections proceeded.
In my view, it matters not that they elected to
do so through their own deployees, instead of appointing another IPC.
This is so
because in terms of rule 12.2.20, the NEC has wide-ranging
powers to ensure ‘the due fulfilment of the aims and objectives
of the ANC and the due performance of its duties’.
[38]
The purpose of this rule, which is often replicated in the
constitutions of voluntary associations,
is to empower the highest
structure of an association to intervene in its best interest when
the need arises because of unforeseen
events. In this case, those
unforeseen circumstances were the declaration of a national state of
disaster and Strydom J’s
order. In deciding to proceed with the
elections, the NEC was doing no more than what the ANC constitution
enjoined it to do. Apart
from the assertions that the conference had
not been properly convened and that the NEC’s conduct amounted
to ‘a hostile
takeover’ of the Provincial Conference,
there is no suggestion that anything untoward happened at the
conference. The high
court thus correctly found that the NEC’s
actions did not violate the ANC’s constitution.
[39]
The appeal must, therefore, fail. In my view, there is no reason why
costs should not follow the result.
Order
[40]
In the result, I make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed
with costs, including the costs of two counsel where so employed.
J E
SMITH
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
the appellants:
A
D Stein SC with A S L van Wyk
Instructed
by
Zisiwe
Attorneys, Mahikeng
Webbers
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
the first respondent:
L
J Morison SC
Instructed
by:
Ntanga
Nkuhlu Inc, Honeydew
Peyper
& Botha Attorneys Inc., Bloemfontein
For
the second and third respondents:
W R
Mokhare SC with N Ntingane
(Drafted
heads of argument)
Instructed
by:
SM
Vakalisa Attorneys, Midrand
Maduba
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For
the fourth to sixth respondents:
A
Sawma SC with M Salukazana
S
Pearl Ndaba Attorneys, Pretoria
Muller
Gonsior Attorneys, Bloemfontein.
[1]
Pilane
and Another v Pheto and Others
(582/2011)
[2011] ZANWHC 63
(30 September 2011) para 18.
[2]
Turner
v Jockey Club of South Africa
1974
(3) SA 633
(A) at 645C;
Natal
Rugby Union v Gould
[1998] ZASCA 62
;
1999
(1) SA 432
(SCA);
[1998] 4 All SA 258
(A) at 440F-G.
[3]
National
African Federated Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Others v
Mkhize and Others
[2014]
ZASCA 177
;
[2015] 1 All SA 393
(SCA) para 21.
[4]
Ramakatsa
and Others v Magashule and Others
[2012]
ZACC 31; 2013 (2) BCLR 202 (CC).
[5]
Section 19 of the Constitution reads as follows:
‘
Every
citizen is free to make political choices, which includes the right
– (a) to form a political party; (b) to participate
in the
activities of, or recruit members, for a political party; and (c) to
campaign for a political party or cause.’
[6]
Ibid
para 73.
[7]
Ibid
para 79.
[8]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[2012]
ZASCA 13
;
[2012] 2 All SA 262
(SCA);
2012 (4) SA 593
(SCA) para 18.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
E
x
Parte United Party Club
1930
WLD 277.
[12]
Ramakatsa
and Others v Magashule and Others
[2012]
ZACC 31
;
2013 (2) BCLR 202
(CC);
My
Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Ohers
[2015] ZACC 31
;
2016 (1)
SA 132
(CC);
2015 (12) BCLR 1407
(CC) para 32.
[13]
Ex
parte United Party Club
1930
WLD 277.
[14]
Padayichie
v Pavadai N.O. and Another
1994
(1) SA 662
(W) at 672F-G;
Congress
of the People and Another v Shilowa and Others
(6779/2011) [2013
ZAGPJHC 250 (18 October 2013).
sino noindex
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