Case Law[2023] ZASCA 77South Africa
Media 24 (Pty) Ltd v Nhleko and Another (109/22) [2023] ZASCA 77 (29 May 2023)
Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
29 May 2023
Headnotes
Summary: Civil procedure - application for leave to amend plea - dismissal based on wrong principles of law - appeal upheld.
Judgment
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## Media 24 (Pty) Ltd v Nhleko and Another (109/22) [2023] ZASCA 77 (29 May 2023)
Media 24 (Pty) Ltd v Nhleko and Another (109/22) [2023] ZASCA 77 (29 May 2023)
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sino date 29 May 2023
THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 109/22
In the matter between:
MEDIA
24 (PTY) LTD
APPELLANT
And
NKOSINATHI
NHLEKO
FIRST
RESPONDENT
DR NONCEBO
MTHEMBU
SECOND RESPONDENT
Neutral
citation:
Media 24 (Pty) Ltd v
Nhleko & Another
(Case no 109/22)
[2023] ZASCA 77
(29 May 2023)
Coram:
NICHOLLS, GORVEN, HUGHES and GOOSEN JJA and
UNTERHALTER AJA
Heard
:
This appeal was disposed of without an oral hearing in terms of
s
19
(a)
of
the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
.
Delivered
:
29 May 2023
Summary:
Civil procedure - application for leave
to amend plea - dismissal based on wrong principles of law - appeal
upheld.
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Western Cape Division of
the High Court, Cape Town (Thulare J, sitting as court of first
instance):
1
The appeal is upheld.
2 The order
of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘
1
The applicant is granted leave to amend its plea within ten days of
this order.
2
The respondents are liable to pay the costs on an attorney client
scale.’
JUDGMENT
Nicholls JA (Gorven,
Hughes and Goosen JJA and Unterhalter AJA concurring)
[1]
This appeal concerns the dismissal of an
application to amend a plea. On 27 November 2016, Media 24 (Pty) Ltd
(Media 24) published
an article on the front page of the City Press
Newspaper, under the heading ‘Nhleko’s R30 m
blessing.’ The
article stated that Mr Nkosinathi Nhleko (Mr
Nhleko), who was the Minister of Police at the time, had been
‘implicated for
signing off millions of rands for work done by
his love interest – and for going all out to reinstate charges
against Ipid
head Robert McBride.’ The love interest was a
reference to his partner, Dr Nomcebo Mthembu (Dr Mthembu), who
according
to the article, ‘scored more than R30 million for
providing services which the police ministry officials claim that
they
could have received for free.’ The article stated that the
police ministry paid R30.8 million to Indoni, the non-profit
organisation
run by Dr Mthembu.
[2]
Mr Nhleko and Dr Mthembu sued for
defamation claiming R15 million each, for damages which they
allegedly suffered. Media 24
admitted the publication of the article
but denied the meaning attributed to it, and that it was defamatory.
In the alternative,
Media 24 pleaded that it had established the
defences of (a) truth in the public interest; (b) protected comment;
and (c) reasonable
publication.
[3]
In response to the plea, Mr Nhleko and Dr
Mthembu filed a
rule 30A
notice, in terms of the uniform rules of
court, objecting to the plea on the grounds that it constituted a
bare denial, it was
evasive, and did not clearly and concisely state
the material facts on which Media 24 relied for its defence. It was
further alleged
that the plea did not answer the point of substance
and did not comply with the uniform rules of court. In order to
address some
of the objections, Media 24 filed a notice of intention
to amend its plea. Again, an objection was raised in which it was
asserted
that the proposed amendment was an ‘elaborate lie with
the sole purpose of misleading the court’ and was an ‘insult
to the integrity and intelligence’ of Mr Nhleko and Dr Mthembu.
It was contended that Media 24 had failed to justify statements
in
the article. This led Media 24 to bring an application for leave to
amend. This was opposed.
[4]
The Western Cape Division of the High
Court, Cape Town (high court), per Thulare AJ, after an extensive
analysis of the pleadings
and the objection, stated that the case was
premised on two points, namely the role, if any, played by Mr Nhleko
in regard to the
payment of more than R30 million, and the payment
itself. The court then went on to conclude that ‘[t]his mast of
direct
involvement of [Mr Nhleko] hoisted in the article, in giving
Indoni the work, appear to have been blown away by the winds of a
change of front by [Media 24] in its plea.’ The high court
found that the ‘bleeding edge’ of the article was the
payment to his love interest, whilst the ‘chase’ was the
payment and Media 24 had failed ‘to cut to the chase’.
[5]
The
high court gave the following order:
‘
(a)
Leave to effect the amendment to the Applicant’s plea on the
furnished particulars of amendment as envisaged in this notice
of
motion is not authorized.
(b) The Applicant is
granted leave to make consequential adjustments to the furnished
particulars of amendment of the plea as envisaged
in this notice of
motion.
(c) The Applicant is
granted leave to deliver its consequential adjusted particulars of
amendment of the plea within twenty (20)
days of this order.
(d) The Applicant to pay
the costs, including costs occasioned by any consequential adjusted
particulars of the plea.’
[6]
The high court granted leave to appeal to
this Court. Mr Nhleko and Dr Mthembu have not participated in
the appeal. Their attorneys,
as did those of Media 24, indicated that
they had no objection to the matter being disposed of in terms of
s
19
(a)
of
the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
, without an oral hearing.
[7]
In its judgment granting leave to appeal to
this Court, the high court stated that the substantive issue was
whether Media 24 could
plead a bare denial in a defamation case
involving an admitted publication of an alleged payment in the first
page headline of
a leading Sunday paper. It explained its reasoning
thus in paragraphs 11 and 12:
‘
In
my view, a bare denial should not be a form of gatekeeping by the
applicant, a mass media player in the arena of public communication.
In the circumstances, there is a duty to publicly justify a mass
publication, for the applicant to remain a trusted and legitimate
source of public information and an authoritative source of
information. Media 24 should not be allowed to be a fundamental
problem
for society by being what appears to be a springboard and
source for the scope, spread and reach of misinformation, especially
against the State or its functionaries. There is no doubt that
reports about corruption, especially by our political leaders, affect
the confidence of our people in the political system and our
democracy. Fake news about our democratic institutions and players
are a threat to the stability of our nation and should not be
tolerated by all peace loving South Africans and their friends.
It is necessary that it
becomes clear whether Media 24 is not party of any group who thrive
on fake news for ideological purposes
and the advancement of a
political campaign and agenda, as the respondents harbour. When the
time to account for its headlines
comes, Media 24 cannot become
voiceless in substance. Media 24 cannot be a utility that control the
view of the people [of] South
Africa by facilitating what appears to
be misinformation and play dumb when confronted. To curb fake news
and misinformation, transparency
is not only a need but a mandate.
Those reported on, and those reported to, have a legitimate
expectation to the data upon which
the applicant relied when it
reported on the country’s leader. This is simply because
democracy envisages engaged participation
by informed and thoughtful
voters. The applicant cannot evade judicial scrutiny by refusing the
judicial light to streak in its
dark corner of fact checking.’
[8]
The
high court misunderstood what a defendant in a defamation action is
required to plead. In the first instance, it should be understood
that it is not the article itself which has to be justified, but the
defamatory statements that are alleged to have been published.
The
first hurdle a defendant has to overcome is whether the words
attributed to it are defamatory, and then only those portions
of the
article that are alleged to be defamatory need to be dealt with in
the plea. A defendant has no duty to plead to allegations
that do not
form part of the pleaded defamation. Once a publication is shown to
be defamatory, a presumption of wrongfulness then
arises and the onus
is on the defendant to rebut it by showing that its publication was
justified. A media defendant who cannot
establish the truth of a
defamatory statement, may rely on the reasonableness of the
publication as a defence.
[1]
The
defendant must allege and prove that it had reason to believe the
truth of the statement and took reasonable steps to verify
its
correctness. Therefore, its publication was reasonable in the
circumstances.
[9]
Whether a plea constitutes an impermissible
bare denial will depend upon what averment is being dealt with. A
plea to what is alleged
to be defamatory will require no more than a
denial unless a special meaning or sting is alleged. A defence of
justification may
require some elaboration because where the onus
rests on a party it must allege the facts on which the defence rests.
[10]
In its unamended plea, Media 24 denied that
the statements had the defamatory meaning attributed to them;
alternatively it put up
the justification that the article was true
or substantially true; that the publication thereof was in the public
interest; that
the article was published in the good faith belief of
its truthfulness; and, that it was reasonable to do so. Media 24 was
satisfied
that no more was required, but introduced the amendment in
order to obviate any interlocutory skirmishes that may arise as a
result
of the notice of objection. It therefore sought to amend its
plea by amplifying the denials and fleshing out its original plea.
[11]
The
high court characterised the inquiry as one in which Media 24 had to
justify the allegations in the article and whether it had
run a front
page story relying on ‘false Ministry corridors’ gossip’
regarding an alleged payment. The high court
formulated the question
thus: ‘Are you a gossip monger driving publicity stunts or a
professional news reporter?’
[2]
It concluded that from Media 24’s plea ‘. . . one does
not know if it had or did not have any money trail to ground
its
truth.’ Therefore, it held that Media 24’s case was
ambiguous, vague, evasive and lacking clarity and the amended
plea
did not facilitate the proper ventilation of the true dispute between
the parties.
[12]
Media 24 was required to plead to
allegations made in the particulars of claim. It was not obliged to
verify or justify the allegations
made in the article that were not
pleaded to constitute the defamation. The amended plea made various
admissions as well as providing
details of the denials and the basis
for them, where appropriate. Where the particulars of claim contained
allegations which were
irrelevant to the main issue, a bare denial of
these was not objectionable.
[13]
Instead of focusing on the pleaded case
before it, the learned judge based his findings on his personal
interpretation of the article
and what he believed the issue should
be, namely the role of the media in a democratic society. He
concluded that the judiciary
has ‘a responsibility to seek
solutions which enhance a conversation, or information exchange
between equals, in pleadings
before them . . .’. This being so,
‘a bare denial should not be a form of gate keeping a mass
media player in the arena
of public communication’. To grant
the amendment would therefore be ‘highly prejudicial’ to
Mr Nhleko and Dr
Mthembu whose position would be made worse by the
proposed amendment as they would be no closer to determining what
role Mr Nhleko
played in facilitating the R30 million payment to
Indoni.
[14]
It is difficult to understand how there
could be any prejudice to the plaintiffs by the proposed plea, which
merely sought to amplify
the denials in the original plea. Again,
this finding was based on an incorrect understanding of the defences
to a defamation action
and the nature of a plea. The allegations
concerning Mr Nhleko’s role in facilitating the payment to
Indoni, are not
allegations in the particulars of claim to which
Media 24 was obliged to respond.
[15]
The far reaching utterances of the high
court on the role of the media and the judiciary are completely
misplaced. By pleading a
bare denial to the allegation of defamation,
in these circumstances, the litigant was not attempting to ‘evade
judicial scrutiny’.
It is at the trial that these denials will
be tested, not in the pleadings.
[16]
In
coming to its conclusion to refuse the application for amendment, the
high court paid scant regard to the purpose of pleadings,
which is to
define the issues between the parties. Because the primary role of
pleadings is to ensure that the real dispute between
litigants is
adjudicated upon, courts are loathe to deny parties the right to
amend their pleadings, sometimes right up until judgment
is granted.
An exception is made when the amendment is
mala
fides
or will result in an injustice which cannot be cured by a costs
order.
[3]
Thus, the power of a
court to refuse amendments is confined to considerations of prejudice
or injustice to the opponent.
[17]
Even
where an amendment has led to the re-opening of a case, this has been
allowed where the reason was the state of the pleading
rather than
deliberate conduct on the part of an applicant.
[4]
Prejudice has been found to occur only in situations where the
opponent is worse off than he was at the time of the amendment,
for
example the withdrawal of an admission can have a detrimental effect
in certain circumstances. The fact that an amendment may
lead to the
defeat of the other party is not the type of prejudice to be taken
into account.
[5]
Here the court
refused the amendment because it did not go into sufficient detail.
That could only be a ground for objection if
it fails to comply with
the rules as to pleadings or is otherwise excipiable.
[18]
It is not for the courts to impose their
views as to the true nature of the case. It is the pleadings, and the
pleadings alone,
that define and determine the issues upon which the
court will adjudicate. The sole requirement of the application for
amendment
was to ensure that the plea advanced encapsulates the
defence to the particulars of claim, not to the article itself. As
has often
been stated by our courts, it is the
facta
probanda
that must be pleaded, not the
facta probantia
.
A litigant is not required to prove its case in the pleadings, nor to
describe the evidence to be led, but to state the material
facts on
which it relies and which it intends to prove at the trial.
[19]
Trial courts are reminded that an adherence
to the fundamental principles of pleadings should be observed and
parties should be
allowed to ventilate their case as they determine,
within the bounds of these well understood principles.
[20]
It is necessary to comment on the
appealability of the order. In the first place, this order is
predicated on entirely incorrect
principles of law and cannot be
allowed to stand. In the second place, it is not clear whether the
order is enforceable or indeed
what would constitute compliance with
the order. The order requires Media 24 to answer a different case
from that which was pleaded
and to address allegations which were
contained in the article rather than the particulars of claim. To
refuse the application
to amend would deprive Media 24 of the
opportunity of advancing its defence and as such would be final in
effect. Such an outcome
would be entirely at odds with parties’
right to litigate on the issues as they see them, and not those
identified by the
court.
[21]
As regards the costs of the application for
amendment, these are usually borne by the applicant. In this matter,
Media 24 sought
punitive costs on an attorney own client scale on the
basis that the objection was reckless and vexatious. It is evident
that some
of the allegations in the notice of objection went beyond
what is reasonably acceptable. For example, it was alleged that the
application
to amend had been sought to mislead the court, the public
and the plaintiffs; that Media 24 had lied to the court and was using
the amendment to defeat the ends of justice and was using the rules
of court as a ‘cover up’ for its unlawful conduct
and
‘dirty tricks campaign’; it was an attempt to ‘bully
the plaintiffs into abandoning their claim’. The
proposed
amendments were described as ‘a desperate attempt to clutch on
straws’ in an attempt to justify its unlawful
conduct. These
intemperate and ill-founded remarks are deserving of censure. That
they appear to have secured some unwarranted
endorsement from the
high court does not render the conduct any less problematic. In the
circumstances, a punitive costs order
is justified against the
respondents in the high court application. Since the respondents did
not oppose the appeal, it is appropriate
that no costs order be made
in respect of the appeal.
[22]
The following order is made:
1
The appeal is upheld.
2 The order
of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘
1
The applicant is granted leave to amend its plea within ten days of
this order.
2 The respondents
are liable to pay the costs on an attorney client scale.’
________________________
C HEATON NICHOLLS JA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
Appearances
For
appellant:
S
Budlender SC
Instructed
by:
Willem
De Klerk Attorneys, Johannesburg
Honey
Attorneys, Bloemfontein
[1]
National
Media Ltd and Others v Bogoshi
1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA); [1998] 4 All SA 347 (A).
[2]
This was a translation in the high court judgment of the Setswana
expression: ‘O Maratahelele kgotsa o Mmegadikgang’.
[3]
Moolman
v Estate Moolman
1927 CPD 27
at 29. This principle has been confirmed in numerous
cases including the constitutional court in
Affordable
Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another
[2005] ZACC 3
;
2006 (3) SA 247
(CC);
2005 (6) BCLR 529
(CC) para 9.
[4]
Myers
v Abramson
1951(3) SA 438 (C) at 450A-B.
[5]
GMF
Konstrakteurs EDMS (BPK) and Another v Pretoria City council
1978 (2) SA 219
(T) at 226D;
[1978] 2 All SA 407
(T) at 411;
Trans
Drakensberg Bank Ltd (Under Judicial Management) v Combined
Engineering
(Pty)
Ltd and Another
1967 (3) SA 632
(D).
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