Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 787South Africa
Sithole v Road Accident Fund (2024/052535) [2025] ZAGPJHC 787 (8 August 2025)
Headnotes
Summary: Rule 18(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court requires all pleadings to be signed by both an attorney and an advocate. Section 19 of the Road Accident Fund Act stipulates that a claim may only be instituted and prosecuted by an attorney and certain state employees. Advocates with trust accounts cannot sign pleadings on their own nor may they institute and prosecute Road Accident Fund claims.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Sithole v Road Accident Fund (2024/052535) [2025] ZAGPJHC 787 (8 August 2025)
Sithole v Road Accident Fund (2024/052535) [2025] ZAGPJHC 787 (8 August 2025)
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sino date 8 August 2025
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case
Number:2024/052535
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:YES
(3)
REVISED: YES
In the matter between-
Bangiwe Phikisile
SITHOLE
Plaintiff
And
Road Accident
Fund
Defendant
Summary: Rule 18(1) of
the Uniform Rules of Court requires all pleadings to be signed by
both an attorney and an advocate. Section
19 of the Road Accident
Fund Act stipulates that a claim may only be instituted and
prosecuted by an attorney and certain state
employees. Advocates with
trust accounts cannot sign pleadings on their own nor may they
institute and prosecute Road Accident
Fund claims.
JUDGMENT
[1]
This matter was set down on the RAF default
judgment roll for the 5
th
August 2025. Whilst preparing for the hearing of the matter it became
clear that both the summons and particulars of claim were
signed by
adv N Sikhakhane (with a Trust Account) and that the proposed draft
order that had been uploaded onto CaseLines contained
the following:
“
The aforesaid sum shall be paid
directly into the Trust Account of Applicant’s Advocate (with
Trust Account) of record ADVOCATE
NDLOVUKAZI SIKHAKHANE, details of
which are as follows: …”
[2]
I caused a note to be uploaded onto
CaseLines and which read as follows:
“
This
matter may not be removed from the roll. Counsel to prepare written
Heads of Argument why, in light of the decision in Segole
v Road
Accident Fund (16923/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC
(Segole)
the claim should not be dismissed and
adv Sikhakhane be referred to the LPC.”
[3]
The
Segole
judgment is a judgment of the Honourable Millar, J
and which was handed down on the 21
st
July 2025.
[4]
At the time of uploading the CaseLines note
there was no indication who would be appearing for the plaintiff at
the hearing of the
matter.
[5]
Adv Sikhakhane appeared for the plaintiff
when the matter was called on Tuesday 5
th
August 2025 and after addressing the court on her
“
displeasure”
at the tone and wording of the CaseLines note,
made some submissions to the court which may be summarised as
follows:
She declined to adhere to
the court’s directive to prepare written Heads of Argument
because:
a) by asking her to
prepare and submit Heads of Argument the court had prejudged the
matter and was biased;
b) She was in possession
of a letter from the Legal Practice Council (LPC) permitting her to
accept instructions from the public
to prosecute Road Accident Fund
(RAF) claims. Adv Sikhakhane attempted to hand up the letter from the
Bar but I declined to accept
it as it is not proper to proffer
evidence from the Bar.
[6]
I advised her that the issues were serious
and the matter could not properly be ventilated without giving her an
opportunity to
make considered written submissions to the query
raised in the CaseLines note. Adv Sikhakhane’s attitude
remained that she
declined to make any written submissions as this
court had prejudged the matter and she had a letter from the LPC. No
point would
have been served to debate the matter any further and the
next matter was called.
[7]
Adv Sikhakhane appears to have had a change
of heart and on 6 August 2025 at 15:47 her written Heads of Argument
was uploaded to
CaseLines. The essence of the argument contained in
these Heads of Argument is that; to the extent that Adv Sikhakhane
had sought
and obtained a letter from the LPC entitling her, as an
advocate with a trust account to represent RAF claimants and lodge
claims
on their behalf, she had done nothing wrong.
[8]
In addition to the above the Heads of
Argument makes out an argument that it was the intention of the Legal
Practice Act that all
practitioners should be equal and that, as
such, she was entitled to do the work of an attorney.
[9]
The argument concludes with a submission
that the Uniform Rules of Court are only Rules, which are trumped by
the Legal Practice
Act.
[10]
The
crux
of the
Segole
judgment appears from the following extracts
thereof:
“
[8]
Firstly, section 19 of the RAF Act provides that liability on the
part of the respondent is excluded in certain cases.
Section
19(c) and (d) provide that the respondent is not liable:
“
(c)
if the claim concerned has not been
instituted
and
prosecuted
by the third party, or on behalf of the third party by-
(i)
any
person entitled to practice as an attorney within the Republic; or
(ii)
any
person who is in the service, or who is a representative of the state
or government or a provincial, territorial or local authority;
or
(d)
where the third party has entered into an agreement with any person
other than the one referred
to in paragraph (c)(i) or (ii) in
accordance with which the third party has undertaken to pay such
person after settlement of the
claim-
(i)
a
portion of the compensation in respect of the claim; or
(ii)
any
amount in respect of an investigation or of a service rendered in
respect of the handling of the claim otherwise than on instruction
from the person contemplated in paragraph (c)(i) or (ii);”
[9]
Since the LPA came into operation on 1 November 2018, there are three
categories within which a legal practitioner may be admitted
and
practice. The first and second being an attorney and a referral
advocate. The third is a category introduced by
the LPA –
is that of a trust account advocate.
[10]
Section 34 of the LPA describes each of the three categories:
“
(1)
An attorney may render legal services in expectation of any fee,
commission, gain, or reward as contemplated
in this Act or any other
applicable law, upon receipt of a request directly from the public
for that service.
(2)(a)
An advocate may render legal services in expectation of a fee,
commission, gain or reward as contemplated in this Act
or any other
applicable law –
(i)
upon
receipt of a brief from an attorney; or
(ii)
upon receipt of a request directly from a member of the public or
from a justice centre for that
service, subject to paragraph (b).
(b)
An advocate contemplated in paragraph (a)(ii) may only render those
legal services, rendered by
advocates before the commencement of this
Act as determined by the council in the rules, if he or she –
(i)
is
in possession of a Fidelity Fund certificate and conducts his or her
practice in accordance with the relevant provisions of chapter
7,
with particular reference to sections 84, 85, 86 and 87;”
[1]
“
(ii)
Has notified the council thereof in terms of section 30(1)(b)(ii)”
[2]
.
…
..
[14]
The role of an attorney is clearly defined in the Rules, and these
set out and maintain the traditional separation of roles
that existed
before the LPA came into operation. If one has regard to the
definitions contained in rule 1, it is readily apparent
that the
traditional separation of roles is maintained and is in harmony with
section 34(2)(b). There is simply no room to argue
that a trust
account advocate is entitled to assume the role of both an attorney
and an advocate. Both the LPA and the Rules unequivocally
prohibit
such a course of conduct.
[15] In consequence of
the fact that the further steps in the prosecution of the claim have
not been taken by either the applicant
or an attorney, no liability
can attach to the respondent in consequence of such steps.
Advocate Zitha is not an attorney.
Section 34(2)(b) of the LPA
Act specifically prohibits trust account advocates in his position
from doing the work previously done
by an attorney as provided for in
section 19(c)(i) of the RAF Act.
…
.
[17]
Since the liability of the respondent is excluded in the event of a
non-compliance with section 19(c)(i) of the RAF Act, the
application
for default judgment must in consequence of that non-compliance be
refused.
…
.
[20] Advocate Zitha
does not appear to have considered the provisions of rule 18(1) which
requires that particulars of claim are
to be signed by both an
attorney and an advocate and simply signed the amended particulars
off himself.
[11]
I agree with with the assessment of the
court in the
Segole
matter.
[12]
In casu
,
the letter from the Legal Practice Council, authorising Adv
Sikhakhane to act on behalf of claimants against the RAF, would
clearly
be
ultra vires
the
wording of the RAF Act and it would have been beyond the powers of
the author to give it, in light of the clear wording of the
RAF Act.
To the extent that the Legal Practice Council had done so, it had
clearly exceeded its powers.
[13]
In the
Segole
matter the original summons and particulars of
claim had been properly issued and it was only a later amendment to
the particulars
of claim which had been signed by the trust advocate
alone.
In casu
the
position is different as it is the original summons and particulars
of claim that had been signed by adv Sikhakhane as a trust
advocate.
[14]
Rule 18(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court
reads as follows:
(1)
A combined summons, and every other
pleading except a summons, shall be signed by both an advocate and an
attorney or, in the case
of an attorney who, under section 4(2) of
the Right of Appearance in Courts Act, 1995 (Act 62 of 1995), has the
right of appearance
in the High Court, only by such attorney or, if a
party sues or defends personally, by that party.
[12] The Rule had
not been amended and accordingly there is no provision in the Uniform
Rules of Court for a trust account
advocate to sign pleadings alone.
In light of the wording of Rule 18(12) Adv Sikhakhane’s signing
of the summons and particulars
of claim on her own would constitute
an irregular step.
[13]
The extract quoted from the
Segole
judgment confirming the division of rights and
obligations between attorneys and advocates addresses the comments in
the plaintiff’s
submissions adequately.
Ex
abundanti cautela
it may be added that
if the true intention was that advocates with trust accounts should
be able to perform the work of attorneys,
it would have been a
requirement that they complete the same two years of articles of
clerkship which prospective attorneys are
required to do and to write
the same admission exams. A legal graduate may become an advocate
(without being a member of a Bar
association) simply by bringing an
application in the High Court. This option has never been available
for legal graduates who
wish to practice as attorneys.
Order
[15]
Having heard counsel for the plaintiff, I
grant an order which reads as follows:
a.
The application for default judgment is
refused.
b.
The Registrar is ordered to transmit a copy
of this judgment to the Legal Practice Council, Gauteng in light of
the finding that
they exceeded their mandate and authority by issuing
letters confirming that advocates with trust accounts may institute
and prosecute
Road Accident Fund claims.
D F Weideman
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
Heard:
5 August 2025
Delivered: 8 August
2025
APPEARANCES:
Applicant’s
counsel: Adv. N Sikhakhane
Applicant’s
Attorneys: None
Respondent:
None
[1]
Sections
84 to 87 set out the obligations of legal practitioners relating to
the handling of trust monies, applications for and
the issue of
fidelity fund certificates, the operation of trust accounts and
accounting in respect of such accounts.
[2]
Section
30(1)(b)(ii)
requires
the practitioner to notify both the court and the legal practice
council whether there is the intention, in the case
of an advocate,
to practice with or without a Fidelity Fund certificate.
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