Krugersdorp Spiritual Church v Mcnab (054285/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1104 (29 October 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1104 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Krugersdorp Spiritual Church v Mcnab (054285/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1104 (29 October 2025) Krugersdorp Spiritual Church v Mcnab (054285/2024) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1104 (29 October 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1104.html sino date 29 October 2025 # IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA # GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO :  054285/2024 DATE :  2025-10-29 (1)  REPORTABLE: NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3)  REVISED DATE: 29 October 2025 In the matter between KRUGERSDORP SPIRITUAL CHURCH                 Applicant and STEWART MCNAB                                             Respondent JUDGMENT EX TEMPORE WILSON J : This is an application for an extraordinary range of relief which can be categorised as follows.  First, there is the relief in paragraph 1 of the notice of motion in which the respondent, Mr Mcnab, is directed to return various documents and other material said to have come into his possession when he was an officer of the applicant, the Krugersdorp Spiritualist Church. Paragraph 2 is, with the exception of paragraph 2.6, an order that directs Mr Mcnab to curtail his expressive or associational conduct. Paragraph 2.6 is an order restraining Mr. McNab from threatening, harassing or intimidating the applicant. The problem with the relief claimed in paragraph 1 is that there is not one shred of evidence on the founding papers that Mr Mcnab is in possession of any of the documents I am asked to direct that he returns. Nor is there any factual or legal basis laid for the proposition that he is under an obligation to do so.  He may have the documents.  He may be under an obligation to return them.  The problem is that the deponent to the founding affidavit does not say so.  For that reason, I cannot grant any of the relief in paragraph 1. Paragraph 2, insofar as it seeks to restrain Mr Mcnab’s associational or expressive conduct, is not competent at law.  A case must be made out that a prior restraint on expressive or associational conduct is necessary on the facts before me, and that a damages claim brought in due course will not be sufficient to vindicate the applicant’s rights.  No such case is made out in the founding affidavit, and so a prior restraint cannot be granted. Paragraph 2.6 cannot be granted because the underlying conduct said to constitute threatening, intimidating, harassing, or victimising behaviour is not specified in the founding affidavit. In the circumstances, the application must be dismissed.  It is, of course, open to the applicant to bring a fresh application alleging specific conduct which it would be lawful to restrain Mr Mcnab from carrying out.  But this is not that application. I make the following order: [1]  The application is dismissed. [2]  Each party will pay their own costs. WILSON J JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT 29 October 2025 sino noindex make_database footer start