H.A.C v S.L.M (Leave to Appeal) (18281/2021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1333 (7 November 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1333 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## H.A.C v S.L.M (Leave to Appeal) (18281/2021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1333 (7 November 2025) H.A.C v S.L.M (Leave to Appeal) (18281/2021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1333 (7 November 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1333.html sino date 7 November 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO: 18281/2021 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NO DATE: 07 November 2025 In the matter between: H[...], A[...] C[...] Applicant And S[...], L[...] M[...] Respondent Summary: Application for leave to appeal - s17(1)-Superior Court Act 10 of 2013. Court a quo misdirected itself. Reasonable and legitimate and compelling grounds for success. The different Court to come to a different conclusion. In casu, the said requirements were not satisfied and application dismissed. LEAVE TO APPEAL NTLAMA-MAKHANYA AJ [1]  This is an application for leave to appeal certain orders that were made by this Court in the main judgment which was delivered on 19 June 2025 to be considered by the Full Court bench or by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The application is opposed by the Defendant who was the Applicant in the main trial and was represented by her Legal Representative. The Applicant, who was the Defendant in the main trial and as is the case in this application, represented himself as he characterised himself as a lay person. [2]  The application was lodged in terms of section 17(1) of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013. [3]  The application is opposed by the Defendant. Grounds for appeal [4]  In this case, the grounds of appeal are broadly set out in the notice of appeal read together with the Heads of Arguments. The Applicant contended that this Court misdirected itself in both facts and law. The Applicant made no further oral submissions at these proceedings to substantiate the grounds of appeal as he exclusively relied on his Heads of Arguments. The Court gave him the right to reply but was firm in his position not to counter-argue the response against the grounds raised by the Defendant. [5]  The grounds are narrowly focused on the following orders as they appear in the main judgment to the exclusion of all others: [45.1]  The Defendant is to make payment of an amount of R2 988 639.00 (two million nine hundred and eighty-eight thousand six hundred and thirty-nine) to the Plaintiff . [45.2]  The Defendant is to make payment of interest of the amount of R2 988 639. 00 to the Plaintiff at the prescribed rate from the date of demand to the date of payment. [45.3]  The Plaintiff and Defendant's joint ownership in the timeshare units, namely the Magalies Park Two Shareblock Ltd and Champagne Valley Shareblock, is ordered to be terminated within 30 days of this Order. [45.4]  The Defendant is directed to sign all documentation, inclusive of a Power of Attorney, required in order that the timeshare units may be marketed and sold. [6]  The Applicant is of the view that this Court did not apply its mind to the facts and law relating to the valuation of the assets before the date of divorce: 7 March 2019. According to him, this constituted unfair treatment, mistakes in law, injustices and that a different court would come to a different conclusion. In essence, the Applicant put before this Court the version of being a “victim” of unfair treatment which amounted to an injustice in the application of the law. [7]  On the other hand, the Defendant opposes the application for leave to appeal. The content of the opposition was broadly argued that the application had no prospect of success within the framework of section 17(1) of the Superior Act 10 of 2013. The Defendant, other than the written submissions in support of the main judgment, elaborated on the grounds in opposition to the application of leave to appeal. [8]  It is imperative that I consider the legal principles that are applicable in this matter. Legal framework and analysis [9]  This Court is not to reproduce the legal framework and its substantial analysis regarding the prospects of success in an application for leave to appeal. Section 17(1) of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013 is a sharpened legal instrument that sets out the essential principles that are foundational to the application for leave to appeal. The said section provides: (1)(a)  Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion that: (i)  the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or (ii)  there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration”. [10]  It is evident that courts may exercise their judicial discretion to grant leave to appeal on two grounds. First on “reasonable prospects of success”. Secondly, if there are “existing compelling reasons” for granting such an application. This provision has set the highest standard in the consideration of the applications for leave to appeal. The substance of such standards is to limit any potential to overburden the courts with unmerited applications that do not have reasonable prospects success. [11]  The jurisprudence, that serves as precedent setting, has given meaning to the test that determines the merits in granting the application for leave to appeal. Smith J in Valley of the Kings Thaba Motswere (Pty) Ltd v Al Mayya International [2016] ZAECGHC judgment at para 4 held: “ the test for leave to appeal is now more onerous. The intention clearly being to avoid our courts of appeal being flooded with frivolous appeals that are doomed to fail. […] It would, in my respectful view, be unreasonably onerous to require an applicant for leave to appeal to convince a judge – who invariably would have provided extensive reasons for his or her findings and conclusions – that there is a “measure of certainty” that another court will upset those findings. It seems to me that a contextual construction of the phrase “reasonable prospect of success” still requires of the judge, whose judgment is sought to be appealed against, to consider, objectively and dispassionately, whether there are reasonable prospects that another court may well find merit in arguments advanced by the losing party.” [13]  This Court is persuaded by Smith J in that it had objectively analysed and assessed the submitted evidence and reached finality in the adjudication of this matter. It is again required to assess its own reasonableness regarding its own findings in respect of the dispute in question. It is worth mentioning that this Court is expected not only to delve into the “reasonableness principle of the prospects of success” but to first, conduct a self-evaluation exercise in the interpretation and application of the law into the facts in dispute. The self-assessment is an indication that this Court “fell flat” in considering the merits of the case, hence the application to further prove at the different court that matter was meritorious save for the misapplication of the law by the court a quo . [14]  Accordingly, this Court had brought finality into this matter because it had reasonably considered the facts and the law in the resolution of the dispute. The granting of the leave to appeal does not entail a “mere” constitution of a prolonged finalisation of the matter. The Applicant must explicitly state the rationality and legitimacy of the grounds of appeal which may consequently be decided differently by another court. As further expressed by Schippers AJA in MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha [2016] ZASCA 176 at para 17 held: “ applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper grounds that there […] are sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal.” [15]  In this case, the Court finds difficulty in reproducing the factual and legal issues that were canvassed at the main trial to justify its order whilst the same argument raised in this application was interrogated at length in the said judgment. The Applicant submitted that this Court erred in the findings of facts regarding the disbursements of assets before the dissolution of the marriage. According to the Applicant, the Court’s findings led to an incorrect conclusion regarding the division of the joint estate at date of dissolution of marriage: 7 March 2019. [16]  It is the considered view of this Court the Applicant misplaces the principle of the “division of the joint estate”. The division is undertaken at date of divorce, which is 7 March 2029 and not at the time before the dissolution of the marriage. At the date of divorce, all the assets have been collected and evaluated to determine the share of each party in the net assets. The claim in this matter was to give effect on the Defendant’s share which was to be paid by the Applicant. Further, the grounds of appeal are interdependent with the grounds that are not subject of this application. The excluded grounds cannot be interpreted independently from the entire order as they constitute a common goal towards the fulfilment of the claim as ordered in the main judgment. The Applicant, indirectly, confirms his obligation to pay the Defendant the amount due, thus, it is the view of this Court that this application amounted to a delay in finalising this matter. [17]  This Court, having fully considered the grounds of appeal, is of the opinion that they do not constitute any legitimate and compelling reasons in fulfilling the requirements of section 17(1) of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013. Further, it would be a fruitless exercise to grant the appeal that would negatively impact on the limited judicial resources. It would also not justify any reverting to the issues that were properly analysed and decided in the main judgment. This Court is therefore not persuaded that a different court would come to a different conclusion. [18]  The Defendant sought costs on a punitive scale of attorney and client scale whilst the Applicant sought the costs of the suite. This Court exercises its judicial discretion in the awarding of the cost order as it appears below. [19]  Accordingly, the following order is made: [19.1]  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed. [19.2]  The costs are granted on a party and party scale on Scale B and costs of one Counsel where so employed. N NTLAMA-MAKHANYA ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT JOHANNESBURG Delivery: This judgment is issued by the Judge whose name appears herein and is submitted electronically to the parties /legal representatives by email. It is also uploaded on CaseLines, and its date of delivery is deemed 07 November 2025 . Date of Hearing: 30 October 2025 Date Delivered : 07 November 2025 Appearances: Applicant: In person Counsel for the Defendant: Advocate M Abro Instructing Attorneys :                                     Shardlow Attorneys sino noindex make_database footer start