Case Law[2025] ZAGPJHC 1166South Africa
Lesedi Investment Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Sikhakhana and Others (2023/106751) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1166 (17 November 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
17 November 2025
Headnotes
the function of a well-founded exception is "to dispose of the case in whole or in part" and thereby "to avoid the leading of unnecessary evidence at the trial." It is a mechanism for judicial efficiency, designed to resolve legal disputes at the pleading stage. [6] Critically, an exception is a pleading. The distinction between a procedural notice and a pleading is dispositive in this matter. In Hill NO and Another v Brown[2], the court provided essential clarity. It held:
Judgment
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## Lesedi Investment Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Sikhakhana and Others (2023/106751) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1166 (17 November 2025)
Lesedi Investment Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Sikhakhana and Others (2023/106751) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1166 (17 November 2025)
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sino date 17 November 2025
THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: 2023-106751
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED:
DATE:
17/11/2025
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
LESEDI
INVESTMENT PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD
First
Applicant
TLADI
THABISO PUWANE
Second
Applicant
And
COLLETT
DUDUZILE SIKHAKHANA
First
Respondent
VALERIE
NTSADI SIMONE
Second
Respondent
ROAS
ISMAIL AHMED
Third
Respondent
NOMPUMELELO
ESTER MADONSELA
Fourth
Respondent
BUKHOSI
ALPHEUS XIMBA
Fifth
Respondent
MEMENG
DOROTHY MATSETELA
Sixth
Respondent
BRIJH
DEWCHARAN
Seventh
Respondent
EPHY
JOYCE BUSISIWE SHEMBE
Eighth
Respondent
LUCUS
TSHABATSHABA TSHETLO
Ninth
Respondent
JUDGMENT
NKOENYANE
AJ:
Introduction
[1]
This is an interlocutory application that turns on a fundamental
point of procedure.
The First and Second Applicants (the Defendants
in the main action) seek condonation for the late delivery of a
document dated
the 3
rd
of April 2024, which they style an
"Exception." The Respondents (the Plaintiffs in the main
action) seek an order striking
out that document and dismissing the
condonation application, contending that the Defendants are barred
from pleading.
[2]
The procedural history is largely common cause. The Plaintiffs issued
combined summons
in late 2023. After the Defendants filed a notice of
intention to defend, the Plaintiffs served a notice of bar on the
25
th
of March 2024. On the 3
rd
of April 2024,
the last day of the bar period, the Defendants delivered the impugned
document. No further steps were taken until
the Defendants launched
this application for condonation on the 16
th
of January
2025.
Issues
for Determination
[3]
The following issues fall for determination:
3.1.
Whether the Defendants' application for condonation should be
granted.
3.2.
Whether the document dated the 3
rd
of April 2024
constitutes a valid notice of exception.
3.3.
If not, what the consequences are.
The
Legal Framework: The Nature of an Exception
[4]
The starting point is the Uniform Rules of Court. Rule 23(1) permits
a party to deliver
an exception where a pleading is vague and
embarrassing or lacks necessary averments. Rule 23(3) requires that
the grounds for
the exception be "clearly and concisely stated."
[5]
The fundamental nature of an exception was succinctly articulated in
Barclays
National Bank Ltd v Thompson
[1]
.
Van Heerden JA held that the function of a well-founded exception is
"to dispose of the case in whole or in part" and
thereby
"to avoid the leading of unnecessary evidence at the trial."
It is a mechanism for judicial efficiency, designed
to resolve legal
disputes at the pleading stage.
[6]
Critically, an exception is a pleading. The distinction between a
procedural notice
and a pleading is dispositive in this matter. In
Hill NO
and Another v Brown
[2]
,
the court provided essential clarity. It held:
6.1.
An exception is a pleading and, like a plea, "a properly drawn
exception concludes with
a prayer for relief" (at para [4]).
6.2.
A notice in terms of Rule 23(1)(a), which affords an opponent an
opportunity to remove a cause
of complaint, is "simply that, a
notice." It is a precursor to a potential exception, not the
exception itself, and it
"claims no relief" and "does
not call for adjudication" (at para [6]).
6.3.
Consequently, a Rule 23(1)(a) notice "is not a proper response"
to a notice of bar
issued in terms of Rule 26. To avoid being barred,
a defendant must deliver a "pleading," which is either a
plea or a
formal exception (at para [8]).
Analysis
A.
The Condonation Application
[7]
The Defendants seek condonation for the late "setting down of
the exception"
and the "non-delivery of a formal
exception." The test for condonation is trite and requires a
consideration of the degree
of lateness, the explanation offered, the
prospects of success, and the prejudice to the other party.
[8]
The Defendants' explanation that their counsel was not informed of a
hearing date
is unconvincing. It does not adequately explain the
extensive delays in this matter, particularly the failure to
timeously deliver
a proper pleading in response to the notice of bar
and the subsequent inertia. The Plaintiffs' contention that the
Defendants'
conduct is dilatory and tactical is not without merit.
[9]
Most significantly, and for reasons that will become apparent, the
defendants have
no prospects of success on the merits of their
underlying case. A complete absence of prospects is fatal to any
application for
condonation. It follows, therefore, that the
application for condonation must be dismissed.
B.
The Validity of the 3 April 2024 Document
[10]
I turn now to the core of the dispute. The document delivered on the
3
rd
of April 2024 is divided into two parts. Part A
alleges no cause of action, and Part B alleges that the particulars
of claim are
vague and embarrassing. Crucially, the document affords
the Plaintiffs "a 15-day courtesy period" to remove the
cause
of complaint and contains no prayer for relief.
[11]
Applying the binding authority of
Hill NO
, this
document is not an exception. Its defining characteristic is that of
a Rule 23(1)(a) notice. By providing an opportunity
to amend and by
omitting a prayer for the relief of striking out the pleading, it
fails to meet the essential requirements of a
pleading. It is, at
best, a nullity in the context of being a response to a notice of
bar.
[12]
It follows that this document did not constitute a valid response to
the plaintiffs’ notice
of bar. The defendants were therefore
duly barred from delivering their plea upon the expiry of the bar
period on the 3
rd
of April 2024.
C.
The Substantive Grounds of Exception
[13]
Even if I were wrong on the procedural points which I am not and that
the document in question
could properly be regarded as a valid
exception, its substantive grounds would nonetheless fail. On any
assessment, the exception
lacks merit.
13.1.
Unquantified Damages:
The Defendants argue that the
Plaintiffs' claim for damages is vague and embarrassing because
paragraph 42 of the particulars of
claim states the quantum "cannot
reasonably be quantified" before claiming specific amounts. This
argument misunderstands
Rule 18(10).
13.2. As held in
Minister
van Wet en Orde v Jacobs
[3]
,
the Rule requires only such particulars as would enable the defendant
"to estimate the quantum," not to verify its correctness.
The Plaintiffs have pleaded a specific global amount and detailed the
factual basis for the loss (unlawful ejection, demolition,
loss of
income). This is sufficient for the purpose of Rule 18(10).
13.3.
Derivative Action:
The Defendants' contention that the
Plaintiffs requires leave to bring a derivative action under section
165 of the Companies Act
is misconceived. The Plaintiffs' claims, as
pleaded, are brought in their personal capacities as shareholders for
damages suffered
due to alleged fraudulent conduct, not on behalf of
the First Defendant.
13.3.
Restoration
of Property (Prayer 6):
The Defendants correctly cite
Tswelopele
Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane
[4]
for the principle that the
mandament
van spolie
is aimed at the restoration of physical control, "not its
reconstituted equivalent." However, they err in characterising
Prayer 6 as a pure spoliation claim. The Plaintiffs' cause of action
is multifaceted, including claims for declaratory relief and
damages.
Prayer 6 can reasonably be interpreted as a claim for final relief,
such as specific performance, flowing from their other
causes of
action, and is not excipiable on the narrow ground advanced.
Conclusion
[14]
The Defendants’ application for condonation is dismissed. The
document dated 3 April 2024
does not constitute a valid exception and
is accordingly struck from the record. Having failed to deliver
either a plea or a valid
exception in response to the notice of bar,
the defendants remain barred from doing so.
[15]
The Defendants' approach has been procedurally flawed from the outset
and has served to delay
the resolution of this matter. In these
circumstances, the Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs on a
punitive scale.
Order
[16]
The following order is made:
1.
The Applicants' application for condonation is dismissed.
2.
The document dated the 3
rd
of April 2024, purporting to be
a notice of exception, is struck out.
3.
The Applicants are ordered, jointly and severally, the one paying the
other to
be absolved, to pay the Respondents' costs of this
application on the scale as between attorney and client.
NKOENYANE
AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Date
of Hearing: 12 August 2025
Date
of Judgment: 17 November 2025
Appearances:
For
the Plaintiffs/Respondents:
Adv.
TJ Magano
Instructed
by:
Cornelius
JM Attorneys
For
the Defendants/Applicants:
Adv.
LF Taljaard
Instructed
by:
Mmakola
Matsimela Inc.
[1]
1989
(1) SA 547
(A) para 19
[2]
[2020]
ZAWCHC 61
[3]
1999
(1) SA 944
(O) at 953B-C (often cited as 952I–953E)
[4]
2007
(6) SA 511
(SCA) at para [24]
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