Higgs v Angor Property Specialists (Pty) Ltd and Others (2024/126226) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1228 (21 November 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1228 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Higgs v Angor Property Specialists (Pty) Ltd and Others (2024/126226) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1228 (21 November 2025) Higgs v Angor Property Specialists (Pty) Ltd and Others (2024/126226) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1228 (21 November 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1228.html sino date 21 November 2025 FLYNOTES: CIVIL PROCEDURE – Subpoena duces tecum – Irregular step – Demanded extensive due diligence documentation and other records – Cannot be issued at instance of a party in motion proceedings unless authorised by a court order – Subpoena was an irregular step because no court order authorised its issue in motion proceedings – Intention that subpoena should have full effect reinforced prejudice – Subpoena duces tecum set aside as an irregular step – Uniform Rule 6(5)(g). REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG Case Number: 2024-126226 (1) REPORTABLE: NO (2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO (3) REVISED: NO 21 NOVEMBER 2025 In the matter between: ADELE FOURIE HIGGS Applicant and ANGOR PROPERTY SPECIALISTS (PTY) LTD First Respondent TIFFANY REID Second Respondent SHEENA DELTOUR Third Respondent JUDGMENT This judgment and the order incorporated herein is handed down electronically by circulation of the electronically signed document to the respondents’ legal representatives and to the applicant by e-mail, and by uploading a copy hereof to CourtOnline. Moultrie AJ : [1] This is a Rule 30(2) application brought by the respondents (the managing agent and two trustees of a sectional title scheme) in the context of pending motion proceedings that the applicant (the owner of a unit in the scheme) initially instituted on 4 November 2024. The applicant is a litigant-in-person. Since her initial notice of motion sought wide-ranging interdictory relief and damages from all three respondents but was unsupported by an affidavit, they delivered a Rule 6(5)(d)(iii) notice on 6 November 2024 contending, inter alia that the applicant had failed to disclose any cause of action against them. [2] Apparently dissatisfied with the respondents’ failure to respond on oath to her application, the applicant proceeded to procure and deliver what purports to be (and what the respondents accept to be) a “subpoena duces tecum ” issued by the Registrar of this Court on 25 November 2024. The document bears what appears to be the stamp of the Registrar on each page, and reads as follows: SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM TO SATISFY THE APPLICATION UNDER THE NOTICE OF MOTION ISSUED IN THE FOLLOWING TERMS WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE BUSINESS DAYS. 1. That the Applicant cannot fully satisfy the Court with a Full Finding Affidavit to illustrate the irregularities to the court based on the financial matters; 2. That the Respondents are hereby placed under duress to provide the due diligence documentation that have been requested by the Applicant for the period of 5 (eight) years. 3. Due diligence Bank Statements and detailed accounting amounts vs charges are not on record; 4. Until the Respondent’s can prove otherwise the account to be rectified in it’s full forms as requested by the Applicant and the full refund to effect; The refund is in in terms of the domestic affluent charges to be refunded to the Applicant; The added maintenance fee. 5. That the First Respondent to withdraw with urgency the Matter in the Magistrates Court pertaining to the Issued Summons, this to be recorded as irregular and set out in the full finding affidavit. 6. That the Applicant to satisfy the Court with her full finding Affidavit upon receipt of the due diligence documents: - 6.1 Police Clearance of all Trustees 6.2 Nominations ·of the Trustees by the Applicant; 6.3 Clear Credit Records by the Trustees; 6.4 Bank Statements; 6.5 Affidavits to satisfy that there are no procurement gains from the Trustees; 6.6 Competence and due diligence by the First Respondent to the Trustees in so far as: 6.6.1 Due diligence training and adequate understanding of by-laws; 6.6.2 Right to movement and Constitutional Rights of residence; 6.6.3 Clear due diligence and proof thereof that the Trustees always act in the best interest of the residence in so far as: 6.6.4 Ensuring due diligence for adequate parking and a freedom  to exit without fear and/or favour. 6.6.4   Animal rights; 6.6.5 Children's Rights in terms of the Child Protection Act 6.6.6 Due diligence training and understanding to: 6.6.1 Noise levels during business hours due to changes from 2020, that most residence work from home and to ensure no interference are made by any of the Trustees. [3]  It is this document that the respondents seek to have set aside as an irregular step in the current application. They also seek condonation for their non-compliances with the time periods set out in Rule 30 for the delivery of the required notice and the application itself in the period between December 2024 and January 2025. Enrolment, scheduling and format of the hearing [4] During April 2025, the attorneys representing all of the respondents at the time (Otto Krause Inc.) sought the enrolment of the Rule 30 application for hearing as an opposed interlocutory application. [1] It was set down by the Registrar in the opposed motion court for the week commencing on 17 November 2025. [5] Having been allocated to hear the matter by the senior motion court judge and invited to the Caselines hearing bundle, I perused the uploaded papers on the morning of Sunday, 26 October 2025 . I then scheduled the hearing for 11h30 on Monday, 17 November 2025 in open court, [2] and communicated this by means of a “widely-shared” note, which I uploaded to the hearing bundle. [6] The applicant uploaded a number of documents to the hearing bundle between 12h35 and 16h16 that afternoon. For current purposes, the most relevant of these was an “amended notice of motion” and a founding affidavit in which only the second respondent was cited as a respondent. [3] Although these documents had been filed via the CourtOnline registry on 29 September 2025 and it was not suggested to me that any of the respondents had formally objected to their delivery. [4] Notably, paragraph 3 of the amended notice of motion seeks an order to “[c]ompel the Respondent to address the subpoena issued by the registrar”. [7] Amongst the further documents uploaded to the hearing bundle by the applicant on 26 October 2025 was an email that she had sent at 14h53 copying Biccari Bollo Mariano Inc., who had in the meantime delivered a notice indicating their appointment as her attorneys of record (and who subsequently also came on record as attorneys for the third respondent). [5] In this email, the applicant contended that the pursuit of the Rule 30 application and its scheduling for hearing on 17 November 2025 was irregular because it relates to “an old matter … which was replaced”, but nevertheless insisted that “your client” [6] should respond to “the court issued subpoena” that had been issued prior to the amendment of the notice of motion. [7] [8] On 30 October 2025, Otto Krause Inc. uploaded a “unilateral practice note” signed by Mr McTurk “for the first respondent”, reiterating that it was the Rule 30 application (as opposed to the main application, presumably as amended) that had been set down for my determination. [8] [9]  A t approximately 10h00 on 31 October 2025, I had my first opportunity to consider a direction that had been issued to all judges’ secretaries by this Court’s Office Manager the previous day, directing them to institute a “bundle freeze” as a matter of course upon inviting the allocated Judge to an opposed motion unless otherwise directed by the judge concerned. I instructed my secretary to implement the bundle freeze and shortly thereafter uploaded a further widely-shared note to the hearing bundle indicating that I had noted the documents uploaded on 26 and 30 October 2025 and advising the parties of the implementation of the bundle freeze. [10] Despite this, the applicant managed to upload a number of documents to the hearing bundle between 12h16 and 12h17. [9] These included: a. a document entitled “notice of removal of first and third respondents” filed at 11h51 stating that those “Parties were removed as per the Motion”; [10] and b. a document entitled “notice of intention to oppose Respondent’s application dated 17 November 2025 – Special Interlocutory trial roll for the Condonation and Late Filing of the Application” filed at 11h52 , responding to the practice note delivered on behalf of the first respondent, in which she emphasised that she had “clearly amended the parties” in the amended notice of motion dated 29 September 2025 and contended that “it is unclear why the removed Applicants will suddenly apply after ten months”, [11] but nevertheless continued to complain that the subpoena requiring “the respondents” to produce information “was simply ignored”. [11] In the second of these documents, the applicant objected to the scheduling of the matter in open court, on the basis that “in no way shape or form can the Applicant attend in-person at the High Court, Johannesburg in Person due to matters which is not relevant to this hearing, and the Applicant can explain to the Registrar and/or any representative of the Court same in a closed circuit Environment with a member of the South African Police Service in my presence”. [12] However, I have not been furnished with any evidence that the applicant has been placed under “witness protection” in terms of s 10 of the Witness Protection Act, 112 of 1998 , nor have I been advised of the terms of the “protection agreement” that would be required by s 11 thereof. No cognisable reason was suggested by the applicant as to why her attendance at court for the purposes of the hearing of the Rule 30 application might “endanger her safety” as contemplated in s 11(4)(b)(v) of the Act. There was furthermore no explanation as to why a legal representative could not be appointed to represent the applicant at the hearing– at least for the simple purpose of explaining the basis of the objection to its format and potentially seeking a postponement on that basis. In the circumstances, the allocation indicated in my widely-shared notes and provisionally allocated roll (which had been published in the ordinary way, including by email directly to the applicant on 27 October 2025) remained unaltered in my final allocated roll, which was subsequently published in the usual way and sent to the applicant via email at 14h55 on Friday, 7 November 2025. [12] On Sunday, 9 November 2025, the applicant addressed a letter to Otto Krause Inc., the second respondent herself (but not any attorney from BBM Inc.), various officials in the Department and Ministry of Justice, the Legal Practice Council, the Registrar of this court and it’s Court Manager and my secretary in which she alleged “irregularities … pertaining to the upload of the documentation”, [13] and continued to assert that the Rule 30 application had been improperly set down for hearing. [14] [13] On Friday, 14 November 2025, the applicant copied my secretary on an email addressed to BBM Inc. referring to the delivery of their further notice of appointment as attorneys of record for both the second and third respondents earlier that day, [15] again contending that the matter had been set down incorrectly, and seeking to take the point that BBM Inc. had “ not uploaded your formal appearance” on the hearing bundle. [14] Finally, on the afternoon of Sunday, 16 November 2025 (i.e. the day before the duly enrolled and scheduled hearing of the Rule 30 application), the applicant managed to upload further documents to the hearing bundle, [16] including a document entitled “Counter claim and draft order”, [17] in which she sought inter alia the following relief from the second respondent: a. the dismissal of the Rule 30 application [18] with costs “to the applicant on an attorney/client scale”; [19] b.  orders requiring her to produce documentation within three days “ to the court”, including a “ response to the Subpoena Issued by the … Registrar of this Court [which] to my knowledge and the State’s knowledge has not been withdrawn ” [emphasis supplied]; c.  an order dissolving the Body Corporate of the sectional title scheme and requiring it “to be handed over to a Competent party being the Applicant”; and d. an order referring “the second attorney” to the Legal Practice Council for investigation. [20] [15] As proof of service of her counter claim, the applicant uploaded an email to the hearing bundle addressed to the second respondent and her attorneys (again copied to a variety of court and law enforcement officials). [21] [16] There can thus be no doubt that, when the matter was called in open court at the scheduled date and time, the applicant was aware of the enrolment, allocation, scheduling and format of the hearing of the Rule 30 application. Despite this, she was not present or represented by a legal practitioner to oppose the relief sought by the respondents or motivate for the relief sought in her counter claim. [22] [17] In the circumstances, and given the discretionary nature of the relief sought by the respondents, [23] I requested Mr McTurk, who confirmed that he had been briefed to appear on behalf of all of the respondents (albeit by two different sets of attorneys) to address me on the merits of their application, Condonation [18] While Mr McTurk fairly described the explanation for the respondents’ non-compliances with the time periods provided for in Rule 30 as “ not as adequate as one would appreciate ” , these delays were relatively short and are, in my view, insignificant given what I consider to be the strong merits of the Rule 30 application. [24] For the further reasons set out below, I am also of the view that the interests of justice would be served by granting condonation in respect of the delays. [25] Irregular step [19] The respondents impugn the subpoena solely on the basis that the main proceeding (even as amended) is a motion and not a trial, and because subpoenas may not be issued at the instance of a party in motion proceedings. Although this is not strictly correct – a subpoena might be issued in the context of an order made by the Court in terms of Rule 6(5)(g) [26] – no such order has been sought or granted in this instance. I thus agree that the subpoena was an irregular step. Prejudice [20] With regard to prejudice, I put it to Mr McTurk that the subpoena might simply be regarded as a nullity in the absence of an order under Rule 6(5)(g). It seems to me, however, that this is not the case, given that the applicant clearly intends that it should have “ the effect which it would have had if it had complied with the Rules” [27] – at least in relation to the second respondent, in view of the prayers sought in her “amended” notice of motion. [21] While the prejudice to the first and third respondents of allowing the subpoena to stand is slightly less obvious in view of the amendment of the applicant’s notice of motion, those persons were most certainly “respondents” at the time when it was issued, and the “response statement” that the applicant filed in March 2025 indicated that her intention at that stage was still that they should be forced to comply with it. And even if I were to assume that the first and third respondents ceased to be “parties” to the motion proceedings when the applicant delivered her amended notice of motion in September 2025 (judging by the various documents delivered by the applicant subsequent to the enrolment, this seems to lie at the ‘heart’ of her contention that the Rule 30 application should be dismissed) that would be irrelevant since a subpoena issued in motion proceedings may be enforced against a non-party. [28] [22]  In the circumstances, I am satisfied that all of the respondents would be prejudiced should the subpoena be allowed to stand. Discretion [23]  I can conceive of no reason why I should exercise my discretion to decline to set the irregular subpoena aside. In my view, doing so would throw the motion proceedings into further disarray and potentially cause great disruption in the efficient disposition of the applicant’s suit. It is trite that while “ the rules are not an end in themselves to be observed for their own sake ” … … [t]hey are provided to secure the inexpensive and expeditious completion of litigation before the courts and where one or other of the parties has failed to comply with the requirements of the rules or an order made in terms thereof and prejudice thereby being caused to the opponent, it should be the court’s endeavour to remedy such prejudice in a manner appropriate to the circumstances, always bearing in mind the objects for which the rules were designed. [29] Conclusion and costs [24]  In sum, I am prepared to grant the condonation sought by the respondents and conclude that the subpoena falls to be set aside as an irregular step. [25] There is no reason to depart from the ordinary rule that the costs should follow the result. As to the scale of costs, the respondents sought party and party costs, including the costs of counsel on scale “B”. However, the Rule 30 application is on its face a simple one. While the manner in which the applicant responded to it, particularly by amending her notice of motion in an apparent effort to exclude two of the respondents but continuing to include relief specifically aimed at compliance with the irregular step itself, probably rendered it more complex than it ought to have been, I don’t think that this justifies departing from the default position of awarding costs on scale “A”. [30] [26]  I do, however, wish to add a note of caution for the application. While I recognise that she is self-represented, and while I am prepared to accept that the irregular step might initially have been borne out of excusable legal ignorance, her conduct since the enrolment of the Rule 30 application indicates no recognition that she might (even potentially) have been mistaken. To the contrary, she ‘doubled-down’ and proceeded in a high-handed manner, unjustifiably questioning the authority of the court, unfairly placing court staff under pressure and inappropriately seeking to involve third parties, including senior judges and law enforcement officials. She also declined without any proper explanation to take the opportunity of attending the hearing to explain her approach, leaving me to attempt to understand her conduct, which can at best be described as unorthodox, in its best possible light. Should this kind of conduct continue, it is likely to disrupt the orderly disposition of her own suit, and might well be taken into consideration by a court when determining the award of costs therein. [27]  I grant the following order: a.  The late delivery of the respondents’ Rule 30 notice and application is condoned; b.  The subpoena duces tecum dated 25 November 2024 is set aside as an irregular step; c. The applicant is ordered to pay the respondents’ costs, including the costs of counsel on scale “A”. RJ MOULTRIE ACTING JUDGE Heard :                   17 November 2025 For respondents :   S McTurk instructed by Otto Krause Inc. (for the first respondent) and by Biccari Bollo Mariano Inc. (for the second and third respondents). For applicant :         No appearance. [1] The applicant had in the meantime filed an unsigned and unsworn “response statement” on 19 March 2025. [2] This is the “default mode” for the hearing of opposed motions in terms of the applicable Practice Directive. [3] The complete relief sought in the applicant’s amended notice of motion against the second respondent is as follows: “1. Compel the Respondent to Produce the due diligence accounting for the Trustee (nominated as the longest standing Trustee) as set out in the Applicant's Founding Affidavit; 2. Costs on an attorney and client Scale to the relevant State Entity; 3. Compel the Respondent to address the Subpoena issued by the Registrar; 4. Compel the Applicant to address the outstanding issues as set out in the Affidavit, being proof of payment to the relevant State Entity and adherence to extended maintenance plan; 5. FICA documents, and Power of Attorney over the account and permission to make financial decisions, charge interest (as a non registered entity); 5. Court to establish competency; 6. Respondent to refrain from using the Trust funds to defend legal actions brought against her; 7. Respondent to provide a reason why the Financials are not available; 8. Proof of Payment to the relevant State Entities; 9. Permissions obtained pertaining solicitation of services by a third party; Attorney; 10. Permissions obtained to change the Managing Agent; 11. Permissions and details obtained for ownership of the Exclusive use area for unit one; 12. Lawful and accurate readings of water and electricity readings; 13. Other infringements to be addressed; 14. As the Respondent had previously agreed to receive all correspondence pleadings and Notices in writing, for her to refrain from entering other forms of litigation and using a state entity being the Sheriff of the High Court, to serve any documents and/or and using any instrument of the State to divert from the merits of the matter, the e-mail address and caselines of the Applicant is on record; 15. The Respondent to produce these records to all the owners as requested in numerous communications during the past 8 (eight years); 16. Procurement due diligence and confirmation that no financial gains are made by any procurement process; 17. The Respondent is not permitted to approach nor use any entity of the State and more so an Instrument of the Court, as all the case numbers are on record, the Respondent and/or any Trustees and or an party is not permitted to be near the Respondent, her vehicles, her assets, in person, to approach and or receive any correspondence unless directed via the state and come within the public and/or State property and assets, which remain state assets, and not so deemed by the Trustees themselves (as in, assets of the state) within 100 meters of the physical properties and the person and or any persons related to the Applicant; 18. The Respondent to refrain from sending any further accounts, soliciting any further monies to any of the owners of the Sectional Title without producing due evidence thereof, refrain from appointing and soliciting services from External Service Providers and to provide the contact details of the Owners of the Sectional Title; 19. Properties and / or assets currently under the Body Corporate to be indicated as such, and ensure that the properties be transferred with the State's Permission together with Powers of Attorney from all the owners having only 16 units. Any properties obtained through the Body Corporate and/or leverage of such to be divulged and proven for the improvement of the Sectional Title together with the community and other aspects required by the State in this case the City of Johannesburg. (SARS to be updated, interest to be declared all VAT charged to the owners and payment thereof); 20. The respondent to refrain from solicitation of further funds from me and/or any other owner of the units on behalf of the State being the City of Johannesburg , until such time that proof of payment can be Produced; 21. The Body Corporate to be completely dissolved as set out in the Founding Affidavit and handed over to become a Home Owners Association; 22. The Director of Priority Crimes Investigation to take over the accounts with immediate effect and to advise to the Applicant and the Court of the outcome of their investigation(s)”. The underlined portion is intended to highlight the only instance in which the applicant sought to define any particular entity to which her numerous subsequent uses of the term “the State” might be understood as referring. [4] In the circumstances, it seems to me that there may be some validity to the applicant’s grievance that they had not previously been uploaded to the hearing bundle. However, little turns on this. [5] Careful examination of the CourtOnline registry for the matter reveals that: (i) on 16 October 2025, BBM Inc. filed a notice of appointment as attorneys of record for the second respondent; (ii) on 31 October 2025, Otto Krause Inc. filed a notice withdrawing as attorneys of record for the second and third respondent and indicating that BBM Inc. were now those parties’ “newly instructed attorneys of record”; and (iii) on 14 November 2025, BBM Inc. filed a notice of appointment as attorneys of record for both the second and third respondents. [6] The main addressee of the email was the former Judge President of the KwaZulu-Natal Division of the High Court (his Lordship Mr Justice Jappie) and it was also copied to the KZN Provincial Police Commissioner (Lt. N Mkhwanazi), both of whom the applicant had “invited” to the hearing bundle earlier in the day. I infer, however, that the applicant’s reference to “your client” was to the second respondent in view of the notice of appointment dated 16 October 2025 referred to in fn. 4 above and the fact that the email was not copied to Otto Krause Inc., who were at that stage sill the ostensibly appointed attorneys representing the first and third respondents. [7] The full email reads as follows: “Good day, We trust your offices did not make a mistake and confuse the matters. I note that you have added an old matter same which was replaced as per your acknowledgment and due threats that you as BBM per this Notice of Motion will proceed as per your own view and your own opinions and your extreme bullying e-mails wherein you and not the Court, instruct and lambaste me, to follow the rules. However, your client is yet to respond to the Court Issued Subpoena and/or produce the documents. This is noted as once more an irregular and false case to the Justice System, as you are aware this is unlawful to make these changes and produce documents which is not relevant to the Justice System. Until such time that the investigation is completed, kindly remove same as well as the LPC investigation is complete. We trust your offices will refrain from putting down matters on the Justice Portal where same is derived from the facts, despite requested from your offices to produce the documents and include the relevant parties, this is yet to be seen. As you are on record for the new Application kindly address same. We trust your offices nor your client will further obstruct Justice and misuse the Justice System by not producing the correct information. In light of the new irregularities, same to be moved to the Durban High Court, via electronic service. Your offices are however instructed to appoint an attorney in that Jurisdiction. Costs are to the State. Rights Remain Reserved.” [8] I should note that the applicant had in the meantime copied my secretary on a number of emails that she sent to Otto Krause attorneys on 28 October 2025 in which she declined to participate in their proposed process of preparing a joint practice note on the basis that “the set down is irregular”. In my view, the communications sent to my secretary and the delivery of the “unilateral practice note” were both unnecessary: the Rule 30 application had been duly set down as an opposed interlocutory matter and had been allocated to me by the senior opposed motion court judge despite the absence of compliance with paragraphs 25.16 and 25.17 of the Practice Directive requiring delivery of a joint practice note. Given that the applicant is a litigant in person, I had not (as I had in relation to other opposed motions on my roll) given directions on 26 October 2025 requiring compliance with these provisions, and it would not have been appropriate to simply strike the matter from the roll without a hearing on the strength of the applicant’s emails. For the sake of completeness, I note that the applicant’s emails also demanded that the “Provincial Police Commissioner” and “the State” be copied on all communications and served with all documents as “the matter us under investigation and costs are for the state” and that “The matter is for the state to take over … Kindly refrain from making contact with me again and do so via the relevant authorities whichever means they direct.” [9] It remains unclear to me how the applicant succeeded in doing so . At this time, the applicant also copied my secretary on the emails she had addressed to Otto Krause Inc. attaching the documents and noting their withdrawal as attorneys for the second and third respondents (see fn. 4 above). [10] This appears to have been a reference to the amended notice of motion that the applicant had delivered on 29 September 2025. [11] This seems to me to be somewhat opportunistic in circumstances where the amended notice of motion had only been delivered one month previously. [12] The applicant also placed a widely-shared note on the hearing bundle at this time stating that the scheduling of the hearing was “strictly opposed as the matter is opposed” and further that “Applicant cannot be in person due to matters not relevant, notes not shared with the Applicant or consulted. With. 495-01-24 Witness protection act, Applicant must be occampanied by a Senior member of SAPS and this must be made provision for” [sic]. [13] This would appear to have been a reference to the fact that the amended notice of motion had not been uploaded. [14] The letter was resent to my secretary on 11 and 12 November 2025 under cover of emails alleging that “ as of date hereof there is no representation for the Respondent” (notwithstanding  the notice appointing BBM Inc. on her behalf filed on 16 October 2025 – see fn. 4 above); questioning my appointment as an Acting Judge and my authority “to hear 'State Interested’ matters”; and disputing the validity of the bundle freeze as instructed by me. My secretary responded (quite correctly) that she had “implemented the bundle freeze on Case Lines as per the judge’s directives and the bundle will remain closed for all parties. I will only open the bundle after the hearing of the matter. If you want to upload anything (an important and relevant document), you will need to request for indulgence from the Hon Judge who will then decide whether to grant you the indulgence or not. Bundle will remain closed for all the parties.” This courteous response and invitation was met with demands emailed to my secretary on 12 and 13 November 2025: (i) that I should “respond to the letter”; (ii) that my secretary should “ensure that the matter is removed with costs to the Applicant”; (iii) a curious statement that “Caselines is active by the State”; and (iv) a threat that “the Judges Secretary's non adherence and failure to produce is noted to the State and the DOJ by failure to provide to the State an online link and/or failure to provide the Published AJ Approvals for next week”. [15] See fn. 4 above. [16] Again, it remains unclear to me how the applicant succeeded in doing so. [17] The document stated that “the Applicant is not satisfied that a formal Publication is submitted by the Rules of Court for any appointed Acting Judge to be allocated to preside over the matter” and further that “The State requires the Order to be signed by a sitting Judge of this Court and signed and named by Him/Her”. I can assure the applicant that I was indeed duly appointed as an acting judge and that the matter was duly allocated to me. [18] It was alleged that the Rule 30 application constitutes an “application to bar the Respondent from responding to the State Issued Subpoenas” and is “irregular and not in the interest of Justice”, allegedly because it “was brought after the removal of the parties cited in the Attorneys documentation, and the documentation was not uploaded to the Caselines Bundles in terms of the Uniform Rules of the Court and the State’s Directives”. The applicant also pointed out that “a removal was entered into by Otto Krause Attorneys after caselines was closed”. [19] The applicant also sought “ Costs to the State against the Representatives of the Respondent to be compounded by the Judiciary and relevant directives, to be compounded by any representative of the State for any investigation by way of any obstruction for any party to act, by producing documentation when requested to do so”, apparently on the basis that “the roll is used to obstruct the Applicant and any representative of the State”. [20] The applicant complained inter alia that the respondents’ representatives had (i) “filed a Notice of Removal for Parties which are not present in this Application”; (ii) “filed a notice of appointment from another representatives which are for parties not appointed” [sic]; (iii) made a “severe attempt in the Obstruction of the main matter and/or any investigations thereof”; and (iv) “failed to respond to any filed documents in this matter”. [21] The applicant also placed a “widely-shared” note on Caselines requesting the Court to “please see the notes to serve the relevant parties, and the Objections by the State”. [22] The counter claim was obviously delivered out of time: see Uniform Rule 6(7). [23] Afrocentrics Projects and Services (Pty) Ltd t/a Innovative Distribution v State Information Technology Agency (SITA) SOC Ltd 2023 (4) BCLR 361 (CC) para 26. [24] Melane v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd 1962 (4) (SA) 531 (A) 532 C–F. [25] Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others [2000] ZACC 3 ; 2000 (2) SA 837 (CC) para 3; Geldenhuys v National Director of Public Prosecutions [2008] ZACC 21 ; 2009 (2) SA 310 (CC) para 21; Bertie van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others 2010 (2) SA 181 (CC) paras 13-14; Ferris v FirstRand Bank Ltd 2014 (3) SA 39 (CC) paras 10–12. [26] Campbell and another v Kwapa and another 2002 (6) SA 379 (W) at 381G – 382D; Steyn v Meyer [2022] ZAGPPHC 772 (13 October 2022) paras 8 and 9. [27] Chasen v Ritter 1992 (4) SA 323 (SE) at 329F-G; Mynhardt v Mynhardt 1986 (1) SA 456 (T) at 463E – 464B; Wentzel v Banxso (Pty) Ltd and Others [2025] ZAWCHC 376 (22 August 2025) paras 22 and 23. [28] Rule 6(5)(g) says so expressly. [29] Federated Trust Ltd v Botha 1978 (3) SA 645 (A) at 654C . [30] Mashavha v Enaex Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 2025 (1) SA 466 (GJ) paras 16 and 17. sino noindex make_database footer start