Motsile and Another v Motsile and Others (2022/16361) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1245 (1 December 2025)

begin wrapper begin container begin header begin slogan-floater end slogan-floater - About SAFLII About SAFLII - Databases Databases - Search Search - Terms of Use Terms of Use - RSS Feeds RSS Feeds end header begin main begin center # South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg You are here: SAFLII >> Databases >> South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg >> 2025 >> [2025] ZAGPJHC 1245 | Noteup | LawCite sino index ## Motsile and Another v Motsile and Others (2022/16361) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1245 (1 December 2025) Motsile and Another v Motsile and Others (2022/16361) [2025] ZAGPJHC 1245 (1 December 2025) Download original files PDF format RTF format make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2025_1245.html sino date 1 December 2025 SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG CASE NO : 2022/16361 (1)  REPORTABLE: NO (2)  OF INTEREST TO OTHEOTHER JUDGES: NO (3)  REVISED: NO Date: 01 December 2025 In the matter between: MICHAEL ISAAC MOTSILE                                                 First Applicant HEZAL MOTSILE                                                                 Second Applicant And MARIA ELIZABETH MOTSILE                                            First Respondent NKELE MOTSILE                                                                 Second Respondent KENEILWE MOTSILE                                                          Third Respondent CITY OF JOHANNESBURG                                                Fourth Respondent METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY Coram: Dlamini J Heard :                   20 October 2025 Delivered: 01 December 2025 – This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives via email, by being uploaded to CaseLines, and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for the hand-down is deemed to be 10:30 on 01 December 2025. JUDGMENT DLAMINI J INRODUCTION. [1] The applicants have launched this application seeking an order for the eviction of the first, second, and third respondents from the property known as 1[…] M[…] Street, O[…] E[…], S[…], Registration Division IQ, Gauteng Province (“the property”). [2] The applicants seek a further order that if the first, second, and third respondents fail to vacate the property following this court order, in that event, the court should authorize and direct the sheriff to evict the respondents. PARTIES. [3] The first and second applicants are a married couple. They, together with the late Lydia Motsile, are the holders of a Certificate of Registered Grant of Leasehold issued on 13 February 2021. [4] Lydia Motsile is the sister of the first applicant and also a sister of the first respondent’s mother. Lydia passed away in 2018, leaving no children. The second and third respondents are the children of the first respondent. All are herein referred to as the respondents. [5] The fourth respondent is the City of Johannesburg. No order is sought against the fourth respondent, save for the fact that it is the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the property is situated. [6] The applicants testified that they are the rightful owners of the property. They claim that the respondents are illegal occupants because they are occupying the property without the applicants’ consent. [7] The respondent opposes the matter. [8] In summary, the parties' identities and the property’s description are not in dispute. ISSUE FOR DETERMINATION. [9] The issue to be determined is whether the applicants have full ownership of, or are the sole owners of, the property and, if so, whether it is just and equitable to order the eviction of the first, second, and third respondents under the PIE Act. [1] [10] The high water mark of the applicant’s submission is that they are the legal registered owners of the property and are therefore entitled ex lege to the order that they seek. [11] The applicant contends that they have, on numerous occasions, requested that they be allowed to occupy the main house and that the respondents move out into the back room, without success. This has, in the main, led to the ongoing feud that still persists. [12] The first respondent submitted that her mother and the first applicant are siblings. Additionally, that her mother is also the sister of the late Lydia, who passed away intestate. Since Lydia died without leaving any descendants, she is therefore entitled to succeed and inherit from Lydia’s estate by representation. [13] The first respondent states that she has been living on the property since her birth in 1963 up to now. [14] I now turn to the issue that stands to be determined in this matter. [15] The promulgation of the PIE Act has its roots in our Constitution, which dictates that a person may not be evicted from their home without an order of the Court made after consideration of all the relevant circumstances. [16] The principles of eviction under the PIE Act are now well established and have been pronounced in a number of our court decisions. [17] The inquiry into an eviction under the PIE Act involves a two-stage process. [2] [18] Firstly, the court must determine whether the occupation is unlawful and whether the unlawful occupier has raised a valid defense. [19] Once the court is satisfied that no valid defense exists, the court can grant the eviction order. Thereafter, the court must then determine a just and equitable date for the respondent to vacate the property. [20] A cursory perusal of the pleadings indicates that the matter is a family dispute and that the parties have been unable to resolve it through negotiation or mediation. The joint practice note, unfortunately, does not indicate whether the parties made any serious attempts to resolve the matter amicably. [21] Be that as it may, it is well established and not in dispute that the applicants are holders of the permit together with the late Lydia Motsile. Lydia was the sister of the first respondent’s mother. Lydia died intestate and had no children. [22] It is also undisputed that the late Lydia was the third holder of the leasehold rights granted along with the applicants. [23] In accordance with the principles of intestate succession, upon her death, Lydia’s aforesaid share in the property devolves into her estate. As Lydia died intestate. Her sister, the respondent’s mother, and the first applicant are each entitled to a half share in her deceased estate. The first respondent is therefore entitled to succeed by representation to her mother's share of Lydia’s estate. [24] It is common cause that the estate of the late Lydia has not been finalized. Therefore, an executor ought to be appointed to wind up her estate, which will entail the transfer of any rights to the intestate heirs of the deceased, including the first respondent. [25] In this case, the onus rests on the applicants to establish that it is just and equitable to evict the respondent and that they are entitled to the order they seek. [26] Considering all the circumstances mentioned above, I have concluded that the applicants have not established an absolute right to the property in exclusion of the first respondent. Therefore, in my view, the applicants have failed to discharge the onus that rested on them to show that they are entitled to the order they seek. Consequently, it is not just and equitable to order the eviction of the respondents. [27] This concludes this inquiry, and it is therefore unnecessary to consider the next inquiry into a just and equitable date for eviction. [28] For these reasons, the application is therefore dismissed. COSTS. [29] The well-known principle of our law states that costs follow the results. Counsel for the respondents argued that this court should not issue any order regarding costs. Considering the merits of this case, the fact that it is mainly a family dispute, and the advanced age of the applicants, I believe that it is in the interest of justice not to make any order as to costs. [30] I make the following order. ORDER. 1. The application is dismissed. 2. No order as to costs. DLAMINI J Judge of the High Court Gauteng Division, Johannesburg FOR THE APPLICANTS: EMAIL: Adv. I Rakhadani ipfir@rsabar.co.za INSTRUCTED BY: EMAIL: FOR THE RESPONDENTS: Roxanne Barnard Attorneys roxanne@rbarnardatt.co.za Mr. Michael Motaung (Attorney with the right of appearance in the High Court) [1] Act 19 of 1998 [2] See City of Johannesburg v Changing Tides  74  (Pty) ltd and Other SCA0 [2012] ZASCA 116 sino noindex make_database footer start