Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 187South Africa
Consortium Comprising and Another v Ltd Santam Limited and Others (2023/009986) [2023] ZAGPJHC 187 (7 March 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
7 March 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Consortium Comprising and Another v Ltd Santam Limited and Others (2023/009986) [2023] ZAGPJHC 187 (7 March 2023)
Consortium Comprising and Another v Ltd Santam Limited and Others (2023/009986) [2023] ZAGPJHC 187 (7 March 2023)
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sino date 7 March 2023
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case No. 2023/009986
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
7 March 2023
In
the matter between:
THE
CONSORTIUM COMPRISING:
First
Applicant
KC
COTTRELL CO. LTD
ELB
ENGINEERING SERVICES (PTY) LTD (in liquidation)
ELB
EDUCATIONAL TRUST FOR BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS
KC
COTTRELL CO.
LTD
Second
Applicant
and
SANTAM
LIMITED
F
irst
Respondent
NGODWANA
ENERGY RF LTD
Second
Respondent
NEDBANK
LIMITED C/O NEDBANK INCORPORATED
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
WILSON
J
:
The
dispute
1
The applicants, to whom I shall refer as KC Cottrell, seek
interim relief restraining the first respondent, Santam, from paying
out on a guarantee given in favour of the second respondent,
Ngodwana, for the performance of KC Cottrell’s obligations
under
a contract facilitating the construction of a twenty-five
megawatt biomass power plant in Mpumalanga. The power plant is
presently
operational, but by all accounts there are significant
defects in the construction work that require rectification, and
which mean
that the plant, while operational, is not running
optimally.
2
The construction contract, like most agreements of its sort,
provides for the contractor, KC Cottrell, to be paid in instalments
once the employer, Ngodwana, has certified that certain payment
“milestones” have been reached. As the construction
work
went on, Ngodwana certified that a number of these milestones had
been reached, and paid out substantial sums of money to
KC Cottrell
in respect of the construction work.
3
However, Ngodwana has now taken the view that the defects it
has identified in the construction work are so serious as to justify
the reversal of the payment milestones it previously certified had
been reached, and the reclamation of much of the money it paid
over
under those certificates. It gave notice of its intention to do so in
a document referred to before me as “Interim Payment
Certificate 36” (“IPC 36”). In that document,
Ngodwana certified that KC Cottrell is now liable to it in the
sum of
R222 362 236.68. In a letter dated 31 January 2023,
Ngodwana stated that it intended to make a call in that amount
on the
guarantee. That will, in turn, result in Santam claiming the full
amount from KC Cottrell.
4
It is not necessary for me to consider the nature and extent
of the defects in the construction work, or how they are to be
rectified,
in any detail. The only issue of substance before me is
whether KC Cottrell has established a
prima facie
right to
restrain Santam from paying out on the guarantee.
5
Santam does not oppose the application, but Ngodwana does.
Ngodwana does not suggest that the defects it has identified in the
construction
work cannot be rectified. Nor does it suggest that it
will cost anything like the R222 million it seeks to call up to
rectify them,
or that the defects have caused it losses in anything
approximating those amounts. Ngodwana instead relies on what it says
are
the clear terms of the guarantee: viz. that all it needs to
establish, in order to call up the guarantee, is that KC Cottrell is
in breach of the construction contract. That fact is hardly in
dispute. The defects in the work are essentially common cause. That,
Ngodwana says, means that it is entitled to call up whatever amount
it likes up to the limit of the guarantee.
6
Mr. Redman, who appeared for KC Cottrell before me, accepted
that the defects in the work were such that Ngodwana was probably
entitled
to make a call on the guarantee in some amount. He argued,
however, that the amount Ngodwana threatens to call up – just
over R222 million – is so grossly disproportionate to any
amount to which Ngodwana could honestly believe it was entitled,
that
the call Ngodwana threatens would be fraudulent. It is on that basis
– that any call on the guarantee based on IPC 36
would
constitute an act of fraud – that KC Cottrell says it has a
prima facie
right to interdict Santam from paying out on the
call.
The
law
7
It was common ground between the parties that the guarantee at
issue in this case is an “on demand” guarantee.
Guarantees
of this nature provide an especially strong form of
security for an employer under a construction contract. “On
demand”
guarantees – sometimes referred to as “call
bonds” – provide for the employer to call up the
guarantee
in any amount on the mere notification to the guarantor
that an event specified in the guarantee has taken place. In other
words,
all that is needed is a demand that conforms to the terms of
the guarantee. It is not incumbent upon the employer to establish the
nature and extent of the contractor’s liability to it (
Minister
of Transport and Public Works Western Cape v Zandbuild
2011 (5)
SA 528
SCA, paragraph 16). Nor does the employer have to allege that
there is any specific amount due to it at all, unless, of course,
the
amount owing by the contractor to the employer itself constitutes
part of the event specified in the guarantee.
8
So, for example, if a guarantee states that it may be called
upon on a breach of contract, all the employer has to allege is that
there is such a breach. In that event, the full amount due in terms
of the guarantee becomes payable if that is what the employer
demands. If, however, the guarantee states that the employer may call
up the bond on breach only to the extent that it is necessary
to
remedy the breach, then the employer must allege both that there is a
breach and the amount it considers necessary to remedy
the breach. In
neither case, however, is the employer required to establish that
there is a breach, or the nature and extent of
the amount necessary
to cure it. The guarantee is called up on the mere say-so of the
employer.
9
Accordingly, it does not matter to the guarantor whether there
is actually a breach of contract, or whether the amount called up
is
necessary to cure the breach. The guarantor is not entitled to go
behind the employer’s demand, so long as the demand
conforms to
the terms of the guarantee itself. The guarantor’s obligation
to pay out on the guarantee is wholly independent
of the underlying
contract between the employer and the contractor. Any disputes
between the employer and the contractor about
whether there really is
a breach, and the extent of the liability arising from it, are
irrelevant to the guarantor’s duty
to pay on demand from the
employer (see
Coface South Africa Insurance Co Ltd v East London
Own Haven t/a Own Haven Housing Association
2014 (2) SA 382
(SCA)
(“Coface”), paragraphs 13 to 16, 22 and 25 to 26).
10
The one exception to this position is fraud. If the employer
makes a call on the guarantee knowing full well that the event
specified
in it has not occurred (for example that there is not
actually a breach of contract), then the guarantor has no duty to pay
out
on the call, and the contractor is entitled to an interdict
restraining it from doing so (see
Guardrisk Insurance Company v
Kentz (Pty) Ltd
[2014] 1 All SA 307
(SCA) paragraph 17).
The
guarantee in this case
11
Ngodwana’s right to call up the guarantee in this case
depends on the construction to be given to it. If, as Ngodwana
contends,
the guarantee is such that all that need be alleged is a
breach of contract, then the case ends there. There is no serious
dispute
that there is such a breach, and accordingly no suggestion
that Ngodwana’s call on the guarantee could in that event be
fraudulent.
12
If, however, the guarantee requires Ngodwana to go further,
and allege an amount that is needed to remedy the defects that it has
identified in the construction work, then it is necessary to consider
whether Ngodwana honestly believes that it is entitled, in
view of
the defects, to the amount it has threatened to call up.
13
Clause 4 of the guarantee states as follows –
We, SANTAM LIMITED (Reg.
No. 1918/001680/06) (“Guarantor"), hereby irrevocably and
unconditionally undertake with you
that whenever you or the Facility
Agent gives a written notice to us demanding payment by way of
original letter (a "Demand"),
without further proof or
condition (which notice shall state that Contractor has failed to
comply with its obligations in respect
of the Contract, including any
remedy periods stipulated therein), we will, notwithstanding any
objection which may be made by
the Contractor and without any right
of set-off or counterclaim, immediately, but within no later than 5
(five) Business Days,
pay to you
(a) in
respect of amounts claimed as delay liquidated damages into the
Operating Account (Account Number 1120842514,
Branch Code 198765)
with the Facility Agent;
(b) in
respect of all other amounts into the Compensation Proceed Account
(Account Number [....], Branch Code
198765) with the Facility Agent;
or
(c)
into such other account as the Facility Agent may direct, such an
amount as you or the Facility Agent may
in that Demand require not
exceeding (when aggregated with any amount(s) previously so paid,
under this Guarantee) the Guaranteed
Sum ("Guarantee").
14
The terms of this guarantee seem self-evident to me. All that
Ngodwana is required to allege is an unremedied breach of contract.
Mr. Redman pressed the argument, however, that the word “require”
in the phrase “may in that Demand require”
at the end of
the clause means “required to remedy the breach alleged”.
As sympathetic as I am to that position (it
seems obvious on the
facts before me that Ngodwana’s threat to call up the amount
specified in IPC36 is oppressive) I do
not think that the
interpretation Mr. Redman pressed is tenable. There is no difference,
in my view, between the amount Ngodwana
“demands” and the
amount it “requires”.
15
Bearing in mind that this is an application for interim
relief, I have given some thought to whether, though it is in my view
untenable,
Mr Redman’s interpretation is at least arguable. But
I regret that I cannot conclude that there is even a
prima facie
basis on which the word “require” could be read as
anything other than synonymous with “demand”. Far more
would need to be said in the guarantee to enable it to be read as
limiting the amount that could be called up to that which Ngodwana
reasonably requires to remedy the breach it alleges. In light of the
nature and purpose of performance guarantees of this nature,
it is,
in my view, not realistic to read-in an internal limitation on
Ngodwana’s right to call up the guarantee of the kind
Mr.
Redman suggests, without at least some explicit indication of that
intent. I can find no such indication in the text of the
guarantee.
16
For all of these reasons, and with some reluctance, I dismiss
the application with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
S
D J WILSON
Judge
of the High Court
HEARD
ON:
28 February 2023
DECIDED
ON:
7 March 2023
For
the Applicant: NP
Redman SC
M Desai
Instructed
by: LNP
Attorneys, Sandton c/o
PPN Attorneys, Parktown
For
the Second Respondent: PHJ
Van Vuuren SC
DS Hodge
Instructed
by: Tiefenhalter
Attorneys c/o
Dockrat Inc, Dunkeld
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