Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 216South Africa
Swissport South Africa Proprietary Limited v Airports Company South Africa Soc Limited and Others (2022/003417) [2023] ZAGPJHC 216 (10 March 2023)
Headnotes
section 217 of the Constitution, the PPPFA, and the Procurement Regulations applied to ACSA’s tender process in respect of the licensing of ground handling services. [9] The decision in Swissport 1 was in line with the decision of the SCA in Airports Company South Africa SOC Ltd v Imperial Group Ltd,[2] which reasoned that section 217 (1) of the Constitution applies “whenever an organ of state contracts for goods or services, whether for itself or somebody else”. [10] The three well-known ground-handling providers that is; Swissport, Menzies, and NAS Colossal submitted their bids. [11] On 6 December 2021, the bidders were invited to a compulsory briefing session. [12] The RFP sets out the process to be followed in evaluating the tender.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Swissport South Africa Proprietary Limited v Airports Company South Africa Soc Limited and Others (2022/003417) [2023] ZAGPJHC 216 (10 March 2023)
Swissport South Africa Proprietary Limited v Airports Company South Africa Soc Limited and Others (2022/003417) [2023] ZAGPJHC 216 (10 March 2023)
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sino date 10 March 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISON, JOHANNESBURG
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
10/03/2023
Case
no.
:
2022/003417
In
the matter between:
SWISSPORT
SOUTH AFRICA PROPRIETARY LIMITED
APPLICANT
and
AIRPORTS
COMPANY SOUTH AFRICA SOC LIMITED
1ST
RESPONDENT
MENZIES
AVIATION (SOUTH AFRICA)
2ND
RESPONDENT
NAS
COLOSSAL AVIATION SERVICES
PROPRIETARY
LIMITED
3RD
RESPONDENT
Coram:
Dlamini
J
Date
of hearing: 21,
22 & 23 November 2022 - Open Court (11E).
Date
of delivery of Judgment: 10 March 2023
This
Judgment is deemed to have been delivered electronically by
circulation to the parties’ representatives via email and
same
shall be uploaded onto the caselines system.
JUDGMENT
DLAMINI
J
[1]
This is a review application wherein the applicant
seeks to review and set aside the decision of the first respondent
awarding the
tender to the second and third respondents.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[2]
The
constitutional and legislative framework in terms of which
administrative actions may be taken in the procurement process are
now well established and are set out in Section 217
[1]
of the Constitution and the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework
Act, Act 5 of 2000 (the PPPFA).
[3]
Section 217 of the Constitution provides that;-
(1) When an organ of
the state in the national, provincial, or local sphere of government,
or any other institution, contracts for
goods or services, it must do
so in accordance with a system that is fair, equitable, transparent
competitive, and cost-effective.
(2) Subsection (1)
does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in
that subsection from implementing a procurement
policy providing for–
(a) Categories of
preference in the allocation of contracts: and
(b) The protection or
advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by
unfair discrimination.
(2)
National legislation must prescribe
a framework within which the policy referred to in subsection (2)
must be implemented.
[4]
The PPPFA is the national legislation
contemplated in section 217 (3) of the Constitution. It requires the
application of a preference
point system to public tenders.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[5]
The applicant (Swissport), the second
respondent (Menzies) as well the third respondent ( NAS Colossal) are
all qualified and experienced
companies that are already providing
ground handling services to all ACSA’s airports.
[6]
The facts which form part of this dispute
are largely common cause.
[7]
On 26 November 20221 ACSA, invited
proposals from suitable experienced, and qualified ground handleling
companies to be granted
two licenses to provide ground handling
services at its nine airports (the RFP). The uniqueness of this
tender is that ACSA intimated
that it will be awarding a no-fee
license that permitted the successful bidders to conclude a license
agreement with airlines to
provide ground handling with third parties
for the provision of such services as they might be required, at
rates or prices to
be negotiated and agreed with each such airline.
The RFP included a pro forma Ground Handling License and Service
Level Agreement.
[8]
This tender was issued by the ACSA in line
with and following the decision of the Court in
Swissport
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Airports Company South Africa SOC Limited
[2020] ZAGP JHC 70 (2 March 2020) (
Swissport
1
) which involved the 2018 request for
proposal, the predecessor to the current tender process. In that
case, the Court held that
section 217 of the Constitution, the PPPFA,
and the Procurement Regulations applied to ACSA’s tender
process in respect of
the licensing of ground handling services.
[9]
The
decision in
Swissport
1
was in line with the decision of the SCA in
Airports
Company
South Africa SOC Ltd v Imperial Group Ltd
,
[2]
which reasoned that section 217 (1) of the Constitution applies
“
whenever
an organ of state contracts for goods or services, whether for itself
or somebody else”.
[10]
The three well-known ground-handling
providers that is; Swissport, Menzies, and NAS Colossal submitted
their bids.
[11]
On 6 December 2021, the bidders were
invited to a compulsory briefing session.
[12]
The RFP sets out the process to be followed
in evaluating the tender.
12.1 a
pre-qualification criterion that bidders must have a BBBEE status of
Level 2.
12.2
compliance with mandatory administrative requirements, including the
submission of standard bidding documents and
a transformation plan.
12.3 a
functionality evaluation in respect of which tenderers were required
to score for certain sub-criteria and to
achieve an overall minimum
threshold of 72 points out of 100.
12.4 a
comparative evaluation of the qualifying bids based on price and
BBBEE.
[13]
On 17 January 2022, ACSA convened a meeting
between itself and all the potential bidders to engage and agree on
the methodology
around the pricing schedule, which required bidders
to provide pricing for handling a narrow-body aircraft and a notional
widebody
aircraft based on certain assumptions as to the resources
required to turn around those aircraft. Following, this meeting ACSA,
prepared a revised pricing schedule on 25 January 2022, schedule Z.
The key feature here is that this new pricing schedule was
prepared
in agreement with all the bidders.
[14]
The revised pricing schedule provides for
the bidders to specify a rate per turn to turn around a notional
narrow-body and widebody
aircraft with ground times of 40 minutes and
two hours and specified the minimum resources required to turn around
these aircraft.
The prices contained in the pricing schedule are not
the actual prices to be offered to the airlines with which the
bidders will
subsequently contract. It was anticipated that the
prices submitted by a bidder would reflect the prices that it would
ultimately
offer to the airlines for a narrowbody and widebody
aircraft in the scenarios set out in the pricing schedule.
[15]
On 30 March 2022, NAS Holdco and Menzies
PLC the holding entities of the second and third respondents wrote to
ACSA to notify it
of the impending merger between NAS Holdco and
Menzies PLC.
[16]
On 23 May 2022, ACSA awarded the tender
Menzies and NAS Colossal.
[17]
On 22 June 2022, following the award of the
tender, ACSA entered into Service Level Agreement with the successful
bidders.
[18]
Aggrieved with this decision, Swissport
launched an urgent application in which it sort the following
orders;-
18.1
in Part A of the order applicant sought an
order interdicting the respondents from taking any steps,
alternatively further steps
to implement the first respondent's
decision to award the tender for the provision of ground handling
services at all ACSA airports
to the second and third defendants.
18.2
In Part B of the application, Swissport
sought to review and set aside ACSA's decision to award the tender to
NAS Colossal and Menzies.
[19]
The question that falls to be determined is
whether ACSA interrogated the market-relatedness of the prices
submitted by the successful
bidders. That is, whether the bids
submitted by the successful bidders to the first respondent were
market-related as required
by the Procurement Regulations and further
whether the successful bidders low- balled when they submitted their
bids. Finally,
whether Swissport has shown that it was irrational for
ACSA to award the tender to the two successful bidders in
circumstances
where there was a pending merger between their
international holding entities.
[20]
On 29 June 2022, the applicant removed Part
A of this application with costs reserved. I will deal with the issue
of these costs
below.
[21]
It is trite that a decision taken in the
context of a tendering process, including
decisions to award
tenders, constitutes administrative action for the purposes of PAJA.
The decision is also subject to review on
the basis of the principle
of legality in terms of the Constitution.
MARKET RELATEDNESS
[22]
In its heads of argument, the applicant
argues that the ACSA had a duty to consider whether the prices
submitted by the successful
bidders were market-related or not. The
applicant insists that the market-relatedness of the bid is a
mandatory and materially
relevant consideration in any public tender.
This becomes vital in the present tender, argues the applicant,
because the services
are to be rendered not to ACSA but to the
airlines that make use of ACSA’s airports.
[23]
It is further submitted by the applicant
that the prices contained in the bidders completed pricing schedule
are not the actual
prices to be offered to the airlines with which
the bidders will subsequently contract. This situation according to
the applicant
will create a real risk and strong incentive that those
bidders might 'low-ball' by submitting unrealistic low prices for
purpose
of winning the ACSA tender and then charging higher prices to
the airlines.
[24]
In reply, the second respondent argued that
it complied with its obligation and provided its actual prices for
the cost component
required in terms of the agreed schedule Z.
Further, submit the second respondent that for a considerable time
the relevant market
and its prices have been set by all the bidders
herein, in the result that the bidders herein comprise this market
including their
range of price.
[25]
The applicant's allegation that the ACSA
did not interrogate the market-relatedness of the bidding prices has
no merit and stands
to be dismissed. This is so because the pricing
schedule was agreed upon by ACSA and all the bidding parties on 17
January 2020,
that culminated in the drawing of the appendix Z
schedule. Part of appendix Z provides as follows;-
“
6.
To ensure like-for-like tender comparison bidders must submit pricing
strictly in accordance with this pricing schedule. Deviation
from
this pricing schedule could result in a bid being declared
nonresponsive.”
“
9.
The pricing schedule provided will be used for comparison purposes
and awarding of a license as directed by the PPPFA regulations
and
ACT.”
[26]
Further, on behalf of ACSA in the answering
affidavit Ms, Mphephu testified that she was intrinsically involved
in the drawing up
of the bid document and denies that ACSA did not
have the knowledge and did not properly consider whether the prices
submitted
by the successful bidders were market-related.
In paragraph [7] of her
affidavit, she says the following; “
I led the process of
formulating input to the Service Level Agreement with the service
providers. In doing so, I consulted with
internal airport
satkeholders, conducted research on industry best practices, and
proposed appropriate model fo ACSA with regard
to the provision of
Ground Handling Services at ACSA airports before the tender was
issued. I was also involved in the evaluation
of prices submitted by
the bidders and I was present at the meeting between ACSA and the
bidders on 17 January 2022”.
Ms. Mphephu continues at
[9] and says; “
I considered the prices submitted against my
own knowledge of the nature of the services required and the way that
such services
would be generally priced in the industry
”.
[27]
In my view, Ms. Mphephu's evidence put paid
to the applicant's submission that ACSA to did interrogate the
market-relatedness of
the prices submitted by the successful bidders.
Significantly no evidence has been adduced by the applicant in this
Court to rebut
Ms. Mphephu’s testimony. Accordingly, her
evidence remains unchallenged and should stand.
[28]
The allegation by the applicant that the
prices submitted by the second and third respondents were not
market-related and it appears
that there may have been some measure
of “
low-balling”
by the two successful bidders is misplaced. The applicant has not
provided this Court with evidence to sustain this claim and this
allegation stands to be dismissed. As I have indicated above, the
pricing schedule was agreed upon by all the bidding parties.
Second,
ACSA notified the bidding parties that the pricing schedule they
submitted in the bid, ACSA will share this information
with the
airlines. Therefore, there was no incentive for the successful
bidders to low- ball their prices in circumstances where
they were
fully aware that ACSA will share their prices with the airlines.
[29]
Also, it is common knowledge that before
the bidding parties submitted their bids, the bidding parties were
and are continuing to
provide ground-handling services to the very
same airlines. The airlines have knowledge, skill, and expertise in
this industry.
Therefore to suggest, as the applicant does, that they
can be low-balled by the successful bidders is rather not practical
and
stands to be dismissed.
[30]
Significantly, to safeguard against
low-balling ACSA included the penalty provisions in the Service Level
Agreement, which stipulated
that if any bidder submitted information
which information could in the future be discovered to be incorrect,
ACSA will be entitled
to revoke the license. Accordingly, there
exists no incentive for the successful bidders to low-ball in
circumstances where the
successful bidders knew that if discovered
ACSA will revoke their license.
[31]
Further, subsequent to the award of the
tender, Menzies concluded new contracts with Safair and Air Belgium.
This, in my view, bolsters
this Court finding that ACSA considered
the bidder's prices and this further dispels any notion of
low-balling by the successful
bidders. In that had Menzies
low-balled, Safair and Air Belgium would not have concluded these new
contracts, if Menzies’s
pricing schedule materially differed
from the pricing schedule that it submitted in the bid to ACSA.
[32]
In all the circumstances mentioned above, I
am satisfied that ACSA took all reasonable measures to ensure that
the pricing model
was commercially viable. That ACSA interrogated the
pricing and ensured that there was no low-balling in this tender. In
the result,
it is thus my finding that the prices of the successful
bidders were commercially viable and were market-related.
MERGER
[33]
I now turn to deal with the merger of the
holding companies of the successful bidders.
[34]
It is common cause that at the time ACSA
was evaluating this bid, the international holding companies of the
successful bidders
were engaged in a discussion to merge the
successful bidder’s global holding companies
[35]
In July 2022, the Competition Commission
approved the merger subject to conditions, including a divestiture
condition which required
the disposal of, the share of Agility Public
Warehousing Company K.S.P. in NAS Colossal’s South African
ground handling business.
[36]
The applicant argues that the merger has
resulted in two principal irregularities;-
36.1 ACSA did not
apply its mind to the potential impact of the merger on ground
handling services at ACSA’s airports,
particularly if
divestiture had not been ordered.
36. 2 Second,
divestiture, undermines the principles of public procurement in that
it allows the purchaser of the divested
business to obtain the
benefit of an ACSA license without having competed for the
opportunity.
[37]
In reply, ACSA argues that the proposed
merger did not prohibit it, from adjudicating the tender. Further, it
acted reasonably and
rationally because it received legal advice to
proceed with the adjudication of the tender. Finally, the approval of
the merger
by the Commission means that Menzies and NAS will continue
to conduct business in this country as separate and distinct
entities.
[38]
In my view, the applicant's submission in
this regard has no merit and must be dismissed. This is so because
there is nothing in
the law that prohibited ACSA from adjudicating
this tender during the proposed merger. Doing so will have resulted
in ACSA having
to wait for an indeterminable period for the
Competition Commission to issue its ruling. ACSA has a legislative
mandate to ensure
that the traveling public and airlines have
certainty of being provided with ground handling services at its
airport.
[39]
Mergers and acquisitions are normal
commercial transaction that takes place daily nationally and
internationally. There is nothing
unique or unlawful about them. In
any event, the Competition Commission delivered its ruling and
ordered the divestiture of one
of the successful bidders. The
Competition Commission's ruling ensured that the would be no monopoly
and this leveled the playing
field.
COSTS IN PART A
[40]
The applicant had brought the application
in two parts. Part A of the notice of motion sought an order, on an
urgent basis interdicting
ACSA and the successful bidders from taking
any steps to implement the award and extending the term of the
current license agreements
of Swissport and the successful bidders,
pending the finalization of the review contemplated in Part B.
[41]
On 31 May 2022, the applicant sent a letter
to ACSA regarding the decision not to award the tender to Swissport.
[42]
On 3 June 2022, ACSA replied to the
aforesaid letter and undertook to respond to the applicant's letter
by the close of business
on 6 June 2020.
[43]
On 6 June 2022, the applicant launched the
urgent application.
[44]
On 21 June 2022, following a meeting
between the parties, ACSA via email extended the applicant’s
licence until 31 March 2023.
[45]
On 29 June 2022, Swissport removed the
urgent application with costs reserved. The result is that the
applicant dragged the respondents
to court in circumstances when it
was unnecessary for the applicant to do so. The respondents were
forced to incur costs and file
their opposing papers to defend the
urgent application.
[46]
I have dismissed the applicant's main
application, accordingly, costs should follow the result. The
applicant is ordered to pay
the costs of the respondents in Part A.
[47]
Taking into account all the circumstances
that I have alluded to above, it is my considered view that the
applicant has failed to
discharge the onus that rested on its
shoulders and proved its case for the relief it sought. Accordingly,
the review application
in Part B is dismissed.
ORDER
1.
The order marked X which I signed on 16
February 2023 is made an order of this Court.
DLAMINI
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Date of
hearing: 21, 22
& 23 November 2022
Delivered: 10
March
2023
For
the Applicant:
Frank
Snyckers SC
snyckers@group621.co.za
Adv. Michael Mbikiwa
mbikiwa@group621.co.za
Instructed
by:
Webber Wentzel
Mr G Penfold, Mr H Davies
and Ms P Singh
Glenn.penfold@webberwentzel.com
Prelisha.singh@webberwentzel.com
Haydn.Davies@webberwentzel.com
For
the 1
st
Respondent
:
Tembeka
Ngcukaitobi SC
tembeka.ngcukaitobi@gmail.com
Adv Katlego Monareng
katlego0528@gmail.com
Instructed
by:
Mashiane Moodley and Monama Inc
Mr D Maphakela and Ms Z
Khuzwayo
dmaphakela@m4attorneys.co.za
zanelek@m4attorneys.co.za
For
the 2
nd
Respondent
:
Deon
Irish SC
deoni@iafrica.co.za
Adv Darryl Cooke
dcooke@capebar.co.za
Instructed
by:
Macgregor Stanford Kruger Inc.
Mr D Macgregor
david@macgregs.co.za
C/O: Fluxmans
ldospassos@fluxmans.com
For
the 3
rd
Respondent
:
Emiel
van Vuuren SC
vanvuuren@group621.co.za
Luyanda Mtukushe
mtukushe@group621.co.za
Instructed
by:
Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa Inc.
Ms R Sutherland, Ms Y
Moodley and Mr M Homveld
romany.sutherland@nortonrosefulbright.com
yishika.moodley@nortonrosefulbright.com
michael.homveld@nortonrosefulbright.com
[1]
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
[2]
(1306/18)
[2020] ZASCA 02
(31 January 2020)
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