Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 266South Africa
Universal Blending (Pty) Ltd v Henderson (2021/21636) [2023] ZAGPJHC 266 (24 March 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
24 March 2023
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Universal Blending (Pty) Ltd v Henderson (2021/21636) [2023] ZAGPJHC 266 (24 March 2023)
Universal Blending (Pty) Ltd v Henderson (2021/21636) [2023] ZAGPJHC 266 (24 March 2023)
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FLYNOTES:
TRADE SECRETS AND PRODUCT FORMULA
LABOUR
– Unlawful competition – Trade secrets – Company
seeking formula for product from former director
–
Contending that formula was its confidential information –
Seeking to interdict his use of the formula in competition
–
Whether company owned the formula – Evidence that a close
corporation owned the formula and that applicant
company attempted
to recreate the formula – Application dismissed.
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NUMBER
: 2021/21636
NOT
REPORTABLE
NOT
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES
NOT
REVISED
In
the matter between:
UNIVERSAL
BLENDING (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
SAREL
HENDERSON
Respondent
Heard
on:
7
March 2023
Delivered
on:
24 March 2023
##### JUDGMENT
JUDGMENT
WESLEY
AJ:
[1]
The respondent was employed by the
applicant from 2014 and also became a director and shareholder in
2019. He resigned as employee
and director in September 2020 and
returned his shares at the same time. The applicant alleges that the
respondent, through his
employment at the applicant, acquired
knowledge of the formula for manufacturing its “Roadsaver”
product, a bitumen
product that can be used to fill and seal potholes
and cracks in tarred surfaces, and that the respondent is now using
that knowledge
to produce the Roadsaver product in competition with
the applicant. The applicant contends that the respondent’s
conduct
is unlawful because the formula for producing the Roadsaver
product is a trade secret that it owns.
[2]
The applicant claims further that in fact
the respondent is the only person who knows the full formula for the
Roadsaver product,
because while still employed at the applicant he
was responsible for revising the formula for the product (to replace
an additive
that could no longer be used because it was found to be
carcinogenic). The applicant alleges that the respondent has refused
to
divulge the full formula to it despite demand.
[3]
In the circumstances, in April 2021 the
applicant launched an urgent application in which it sought the
following relief against
the respondent:
[3.1]
ordering the respondent to reveal to the
applicant, forthwith and immediately and in writing, the entire
composition and manufacturing
process of its proprietary
solvent-based pothole and crack filler known to it and the respondent
as “Roadsaver”;
[3.2]
interdicting and restraining the respondent
from competing with the applicant by using in any way, alone or with
any other persons
or entities, the applicant’s confidential
information, namely the formulation and manufacturing process of the
aforesaid
products, namely “Roadsaver”;
[3.3]
interdicting and restraining the respondent
from revealing or divulging to any persons or entities the
formulation and manufacturing
process of the applicant’s
aforesaid products;
[3.4]
interdicting and restraining the respondent
from patenting or otherwise exploiting, in any way, the formulation
and manufacturing
process of the applicant’s aforesaid
products.
[4]
The matter did not proceed on an urgent
basis and now comes before me as an ordinary opposed motion, with the
applicant seeking
final relief and the respondent seeking that the
application be dismissed.
# The relevant legal
principles
The relevant legal
principles
[5]
The unauthorised use of another’s
trade secrets is unlawful competition and can be interdicted, even in
the absence of a restraint
of trade (
Pexmart
CC and Others v H Mocke Construction (Pty) Ltd and Another
2019 (3) SA 117
(SCA) at [63] – [67] and [77]).
[6]
In order to establish a right to relief the
applicant must show that:
[6.1]
it
is the owner of the Roadsaver product;
[6.2]
the
product constitutes a trade secret in that:
[6.2.1.]
it relates to, and is capable of
application in, trade and industry;
[6.2.2.]
it
is secret or confidential; and
[6.2.3.]
it is of economic value to the applicant;
[6.3]
the
respondent is using the product to compete with the applicant.
[7]
Since the applicant seeks final relief in
motion proceedings, relief can only be granted if the facts as stated
by the respondent
together with the admitted facts in the applicant's
affidavits justify an order, unless the respondent’s
allegations or denials
“
are so
far-fetched or clearly untenable that the Court is justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers
”
(
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck
Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at 634I – 635C)
[8]
In
Fakie NO v
CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA
326
(SCA) at
[56]
, the Supreme Court of Appeal re-stated the test in
relation to “
far-fetched
”
allegations as follows:
“
A respondent's
version can be rejected in motion proceedings only if it is
'fictitious' or so far-fetched and clearly
untenable that it can
confidently be said, on the papers alone, that it is demonstrably and
clearly unworthy of credence.”
# The merits
The merits
## The nature of the
Roadsaver product and its use by the respondent
The nature of the
Roadsaver product and its use by the respondent
[9]
The contents of the respondent’s own
answering affidavit confirm that the composition and formula for the
manufacture of the
Roadsaver product are not generally known and have
substantial economic value. The respondent has also expressly
confirmed in his
answering affidavit that he intends competing with
the applicant. In the circumstances, and as rightly conceded by the
respondent’s
representative in argument, there is no dispute
that the Roadsaver product constitutes a trade secret and that the
respondent intends
making use of it to compete with the applicant
absent an order from this Court.
[10]
The main issue for determination by me then
is whether the applicant has proved that it is the owner of the
Roadsaver product.
## Ownership
Ownership
[11]
The applicant alleges in the founding
affidavit that it is the owner of the Roadsaver product, but it does
not clearly explain how
it acquired ownership, a point I return to in
more detail below. The respondent, on the other hand, expressly
denies that the applicant
is the owner. He asserts that he is the
owner or, otherwise, a close corporation called Pilot Lubricant CC
(“Pilot”)
is the owner of the product. Pilot is the
entity that historically supplied the Roadsaver product to the
applicant.
[12]
Since the applicant seeks final relief, I
must accept the respondent’s version that the applicant is not
the owner of the
Roadsaver product unless it is so far-fetched or
untenable that it falls to be rejected out of hand.
[13]
In my view, the respondent’s
contention that he is the owner of the Roadsaver product can be so
dismissed. The respondent
says that in 2016 he, of his own accord,
approached Mr CA Botes, the applicant’s main shareholder, who
gave him a list with
the names of the chemicals used to produce the
Roadsaver product. The respondent says that he used this list and,
through a process
of trial and error, eventually determined how to
manufacture the Roadsaver product. He says he did this without
financial support
from the applicant and using his own resources. The
respondent says that in the circumstances he developed the formula
independently
of the applicant and not for the applicant’s
benefit.
[14]
The contention is entirely implausible. The
respondent acknowledges that Mr Botes, who, as I have said, was the
applicant’s
main shareholder, provided him with at least the
starting point for recreating the formula in the form of the list of
chemicals.
The respondent acknowledges that he was an employee of the
applicant at this time. The respondent also himself says that at the
time Mr Botes provided him with the original formula the applicant
was facing increasing prices from its then supplier, Pilot,
which was
making its business unprofitable.
[15]
The respondent’s version in his
answering affidavit that he approached Mr Botes specifically to ask
for the names of the chemicals
used in the Roadsaver product so that
he could independently recreate the formula for his own account, is
also inconsistent with
what he said in his letter of resignation in
September 2020, a copy of which the applicant attached to its
founding affidavit,
and which the respondent did not deal with in his
answering affidavit. In that letter, the respondent indicated that
during the
course of a visit he made to Mr Botes, Mr Botes gave him
the chemical ingredients and asked him if he could do something with
them.
[16]
In these circumstances, the respondent’s
suggestion that Mr Botes assisted him to develop the formula for his
own benefit
and not for the applicant is simply not credible.
[17]
The respondent’s allegation that
Pilot is the lawful owner of the Roadsaver product requires more
careful consideration. As
I have indicated, Pilot is the firm that
historically supplied the Roadsaver product to the applicant.
[18]
The respondent attaches two documents to
his answering affidavit in support of his allegation. The first is an
email from Mr Johnny
Pillay, the sole member of Pilot, dated 31
October 2012 in which Mr Pillay refers to Roadsaver as a product
“
that I have formulated
”.
[19]
The second is a letter dated 11 July 2017
from Da Silva Attorneys to Mr Pillay. The letter indicates that it
encloses “
a draft response to
Cornelius Botes which he can then forward on his attorney
”.
There is no dispute that “
Cornelius
Botes
” is Mr Botes, the
applicant’s main shareholder. The draft response, to be sent by
Da Silva Attorneys on behalf of Pilot
to Mr Botes, is headed “
Re:
Pilot Lubricants CC/Universal Blending
”
and indicates that Da Silva Attorneys have been requested to assist
Mr Pillay regarding a draft agreement, “
prepared
by your offices and/or your attorneys
”.
The draft agreement itself is attached to the draft response. It is
an agreement of sale of Pilot’s intellectual
property rights in
the Roadsaver product to the applicant.
[20]
The draft response records that there are
various aspects of the agreement that need to be changed. It records
that the first major
issue that needs to be addressed is that Mr
Pillay “
in his capacity as a
member of a close corporation and in his personal capacity is the
owner of the product and the intellectual
Property and this should be
reflected accordingly
”. The draft
agreement records in this regard in paragraph 2.1 that the applicant
has “
co-developed
”
the Roadsaver product and in paragraph 2.3 that the applicant and
Pilot “
have jointly developed and
jointly own the Intellectual Property Rights
”
to the Roadsaver product. The draft response indicates that paragraph
2.1 “
needs to be deleted in its
entirety as [the applicant] has not been a co-developer as alleged
”
and that paragraph 2.3 must also be amended.
[21]
The respondent’s claim that Pilot is
the lawful owner of the Roadsaver product is consistent with his
allegation in his answering
affidavit that the reason he and Mr Botes
discussed recreating the Roadsaver formula in 2016 was because Pilot
had increased its
prices for the product to the extent that it was no
longer profitable for the applicant to continue purchasing the
product. If
the applicant was the owner of the product then, on the
face of it, it would not have needed to recreate the formula in order
to
escape its difficulty. It could simply have found another
manufacturer and provided that manufacturer with the formula to
produce
the product.
[22]
The draft agreement also supports the
respondent’s assertion in the answering affidavit that the
applicant initially considered
buying the formula from Pilot, but
could not reach agreement on an acceptable price.
[23]
Finally, the respondent’s claim that
the Roadsaver product is owned by Pilot is also consistent with what
he asserted at in
his letter of resignation in September 2020.
[24]
The simplest way for the applicant to have
dealt with the respondent’s claim would have been for it to
procure an affidavit
from Pilot confirming that it was not the owner
of the product and to have put this up along with its replying
affidavit, delivered
some two months after the answering affidavit.
The applicant did not do so and provided no explanation for this
omission.
[25]
The applicant also did not deal adequately
in the replying affidavit with the documents put up by the respondent
or the claims he
made in relation to ownership in his answering
affidavit. The applicant did not deal at all with the contents of Mr
Pillay’s
email of October 2012, while its only response to the
letter from Da Silva Attorneys to Mr Pillay in July 2017, and the
attached
draft response and agreement, was to say that it had never
before seen these documents and to point out that clause 2.3 of the
draft agreement recorded that the formula for the Roadsaver product
was jointly owned by the applicant and Pilot. The applicant
did not
though deal with the fact that the draft response recorded that this
clause needed to be amended. The applicant also did
not address at
all the substance of the respondent’s assertion, that in 2017
the applicant was struggling with high prices
from Pilot and engaged
in discussions with Pilot to purchase the formula for the Roadsaver
product from Pilot.
[26]
The applicant also went on to say in the
replying affidavit that Pilot “
only
supplied a portion of the formula, which was secret
”,
a statement that appears to suggest that Pilot owned at least some
portion of the formula and for which counsel for the
applicant could
not provide any other explanation.
[27]
The applicant did attach to its replying
affidavit an undated document on a Pilot letterhead headed
“
certificate of quality
”,
in which it is stated that Pilot “
are
the developers, blenders and manufacturers of the cold bitumen
product ‘Roadsaver’, used in the sealing of road
potholes
and cracks. We manufacture on behalf of Universal Blending (Pty) Ltd,
who are the owners, distributors and exporters of
the product
”.
The applicant provided no explanation though as to when this document
was created, or the circumstances surrounding its
creation, or any
proof that it even in fact emanated from Pilot.
[28]
What the document does indicate is that
Pilot developed the Roadsaver product. Documents attached to the
founding affidavit by the
applicant reflect the same claim. For
example, the applicant attached a letter on a Pilot letterhead, which
is also undated but
which the applicant says was prepared in October
2004, which records that “
CA Botes
approached Mrs EJ Van Assen (see CV on p36)
to
assist us
under contract to
develop a cold bitumen asphalt crack filler
”
(my underlining). The letter suggests that “
should
you require more information please do not hesitate to contact us at
the above company
”.
[29]
Curiously, the applicant also attached to
the founding affidavit another letter on a Pilot letterhead, also
undated, which is identical
to the letter I have just discussed save
that a paragraph has been inserted at the commencement of the letter
recording: “
Pilot Lubricants was
involved in the development of roadfix cold mix pothole filler. We
developed roadfix in conjunction with CSIR
(Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research), by supplying the secret formula and
improved it all the time in collaboration
with the owners, Universal
Blending Pty Ltd
”. Although it is
suggested in the founding affidavit that this letter was prepared at
around the same time as the first letter,
this cannot be correct,
because it is common cause that the applicant was only registered as
a company in 2012, and so could not
have been mentioned by name in a
letter drafted in 2004. No other explanation is provided as to the
circumstances in which this
second letter was drawn up, or who
prepared it, or how it came into the applicant’s possession.
[30]
To be clear, there is also support in the
papers for the applicant’s version that is the owner of the
Roadsaver product. The
letter I have just mentioned says this in
terms, as does the letter on a Pilot letterhead attached to the
replying affidavit that
I have discussed above. Other letters
attached to the founding affidavit, including a letter from the CSIR
to Roadfix International,
but marked for the attention of Mr Botes,
also seem to confirm Mr Botes’ role in developing the product
from 2004. The respondent’s
own allegations in his answering
affidavit confirm at least Mr Botes’ knowledge of some part of
the formula for manufacturing
the Roadsaver product, because Mr Botes
provided this to the respondent.
[31]
There is also evidence that the applicant
represented to third parties that it owned the Roadsaver product, for
example its discussions
with representatives from Hi-Eco-Teck (Pty)
in 2019 and its application to Agrement South Africa (Pty) Ltd for
certification of
the product around the same time, both of which are
discussed in the founding affidavit and are not disputed in the
answering affidavit.
[32]
There is not though any clear explanation
in the founding affidavit as to how the applicant acquired ownership
of the Roadsaver
product that satisfactorily resolves the evidence to
the contrary that I have identified above. The facts relating to the
acquisition
of ownership are dealt with vaguely by the applicant,
insofar as they are dealt with at all. The deponent to the founding
affidavit
alleges, for example, that the applicant developed the
Roadsaver product from 2004. But the applicant did not exist in 2004.
It
was only registered as a company in 2012. The deponent to the
founding affidavit makes the bare allegation that the applicant was
“
then known as Roadfix
International
”, but this also
does not appear to be correct. Roadfix International is clearly a
separate firm from the applicant, albeit
that Mr Botes appears to
have been the driving force behind both.
[33]
Finally, it is true that the respondent has
admitted that he provided the applicant with the formula he had
developed at a meeting
in November 2019 and signed various documents
on that date in which he acknowledged that the applicant owned the
formula. The respondent
asserts, however, that the statements in
these documents are not true and that he was coerced and intimidated
into signing the
documents, a claim that I certainly cannot dismiss
simply on the papers before me.
[34]
This brings me back to the important point.
I am not required in this application to try and weigh up the
probabilities of the parties’
respective versions. I am
required to determine only whether the respondent’s version is
so improbable that it falls to be
rejected out of hand. Having regard
to the facts I have set out above, I do not consider this to be the
case. It may well be that
the applicant has answers to all of the
concerns I have raised above. But they do not appear on the papers
before me, and in the
absence of such answers I cannot conclude that
the respondent’s version is so far-fetched that it can
confidently be said,
on the papers alone, that it is demonstrably and
clearly unworthy of credence.
[35]
In the circumstances, for purposes of
determining the applicant’s right to the final relief it seeks
in this application,
I must accept the respondent’s version
that the Roadsaver product was owned by Pilot and find that the
applicant has not
proved that it is the owner of the Roadsaver
product.
# Conclusion
Conclusion
[36]
I have found that the applicant has not
established that it is the owner of the Roadsaver product. Counsel
for the applicant accepted
in oral argument before me that all of the
relief sought by the applicant is predicated on a finding that it is
the owner of the
product. In the circumstances, it follows that the
applicant has not established a right to any of the relief sought in
the notice
of motion.
[37]
Having reached this conclusion, it is not
necessary for me to consider the respondent’s further
objections to the relief sought,
namely that it is too vague to be
enforceable and that he had already handed over the formula rendering
the relief requiring him
to do so superfluous. It is also not
necessary for me to consider whether I should admit the supplementary
affidavit delivered
by the respondent in November 2022, which
admission the applicant opposed, although for completeness I note
that the respondent
did not bring any formal application for the
admission of that affidavit, and, in any event, I do not consider
that its contents
are relevant to any of the issues to be determined
in the application, on which basis I would not have been minded to
admit it.
[38]
Both parties sought costs in the event that
they were successful and there is no reason why costs of the
application should not
follow the result. Although the respondent
suggested faintly that I should make a special order of costs against
the applicant,
no proper basis was advanced for such an order and I
do not consider that there is one.
[39]
In the circumstances, I make the following
order:
1.
The application is dismissed;
2.
The applicant is to pay the respondent’s costs.
MA WESLEY
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Local Division,
Johannesburg
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, by being uploaded to
Case
Lines
and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for
hand-down is deemed to be
24 March 2023
.
Appearances:
On behalf of the
applicant:
Adv M Coetzee
Instructed
by: Vercueil
Attorneys
On behalf of the
respondent:
Mr
CE Boden of JJS Manton Attorneys
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