Case Law[2023] ZAGPJHC 595South Africa
Botes v Xhantini NO (Reasons) (2018/27381) [2023] ZAGPJHC 595 (16 May 2023)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
16 May 2023
Headnotes
in the matter of Zweni v Minister of Law and Order [1993] 1 All SA 365 (A). Despite the aforegoing the Defendant has elected to request reasons for that interlocutory
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Botes v Xhantini NO (Reasons) (2018/27381) [2023] ZAGPJHC 595 (16 May 2023)
Botes v Xhantini NO (Reasons) (2018/27381) [2023] ZAGPJHC 595 (16 May 2023)
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sino date 16 May 2023
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER:
2018/27381
NOT REPORTABLE
NOT OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES
REVISED
30.05.23
In
the matter between:
DINA
JOHANA CATHRINA BOTES
Plaintiff
and
NOSINOTHI
SELINA XHANTINI N.O.
Defendant
Neutral
Citation
:
Dina Johana Cathrina Botes v Nosinothi Selina
Xhantini N.O.
(Case No: 2018/27381) [2023] ZAGPJHC 595 (16 May
2023).
WRITTEN REASONS
IN TERMS OF SUBRULE
49(1)(c)
WANLESS
AJ
Introduction
[1]
In this matter the Defendant raised a Special Plea of prescription.
It was agreed between the parties that in terms of
subrule 33(4) this
issue would be separated from all the other issues and determined by
this Court.
[2]
On the 16
th
of May 2023 the issue of prescription was
heard by this Court. The Plaintiff’s cause of action in the
matter is that one
IVY NOKUSA XHANTINI, an erstwhile attorney of this
Court and now deceased
(“the deceased”)
,
negligently allowed the Plaintiff’s claim against the Road
Accident Fund
(“RAF”)
for damages to prescribe. In
the premises, the Defendant in the action is now the
executrix
of the deceased’s estate.
[3]
It is common cause that the Plaintiff’s claim against the RAF
did in fact prescribe after the Plaintiff had given
the said attorney
a mandate to represent the Plaintiff. However, the Special Plea of
the Defendant is that the Plaintiff’s
claim against the
Defendant has also prescribed in terms of subsections 11(d) read
with12(1) and (3) of the Prescription Act 68
0f 1969
(“the
Act”).
It is the Special Plea which this Court is asked to
determine.
[4]
In the Defendant’s Special Plea the Defendant relies on three
(3) different dates (in the alternative) upon which
it is alleged the
Plaintiff should have reasonably been aware of the identity of the
debtor and, by the exercise of reasonable
care, the facts giving rise
to the debt.
[5]
It was common cause that the Defendant bore the onus to prove, on a
balance of probabilities, that the claim of the Plaintiff
had
prescribed and that the Defendant had also attracted the duty to
begin adducing evidence in proof thereof.
The
evidence
[6]
This Court originally understood that the Defendant intended leading
the
viva voce
evidence of two (2) witnesses. Be that as it may
the Defendant ultimately relied on the evidence of a single witness
only, namely
that of one FERZANA MOHAMMED MIA
(“Mia”)
.
Mia, an attorney of this Court, gave evidence before this Court that,
inter alia
, she knew the deceased prior to the deceased’s
death; took over the files in the deceased’s practice for a
period of
time; addressed letters to clients of the deceased and
handed over files of the deceased’s practice to the Legal
Practice
Council. When testifying, she referred to various documents
which were in a trial bundle and were admitted into evidence by
consent.
[7]
Mia’s evidence before this Court was more remarkable for what
it failed to prove rather than for what it did in
fact prove. Under
cross-examination she readily conceded (and this was factually
correct) that she could assist this Court in no
manner whatsoever as
to whether the Plaintiff would have been aware at any of the dates
and based on any of the facts as relied
upon by the Defendant that
the deceased had failed to take the necessary steps to lodge the
Plaintiff’s claim with the RAF
and thus allowed the Plaintiff’s
claim to prescribe. In fact, Mia testified that she never met the
Plaintiff at any stage
and the Plaintiff’s file was not one of
the files she came across when she took care of the deceased’s
practice after
the death of the deceased.
[8]
Not surprisingly, in light of the fact that the onus of proof lay
with the Defendant the Plaintiff closed her case without
leading any
evidence. Adv Killian asked this Court to dismiss the Defendant’s
Special Plea with costs. Adv Jongani, whilst
accepting that the
evidence of Mia did not assist the Defendant in discharging the onus
incumbent upon the Defendant
(and lamenting the fact that he had
not been given the opportunity to cross-examine the Plaintiff)
nevertheless attempted to argue before this Court that the Special
Plea should be successful.
[9]
This argument was based,
inter alia
, on the fact that he
contended that this Court should, in
lieu
of the failure of
the Plaintiff to place any
viva voce
evidence before this
Court in respect of the Defendant’s Special Plea of
prescription, have regard to the pleadings in this
matter, with
particular regard to the requests for further particulars and the
replies thereto which had been exchanged between
the parties.
[10]
Adv Jongani
also referred this Court to the matters of
Gunase
v Anirudh
[1]
and
Macleod
v Kweyiya.
[2]
Conclusion
[11]
It is trite that a Court cannot decide a matter on pleadings alone.
Pleadings do not constitute evidence. As for
Gunase
this
matter merely confirms the principle that a creditor cannot delay the
onset of prescription by wilful or negligent inaction
and, as such,
does not assist the Defendant in this particular matter. Also, the
Defendant’s reliance on
Macleod
was completely misplaced
since this matter is authority for the principle that a defendant
bears the full evidentiary burden to
prove a plea of prescription,
including the date upon which a plaintiff obtained actual or
constructive knowledge of the debt and
this burden only shifts to the
plaintiff if the defendant has established a
prima facie
case.
[12]
On the basis that pleadings are not evidence; the Defendant had not
even established a
prima facie
case and had clearly failed to
discharge the onus incumbent upon the Defendant to prove, on a
balance of probabilities, that the
Plaintiff’s claim against
the Defendant had prescribed, this Court made an order whereby the
Special Plea was dismissed,
with costs. This was all made clear to
the legal representatives during the course of the hearing.
[13]
At the time that this Court made that order it was noted and placed
on record that an
ex tempore
judgment would not be given
(whilst it could have been) since it appeared (apart from the obvious
merits of the matter) that the
order was not appealable as it is not
final in effect, definitive of the rights of the parties and does not
dispose of a substantial
portion of the relief claimed within the
meaning thereof as held in the matter of
Zweni v Minister of
Law and Order
[1993] 1 All SA 365
(A).
Despite the aforegoing
the Defendant has elected to request reasons for that interlocutory
order (not judgment), presumably in terms
of subrule 49(1)(c). In
this regard the Defendant’s notice requesting reasons does not
specify in terms of which rule or
on what basis the Defendant
requests or is entitled to reasons for this Court’s order.
[14]
Nevertheless, despite the aforegoing and the onerous workload under
which this Court is placed, this Court has elected, in
the interests
of justice, to provide the reasons for the order made (as set out
above).
B.C. WANLESS
Acting Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng Division,
Johannesburg
Heard
: 16 May
2023
Ex Tempore
: 16
May 2023
Written Reasons
Requested
22 May 2023
Written Reasons
Provided
: 30 May 2023
Appearances
For
Plaintiff
:
J
Killian
Instructed
by
:
A
Wolmarans Incorporated
For
Defendant
:
N
Jongani
Instructed
by
:
Fairbridges
Wertheim Becker Attorneys
[1]
2012 (2) SA 398
(SCA).
[2]
2013
(6) SA 1
(SCA).
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