Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 642South Africa
Nkgau v Road Accident Fund (23282/16) [2022] ZAGPJHC 642 (17 August 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
17 August 2022
Headnotes
causation should be distinguished from quantification. Quantification is depended not on proof on a balance of probabilities but on the Court’s estimation of the likelihood of a future state of affairs. In the case of uncertainty, the Court should make the estimate in favour of the Plaintiff, provided that the best evidence was led.
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## Nkgau v Road Accident Fund (23282/16) [2022] ZAGPJHC 642 (17 August 2022)
Nkgau v Road Accident Fund (23282/16) [2022] ZAGPJHC 642 (17 August 2022)
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sino date 17 August 2022
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(SOUTH
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION)
CASE
NO: 23282/16
REPORTABLE:
NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
REVISED.
YES
17
August 2022
In
the matter between:
NKGAU
L
Plaintiff
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
JUDGEMENT
20d186b024084f5989a9f9e3294c194820d186b024084f5989a9f9e3294c1948-1
MATSEMELA
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an action for delictual damages in
terms of the Road Accident Fund Act arising out of personal injuries
sustained as a result
of a motor vehicle collision that occurred on
the 12 August 2012.
[2] On the 27th of
October 2021, the Judge Matojane granted an order whereby the
Defendant’s defence in the principal action
was dismissed and
the matter will proceed by way of default judgment.
[3] By agreement between
the parties liability was conceded in favour of the Plaintiff in
September 2014. The quantification of
Plaintiff`s damages remains in
dispute.
ISSUES
FOR DETERMINATION
[4] This court has to
determine the following:
4.1. Past loss of
earnings
4.2. Future loss of
earnings and earning capacity.
PAST AND FUTURE
MEDICAL EXPENSES AND GENERAL DAMAGES
[5] Counsel for the
plaintiff addressed the Court that plaintiff abandons his claim for
past hospital and medical expenses.
[6] The Plaintiff served
and filed a RAF 4 Serious Injury Assessment Report Form by Dr. Kruger
who qualifies the Plaintiff’s
injuries as serious in terms of
the Narrative Test 5.3 (Severe long-term mental or severe long-term
behavioural disturbance or
disorder). The issue of general damages
and Section 17(4)(a) undertaking is postponed sine die pending the
outcome of the full
court decision which has been constituted by
acting JP Ledwaba regarding these issues.
EMPLOYMENT AND
EDUCATIONAL HISTORY
[7] The Plaintiff
completed a grade 12 level of education at Springs Technical College
in 2010. He completed his theoretical N3
in aircraft maintenance in
June 2011 and his practical training in December 2011. He commenced
his with his apprenticeship at Execujet
in January 2012 in order to
become an Aircraft Maintenance Engineer (“AME”).
[8] The accident
intervened on 20 August 2012 and after 3 months off duty he was able
to return and was officially appointed as
an apprentice AME from
December 2012
.
He passed his trade test on 09 December 2014
and qualified as an aircraft mechanic at the same time. He worked as
an apprentice
AME from 10 December 2012 up to July 2015. He was then
promoted to learner AME until May 2018 and was appointed as a
qualified
AME in June 2018 to current
.
JOB DESCRIPTION
[9] His employment
generally consists of visual inspections and then hands on removal
and replacements of the following components:
9.1. Airframe,
9.2. Engines, and
9.3. Wheels
9.4. His job demands is
stipulated as a Medium work category occupation
.
LOSS OF EARNINGS
[10]
To claim loss of earnings or earning capacity the Plaintiff must
prove the physical disabilities resulting in the loss of earnings
or
earning capacity and also actual patrimonial loss.
[1]
[11]
Loss of earnings or earning capacity is assessed under the Lex
Aquilia on the basis that the Defendant must make good on the
difference between the value of the Plaintiff’s estate after
the commission of the delict and the value it would have had
if the
delict had not been committed.
[2]
[12]
There must be proof that the disability gives rise to a patrimonial
loss, this, in turn, will depend on the occupation or nature
of the
work which the Plaintiff did before the accident, or would probably
have done if he had not been disabled.
[3]
[13]
In
De
Klerk v Absa Bank Ltd And Others
[4]
the court held that causation
should be distinguished from quantification. Quantification is
depended not on proof on a balance
of probabilities but on the
Court’s estimation of the likelihood of a future state of
affairs. In the case of uncertainty,
the Court should make the
estimate in favour of the Plaintiff, provided that the best evidence
was led.
CONTIGENCIES
[14]
Once the value of the income which the Plaintiff will lose in future
has been ascertained, contingencies has to be taken into
account. In
Southern
Insurance
Association
Ltd v Bailey NO
[5]
it was held that any enquiry into damages for loss of earning
capacity is of its nature speculative, as it involves a prediction
as
to the future. All that the Court can do is to make an estimate,
which is often a very rough estimate, of the present value
of the
loss.
[15] It is trite that
where the method of actuarial computation is adopted in assessing
damages for loss of earning capacity, it
does not mean that the trial
Judge is tied down by actuarial calculations. The court has "a
large discretion to award what
the court considers right".
[16] One of the elements
in exercising that discretion is the making of a discount for
"contingencies" or the "vicissitudes
of life".
These include such matters as the possibility that the plaintiff may
in the result have less than a "normal"
expectation of
life; and that he may experience periods of unemployment by reason of
incapacity due to illness or accident, or
to labour unrest or general
economic conditions.
[18]
The technique of assessing damages involves consideration of relevant
events which may occur or relevant conditions which may
arise in the
future. Even when it cannot be said to have been proved, on a balance
of probability justice may require that what
is called a contingency
or allowance be made for a possibility of that kind. See
Burger
v Union National South British Insurance CO
.
[6]
[19] It is trite that the
Plaintiff’s capacity to earn an income has to be impaired. It
is only once impairment has, as a
fact, been established, that the
question of quantification arises, and that the question of
appropriate contingency provisions
fits into the quantification
exercise not the first, enquiry. The approach would firstly be
whether there is a conceptual difference
between the question whether
a plaintiff has suffered an impairment of earning capacity. This has
to be determined on a balance
of probability in that plaintiff has
the onus to discharge. The answer to this question is at least
theoretically answered affirmatively
if the plaintiff will have
established a 51% chance of impairment being present.
[20]
Secondly is whether the plaintiff will in fact suffer a loss of
income in the future. The answer to this question is an assessment
in
respect of which there is no onus in the traditional sense. This
assessment involves the exercise of quantifying as best one
and the
chance of the loss actually occurring. The answer to this question is
provided by the best match between the likelihood
of a loss been
suffered and the fraction expressed as a percentage.
[7]
[21]
The rate of the discount cannot be assessed on any logical basis. The
assessment must be largely arbitrary and must depend
upon the trial
judge’s impression of the case. See “
MVA
Handbook”
[8]
[22]
In
Road
Accident Fund v Guedes
[9]
the court referred with approval to “The Quantum Yearbook”,
2004 by R Koch at 106 under the heading 'General contingencies',
where it states that when: “assessing damages for loss of
earnings or support, it is usual for a deduction to be made for
general contingencies for which no explicit allowance has been made
in the actuarial calculation. The deduction is the prerogative
of the
Court. . . . There are no fixed rules as regards general
contingencies. “
[23]
Then follows what is termed a 'sliding scale' and the following is
stated: 'Sliding Scale: % for year to retirement age, ie
25% for a
child, 20% for a youth and 10% in middle age. See
Goodall
v President Insurance Co Ltd
[10]
[24]
The
Quantum Yearbook,
[11]
under
the heading “General Contingencies” where it is stated:
“
There
are no fixed rules as regards general contingencies.guidelines can be
helpful:sliding scale of ½ % per year to retirement
age...”.
[25] A short period of
exposure to the risk of adversity justifies a lower deduction than
would be appropriate to a longer period.
MEDICO LEGAL EXPERTS
V MOOLMAN
/OCCUPATIONAL THERAPIST
[26] V Moolman noted in
his report that based on the Plaintiff`s lifting abilities he tested
suited for work in the Light Work Category.
This is not a match for
his pre- accident postion as apprentice aircraft mechanic. His
capacity for light work is only a partial
match for his current
position. It appears as if the Plaintiff finds himself in a position
where his employer is lenient towards
his limitations by not
assigning work to him which would require heavy lifting.
[27] He does however find
himself in situations where he would not have a technician available
to assist him where he would then
have to exceed his safe lifting
capacity especially when he has to do on-site repairs which, for
preservation purposes is not recommended.
His work capacity has been
compromised as a result of the accident related injuries. From a
psychological perspective it appears
that he continues to have
difficulties with bad moods and impatient behavior which has a
negative impact on relationships at work.
It appears that these are
worse when he has to work under pressure.
[28] The Plaintiff stated
that that he finds working in the aviation industry too stressful and
he does not envision himself doing
this work in the longer term due
to the difficulties he experiences at times when he is under
pressure.His emotional difficulties
have made a negative impact on
his level of competence at work. His ability to progress to working
on bigger aircraft and thus
handling and manipulating components has
also been compromised, thus promotion in his career has been
curtailed.
L. LINDE AND K JOOSTE/
INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS
[29] L Linde and K Jooste
noted in their report that Pre-morbidly the Plaintiff would have
continued with his career at Execujet
and would have developed in a
similar way as it has to date. However, he would have been
psychologically and physically healthy
and therefore qualified for
promotion to the position of Senior AME.
[30] As a Senior AME he
would have earned within the Patterson C5 level. He would probably
have continued in this position until
his retirement age of 65. Post-
morbidly, when interviewed in 2015 about his future aspirations the
Plaintiff stated that he aspires
to be promoted to the role of Senior
AME.15.6. In his 2020 interview he stated that his physical
difficulties at work are managed
by an assistant who can do most of
the heavy lifting. He did however note that the stress and
responsibilities at work have increased
which in turn is exacerbating
his headaches and overall emotional and psychological difficulties
and composure.
[31] They explained that
he does have a passion for his work and he does enjoy his work,
however he does not believe his physical
capabilities and
psychological state , post-morbidly, is adequate to keep him going in
the industry. He cannot see himself coping
long-term physically and
mentally.
[32] They received
collateral information indicates that the Plaintiff still has
potential to Be promoted to Senior AME but that
such promotion has
been delayed by at least two years. Mokoena confirmed that the
Plaintiff has physical limitations but that they
do accommodate him.
Mokoena however added that these limitations might cause problems for
him as a Senior AME because as a Senior
you have to do everything on
your own. So some of the things that are expected from a senior to be
able to do, the plaintiff cannot
do due to the accident.
[33] Mokoena and Snyman
confirmed that the work that the Plaintiff does is highly stressful
as they work with people`s lives essentially,
and with a promotion
there will be more overtime hours.
[34] The Plaintiff will
probably not be able to cope with the demands of the more senior
position, as he is already experiencing
difficulties in his position
as AME even although he is enjoying a degree of sympathy. He will
suffer at least a two year delay
before his appointment as a Senior
AME.
[35] When taking the
collateral information and expert opinions in consideration he will
battle even more to cope with the demands
of this more senior
position. It is foreseen that he will at best return to his position
of AME after a period of 12-24 months,
including a period of
management of poor performance and then being declared incompetent to
act as Senior AME.
[36] There is a real risk
that the Plaintiff will resign at this stage as he may be
disheartened and unmotivated to continue in
his previous position as
AME. A higher contingency deduction should be applied for the risk
that he will resign at a young age.
Alternatively, should he persist
in his position as AME it is not foreseen that he will be working
until the usual retirement age
and probably the Plaintiff will not
work beyond the retirement age of 55.
ACTUARIAL CALCULATIONS
[37] GA Whittaker
prepared calculations in determining the Plaintiff’s past and
future loss of earnings and earning capacity.
Post-accident 2 year
delay in promotion to Senior AME i.e. 01 January 2023. Returns to
working as AME from 01 July 2024 increasing
in line with inflation
until retirement age 65.
Past Loss
Value of income uninjured
R 1 021 529
Less contingency 5 % R 51
076
R 970 453
Value of income injured R
594 629
Less contingency 5% R 29
731
R 564 898
Net past loss R 405 555
Future Loss
Value of income uninjured
R 16 747 946
Less contingency 17.5% R
2 930 891
R 13 817 055
Value of income injured R
10 234 270
Less contingency 37,5% R
3 873 851
R 6 396 419
Net future loss R 7 420
637
Total net loss R 7 826
192
Loss after application of
the limit
Net past loss R 282 338
Net future loss R 6 176
755
R 6 459 093
Applying the same
scenario with a retirement age of 55 the net loss after application
of the limit is R 6 798 271.
[38] I have considered
all the arguments, expert reports and actuarial calculations and
decided to follow the actuarial calculation
by GA Whittaker. I came
to the conclusion that 15% pre-morbid and 35% postage morbid
contingencies should apply. The contingency
differential spread is
thus 20%. Having said that I therefore make the following order:
ORDER
The Defendant is liable
100% for the Plaintiffs’ proven damages. The Defendant is to
pay the Plaintiff an amount of R 6 459 093
for past and future
loss of earnings.
MOLEFE
MATSEMELA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE SOUTH GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION
Date
of hearing:
25 MAY 2022
Date
of judgment:
17 AUGUST 2022
For
the Plaintiff
ADV. A Louw
Instructed
by Erasmus
De
Klerk Inc
[1]
See
.
RUDMAN V ROAD ACCIDENT FUND 2003 SA 234 (SCA).
[2]
See
SANTAM
VERSEKERINGSMAATSKAPPY BEPERK V BEYLEVELD 1973(2) SA146(A) 150 B-D
[3]
See
UNION
AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CO LIMITED V COETZEE 1970(1) SA295 (A) AT
300A.
[4]
2003(4)
SA 315 (SCA)
[5]
1984
(1) SA 98
(A) FROM para 99-100
[6]
1975 4 SA 72 (W) 75.
[7]
See
De
Klerk v ABSA Bank Ltd and Others
2003(4)
SA 315 (SCA) went on length to explain the difference between
causation and quantification of damages .
[8]
BY
D P HONEY AND H J
NEWDIGATE
PAGE 176).
[9]
2006
(5) SA 583
(SCA) at Paragraph [9] at 587 to 588
[10]
1978
(1) SA 389 (W)
[11]
2014
by Robert Kock (Actuary) at 114
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