Case Law[2024] ZAGPPHC 658South Africa
Mkhari and Another v Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship Claim and Others (38689/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 658 (1 July 2024)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria)
1 July 2024
Judgment
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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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## Mkhari and Another v Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship Claim and Others (38689/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 658 (1 July 2024)
Mkhari and Another v Chairperson of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship Claim and Others (38689/2022) [2024] ZAGPPHC 658 (1 July 2024)
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sino date 1 July 2024
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 38689/2022
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES:
YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES
DATE:
1/7/2024
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
MKHARI,
RISMATI WILSON
First
Applicant
MKHARI
ROYAL FAMILY
Second
Applicant
and
THE
CHAIRPERSON OF THE AD HOC PANEL ON THE
RESTORATION OF THE VATSONGA
KINGSHIP CLAIM
First
Respondent
SHIRINDA,
SHIRHAMI
Second
Respondent
MOPAI,
ZAMOKUHLE BM
Third
Respondent
THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Fourth
Respondent
THE
MINISTER OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS
Fifth
Respondent
THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL:
DEPARTMENT
OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE AND TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS
Sixth
Respondent
MUKHARI,
HLEKANI SAMUEL
Seventh
Respondent
THE
NJHAKANJHAKA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
Eighth
Respondent
MUKHARI,
SIKHETO THOMAS
Ninth
Respondent
THE
KHENSANI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
Tenth
Respondent
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON
1 JULY 2024
CP
WESLEY AJ
Introduction
1.
According to the notice of motion, in this application the applicants
seek the following relief:
1.1 In terms of prayer 1,
an order that the “
Report on the Reconsideration for the
Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship Claim by Rismati Wilson Mkhari,
prepared by Mopai ZBM
and Shirinda SE”
, dated 29 October
2021 (“the October Report”), under the signature of the
second and third respondents, be declared
not to constitute a report
in compliance with the mandate of the Ad-hoc Panel in terms of the
order of court of 21 September 2020
by Molopa-Sethosa J, under case
number 12543/2016, and that the October Report be declared to be
unlawful and invalid, and be reviewed
and set aside.
1.2 In terms of prayer 2,
an order that, in consequence of prayer 1, the fourth
respondent’s
decision as per President’s Act No. 24 (81/172488 (Z 19E))
dated 19 February 2022, declining the first
applicant’s
Vatsonga Kingship claim,
be declared to be unlawful and
invalid, and be reviewed and set aside.
1.3 In
terms of prayer 3, an order that fourth respondent is to consider
only the
“
Report of the Ad hoc
Panel for the Reconsideration of the Vatsonga Kingship claim”,
dated 28 July 2021
(”the July
report”)
, under the signature of the first
respondent, and to make a new decision within 30 (thirty) days from
the date of the order being
handed down, on the first applicant’s
Vatsonga Kingship claim in accordance with this report and its
recommendations only.
1.4 In
terms of prayer 4, in the alternative to prayer 3, an order that the
decision of the fourth respondent mentioned in prayer
2 be
substituted in terms of section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of the Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act,
[1]
with a decision as follows:
“
Having
considered the ‘Report of the Ad Hoc panel for the
Reconsideration of the Vatsonga Kingship claim’,
dated
28 July 2021, under the signature of the first respondent, it is
decided that the Vatsonga Kingship claim of the first applicant
is
recognised in terms of section 3 of the Traditional Kho-San
Leadership Act 3 of 2019, read with
section 2A
of the
Traditional
Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
.”
1.5 In terms of prayer 5,
an order that the fifth respondent, in consequence of prayer 4, is to
issue a new President’s Act,
recognising the first applicant’s
Vatsonga Kingship claim, within 30 (thirty) days from the date of an
order being issued.
1.6 In terms of prayer 6,
an order that any respondent who opposes the application be ordered
to pay the applicants’ costs.
2. The applicants submit
that the October Report and fourth respondent’s decision of 19
February 2022 fall to be reviewed
and set aside in terms of the PAJA
and, failing that, in terms of the principle of legality. The fourth,
fifth and sixth respondents
contest this.
3. The crux of the
dispute between the parties, and the issue that falls to be decided,
is whether or not the October Report and
fourth respondent’s
decision of 19 February 2022 fall to be reviewed and set aside.
The
parties
4.
The first applicant is
Rismati Wilson Mkhari.
He is the most senior member of the Mkhari Royal Family. He brought
the application for the recognition
of the Vatsonga Kingship on
behalf of the second applicant.
5.
The second applicant is
the Mkhari Royal
Family. It purports
inter alia
to administer the affairs of the Vatsonga Kingdom.
6.
The first respondent is
the Chairperson of the
Ad-hoc Panel on the Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship
(“the
Ad-hoc Panel”)
. He is Professor
Jabulani Simon Maphalala. He was appointed to the Ad-hoc Panel for
his expertise in history.
7.
The second respondent is Advocate Shirhami Shirinda, an advocate of
the High Court of South Africa, and a member of the
the
Ad-hoc Panel.
He was appointed to the
Ad-hoc Panel for his expertise in law.
8.
The third respondent is Ms Z
amokuhle BM
Mopai, a member of the
the Ad-hoc Panel.
She was appointed to the Ad-hoc Panel for her expertise in traditions
and customs.
9.
The first, second and third applicants are cited as members of the
Ad-hoc Panel, and
out of the interest that
they have in the relief that is sought.
10.
The fourth respondent is the President of the Republic of South
Africa, who is cited in his official capacity.
He took the
decision of 19 February 2022 to decline the Vatsonga Kingship claim.
11.
The fifth respondent is the Minister of Cooperative Governance and
Traditional Affairs, who is cited in her official capacity.
She
administered the
Traditional
Leadership and Governance Framework Act,
[2]
which was repealed with effect from 1 April 2021,
[3]
and also appointed the first, second and third respondents to the
Ad-hoc Panel.
12.
The sixth respondent is the Director General of the Department of
Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, who is cited
in his
official capacity.
13.
The seventh respondent is Hlekani Samuel Mukhari, who is cited as the
current senior traditional leader of the Njhakanjhaka
Traditional
Council.
14.
The eighth respondent is the Njhakanjhaka Traditional Council.
15.
The ninth respondent is Sikheto Thomas Mukhari, who is cited as the
current senior traditional leader of the Khensani Traditional
Council.
16.
The tenth respondent is the Khensani Traditional Council.
17.
The seventh to tenth respondents made submissions to the
the
Ad-hoc Panel in the course of its investigations, and they are
likewise cited out of the interest that they have in the relief
that
is sought.
18. The application was
opposed by the fourth, fifth and sixth respondents alone.
The relevant facts
19.
The relevant facts are, in brief, as follows.
19.1 On 31 August 2010
the first applicant, on behalf of the second applicant, lodged an
application for the restoration of the
Vatsonga Kingship with the
Commission on Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (“the
Commission”). The Commission
was established with effect from 1
February 2010 in terms of the
Framework Act.
19.2 According to
subsection 25(1) of the Framework Act, the Commission had authority
to investigate and make recommendations on
any traditional leadership
dispute and claim contemplated in subsection 25(2). Subsection
25(2)(a)(i) provided that the Commission
had authority to investigate
and make recommendations on
inter alia
a case where there was
doubt as to whether a kingship was established in accordance with
customary law and customs. In terms of
subsection 25(2)(a)(iv) the
Commission could investigate and make recommendations on claims by
communities to be recognised as
kingships.
19.3 In May 2015, after
having concluded its investigations, the Commission issued its
report. In its report the Commission recommended
that the Vatsonga
Kingship claim be declined.
19.4 In August 2015 the
fourth respondent, acting in terms of section 26(3) of the Framework
Act, duly declined the Vatsonga Kingship
claim.
19.5 In 2016, and feeling
aggrieved by the fourth respondent’s decision as foresaid, the
applicants took the Commission’s
report and recommendation, and
the fourth respondent’s decision, on review to the High Court,
Gauteng Division.
19.6 On 21 September 2020
the High Court, per the honourable Molopa-Sethosa J, made an order in
the review application which provided,
apart from costs, for the
following:
19.6.1 the decision taken
by the Commission in May 2015 to recommend to the fourth respondent
that the Vatsonga Kingship claim be
declined was reviewed and set
aside;
19.6.2 the decision taken
by the fourth respondent in August 2015 to accept the Commission’s
recommendation that the Vatsonga
Kingship claim be declined was
reviewed and set aside;
19.6.3 the fifth
respondent was directed to, within thirty days of the order, appoint
suitably qualified members to form an ad-hoc
panel solely for the
purpose of reconsidering the Vatsonga Kingship claim;
19.6.4 the ad-hoc panel
was directed to conduct its work and issue a final report, with
recommendations, within 6 months of being
appointed; and
19.6.5 the fourth
respondent was directed to make a fresh decision in terms of the
Framework Act within sixty days of receiving
the final report of the
ad-hoc panel in terms of section 26(3) of the Framework Act.
19.7 On 27 January 2021,
the fifth respondent appointed the first, second and third
respondents as members of the Ad-hoc Panel.
19.8
On 28 July 2021, after having concluded its investigations, the
Ad-hoc Panel issued its report, under the signature of the
first
respondent. This is the July Report. The July Report recommended that
the
Vatsonga Kingship claim be upheld.
19.9
On 29 October 2021 the Ad-hoc Panel purported to issue a second
report, under the signatures of the second and third respondents.
This is the October Report. The October Report recommended that the
Vatsonga Kingship claim be declined.
19.10 Both the July
Report and the October Report were then presented to the fourth
respondent for consideration before making his
decision on the
Vatsonga Kingship claim.
19.11 On 19 February
2022, after considering the July Report and the October Report, the
fourth respondent decided, as per President’s
Act No. 24
(81/172488 (Z 19E)), to accept the recommendation that was made in
the October Report and thus declined the Vatsonga
Kingship claim. The
decision read, in the material part, as follows:
“
And
whereas
on
21 December 2021, the Presidency received two reports from members of
the Ad-Hoc Panel. One report from Professor Maphalala (the
Chairperson) and another report by the other two members of the
Ad-Hoc Panel, Ms Mopai and Adv Shirinda.
And
whereas
I have considered the
two reports provided by the members of the Ad-Hoc Panel.
I
now
in terms of
section 26(3)
of
the
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003
,
accept the majority report by Ms Mopai and Adv Shirinda, which
concluded the Vatsonga do not have a kingship.
The Vatsonga
kingship’s claim as lodged by Mr Risimati Wilson Mkhari and the
Mkhari Royal Council is therefore declined.”
(bold in the original)
20.
The applicants contend that the July Report is the
only legitimate report of the Ad-hoc Panel. The fourth, fifth and
sixth respondents
contest this. The particular bases on which the
parties rely for their opposing contentions are not presently
material. What is
material, however, is the fact that neither the
fourth, fifth and sixth respondents, nor anyone else, has taken any
steps in order
to have the July Report reviewed and set aside by a
court.
21. The fourth, fifth and
sixth respondents contend in turn that the July Report and the
October Report together constitute the
report of the Ad-hoc Panel.
The
October Report
22.
For purposes of this part of the judgment, this court will accept for
the sake of argument
that the
July Report and the October Report together constitute the report of
the Ad-hoc Panel.
23.
In
section 1
of the PAJA the term “administrative action”
is defined as meaning, for present purposes-
“
any decision
taken by ... an organ of state, when ... exercising a public power or
performing a public function in terms of any
legislation ... which
adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct,
external legal effect ...”
.
24.
According to
Competition
Commission of South Africa v Telkom SA Ltd and
Other,
[4]
t
here
are two separate aspects of the definition of administrative action
in the PAJA. These are, first, the requirement that the
decision must
be one of an administrative nature and, second, the requirement that
the decision must have the capacity to affect
legal rights.
25.
Regarding the first aspect, in Hoexter and Penfold
Administrative
Law in South Africa
,
[5]
the learned authors discuss action of an administrative nature as
opposed to action of an investigative nature. They point out
that in
Bernstein
v Bester NO
,
[6]
the Constitutional Court found it difficult to fit an investigation
into the affairs of a company “
into
the mould of administrative action”
,
particularly since the investigation was not aimed at making binding
decisions. Hoexter and Penfold then make reference to
Competition
Commission of South Africa v Telkom SA Ltd and Others
,
[7]
in which the Supreme Court of Appeal addressed
inter
alia
the
Competition Commission’s functions. These functions include the
investigation
and evaluation of alleged contraventions of the Competition Act.
[8]
I
n
its judgment,
[9]
the Supreme
Court of Appeal affirmed the earlier approach adopted in
Simelane
and
Others NNO v Seven-Eleven Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Another
,
[10]
holding that
“
the
decision
in
Simelane
that
the ultimate decision to refer a matter to the Tribunal and the
referral itself are of an investigative and not an administrative
nature remains a correct reflection of the position under PAJA and
the decision that PAJA does not apply in this review is correct.”
26.
As alluded to,
Simelane
and
Others NNO v Seven-Eleven Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Another
,
[11]
dealt with the
Competition
Commission’s functions to investigate a complaint and to refer
it to the Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Appeal
held that these
functions, being
investigative
in nature, were not subject to review.
27.
The Ad-hoc Panel was set up in order to investigate and report on the
Vatsonga Kingship claim, and to make recommendations thereon.
[12]
The
July
Report and the October Report
contain
the results of the investigations that were conducted by the Ad-hoc
Panel into the Vatsonga Kingship claim, as well as the
Ad-hoc Panel’s
recommendations on the Vatsonga Kingship claim.
28.
Having regard to the functions of the Ad-hoc Panel, as well as the
nature, content and purpose of the
July
Report and the October Report, it is apparent, in this court’s
view, that
the
July Report and the October
Report are investigative in nature and
not administrative in
nature.
29.
Regarding the second aspect,
the
July Report and the October Report
do
not fall within the ambit of the definition of “administrative
action” as per section 1 of the PAJA, quoted above,
for the
following reason. The reports do not, in themselves, adversely affect
the rights of the applicants, nor have a direct,
external legal
effect. In the words of
Competition
Commission of South Africa v Telkom SA Ltd and Others
,
[13]
the
July Report and the October Report
do
not have the
capacity
to affect legal rights. In the words of
Bernstein
v Bester NO
,
[14]
these reports are not aimed at making binding decisions. As stated,
the
July
Report and the October Report
contain
the results of the investigations that were conducted by the Ad-hoc
Panel, coupled with the recommendations that are made
therein by the
Ad-hoc Panel, concerning the Vatsonga Kingship claim. No external
effect at all flowed from the same, nor did they
have any effect on
the applicant’s legal rights.
Any
direct, external legal effect, and any adverse effect on the legal
rights of the applicants, would only arise if, and ensue
when, the
fourth respondent acted on the
July
Report and the October Report and made a binding decision based
thereon concerning the Vatsonga Kingship claim. That is, however,
a
separate matter entitrely.
30. It follows, in this
Court’s view, that the October Report is not susceptible to
being reviewed under the provisions of
the PAJA.
31. As stated, the
applicants argued that the October Report could be reviewed under the
principle of legality. This court agrees.
32.
It is not necessary to expand extensively on the principle of
legality for purposes of this judgment. The following brief account
will suffice.
[15]
The
principle of legality is aspect of the rule of law, which is a
concept that is a founding value that features in section 1(c)
of the
Constitution. Section 1(c) expressly provides that South Africa is
founded on the rule of law. The principle of legality
expresses the
fundamental idea that the exercise of public power is only legitimate
when it is lawful. This is evident from the
oft cited passage from
the judgment of the Constitutional Court in
Fedsure
Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council
,
[16]
that “
[i]t
seems central to the conception of our constitutional order that the
legislature and executive in every sphere are constrained
by the
principle that they may exercise no power and perform no function
beyond that conferred upon them by law.”
33.
The common law doctrine of
functus
officio
is
coupled with the principle of legality.
[17]
Again, it is not necessary to expand extensively on the doctrine of
functus
officio
for
purposes of this judgment. It suffices to state that the doctrine
entails that absent an express enabling legislative provision,
once
an administrator has made a decision it cannot be recalled, set-aside
or amended by the administrator. Having made the decision,
the
administrator is
functus
officio
;
he has exhausted his powers. This applies whether decision made by
the administrator is lawful or not. Even if the administrator’s
decision is unlawful, it must be treated as being lawful and binding
until it is set aside by a court. The doctrine of
functus
officio
is
squarely premised on the principle of legality. If an administrator
attempts to recall, set-aside or amended his decision once
made, he
will be acting unlawfully because, having exhausted his powers, the
same are spent and the administrator has no further
power to act.
34. In this court’s
view, when the Ad-hoc Panel issued the July Report on 28 July 2021,
the Ad-hoc Panel became
functus officio
. The powers that the
Ad-hoc Panel had to investigate the Vatsonga Kingship claim and to
make recommendations thereon, conferred
on it by the order of 21
September 2020 that was made by the honourable Molopa-Sethosa J, were
exhausted. This applies whether
the criticism of the fourth, fifth
and sixth respondents concerning the lawfulness of the July Report is
correct or not. As indicated,
neither those respondents nor anyone
else has had the July Report reviewed and set aside by a court. It
follows that when the October
report was issued, purportedly by the
same Ad-hoc Panel, it acted unlawfully because having exhausted its
powers regarding the
Vatsonga Kingship claim, the same were spent and
it had no further power to act.
35. It follows, in this
court’s view, that the October Report is reviewable under the
principle of legality, and that it offends
the principle of legality
for the reasons given in the preceding paragraph.
The decision of the
fourth respondent of 19 February 2022
36. As indicated, after
considering the July Report and the October Report, on 19 February
2022, the fourth respondent decided,
as per President’s Act No.
24 (81/172488 (Z 19E)), to accept the recommendation that was made in
the October Report and thus
declined the Vatsonga Kingship claim. As
shown, in taking this decision the fourth respondent took into
account and relied on the
October Report, and adopted the
recommendation of that report. The fourth respondent did this in
circumstances where the October
Report was unlawful.
37.
It is established law that any subsequent administrative action that
arises from an initial administrative action that is invalid,
will
also be invalid. In
Seale
v Van Rooyen NO
,
[18]
with reference to
Oudekraal
Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town
,
[19]
the
Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that “
i
t
is clear from
Oudekraal
,
and it must in my view follow, that if the first act is set aside, a
second act that depends for its validity on the first act
must be
invalid as the legal foundation for its performance was
non-existent.”
38.
Presently,
the fourth
respondent’s decision of 19 February 2022 depends on the
validity of the
October
Report, which is not valid. If the October Report is set aside, the
legal foundation
the fourth
respondent’s decision of 19 February 2022 falls away.
I
t
follows that in the present circumstances the invalidity of the
October Report vitiates the validity of the fourth respondent’s
decision of 19 February 2022.
39.
Even if the invalidity of the October Report did not vitiate the
validity of the fourth respondent’s decision of 19 February
2022, that decision would nevertheless fall to be reviewed and set
aside in terms of the PAJA on the basis that the fourth respondent
took irrelevant considerations into account when taking the decision,
the irrelevant considerations being the October Report.
[20]
Conclusions
40. This court therefore
concludes that the October Report is reviewable in terms of the
principle of legality, and that it falls
to be reviewed and set aside
for offending the
functus officio
doctrine, and accordingly
for offending the principle of legality.
41. Further, the decision
of the fourth respondent of 19 February 2022 falls to be reviewed and
set aside on the basis that its
validity is vitiated by the
invalidity of the October Report, or otherwise on the basis of
subsection 6(2)(e)(iii) of the PAJA
because irrelevant considerations
were taken into account.
42.
Having reached these conclusions, it is not necessary to deal with
the applicants’ other grounds of review and the fourth,
fifth
and sixth respondents’ countervailing arguments thereto.
Appropriate
relief
43.
In my view, this is not a case where any substitution of this court's
decision for that of the fourth respondent should take
place, as
contemplated in section 8(1)(c)(ii)(aa) of the PAJA. This is clearly
a matter which calls for a remittal to the fourth
respondent,
together with the necessary direction. That direction should be that
the fourth respondent must only consider the July
Report in taking a
fresh decision on the matter of the
Vatsonga Kingship claim
.
44. In prayer 3 of the
notice of motion the applicants seek, as part of the relief, an order
that the fourth respondent is directed
to take a new decision in
accordance with the July Report and its recommendations only. This
court is not prepared to grant such
relief. The relief is capable of
being read as being prescriptive as to the outcome of the fourth
respondent’s fresh decision-making
process. If granted, it
would tend to hamstring the fourth respondent when taking a fresh
decision, and direct the outcome of the
process, which is a situation
that should be avoided.
45. In prayer 3 of the
notice of motion the applicants also seek, as part of the relief, an
order that the fourth respondent is
directed to make a fresh decision
within 30 (thirty) days from the date of this order being handed
down, on the Vatsonga Kingship
claim. This court considers the period
of 30 (thirty) days to be too stringent, and that a period of 60
(sixty) days is more appropriate.
Costs
46.
The general rule is that costs follow the event, that is that the
successful party in litigation is entitled to recover its
costs from
the unsuccessful party.
[21]
Having secured the review and a setting aside of the October Report
and the fourth respondent’s decision of 19 February 2022,
it
cannot be gainsaid that the applicants have been substantially
successful in this application. Costs should thus follow the
event.
47.
The costs awarded to the applicants should, in the circumstances, be
on the party and party scale, and on Scale A in terms of
Rule 69.
Order
48. In the result this
court makes the following order:
48.1 The “
Report
on the Reconsideration for the Restoration of the Vatsonga Kingship
Claim by Rismati Wilson Mkhari, prepared by Mopai ZBM
and Shirinda
SE”
, dated 29 October 2021, under the signature of the
second and third respondents, is declared not to constitute a report
in compliance
with the mandate of the Ad-Hoc Panel in terms of the
order of court of 21 September 2020 by Molopa-Sethosa J, under case
number
12543/2016, is declared to be unlawful and invalid, and is
reviewed and set aside.
48.2 The fourth
respondent’s decision as per President’s
Act No. 24 (81/172488 (Z 19E)) dated 19 February 2022, declining the
first
applicant’s Vatsonga Kingship claim,
is declared
to be unlawful and invalid, and is reviewed and set aside.
48.3
The matter is remitted back to the fourth respondent who is to
consider only the
“
Report of the
Ad hoc Panel for the Reconsideration of the Vatsonga Kingship claim”,
dated 28 July 2021, under the signature of the
first respondent, and make a fresh decision within 60 (sixty) days
from the date
of this order being handed down, on the Vatsonga
Kingship claim.
48.4
The fourth, fifth and sixth respondents are to pay the applicants’
costs of suit, jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be
absolved, on the party and party scale and on Scale A in terms of
Rule 69.
CP
WESLEY
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
Appearances
For
applicant:
Adv Q
Pelser SC with Adv P Eilers
instructed
by Hurter Spies Incorporated
For
the fourth, fifth, and sixth respondents:
Adv F
Nalane SC with Adv A Mofokeng
instructed
by State Attorney, Pretoria
Date
heard:
24
May 2024
Date
of Judgment:
1
July 2024
[1]
3 of 2000 (“the PAJA”).
[2]
41 of 2003 (“the Frameworks Act”).
[3]
See section 65 read with schedule 4 of Act 3 of 2019.
[4]
[2010] 2 All SA 433
(SCA) at para 10
:
“Care must be taken here not to conflate two different aspects
of the definition of administrative action in PAJA, namely,
the
requirement that the decision be one of an administrative nature and
the separate requirement that it must have the capacity
to affect
legal rights.”
[5]
Third Edition at 257.
[6]
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996 (2) SA 751
(CC) at para 97.
[7]
Above.
[8]
89
of 1998.
[9]
At para 11.
[10]
2003
(3) SA 64
(SCA).
[11]
Above.
[12]
In
terms of subsection
25(1) of the Framework Act, the Commission had a similar function,
namely to investigate and make recommendations
on any traditional
leadership dispute and claim contemplated in subsection 25(2) of the
Framework Act.
[13]
Above.
[14]
Above.
[15]
See Hoexter and Penfold at 157 to 161 and authorities there cited.
[16]
1999 1 SA374 (CC) at para 57. And see
Masetlha
v the President of the Republic of South Africa and Another
[2007] ZACC 20
;
2008 (1) BCLR 1
(CC) at
para 12.
[17]
See Pretorius “The Origins of the Functus Officio Doctrine
with Specific Reference to its Application in Administrative
Law”
2005
SALJ
832–864; Henrico
"The Functus Officio Doctrine and Invalid Administrative Action
in South African Administrative Law:
A Flexible Approach" 2020
(34)
Spec
Juris
115;
The Law
of South Africa
Administrative
Justice (Volume 2 - Third Edition) at para 18.
[18]
2008 (4) SA 43
(SCA) at para 13.
[19]
2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA).
[20]
See subsection 6(2)(e)(iii) of the PAJA.
[21]
Pretoria
Garrison Institutes v Danish Variety Products (Pty) Ltd
1984 (1) SA 839
(A).
sino noindex
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