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# South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
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[2023] ZAGPPHC 1218
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## Rolls v Road Accident Fund (22243/2022)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1218 (20 September 2023)
Rolls v Road Accident Fund (22243/2022)
[2023] ZAGPPHC 1218 (20 September 2023)
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sino date 20 September 2023
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: 22243/2022
- REPORTABLE: YES/NO
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
- OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES/NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES/NO
- REVISED:DATE: 20 September 2023SIGNATURE
REVISED:
DATE: 20 September 2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
LIVONA
ROLLS
Applicant
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
(This
matter was heard in open court and after hearing arguments obo
plaintiff, the draft order was made an order of court. the
later
request for reasons was received and reasons are given and uploaded
onto Caselines to the electronically file of this matter.
The date of
uploading onto Caselines is deemed to be the date when reasons were
given)
BEFORE:
HOLLAND-MUTER J:
[1
This matter served before me in the Road Accident Fund Default Court
on 15 August 2023. The proposed draft order presented to
court by
counsel after submissions were made, contained a clause that there
was a valid contingency fee agreement in terms of the
Contingency
Fees Act, 66 of 1997 (the “Act"), entered into between the
plaintiff and her attorney.
[2]
When scrutinising the agreement on Caselines and a hard copy thereof,
I was not satisfied
that the agreement was valid in terms of the Act.
Counsel agreed that the contingency agreement was not in accordance
with the
Act.
[3]
Before dissecting the purported agreement, it is necessary to briefly
refer to the
purpose of the Act. It is clear from the decision in
South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development (Road Accident Fund,
intervening
party) 2013(2) SA 583 South Gauteng High Court,
Johannesburg,(referred to as SAAPIL)
that
"the Act seeks
to strike a balance between the vices of contingency fee agreements,
on the one hand, and their virtue, on the
other, and of making
justice accessible to poor people who might otherwise not have access
to justice"
, par[20] supra.
[4]
The Act must be read in its full context and parties, when entering
into a purported
contingency fee agreement, cannot by choice elect
that only certain sections of the Act applies to the agreement. From
the heading
of the alleged contingency agreement before the court is
it reasonable to infer that the drafter of the agreement wanted only
section
2(1)(a) of the Act to apply to the agreement. This amounts to
a mere repetition of what the Act embodies namely that a legal
representative
will only be entitled to any fees if successful.
In
my view it is not necessary to head the agreement as such because
that is the sole purpose of the Act.
[5]
The agreement then provides in clause 5.4 that should the claim be
successful (or
partially successful), the attorney shall be entitled
to fees equal to the attorney's normal fees (in par 6.2 in the
agreement).
In par 6.2 the agreement provides for normal fees
without
any reference to the limitation provisions of section 2 (2) of the
Act.
[6]
It is stated in section 2(2) of the Act that the purpose of the Act
is to restrict
any fees to exceed 25% of the total of any such fees
or normal fees charged by more than 100 per cent. It is trite that
the Act
is applied that the maximum fees on success will be either 25
per cent of the total awarded or double the normal fees charged
which
amount is the least.
[7]
It was held in
SAAPIL supra para (26}
that effect of the Act
is twofold: First, it permits contingency fees agreements in terms of
section 2(1) of the Act and not in
terms of only section 2(1)(a) of
the Act. Second, it makes all contingency fees agreements subject to
the limitations and requirements
of sections 2(2) to section 5 of the
Act. To try and circumvent the limitations as done in the agreement
before me (the heading
referring only to section 2(1)(a)), implies
that the drafter wanted to exclude the rest of the Act. This renders
the agreement
unlawful and invalid.
[8]
It was further held in
SAAPIL para [50] and [59-60]
that the
limitations are constitutional and it promotes access to justice
which would be nullified if unlimited contingency fees
agreements
were allowed.
[9]
I have no reason to believe that the current agreement does not
comply with the Act and therefore reiterate that the agreement
is not a valid contingency fees agreement, and the deleting
thereof in the draft order remains in force.
J
HOLLAND-MUTER
JUDGE
OF THE PRETORIA HIGH COURT
TO:
M DU TOIT ATTORNEYS
Attorneys
obo Plaintiff
First Floor, Office
1004C
267 West Street
Die Hoewes
Centurion
Ref: M du
Toit/RAF/1144
Email:
marius@dtlaw.co.za
AND TO:
THE STATE ATTORNEY,
PRETORIA
Attorneys for
Defendant
316 Thabo Sehume
Street Pretoria
Ref:
RAF25334/2022/ROLLS L/Z14
Mohlatlego Sekgota
Email:
mohlategos@raf.co.za
LINK NO: 5209581
AND TO:
The Registrar of
the Pretoria High Court
Attention: Z
Msimanga
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