Case Law[2025] ZAWCHC 85South Africa
Le Roux v Stellenbosch University and Others (24729/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 85 (3 March 2025)
High Court of South Africa (Western Cape Division)
3 March 2025
Headnotes
in [13] – not that proof was required that my campaign was, as a fact, helped – but simply that “the post was designed to promote or endorse the appellant as a candidate in the upcoming SRC election, or the very least, help them with their campaign. The appellant therefore had the privilege of being promoted or endorsed by AfriForum Jeug’s Instagram page (which has not only a local but national reach) prior to an election. As the post of the Women’s Day Event, which included a picture of the appellant, was coupled with an encouragement to vote for the SRC, it was clearly intended to persuade to vote for Ms Le Roux.”
Judgment
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# South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
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## Le Roux v Stellenbosch University and Others (24729/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 85 (3 March 2025)
Le Roux v Stellenbosch University and Others (24729/2024) [2025] ZAWCHC 85 (3 March 2025)
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FLYNOTES:
ADMINISTRATIVE – University –
Student
Appeal Court
–
Decision
to disqualify applicant’s candidature for election to
Student Representative Council – Following complaint
regarding funding and social media endorsement by AfriForum Jeug –
Contravention of Student Electoral Act – Applicant
preferring narrow construction of pertinent Items –
Decision-makers had reasonable options and preference of one ought
to be left to decision-maker – Court not entering merits
under guise of review – Review application dismissed.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Before:
The
Hon Mr Justice L G Nuku
Case
No: 24729/2024
In
the matter between:
JOHANNA
HELENA LE
ROUX
Applicant
and
STELLENBOSCH
UNIVERSITY
First Respondent
ROCESHIA JOANNE LIHLE
FEBRUARIE
Second Respondent
AMBER
NIEUWENHYZEN
Third Respondent
Date of hearing
: 12 February 2025
Date of Judgment
: 3 March 2025
JUDGMENT
NUKU,
[1]
The applicant approached this court seeking urgent review of
decisions taken by the first respondent’s functionaries to
disqualify
her candidature for election to the University’s
Student Representative Council (
SRC
) for the year 2024/2025.
The first decision was taken by the University’s Student Court
(
Student Court
) on 5 October 2024 and the second decision was
taken by University’s Student Appeal Court (
Student Appeal
Court
) on 11 November 2024.
[2]
The applicant raised a slew of grounds of review which have all
since been abandoned leaving only one ground based on section 6 (2)
(h) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (
PAJA
)
alleging that the Student Court and the Student Appeal Court were so
unreasonable that no person could have so exercised the power
or
performed the function. The applicant alleged further that, for the
reasons set out in paragraphs 94 to 105 of the founding
affidavit,
the Student Court and the Student Appeal Court ‘
could never
have reasonably or rationally found that there was an endorsement of
my campaign or that I was sponsored, nor was there
any (nothing, not
a shred) of evidence that this was so
…’
[3]
In paragraphs 94 to 105 of the founding affidavit, the applicant
sets out her reasons for contending that she did not contravene
the
provisions of the University’s Student Electoral Act (
Student
Electoral Act
). For the present purposes the following are the
relevant paragraphs:
‘
100. I
submit that S3 3 (7) (a), to the extent that sense can be made
thereof, prohibits the sponsoring of a candidate.
On a narrow reading
it would have required a call to vote for me specifically, which the
cards and the post by AfriForum Jeug did
not. What the two Courts did
in effect was, in the face of more than one potentially reasonable
interpretation, was to choose the
one that would impact the most on
my rights. This is irrational and unlawful and should be reviewed and
set aside. It is trite
authority that in the absence of express or
clear provisions to the contrary: “where a section is capable
of two alternative
constructions, the construction that should be
adopted is the one
in
favorem libertastis
”.
101.
The same applies to s 8 which prohibits mass communication that
endorses or helps them with their campaign,
unless they can show that
they had nothing to do with it. Again, the Instagram post –
there was no evidence that it was mass
communication and specifically
that it had much traction, not nationally, but at SU – did not
actually promote me. And, there
was no evidence that it helped my
campaign. Since there was no endorsement, and no proof of my campaign
being helped there could
never be an onus that shifted to me.
102.
The fact that, without doubt, one of two possible interpretations was
relied on in the Appeal Court in [12]
finding that the Instagram post
“
likely
constitutes an endorsement of the
candidate”.
103.
The Appeal Court also, incorrectly I submit, held in [13] – not
that proof was required that my campaign
was, as a fact, helped –
but simply that “the post was designed to promote or endorse
the appellant as a
candidate
in the upcoming SRC election, or
the very least, help them with their campaign. The appellant
therefore had the privilege of being
promoted or endorsed by
AfriForum Jeug’s Instagram page (which has not only a local but
national reach) prior to an election.
As the post of the Women’s
Day Event, which included a picture of the appellant, was coupled
with an encouragement to vote
for the SRC, it was
clearly intended
to persuade to vote for Ms Le Roux.”
104. My
campaign was not endorsed. There is no proof that it was helped or
that the intention was to help it.
This does away with the privilege
argument because it is anything but “clear” that it was
meant to persuade the electorate
to vote for me – as opposed
to, and just as plausibly, to vote for “jou SR”.
105.
Lastly, as to 8 (1) (a), the Appeal Court in [14] accepted it as
self-evident that the Instagram post was
mass communication which
endorsed me or helped me (not, as it previously held, that it was not
enough that it was
designed
to help me) with my campaign.
Without any of these grounds proved or established there could be no
shift of the burden to me and
no merit in the finding that I was
supposed to proffer evidence to show that I was not involved with the
post in question. In any
event, I denied it. How else am I supposed
to prove a negative? There was nothing to counter this. The Appeal
Court judgment is
so badly reasoned, I submit with respect, that I am
simply unable to determine whether in [15] – [16] it actually
held me
liable on this basis or not. At best I can see it did not.’
[4]
The first respondent, the only respondent that opposed the
application, noting that the allegations made by the applicant in
paragraphs
94 to 106 were made under the heading “the merits”
took the view that they were irrelevant because this is a review
application and not an appeal. That notwithstanding, the first
respondent disputed these allegations.
[5]
The question that this application raised is whether the
applicant has made out a case for the review of the first
respondent’s
decision on the ground that it is so unreasonable
that no reasonable person could have made it or whether, as the first
respondent
contends, the applicant seeks to impermissibly rely on
appeal grounds in a review application. Before considering this
issue, it
is necessary to set out the factual background.
[6]
The applicant submitted her nomination to contest the SRC
elections on 2 August 2024. At the time she was a member and
a
Chairperson of the University’s AfriForum Jeug student chapter.
[7]
On 8 August 2024, the applicant – along with her fellow
AfriForum Jeug student chapter members were at Neelsie Student Centre
handing out roses accompanied by cards on which was printed the words
“
AfriForum Jeug
”,
Gelekkige Vrouedag
”
and “
Stem vir jou SR Ɩ 19-27 Augustus 2024
”.
On 9 August 2024 the AfriForum Jeug posted, on its Instagram
page, the applicant’s photograph with another
young lady each
holding one of these cards. The caption to the post read: “
AfriForum
Youth’s Maties branch gave a bouquet of flowers to every lady
in the Neelsie on Thursday, 8 August 2024 during the
celebration on
National Women’s Day. They also used the opportunity to remind
students to vote for their SR from August 19
to 27
.”
[8]
On 28 August 2024, the second respondent submitted a complaint
concerning the applicant’s SRC campaign to the Student
Electoral
Commission (
Commission
). The complaint referenced
two instances, namely:
‘
1.
Use of Monetary Funds from a Third-Party Organisation: An allegation
that the candidate
utilised additional monetary funds from a
third-party organisation, which is in violation of Part S1.3, clause
3 (7) (a) of the
Student Electoral Act.
2.
Instagram Endorsement by AfriForum Jeug: An allegation that an
Instagram post
by “AfriForum Jeug” on 9 August 2024
endorsed the candidate’s campaign, thereby compromising the
electoral process
and providing the candidate with an unfair
advantage.”
[9]
After having investigated the complaint, the Commission rendered
its report dated 4 September 2024 wherein it recorded, among others,
that:
‘
The investigation
determined that the candidate’s association with AfriForum Jeug
established a direct link to the campaign
activities conducted by the
organisation, including the distribution of marketing materials not
authorized by the Electoral Commission
and the potential use of
third-party funds in making the card that was visible on the
Instagram page
-The Electoral Commission
thus confirms that the candidate’s actions violated the Student
Electoral Act by providing an unfair
advantage, thus jeopardising the
fairness of the election.’
[10]
Despite its finding that the applicant had contravened the
Student Electoral Act, the Commission dismissed the appeal. This was
based on the view it held that it would be unconstitutional to
disqualify the applicant because it (the Commission) had taken more
than 24 hours to conclude its investigation, an issue that had been
raised by the applicant’s legal representatives when
they made
representations to the Commission. The second respondent was advised
that she could either appeal that decision or refer
the matter to the
Student Court in terms of s127 (4) (d) of the University’s
Student Constitution (
Student Constitution
).
[11]
The Commission also advised the applicant, in its communication
dated 4 September 2024 that “
Your actions violated items 2
(3), 3 (7), and 4 (1) of the Student Electoral Act, as conduct
provided you with an unfair advantage
as an SRC candidate thereby
jeopardising the fairness and freedom of the election
.” The
communication went on to advise that “
due to the lapsing of
time to make a decision with regards to the complaint, a decision to
disqualify you would be unconstitutional
and thus, the Electoral
Commission has decided to dismiss the complaint against you
.”
[12]
The second respondent referred the matter to the Student Court in
terms of s127 (4) (d) of the Student Constitution seeking the
following relief:
‘
(a)
Setting aside of the decision taken by the Electoral Commission on
4
th
September 2024, with regards to the complaint …
(b)
The invalidation of the results of the SRC candidate Jolene Le Roux,
due to the candidate’s
contravention of Part S1.3, clause 3 (7)
(a) of the Student Electoral Act.’
[13]
The applicant opposed the application brought by the second
respondent contending that (a) the issue had
already been determined
by the Student Court, (b) the Commission ‘
incorrectly so and
without any factual evidence concluded that
’ she ‘
violated
section 2 (3), 3 (7) and 4 (1) of the Student Electoral Act
…’,
and (c) denied that her conduct contravened any provisions of the
Student Electoral Act.
[14]
The Student Court delivered its judgment on 5 October 2024 finding
that the applicant had contravened item
3 (7) (a) read with item 3
(8) of part S1.3 of the Student Electoral Act. As a sanction, the
applicant was disqualified from participating
in the SRC elections.
[15]
The Student Court gave a detailed judgment that dealt with all the
defences that had been raised by the
applicant. The judgment engaged
with the interpretation of the provisions of the Student Electoral
Act that the applicant was alleged
to have contravened (Items 3 (7)
(a) and 3 (8)), the evidence that the applicant participated in an
event organised by the University’s
AfriForum Jeug chapter
where roses and cards wishing female students a happy women’s
day and reminding them to vote
for their SRC were handed out as well
as an AfriForum Jeug Instagram post on 9 August 2024 which displayed
the applicant together
with an unknown female person holding out the
cards that were handed out on 8 August 2024.
[16]
The applicant appealed the judgment of the Student Court on the
grounds that the Student Court had failed
to properly evaluate the
evidence and that her disqualification was not justified in the
circumstances.
[17]
The Student Appeal Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal
on 11 November 2024 holding that the conduct of handing out cards
in
celebration of Women’s Day that also reminded recipients to
vote for your SRC and the applicant’s photo on the AfriForum
Jeug Instagram account promoted the applicant’s campaign.
Aggrieved by this outcome, the applicant turned to this court by
way
of an urgent application that was issued on 19 November 2024 and set
down for hearing on 22 November 2024. The respondents
were given
until 12h00 on 20 November 2024 to deliver their notices of
opposition, if any and until 12h00 the following day on
21 November
2024 to deliver their answering affidavits.
[18]
The first respondent delivered its notice of opposition on 20
November 2024, and on 21 November 2024 it delivered an affidavit
deposed
to by its attorney of record requesting that the first
respondent be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to the
application
as the timeframes imposed by the applicant were
impossible. The matter came before Slingers J on 22 November 2022 who
struck it
off from the roll for lack of urgency with no order as to
costs.
[19]
The first respondent delivered its answering affidavit on 4
December 2024 raising, as one of the issues, the applicant’s
failure
to seek the relief under PAJA as the decisions she sought to
review constitute administrative action. The first respondent further
raised the issue of the applicant’s failure to identify the
grounds of review relied upon and to link them to the facts.
[20]
On 6 December 2024, the applicant delivered an application for leave
to file a supplementary affidavit,
the purpose of which was to
respond to the issues raised by the first respondent in its answering
affidavit, namely, to seek the
relief under PAJA as well as
identifying the grounds of review relied upon and to link them to the
facts. In the supplementary
affidavit sought to be admitted, the
applicant raised six grounds of review based on various provisions of
PAJA. In addition, the
applicant also delivered her replying
affidavit.
[21]
The matter was re-enrolled for hearing on 10 December 2024 when it
came before Savage J who, again struck
it from the roll for lack of
urgency and ordered costs to stand over for later determination. The
matter was re-enrolled again
for hearing on 12 February 2025 when it
came before me.
[22]
In argument before me, Mr Burke, who appeared for the applicant
submitted that the applicant’s grounds of review are based
on
the provisions of section 6 (2) (h) of PAJA and that in the
alternative the applicant relies on a legality review, an alternative
which he abandoned at some stage. The nub of the submissions made on
behalf of the applicant, based as they were on the paragraphs
from
the applicant’s founding affidavit quoted above, were all
directed at attacking the correctness of the decisions by
the Student
Court and the Student Appeal Court. At some point it was argued that
there was no evidence on the basis of which the
applicant was found
to have contravened the provisions of the Student Electoral Act.
[23]
It was submitted on behalf of the first respondent that the
review application has no merit for the reason that the grounds
relied
upon by the applicant, in her papers, are not review grounds
but appeal grounds. As to the submission that there was no evidence
on the basis of which the applicant could be found to have
contravened the provisions of the Student Electoral Act, it was
submitted
that there was, indeed, evidence (a) about the handing out
of cards, (b) the Instagram post, (c) the applicant being the
Chairperson
of the University’s AfriForum Jeug chapter and (d)
the applicant being a candidate in the SRC elections. From this
evidence,
it was submitted, the Student Court and the Student Appeal
Court drew an inference of fact that established the contravention.
[24]
It was
further submitted that the inference that both Courts drew is one of
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts.
That being
the case it was submitted, that should be the end of the matter. The
applicant was also criticised for the matter she
has litigated
starting from the two days’ notice she gave the respondents
when she launched the application, the failure
to properly plead her
case in the founding affidavit resulting in the need for her to apply
for leave to file a supplementary affidavit
and the slew of grounds
that she raised in her supplementary affidavit most of which she
subsequently abandoned except for one.
It was submitted that the
applicant, by her conduct, has forfeited the so-called Bio Watch
[1]
shield because viewed objectively she has put the first
respondent to unnecessary trouble and expense which it ought not
to
bear.
[2]
[25]
The Student Court found the applicant to have contravened the
provisions of item 3 (7) (a) read with item 3 (8) of part S1.3 of the
Student Electoral Act. These items provide that:
‘
3.
All persons bound by the Student Electoral Act must, during the
electoral period:
(7)
spend no money on any marketing.
(a) As a candidate cannot
use their own money, this includes Facebook, Instagram, Twitter
sponsored pages, any sponsorship cannot
be utilised.
(8)
Refrain from any attempt at misusing power or resorting to privileges
or influence or using
any form of coercion intended to persuade
someone to vote for any candidate.’
[26]
The applicant, in her own papers, admits that the provisions of
item 3 (7) (a) are capable of two alternative constructions, namely
a
narrow construction that requires a call to vote for a particular
named candidate and a broader construction that would be satisfied
without naming a particular candidate. She prefers the narrow
construction in that she was not named in any of the marketing
material
and her case is that both the Student Court and the Student
Appeal Court should have preferred the narrow construction.
[27]
The above admission, in my view is destructive of the applicant’s
case and in fact supportive of
the first respondent’s argument
that this is not a review ground but an appeal ground. If anything,
this admission points
to the reasonableness of the decisions sought
to be impugned in that they are based on a plausible interpretation
of the provisions
of the Student Electoral Court. It can never be
that preferring one plausible interpretation over the other can
result in that
decision being so unreasonable that no reasonable
decisions maker could have made. If anything, it points to the fact
that the
decision-makers had reasonable options and the preference of
one of those options is a matter that should be left to the
decision-maker.
The plausibility of the interpretation that was
preferred by the Student Court and the Student Appeal Court.
[28]
The
other point that was made on behalf of the first respondent was that
the judicial review court is not concerned with the merits
of the
decision under review, it does not ask itself the question “is
this question right or wrong”?
[3]
This court must thus refuse the applicant’s invitation to enter
the merits of the decisions of the Student Court and the
Student
Appeal Court under the guise of a review.
[29]
The applicant, whether by omission or by design, did not deal at all
with the finding relative to the contravention
of item 8 and thus
there can be no basis to disturb that finding. The review thus cannot
succeed.
[30]
Turing to the issue of costs, there is much to be said about the
manner in which the applicant has conducted these proceedings. The
application was served on the first respondent on 19 November 2024 at
13:40 the first respondent was required to deliver its notice
of
opposition less than 24 hours later and its answering papers in less
than 48 hours of service of papers on it. The founding
affidavit,
with the annexures ran to more than 300 pages.
[31]
To add to the above, the applicant had not properly pleaded her
case when it was in court on 22 November 2024 which prompted the
first respondent to raise the issue in its reply. That, in turn,
resulted in the applicant having to apply for leave to supplement
her
founding affidavit by raising a laundry list of review grounds which
were subsequently abandoned on 10 December 2024.
[32]
Had this been litigation between private parties that had nothing to
do with pursuit of constitutional
rights, I would have had no
hesitation in granting punitive costs order against the applicant.
The first respondent’s reliance
on the decision of this court
in
In re: Alluvial Creek Ltd
is, in my view an acknowledgment
that the applicant entered this litigation with the most upright of
purpose and most firm belief
in the justice of her cause.
[33]
It was not suggested that the application is frivolous or manifestly
inappropriate and as Biowatch tells
us it is only in circumstances
where the application is frivolous or vexatious or in any other way
manifestly inappropriate that
an applicant should not expect that the
worthiness of its cause will immunise it against an adverse costs
award. In my view each
party should bear its own costs.
Order:
[34]
In the result the following order shall issue:
The application is
dismissed with each party to bear its own costs
L
G NUKU
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
:
For
the Applicant
:
Adv. C L
Burke
Instructed
by
: Hurter
Spies Inc, Centurion
C/O
: MMH
Attorneys, Cape Town
For
the First Respondent :
Adv. R G Patrick SC
Instructed
by
: Cluver
Markotter Inc, Stellenbosch
C/O
: Walkers Inc,
Cape Town
For
the Second and
Third
Respondents
:
No
appearance
[1]
Biowatch
Trust v Registrar, Generic Resources 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC)
[2]
In
re: Alluvial Creek Ltd
1929 CPD 532
[3]
Bo-Kaap
Civic and Ratepayers Association v City of Cape Town
[2020] 2 All SA
330
(SCA) at para [72]
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