Case Law[2022] ZALAC 4South Africa
Bakenrug Meat (Pty) Ltd t/a Joostenberg Meat v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (CA8/2020) [2022] ZALAC 4; [2022] 4 BLLR 319 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1272 (LAC) (18 January 2022)
Labour Appeal Court of South Africa
18 January 2022
Judgment
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# South Africa: Labour Appeal Court
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## Bakenrug Meat (Pty) Ltd t/a Joostenberg Meat v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (CA8/2020) [2022] ZALAC 4; [2022] 4 BLLR 319 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1272 (LAC) (18 January 2022)
Bakenrug Meat (Pty) Ltd t/a Joostenberg Meat v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (CA8/2020) [2022] ZALAC 4; [2022] 4 BLLR 319 (LAC); (2022) 43 ILJ 1272 (LAC) (18 January 2022)
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sino date 18 January 2022
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Reportable
IN
THE LABOUR APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Case
no: CA8/2020
In the matter between:
BAKENRUG MEAT (PTY) LTD t/a
JOOSTENBERG MEAT
Appellant
and
THE COMMISSION FOR CONCIALIATION
MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION
First Respondent
COMMISSIONER JJ KITSHOFF
N.O
Second Respondent
CORISA HOUGH
(OOSTHUIZEN)
Third Respondent
Heard:
25 November 2021
Delivered:
18 January 2022
Coram: Waglay JP, Davis JA and
Savage AJA
JUDGMENT
DAVIS
JA
Introduction
[1]
This
appeal concerns the determination of the scope of the duty of good
faith owed by an employee to an employer. In this case,
the employee
(third respondent), was employed as a sales representative by the
appellant on 28 October 2013. Appellant conducts
a business which
produces and then sells a range of meat products. On 10 October 2016,
she was dismissed, after having been found
guilty of a charge of
dishonesty because she failed to inform the appellant that she
operated a business of her own which marketed
dried meat products and
thus had failed to give full attention to marketing the meat products
produced by the appellant.
[2]
Upon
being dismissed, the third respondent referred an unfair dismissal
dispute to the first respondent. An arbitration hearing
was conducted
by the second respondent.
[3]
The
second respondent heard evidence relating to the charges which had
been brought against the third respondent, being:
‘
1. (she)
took on employment while you were also working in other capacity.
2. (she)
undertook that she would be physically calling weekly + on regular
basis
but as today it was found that she hadn’t been calling.’
[4]
The
second respondent found that the third respondent’s dismissal
was substantively fair for the following reasons:
‘
In this
instance, the applicant operated a formal business with at least one
full-time employee from rented premises and marketed
dried meat
products. The respondent marketed meat products and at
the very least it should have been aware of the applicant’s
activities so that it could decide whether the applicant’s
activities were in conflict. The applicant chose to not
tell
the respondent. It was dishonest not to do so.
The effect was that she could not have
given full attention to her duties. The respondent provided
evidence that it was constantly
attempting to impress upon the
applicant that she was not performing her duties.
The fact that the applicant believed
that the respondent should have known what she was doing because
Wesley knew, and he did not
testify to this, is unacceptable.
The fact that the respondent may not have marketed biltong prior to
September 2016 is also
not an acceptable excuse for the applicant to
operate a formal business, marketing meat products, without telling
the respondent.
I find that the
applicant has acted in a dishonest and an unacceptable manner.
’
[5]
The
third respondent then launched a review application before the court
a
quo
.
Her application proved to be successful and accordingly, the
arbitration award of the second respondent was reviewed and set
aside. It is against this decision, with the leave of this Court,
that the appellant contends that the decision to dismiss the third
respondent was substantively fair and hence the order of the court
a
quo
stands to be set aside.
The reasoning of the
court
a quo
[6]
Sitting
in the court
a
quo,
Cele J found on the evidence presented to the second respondent, that
the third respondent ran her business only on weekends.
For the
learned judge, this was a significant fact in that
“
it
may well be that the applicant could have done some activities in
furtherance of her side-line business such as ordering stock
or
checking on the employee operating it. She was not employed 24
hours by Mr Myburgh (on behalf of the appellant)”
.
[7]
For
this reason, Cele J found that the second respondent was bound to
accept the third respondent’s version that the business
only
ran on weekends and hence there was “no nexus between her
performance for the third respondent (appellant) and the running
of
the side-line business.” Consequently, the learned judge
found that the second respondent had arrived at a conclusion
which no
reasonable decision-maker could have reached, namely that the record
of evidence did not sustain the charge that she “took
on
employment whilst you were also working in another capacity.”
The case of appellant
[8]
On
appeal, the appellant’s counsel contended that the third
respondent in her capacity as an employee owed the appellant a
duty
of good faith, so that anything done by her which was incompatible
with her duties as an employee would justify a dismissal.
In this
connection, counsel relied on a
dictum
in
Sappi
Novo Board (Pty) Ltd v Bolleurs
(1998) (19) ILJ 784 LAC) at para 7:
‘
If an
employee does anything incompatible with his due or faithful
discharge of his duty to his master, the latter has a right to
dismiss him
.’
[9]
While
there was some dispute as to whether the third respondent sold more
than biltong products, it was clearly accepted by the
court
a
quo
that she had sold biltong products pursuant to her own business. It
is also common cause that the appellant’s business comprised
of
the marketing and distribution of various types of cold meat products
and, later, biltong as from September 2016. Much was made
by the
court
a
quo
that the business of the appellant did not include biltong until
sometime in September or October 2016. The significance of this
finding for the court
a
quo
was that this date was presumably after the charges had been brought
by the appellant against the third respondent. Significantly,
the
third respondent testified that she would have ceased selling biltong
if she had been instructed to do so by the appellant.
This
concession, according to the appellant’s counsel, revealed an
awareness on her part that she was competing with her
employer and
that she owed the employer a duty to disclose her independent
business activities.
[10]
On
the basis of the decision in
Schwartz
v Sasol Polymers and others
(2017) 38 ILJ 915 (LAC) at para 30, counsel submitted that dishonest
non-disclosure of a material fact justifies a dismissal and
further
that a calculated silence in the face of a duty to inform an employer
of a material facts amounted to a fraudulent non-disclosure.
[11]
Appellant’s
counsel also referred to uncontested evidence given by Mr Myburgh, on
behalf of the appellant before the second
respondent, as to the type
of business that the third respondent had conducted which included:
‘
Cutting up
of meat, goat, lamb, pork etc. Deboning of carcasses and cuts,
cutting up of bones, Goulash, steak. It’s
all business,
all activities that we are busy with. This business is
competing directly with what we do and then game meat
processing, dry
wors, biltong, packing, packing into smaller packages.’
[12]
Appellant’s
counsel also noted that the third respondent had informed the
appellant in a letter, that apart from maintenance
which she claimed
as a result of her divorce, her only form of income was the salary
she was paid by the appellant, a fact that
was not challenged in the
review application. In short, the submission was made that the third
respondent had secreted her business
activities from her employer in
clear violation of her fiduciary duty to her employer.
Evaluation
[13]
The
approach adopted by the court
a
quo
appeared to amount to the following: unless an employee informed her
employer that she was moonlighting to the extent that there
was some
competition with her employer’s business, no dismissible
offence had been conducted. In other words, there
was no duty
of an employee to inform an employer about a potential conflict of
interest.
[14]
Much
was made by the third respondent’s counsel that the third
respondent only operated her biltong business on weekends,
at which
point, in the view of counsel, the third respondent was not acting in
conflict with her duties to the appellant as an
employee.
Furthermore, the submission was made that the third respondent had
not been dismissed for poor work performance
nor was there any
evidence to substantiate any such allegation. It was also
contended that her biltong business had not negatively
impacted upon
her work for the appellant.
[15]
The
evidence clearly indicates however that the third respondent failed
to disclose an essential and important fact that she was
running “a
side-line business” in the market for the sale of meat
products, albeit that they might not have been identical
to the meat
products which were sold by appellant. That she was able to discharge
her duties to the appellant does not take her
case any further. She
was employed as a sales representative in a business that was
involved in the sale of meat products. As a
side-line business, she
conducted a business which involved the sale of biltong, namely a
meat product. She failed to disclose
these obviously material
activities to her employer and was therefore manifestly acting in
violation of her duty of good faith
to her employer.
[16]
The
conclusion reached by the second respondent that “employees act
in bad faith if conflict of interest may arise even though
no real
competition actually results” is unassailable. The finding, on
the uncontested evidence, of the second respondent
that the third
respondent operated a formal business with at least one full-time
employee from rented premises and marketed at
least one category of
meat product, without at all informing the appellant thereof, absent
any evidence to gainsay these findings,
must be accepted as the
factual matrix upon which a reasonable decision must be predicated.
[17]
Accordingly,
when the second respondent found that the third respondent had acted
in a dishonest and unacceptable manner, he came
to a conclusion which
most certainly on the facts, was a reasonable one. Expressed
differently, there was no basis on the evidence,
which constituted
the record of the arbitration hearing, that a conclusion could
justifiably be reached that the outcome reached
by the second
respondent was one that could not reasonably be reached. See
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd
(Congress
of SA Trade Unions as Amicus Curiae)
(2013)
34 ILJ 2795 (SCA). It follows that there was no basis by which the
court
a
quo
should have interfered with this finding. Accordingly, the appeal
must succeed.
[18]
The
following order is therefore made:
1.
The
order of the court
a
quo
of 12 September 2019 is set aside and replaced with the following:
a.
The
application to review the arbitration award issued by the second
respondent on 22 March 2017 under case number WECT 17540-16
is
dismissed.
b.
There
is no order as to costs
____________
Davis JA
Waglay
JP and Savage AJA concur.
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE APPELLANT:
Instructed
by Frank Biccari Attorneys
FOR
THE THIRD RESPONDENT:
Instructed
by Macgregor Erasmus Attorneys
sino noindex
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