Case Law[2026] KEELC 704Kenya
Clifton Bay Limited v Chivatsi (As the administrator of the Estate of Jefwa Kalama Lewa - Deceased) & 2 others (Environment and Land Appeal E001 of 2024) [2026] KEELC 704 (KLR) (10 February 2026) (Judgment)
Employment and Labour Court of Kenya
Judgment
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MALINDI
ELCA NO E001 OF 2024
CLIFTON BAY LIMITED ………………….………………..…….…………..
APPELLANT
VERSUS
1. DAMA NGUWA CHIVATSI (AS THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JEFWA KALAMA LEWA (DECEASED) …....…
RESPONDENT
2. LAND REGISTRAR KILIFI…...…………………………………………
RESPONDENT
3. THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL …………………………..…………
RESPONDENT
(Being An Appeal From The Judgment And Decree Of Hon James Ongondo, SPM
Delivered On 6th March 2024 In CMELC Case No 154 Of 2021 –Dama Ngowa
Chivatsi (Suing As Administrator Of Estate Of The Late Jefwa Kalama Lewa ) Vs
Clifton Bay Ltd, Land Registrar Kilifi And The Hon Attorney General.)
JUDGMENT
1. The following are the grounds of appeal contained in the Memorandum
Of Appeal in this case dated 2nd April 2024. It is claimed by the
appellant that the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact:
a. By failing to consider and find that the first respondent’s
suit was statutorily time barred;
b. By failing to consider that the appellant was not required
to file a resolution authorizing its witness to testify;
c. By imputing fraud on the appellant in failing to consider
the Transfer of Land instrument executed by the 1st
respondent and his co-owner was sufficient evidence of
the sale of the property to Sleet Properties Limited and
also by failing to consider the cheque and Cash payments
which constituted sufficient evidence that the 1st
respondent along with his co-owner received payment
from Sleet Properties Limited for the transfer of the suit
property to Sleet Properties Limited;
d. By failing to find that the evidence on record showed that
their appellant duly purchased the suit property from
Sleet Properties Limited;
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e. By finding that the 1st respondent was entitled to 4 acres
of the suit property without fully considering the
evidence submitted by the appellant which demonstrated
that the 1st respondent and his co-owner had executed
the transfer of land for the entire suit property and not a
portion, in favor of Sleet Properties Limited;
f. By failing to consider that the 1st respondent had already
received payment from Sleet Properties Limited for the
suit property and therefore implying that directing the
issuance of title to him would result in unjust enrichment
which is unfair to the appellant;
g. By finding that the appellant was a foreign company yet
the character of the appellant was not in question and
had not been pleaded by the 1st respondent;
h. By failing to consider the testimony of the appellant's
witness Daniel Thoya that the copies of the titles, one in
the 1st respondent name, and the other in Sleet
Properties Ltd.’s name had been destroyed in a fire which
explanation should have been considered by the court
and not held against the appellant;
i. By failing to consider the appellant’s submissions which
strongly supported the appellant’s case and were backed
by legal principles and precedents;
j. By delivering a judgment that was contrary to the weight
of evidence and law.
2. It is therefore proposed that the appeal herein be allowed and the
judgment of the Hon James Ongondo, Senior Principal Magistrate
delivered on 6th March 2024 be set aside and the 1st respondent’s suit
in the trial court be dismissed and the costs of this appeal and those of
the appellant in the trial Court below be borne by the 1st respondent.
3. The background to the present appeal is that Malindi ELC Chief
Magistrate’s Court Civil Suit Number 154 Of 2021 was filed in
which in the further amended plaint, filed on 8th July 2022, the 1st
respondent herein sued the appellant herein plus the Land Registrar,
Kilifi and The Attorney General the present 2nd and 3rd respondents. His
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claim was that he was the real co-owner of approximately 4 acres
hived off the suit land known as Kilifi/Madeteni/423, a beachfront
property measuring 3.2 hectares, together with Julius Ngala Karisa,
now deceased. He and his co-owner Julius, having fulfilled all the
allocation conditions, obtained a discharge from the Settlement Office
and presented it at the Land Registry Kilifi, for issuance of the first title
jointly, but the land register indicated that the title deed had already
been issued to strangers hence the suit. The 1st respondent made a
report of the issue to the police.
4. According to the plaint, Julius took care of issues concerning discharge
of the property and the 1st appellant could not remember giving him
power to transfer his 4 acres without his permission. However, the 1st
respondent is aware that Julius had sold approximately 4 acres of his
own share of the land to someone going by the name Daniel from
Kaloleni, and Daniel later sold it to another party. The plaintiff never
received any money from any sale; that it was later discovered that
the entire plot Kilifi/Madeteni/423 had been fraudulently transferred to
Sarova Whitesands Hotel and Clifton Bay Limited who had never
resided on the suit property. The 1st respondent claimed that the suit
property of 4 acres had belonged to him for many generations he had
been occupied the same without any interruption. The 1st respondent
was not involved in the application for a Land Control Board consent to
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transfer. The 1st respondent prayed for the following orders in his
plaint:
a. A permanent injunction restraining the appellant or its
agents from in any manner whatsoever interfering with
the suit property measuring approximately 4 acres hived
off from Kilifi/Madeteni/423;
b. An order directing the appellant forthwith hand over
vacant possession of the suit property being
approximately 4 acres hived from Kilifi/Madeteni/423 to
the respondent or an eviction order do issue against the
appellant;
c. The land register for Kilifi/Madeteni/423 be amended to
reflect the name Jefwa Kalama Lewa as the registered
owner and a title deed be issued for his 4 acres of the
suit property;
d. That the previous title deed issued to the appellant be
revoked without its production;
e. An order to the Land Registrar Kilifi without gazettement
to proceed and issue a title document for the 4 acres
hived from parcel number Kilifi/Madeteni/423 in the name
of Jefwa Kalama Lewa;
f. An order directing the Officer Commanding Malindi Police
Station to supervise the eviction;
g. Costs and interest of the suit;
h. Any other relief that the court may deem fit and just.
5. The appellant filed an Amended Statement Of Defense dated 18th
August 2022 in which it is stated as follows: that it is the registered
proprietor of the suit property, having legally acquired the same from
Sleet Properties Limited for Kenya shillings 13,000,000/=; that Sleet
Properties Limited executed a transform which was registered on 10th
September 2007 and the appellant was subsequently issued with a
title deed of the same date; that the appellant took possession of the
suit property immediately upon completion of the transfer and
registration of title deed in its name and employed a caretaker to
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manage the property on its behalf. It constructed a perimeter wall
around the suit property and has enjoyed quiet peaceful and
interrupted possession for over 12 years. In 2009 the appellant applied
for change of user from agricultural to multi-dwelling and hotels and
the same was approved by the then Commissioner of Lands on 21st
December 2009. The appellant surrendered the title deed to the
government and was issued with a certificate of lease dated 11th March
2011 for term of 99 years commencing 1st January 2011. The appellant
avers that there was never any contract between it and Julius; that the
suit is defective for want of compliance with the provisions of Order
40(1) CPR. The appellant raised the defence of Limitation on the basis
that it having been in occupation of the suit land for a period in excess
of 12 years, the suit is time barred.
6. The 2nd and 3rd respondents filed a defence dated 18th October 2022 in
which they stated as follows: that parcel number 423 was jointly
allocated Jefwa Kalama and Julius Ngara Karisa on 27th March 1997 and
an outright purchase payment was made of Kenya shillings 16,750/=
and a receipt issued in the names of Jefwa Kalama and Julius Ngala
Karisa, and a certificate of outright purchase was issued on 16th May
2006 in favor of the two allotees. Thereafter, a Discharge of Charge
and Transfer Documents were released in favor of both Jefwa Kalama
and Julius Ngala Karisa on 25th October 2006. The transfer was signed
by the allottees and witnessed by the District Land Adjudication Officer
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Kilifi on the 14th November 2006 and presented to the land registry for
issuance of title deed; that however, records at the lands office show
that the first green card was opened on 31st July 1981, supported by an
adjudication record created on the 12th September 1980. The property
was registered to Damaris Njeri Gachoka on 31st July 1981 and a land
certificate issued on 8th February 1982. These records were cancelled
in 1986 by the then Commissioner of Lands due to irregularities in
allocation.
7. The second set of records was created pursuant to receipt of lease
dated 7th March 2011 from the office of the Commissioner of Lands,
Nairobi. This culminated in the issuance of a certificate of lease to
Clifton Bay Limited on 11th March 2011 for a term of 99 years for a
peppercorn from 1st January 2011.
8. The third set of records was created pursuant one to a Discharge of
Charge from the Settlement Fund Trustees dated 25th October 2006
and registered in Kilifi Lands Office on the 14th November 2006,
allocating the property to Jefwa Kalama and Julius Ngala Karisa.
9. The 2nd and 3rd respondents denied fraud and stated that if at all titles
were issue to the appellant issued in the proper and lawful manner and
in accordance with the documents lodged for registration. It was also
pleaded that no notice of intention to sue under Section 13A of the
Government Proceedings Act has been received. Hearing took place
between 8th February 2023 and 3rd October 2023 and on the latter date
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parties were ordered to file submissions, and the judgment was
delivered on 6th March 2024, allowing the 1st respondent’s claim hence
the present appeal.
10. The issues arising from the present appeal for determination are
as follows:
a. Whether the trial Court erred in law and in fact in failing
to find the suit was statutory time barred;
b. Whether the trial Court erred in law in finding that the
appellant was not required to file a resolution authorizing
its witness to testify;
c. Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in
finding that there was fraud;
d. Whether the trial magistrate’s judgment was contrary to
the weight of evidence rendered;
e. Who should meet the costs?
11. On whether the trial Court erred in law and in fact in failing to
find the suit was statutory time barred, the learned trial magistrate
held that time began running from the time the fraud was discovered.
He held that fraud was discovered in the year 2020. He stated that the
1st respondent is protected by Section 26 LRA since his claim was
grounded on fraud.
12. In paragraph 9A the appellant had premised his objection on
Limitation on the fact that it had been in occupation of the suit land for
a period in excess of 12 years. However, the 1st respondent’s case is
that he and his co-allottee were issued with the letter of offer in 1997,
that they made the required payments in 2006; that they obtained a
discharge of charge in August 2020; that when the 1st respondent
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attempted to register the discharge of charge at the Land Registry at
Kilifi he discovered that the land title for the suit land had been issued
to strangers. That is when he was issued with some advice by the Land
Registrar that he ought to file suit to challenge the title deed. That is
then pleading of 1st respondent. This court can only go by the
pleadings of the parties. That pleading states that the plaintiff’s cause
of action lies in fraud.
13. Section 4 of the Limitation of Actions Act provides as follows:
“4. Actions of contract and tort and certain other actions
(1) ……….
(2) An action founded on tort may not be brought after
the end of three years from the date on which the cause
of action accrued:
Provided that an action for libel or slander may not be
brought after the end of twelve months from such date.”
14. The provisions of Section 26(c) of the Limitations of Actions Act
are as follows:
“26. Extension of limitation period in case of fraud or
mistake
Where, in the case of an action for which a period of
limitation is prescribed, either—
(a)the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or
his agent, or of any person through whom he claims or
his agent; or
(b)the right of action is concealed by the fraud of any
such person as aforesaid; or
(c)the action is for relief from the consequences of a
mistake,
The period of limitation does not begin to run until the
plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could
with reasonable diligence have discovered it…”
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15. A claim based on fraud must be brought within 3 years from the
date of the occurrence of the cause of action, or if the cause of action
was concealed, from the date the claimant discovers the fraud, or
could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. In the present case
the 1st respondent’s case was simply that he discovered the fraud
when he went to present the discharge to the registration in 2020 and
he filed suit in 2021, one year after, and the issue of extension under
Section 26 does not even arise. I therefore find that the trial
magistrate was correct in finding that the 1st respondent’s claim was
not time barred.
16. As to whether the trial Court erred in law in finding that the
appellant was not required to file a resolution authorizing its witness to
testify, it is evident that the trial magistrate gave the evidence of the
appellant’s witness a short shrift. He merely stated as follows in the
only sentence that discussed the issue in his judgment:
“Further, the defendant’s testimony was null and void as
the witness did not produce resolution (sic) enabling her
to testify before court.”
17. In Dardanelli & 6 others v Tilito & 3 others [2025] KEELC
392 (KLR) the court observed as follows:
“20. The case of Bugerere (supra) dealt with the issue of
filing of a suit by a company which is in itself a matter of
great consequence. The present case relates to the
defence of a suit filed against a company, in which an
application has been made and a supporting affidavit
attached thereto. It is that supporting affidavit that is
under challenge for the reason of the deponent’s
apparent want of authority from the company to swear it.
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21.I must state that Exhibit “PT-1” in the applicant’s
supporting affidavit shows that the deponent is a director
of the 2nd defendant; so does Exhibit “ELD 10” submitted
before this court by the plaintiffs themselves. I therefore
find that there is no controversy as to whether or not the
deponent is a director of the 2nd defendant. By
extrapolation, if as held in Arthi (supra) that a board
resolution is not a requisite for an advocate to file suit on
a company’s behalf and a director can instruct him to
undertake that task, there is no good ground upon which
this court can hold that a director has no mandate to
authorize an advocate to perform a lesser task of
swearing an affidavit in support of an application such as
the present unless the contrary is shown.
22.No evidence has been presented by the plaintiffs to
the effect that there is any objection from the rest of the
directors or shareholders to the swearing of the affidavit.
23.For the foregoing reasons, this court hereby dismisses
allegation that the 2nd defendant has not granted
authority granted to the 1st defendant to swear the
affidavit dated May 23, 2024.”
18. In short, in the Dardanelli case (supra), the court declined to
uphold an objection based on want of a resolution to swear an
affidavit. Affidavit evidence is just like oral evidence given on oath, but
the difference is only that it is in writing and the oath is administered
by a Commissioner for Oaths duly authorized for the purpose. Applying
the court’s reasoning and acceptance of the affidavit evidence in the
Dardanelli case (supra) to the oral evidence of the appellant’s witness
in this case, I am of the view that a resolution was not necessary for
the witness to competently give evidence on behalf of the appellant.
The trial magistrate was therefore in error in finding that the evidence
of the appellant’s witness was null and void for want of a resolution
from the appellant purporting to give her authority to testify.
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19. Regarding whether the trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in
finding that there was fraud, it is correct that the learned trial
magistrate found that there was. He found that if there was no title
issued in the names of the two allottees of the suit property and that
there was no possibility that they could have transferred title to the
current owners.
20. It is the evidence of the parties that should be allowed to speak
for itself. A case rises and falls solely by means of the evidence
adduced by the parties. It is the case that statements made by a party
in a pleading which at the end of the hearing have no evidence to
support them have not been proved. So what was the evidence of the
1st respondent in this case?
21. The 1st respondent’s narrative of events begins with the
allotment of land to him and his co-allottee, then progresses to the
payment of the dues required, followed by the execution of a discharge
in the allottees’ favour by the Settlement Fund Trustees which could
not be registered at the land registry simply because other persons
had already been registered as owners. The question that naturally
arises is how those people who preceded the allottees achieved their
registration when the discharge had not been issued in order to
disencumber the land from dues owed to the SFT. The appellant has
insisted in the suit and now in the present appeal that it was the 1st
respondent and his deceased co-owner who sold the entire land. The
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appellant denied selling his portion of 4 acres though he testified that
his co-allottee had sold a portion of his entitlement to a man called
Daniel who came from Kaloleni. Its registered title being under
challenge, it was upon the appellant to demonstrate to the court that it
was legally obtained. The evidence of DW1 which the trial magistrate
did not take stock of was to the effect that the appellant purchased the
suit land from one Daniel Katana in 2007. Daniel had informed them
that he purchased the suit from the 1st respondent. On cross-
examination, she stated that the land was sold to her company by
Sleet Properties Ltd led by the said Daniel. Further cross-examination,
revealed Sleet Properties Ltd to be a mere estate agent who were not
in occupation of the property. DW1 did not have any copy of title
issued in the name of Sleet properties ltd. The witness for the
appellant could not explain why Sleet Properties Ltd was paying Kshs
150,000/- to Jefwa Kalama Lewa. The witness told the court that
there never existed any contract between the appellant and the 1st
respondent and his co-owner of the suit land.
22. The evidence of Daniel Thoya Kalama was that he is the director
of Sleet Properties Ltd and that upon learning that the appellant
wanted an extra property next to a property it had purchased in the
vicinity of the suit land, he established that the suit land was owned by
Jefwa Kalama Lewa and Julius Karisa Ngala; Jefwa then introduced
Daniel to Karisa and they agreed to sell the property to his company
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Sleet Properties Ltd. During the acquisition, process the SFT discharged
the property and transferred the same to the two co-owners who then
executed transfer in favour of Sleet Properties Ltd which Daniel
presented for registration thereby yielding title in Sleet’s name. He
then transferred the suit land to the appellant in 2007.
23. It is instructive that Jefwa Kalama Lewa lodged the suit in the
lower court while he was still alive but died in 2022 and his widow took
over the prosecution of the suit.
24. Among the documents produced by the appellant’s witness was
a transfer from Sleet Properties Ltd to the appellant, a transfer of the
land from SFT to Jefwa and Julius (undated and unregistered), a copy of
a discharge of charge, (dated 20/10/2006 (with the year 2006
seemingly having some visible alterations) and unregistered), a
transfer from the Jefwa and Julius to Sleet Properties Ltd, (apparently
registered on 4/9/2007) a cheque dated 11/10/2007 for the sum of
Kshs 150,000/- written by Daniel Thoya Katana in favour of Jefwa
Kalama Lewa, an acknowledgement of Kshs 20,000/paid to Jefwa from
Daniel Katana Thoya dated 6/5/2009, labelled as part payment for the
purchase of the suit land; and a bank statement of Daniel showing the
cheque for Kshs 150,000/- was cashed on an unclear date in October
2007.
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25. It is noteworthy that no copy of title or search certificate was
produced to demonstrate that the land was indeed ever transferred to
the Sleet Properties Ltd.
26. According to the evidence of the 2nd and 3rd respondents
however, the suit land was offered to Jefwa and Julius and the
discharge of charge was processed on 25/10/2006. The land registry
lacked any documents that could support the transfer from the two
allottees to the appellant. The transfer produced by the witness for the
2nd and 3rd respondents is in the name of Jefwa and Julius and appears
to have been registered on 14th November 2006 at the Kilifi Land
Registry. The same case applies to the discharge of charge.
27. What is sorely lacking from among the documents of the 2nd and
3rd respondents is a transfer of between Jefwa and Julius on the one
hand and Sleet Properties Ltd on the other. The only transfer showing
such a transaction was produced by the appellant’s witness, shows
that it was apparently registered on 4/9/2007. However, it is quite
curious for the appellant to have that kind of document purporting
registration while the 2nd and 3rd respondents do not have a replica at
all in their registry; consequently, it is no surprise that it is not certified
as a true copy by the Land Registrar. The consideration thereon is
reflected as Kshs 1,200,000/= while the appellant states that it
purchased the suit land from Sleet Properties Ltd for Kshs 13,000,000/-
vide a transfer registered 10/9/2007, merely 4 days from the date
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appearing on the transfer between Sleet Properties Ltd and Jefwa and
Julius. Similarly, the copy of transfer is not certified by the Land
Registrar and it can not be vouched for as having been lodged at the
Kilifi Land registry.
28. It is not lost on this court that a crucial part of the title
registration process in Kenya is the lodging of the transfers in the land
registry. In this court’s view, it is trite that the 2nd and 3rd respondents
having disowned the transfers, only evidence that could extricate the
challenged title was proof that the said transfers were presented at the
Kilifi land Registry and booked for registration, otherwise their
authenticity would remain unproved.
29. Though the two copies of transfer apparently bear daybook
numbers on their face, no copy of the Presentation Book was exhibited
in court as conclusive proof to show that both transfers were ever
lodged at the Kilifi land registry. In the absence of the certification that
they emanate from the land registry and also the absence of a copy of
the Presentation Book, the appellant’s claim that the suit land was first
transferred to Sleet Properties Ltd, and subsequently to it, is too shaky
to be believed in the face of the strong challenge to the appellant’s
title mounted by the 1st respondent.
30. In this court’s view, there was no sufficient evidence to support
the manner in which the appellant’s freehold title dated 10/9/2007
found itself at the land registry.
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31. In any event, there is good reason to believe that if indeed the
transfers were lodged and the titles in the names of the appellant and
Daniel were lodged and issued at the land registry respectively at
around the same time, there is no good reason why none of the
appellant’s witnesses produced certified copies of the transfer both in
favour of Sleet Properties Ltd and the appellant.
32. It is not that an undue burden is being foisted upon the appellant
to prove that those transfers that led to the issuance of its title were
ever lodged at the land registry. It is an unavoidable part of the
process for such transfers to be lodged in all registrations. Where they
have not been lodged, no title can issue. Already the title in favour of
Sleet Properties Ltd is missing. So the question would be how the land
became transferred from the 1st respondent et al to the appellant if
title was not first issued in the name of Sleet Properties Ltd. In
Elizabeth Wambui Githinji & 29 others v Kenya Urban Roads
Authority & 4 others [2019] KECA 706, (KLR), the court stated as
follows:
“Quality of title refers to inviolability and marketability of title. A
marketable title is a title that is free from any defects or clouds
that a reasonable buyer would find objectionable.”
33. The detestable clouds alluded to in Elizabeth Wambui Githinji
(supra) usually emanate from the manner of acquisition of title. The
process of acquisition of title is as vital as the product when it comes to
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production of titles and this as seen in Munyu Maina v Hiram
Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR where it was stated as follows:
“We state that when a registered proprietor’s root of title is
under challenge, it is not sufficient to dangle the instrument of
title as proof of ownership. It is this instrument of title that is in
challenge and the registered proprietor must go beyond the
instrument and prove the legality of how he acquired the title
and show that the acquisition was legal, formal and free from
any encumbrances including any and all interests which need not
be noted on the register.”
34. The gist of the plaintiff’s claim in Malindi Musketeers Limited
v Attorney General & another [2025] KEELC 6764 (KLR) was that
the government, being the guarantor of the sanctity and indefeasibility
of title, should pay him compensation in the form of loss for breach of
that guarantee through administrative irregularities that resulted in
double allocation of a plot in one of the notorious areas affected by the
now discredited 1986 title recall exercise by the government,
Chembe/Kibabamshe. The plaintiff stated that he legitimately acquired
title to the suit land but has been deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the property for a decade due to the defendants’ irregular issuance of
a parallel title to a third party over the same land in the year 2010.
Regarding presentation book entries, the court stated as follows in that
case:
“54. According to the said Presentation Book extract, no transfer
was ever lodged or registered with the Kilifi Land Registry in
favor of Tanga Trolleys Services on 25th October 1999 as claimed
by the plaintiff. Looking at the same exhibit the extract in
respect of presentations of February 2000 show that on 17th
February 2,000, only documents in respect of 4 transactions
were lodged the Kilifi Land Registry. These were in respect of
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Kilifi/Mtondia/866 (a transfer) Kilifi/Mtondia/880 (a transfer)
Kilifi/Mtondia/867 (a transfer) and Gede/Mijomboni/484 (a
transfer).
55.Clearly no transfer executed between Tanga Trolleys Services
and Southern Sun Investments Limited for any land parcel
whatsoever was ever lodged in the Kilifi Land Registry on 17th
February 2000. I have stated that the plaintiff has not produced
any Presentation Book in respect of the date 7th November
2007, on which it purports that its transfer was registered in the
Kilifi Land Registry. That is a very serious omission on the part of
the plaint which makes it doubtful that the transfer produced as
P. Exh 1 on page 3 of the bundle was ever presented for
registration at the Kilifi Land Registry.
56.There is also no credible entry in the presentation book
showing that the government of Kenya transferred the suit land
to Tanga Trolleys Services on 21st October 1999, that Tanga
Trolleys Services transferred the suit land to Southern Sun
Investments Limited on 17th February 2000, and that in turn
Southern Sun Investments Limited transferred the suit land to
Malindi Musketeers Limited on 7th November 2007. Without that
evidence, the plaintiff has nothing to show this court that he had
acquired valid title to the suit land.”
35. In view of the foregoing, the root of title of Sleet Properties Ltd
has not been established as valid, hence the validity of the appellant’s
title is not ascertainable. Where his title is impugned, a litigant who
insists on presenting as proof of ownership the same title which just
somehow popped up at the land registry, without impeccable evidence
of how it was ever processed from the beginning to the end, has not
established that his title is valid and the same applies to the
appellant’s title in this case. Proof that the appellant’s title emerged in
the land registry without any registration antecedents is sufficient
proof of fraud.
36. The conclusion of the above discourse is that the learned trial
magistrate did not err in finding that there was fraud in the
Page 18 of 19
MLDELCLCE001/24-JDGT/DF-02.04.24/FH-16.10.25/LH-16.10.25/DJ-10.02.26F.
procurement of title in the appellant’s name. This also conclusively
answers the fourth issue for determination, as to whether the trial
magistrate’s judgment was contrary to the weight of evidence
rendered, in the negative.
37. The outcome is that the present appeal lacks merit and the same
is hereby dismissed with costs.
It is so ordered.
Dated, signed and delivered at Malindi on this 10th day of
February 2026.
MWANGI NJOROGE,
JUDGE, ELC, MALINDI.
Page 19 of 19
MLDELCLCE001/24-JDGT/DF-02.04.24/FH-16.10.25/LH-16.10.25/DJ-10.02.26F.
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