Case Law[2024] ZAGPJHC 560South Africa
S v Koshe (SS007/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 560 (11 June 2024)
Headnotes
liable for those events on the basis of the decision of State v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A) only if certain prerequisites are satisfied. In the first place he must have been present at the scene where the violence was committed. Secondly, he must have been aware of the assault of the victims. Thirdly, he must have intended to make common cause with those who were actually perpetrating the assault. Fourthly, he must have manifested his sharing of a common purpose with the perpetrators of the assault by himself performing some act of association with the conduct of the others. Fifthly, the requisite
Judgment
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# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
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## S v Koshe (SS007/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 560 (11 June 2024)
S v Koshe (SS007/2023) [2024] ZAGPJHC 560 (11 June 2024)
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sino date 11 June 2024
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
1.
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
2.
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
3.
REVISED YES/NO
11
June 2024
Case No.: SS 007/2023
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
NKOSINATHI
KOSHE
Accused
JUDGMENT
Strydom J
[1]
This is an
ex-tempore
judgment in this matter. The accused, Mr. Nkosinathi Koshe (the
accused) has been charged on two counts, one count of murder read
with section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the
Amendment Act) and also on the second count, a count of robbery
with
aggravating circumstances as defined in section 1 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA) read with section 51(2)
of Act 105
of 1997.
[2]
The accused, after the charges were put to
the accused, he pleaded not guilty on the murder count and guilty on
the robbery count.
[3]
Mr. Mavatha appearing on behalf of the
accused then handed in a statement in terms of section 112(2) of the
CPA pertaining to the
plea of guilty on the robbery count. The Court
does not intend, at this stage, to read that statement into the
record again, suffice
to say that the Court was satisfied the all the
elements of the crime of robbery with aggravating circumstances were
admitted in
this statement. Accordingly the accused was convicted on
this count.
[4]
The Court explained to the accused that in
relation to count 1 reference is made to section 51(1) of the
Amendment Act and in relation
to count 2 reference was made to
section 51(2) of the same Act. In terms of section 51(1) the
Amendment Act prescribes that if
a person is convicted of an offence
referred to in Part I of Schedule 2, life imprisonment would be the
prescribed minimum sentence.
[5]
At this stage it can already be found that
if accused is convicted on the murder count, it would fall within the
ambit of Part I
of Schedule 2 of the Act. Schedule 2, Part I provides
that a murder would fall within the category of section 51(1) when
the murder
led to the death of a victim during a robbery with
aggravating circumstances. As stated, the accused pleaded not guilty
to the
murder count but made a statement in relation to the robbery
count in terms of section 112(2) of the CPA.
[6]
The State also, as part of its case then
sought admissions to be made in terms of section 220 of the CPA in
relation to a photo
album and the post mortem report. There was no
objection to this, and the Court received these documents which were
marked EXHIBITS
A and B respectively.
[7]
In terms of EXHIBIT B, the cause of death
of the deceased, was stated to be gunshot wounds to the head and to
the torso\ abdominal
areas. After these documents were received in
evidence, the State closed its case.
[8]
The accused was then called to testify as
part of the defences’ case. He placed on record his age of 21
years and that he
finished Grade 10 at school. He was referred to
EXHIBIT X, the statement in terms of section 112 and yet again
confirmed the contents
thereof.
[9]
He explained why he pleaded not guilty to
the murder count and stated it was on the basis that he did not pull
the trigger that
killed the deceased. He testified that he did not
really understand this so-called concept of common purpose.
[10]
During cross-examination a few questions
were asked which again placed him on the scene and he again confirmed
that he saw what
was happening there. He saw that Siphiwe had a
firearm in his possession and confirmed that he and Themba, the other
co-perpetrator,
had knives.
[11]
After the shooting he saw that the deceased
was lying there but they went inside and committed the robbery. What
was stolen was
the ring of the wife of the deceased as well as two
cell phones. He confirmed that he later sold the ring for R2 000.
[12]
The Court must now consider what evidence
there is to either convict or acquit the accused on the murder count.
[13]
The accused admitted that on 18 January
2023 he went with two of his friends, Siphiwe Dlamini and Themba
Dlamini to the house where
the deceased was shot and killed. They
were together, driving in a motor vehicle after they attended a
drinking place and randomly
stopped at a house to rob the occupants.
[14]
They together formed the intention to act
in concert to rob these occupants. The role that the accused played
was that he stood
guard close to the door whilst the other two
perpetrators entered the house. He had a knife with him. Before
Siphiwe entered the
house he took out a firearm. Accordingly accused
was aware that Siphiwe had a firearm.
[15]
In his section 112 statement he further
stated that he saw the deceased came from the room. He then heard a
gunshot. The three of
them then proceeded to rob the wife of the
deceased.
[16]
According to the evidence it is thus clear
that the accused admitted that the deceased was killed during the
robbery but explained
that he was not the person that fired the shot.
[17]
The only issue for this Court to decide is
whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused acted
with a common purpose
or with a common intention to kill the
deceased. In circumstances of this case the question would be whether
the accused had foreseen
the possibility that someone can get killed
during the robbery.
[18]
This brings the doctrine of common purpose
into the equation. In
State v Mgedezi
and Others
1989 (1) SA 6787
(AD) the
Court found that an accused could only be liable on the basis of a
common intention if certain prerequisites are satisfied.
[19]
In this case the Court found as follows and
I quote from the headnote at page 688.
“
In the
absence of proof of a prior agreement an accused who was not shown to
have contributed causally to the killing or wounding
of the victims
(in casu. Group violence on a number of victims) can be held liable
for those events on the basis of the decision
of State v Safatsa and
Others
1988 (1) SA 868
(A) only if certain prerequisites are
satisfied. In the first place he must have been present at the scene
where the violence was
committed. Secondly, he must have been aware
of the assault of the victims. Thirdly, he must have intended to make
common cause
with those who were actually perpetrating the assault.
Fourthly, he must have manifested his sharing of a common purpose
with the
perpetrators of the assault by himself performing some act
of association with the conduct of the others. Fifthly, the requisite
mens rea; so, in respect of the killing of the deceased, he must have
intended them to be killed, or he must have foreseen the
possibility
of their being killed and performed his own act of association with
recklessness as to whether or not death was to
ensue.”
[20]
The Court also found that inherent in the
concept of imputing to an accused the act of another on the basis of
common purpose is
the indispensable notion of acting in concert.
[21]
Now, testing the situation of the accused
against this ratio the Court will also use the numbering as was used
in
Mgedezi
.
[22]
Firstly, the accused was present during the
robbery and the killing of the deceased. Secondly, accused was aware
of the shooting
on the deceased. As to three, the Court finds that
accused made common cause with the two other perpetrators as they
went there
together to rob the occupants of that house whilst they
all had weapons. In this instance Siphiwe, with the knowledge and
within
the eyesight of the accused has drawn a firearm.
[23]
As far as the fourth requirement is
concerned, the accused played an active role as he was taking guard
to warn the other perpetrators
should someone has arrived there. As
to the fifth requirement, whether he had
mens
rea
or the requisite mindset, the Court
must draw an inference.
[24]
The question would be, can the inference be
drawn that he intended to kill the deceased, or did he foresee the
possibility that
during this robbery someone might get killed? Did he
reconcile himself with this possibility that their actions by robbing
that
house could lead to the death of someone? An inference can only
be drawn from the proven facts and the inference to be drawn must
be
the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from these facts.
[25]
In circumstances of this case the question
is, to put it differently, whether the accused foresee the
possibility that the deceased
could be killed during this robbery.
Now, accused went together with the other perpetrators, being armed
himself. He knew the Siphiwe
had a firearm.
[26]
In such circumstances he must have foreseen
the possibility that either the victim can resist or that the victim
can be shot for
no apparent reason. This is exactly what happened in
this matter.
[27]
Accordingly, it would not assist the
accused to say, well, I did not fire the shot, he made common cause
with the entire attack
and the robbery. He ought to have foreseen in
the sense that he in fact foresaw the possibility, that someone can
get killed during
the robbery. If any person takes part in a robbery,
being armed, whilst other members of the group have firearms, such
eventuality
must be foreseeable.
[28]
The Court finds that accused acted in the
furtherance of a common purpose together with the other perpetrators
to rob the house
of deceased and, if needs be, to kill people inside
that house.
[29]
Consequently, accused is found guilty on
count 1 as charged.
R STRYDOM
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Heard
on:
07 June 2024
Delivered
on:
11 June 2024
Appearances:
For the
State:
Mr. M. Maleleka
Instructed
by:
The National Prosecuting Authority
For the Accused:
Mr. A. Mavatha
Instructed
by:
Legal-Aid
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