Case Law[2022] ZAGPJHC 481South Africa
Phanyane N.O. v Phanyane and Others (20/44545) [2022] ZAGPJHC 481 (11 July 2022)
High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)
11 July 2022
Headnotes
in the names of the First and Second Respondents, and registration of a new title deed in favour of the deceased estate. 6. The Applicant resides at the N [....] 1 property. The First Respondent contradicts himself in his answering affidavit: he admits that he resides in Witsieshoek as alleged by the Applicant, but elsewhere states that he resides at the N [....] 1 property.
Judgment
begin wrapper
begin container
begin header
begin slogan-floater
end slogan-floater
- About SAFLII
About SAFLII
- Databases
Databases
- Search
Search
- Terms of Use
Terms of Use
- RSS Feeds
RSS Feeds
end header
begin main
begin center
# South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
You are here:
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
>>
2022
>>
[2022] ZAGPJHC 481
|
Noteup
|
LawCite
sino index
## Phanyane N.O. v Phanyane and Others (20/44545) [2022] ZAGPJHC 481 (11 July 2022)
Phanyane N.O. v Phanyane and Others (20/44545) [2022] ZAGPJHC 481 (11 July 2022)
Download original files
PDF format
RTF format
make_database: source=/home/saflii//raw/ZAGPJHC/Data/2022_481.html
sino date 11 July 2022
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA,
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO:
20/44545
REPORTABLE: NO
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES: NO
REVISED: NO
11 July 2022
In the matter between:
TSHEPISO
GODFREY PHANYANE N.O.
APPLICANT
and
SAM
PHANYANE
FIRST RESPONDENT
MAMOTSOKOTSI
ANNA PHANYANE
SECOND RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF
HOUSING:
GAUTENG
THIRD RESPONDENT
THE MEC OF HUMAN
SETTLEMENTS:
GAUTENG
FOURTH RESPONDENT
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
REGISTRAR
OF DEEDS
SIXTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Olivier AJ:
1.
The Applicant is the grandson of the late
Makanono Zephoria Phanyane (“the deceased”), who died on
5 July 2016. He brings
this application in his official capacity as
the appointed executor of her estate.
2.
The First Respondent is Sam Phanyane, the
deceased’s son, and uncle of the Applicant. The Second
Respondent, Mamotsokotsi
Anna Phanyane,
is
the wife of the First Respondent. The Third Respondent is the
Director-General of Housing: Gauteng. The Fourth Respondent is
the
MEC of Human Settlements: Gauteng. The Fifth Respondent is the Master
of the High Court. The Sixth Respondent is the Registrar
of Deeds.
Relief is sought against the First, Second and Sixth Respondents.
3.
Only the First and Second Respondents
oppose the application.
The First
Respondent has deposed to an answering affidavit. The Second
Respondent has not filed a confirmatory affidavit.
4.
The relevant facts are:
4.1.
The deceased passed away on 5 July 2016.
4.2.
The deceased had made a last will and
testament (“the will”) on 8 February 2005, in which the
Applicant was nominated
as the executor of her estate.
4.3.
The will created a trust in favour of the
family, called the Phanyane Family Trust. The Applicant was nominated
as trustee, and
the beneficiaries of the trust were listed as the
deceased’s son (the First Respondent), her grandson (the First
Applicant)
and four granddaughters, two of whom have filed affidavits
in support of this application.
4.4.
The deceased owned ERF [....], N
[....] 1 Township, also known as number [....] M
[....] Street, N
[....] 1, Soweto (“the N [....] 1
property”) at time of her death. She expressed the wish that
after her death, ownership
of the property should pass to the trust
to provide accommodation for her son and grandchildren.
4.5.
In
accordance with the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 (“the
Act”), a death needs to be reported within 14
days
[1]
and a will should be produced as soon as the possessor thereof
becomes aware of the death.
[2]
4.6.
The
First Respondent first reported the estate to the Master,
Bloemfontein, claiming that the deceased had died without a will.
On
12 August 2016 a Letter of Authority was issued in his favour, duly
authorising him to take control of the assets of the deceased
estate.
[3]
4.7.
The estate was reported a second time to
the Master, Bloemfontein – this time by the Applicant, more
than eight months after
the deceased’s passing. The Applicant
produced a will, which the Master accepted and registered on 16 March
2017.
4.8.
The Master withdrew the Letter of Authority
issued to the First Respondent, on 4 May 2017. The First Respondent
was notified telephonically
and in writing. The typed letter was
date-stamped 4 May 2017 and written on official letterhead.
The
relevant parts read as follows:
Refer to our
telephonically conversation on the 04-05-2017
Please be advised that
the Letter of Authority issued to you on the
12-08-2016
is
hereby withdrawn. Any further use thereof will be unlawful. Kindly
return the Letter of Authority by return of post.
I will proceed to appoint
a new Master’s representative without any further notice to
you.
You can contact me at
[....]
ME
Mukhwantheli
(sic)
4.9.
A Letter of Authority was issued in favour
of the Applicant, on 8 June 2017.
4.10.
On 15 September 2019, more than two years
after the revocation of the First Respondent’s Letter of
Authority, Title Deed T
[....] holding the N [....] 1 property
was registered in the names of the First and Second Respondents
jointly.
4.11.
The Applicant launched this application on
17 December 2020.
5.
The Applicant submits that the registration
of the title deed in the names of the First and Second Respondents
was unlawful, as
the Letter of Authority issued to the First
Respondent on 12 August 2016 was invalid at the time of registration.
He seeks cancellation
of the title deed held in the names of the
First and Second Respondents, and registration of a new title deed in
favour of the
deceased estate.
6.
The Applicant resides at the N [....] 1
property. The First Respondent contradicts himself in his answering
affidavit: he admits
that he resides in Witsieshoek as alleged by the
Applicant, but elsewhere states that he resides at the N [....] 1
property.
7.
The Applicant alleges that the First
Respondent intends to sell the property, which he denies.
8.
In his opposing papers the First Respondent
alleges the following:
8.1.
The purported will is a “fraudulent
document” and invalid.
8.2.
The deceased had died intestate.
8.3.
The Registrar had lawfully registered the N
[....] 1 property in the names of the First and Second Respondents,
with a valid Letter
of Authority.
8.4.
The Master had acted unlawfully by revoking
his Letter of Authority, due to a lack of authority and because the
First Respondent
had not been given an opportunity to be heard.
9.
The First Respondent alleges in
amplification that:
9.1.
the Applicant had failed to produce the
will within the required 14-day period.
9.2.
the Applicant had failed to present the
will to family members at the funeral.
9.3.
the Applicant had forged the signature on
the will, as it was different to the deceased’s “common
signatures”
around the time of signing of the will.
9.4.
the alleged will does not state the place
of signing of the will.
9.5.
the use of the male form “testator”,
and not the female form “testatrix”, shows that the will
is a forgery.
9.6.
it is “common knowledge” that
the deceased was in Witsieshoek on the date of signing of the will.
10.
The
First Respondent submits that the Applicant should lead evidence to
prove that the will is valid. This is wrong in law.
A
will which is regular and complete on the face of it is presumed to
be valid until its invalidity has been established. The onus
is on
the person alleging invalidity to prove such allegation.
[4]
The standard of proof is the same as that which applies in all civil
cases – proof on a balance of probabilities. In other
words, he
who alleges invalidity must prove it. It is clear to me that the
First Respondent has failed to discharge this onus.
11.
The place of signature is clearly stated in
the will as Johannesburg. There is no requirement in law that a
female testator should
be referred to as testatrix. There is no
evidence to show that the deceased was in fact in Witsieshoek on the
day that the will
was signed.
12.
In
cases where a testator’s signature is challenged, it has become
common (although not necessary if other forms of proof
are available)
to adduce the evidence of a handwriting expert.
[5]
No such evidence has been placed before the court. The allegation
that the signature on the will is different from the deceased’s
“common signature” around that time is without proof.
13.
It cannot be inferred from the Applicant’s
failure to comply with the reporting requirements timeously that the
will is a
forgery. At most, it shows that the Applicant was tardy in
reporting the estate and producing the will.
14.
The First Respondent claims further that
the deceased had died intestate. This is linked to the allegation
that the will is invalid.
As concluded above, the First Respondent
has failed to discharge the onus. The allegation that the deceased
had died without a
will, therefore, is without foundation. In any
event, even if the deceased had died without a will, the First
Respondent would
not have become the sole heir as the deceased had
other children who would have qualified to inherit in accordance with
the rules
of intestate succession.
15.
The First Respondent’s Letter of
Authority was withdrawn on 4 May 2017. It is clear that any purported
act of the First Respondent
in respect of the deceased estate after
this date would have been unlawful and invalid; the Master’s
letter makes this clear.
This includes the transfer of any immovable
estate property and registration of a title deed in respect thereof.
The First Respondent’s
insistence that the N [....] 1 property
was lawfully registered in his and his wife’s names with a
valid Letter of Authority
is not supported by the facts.
16.
The
First Respondent is correct that the Master ordinarily becomes
functus
officio
once Letters of Authority or Executorship have been issued.
[6]
However, this is subject to the powers of removal which the Master
has in terms of Section 54 of the Act, titled
Removal
from office of executor
.
[7]
17.
Section 54(1)(b)(v) of the Act provides
that the Master may at any time remove an executor from office “if
he fails to perform
satisfactorily any duty imposed upon him by or
under this Act, or to comply with any lawful request of the Master.”
If the
Master intends to remove an executor on this ground or any of
the other grounds listed in 54(1)(b), a specific procedure applies
(s
54(2)):
Before removing an
executor from his office under subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) or
(v) of paragraph (b) of subsection (1),
the Master shall forward to
him by registered post a notice setting forth the reasons for such
removal, and informing him that
he may apply to the Court within 30
days from the date of such notice for an order restraining the Master
from removing him from
his office.
18.
The First Respondent argues that the Master
had to follow this procedure and should also have granted him a
hearing before removing
him. He avers that the Master violated the
audi alterem partem
rule, and also his right to administrative justice in terms of
section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996.
19.
Was the Master required to observe
subsection (2) and if so, did non-compliance violate the First
Respondent’s rights?
20.
In my view the answer is no. The procedure
prescribed by section 54(2) applies only to removals in terms of
subsection (1). It seems
clear to me the First Respondent was removed
in terms of section 54(3):
(3) An executor who has
not been nominated by will may at any time be removed from his office
by the Master if it appears that there
is a will by which any other
person who is capable of acting and consents to act as executor has
been nominated as executor to
the estate which he has been appointed
to liquidate and distribute …
(4) …
(5) Any person who ceases
to be an executor shall forthwith return his letters of executorship
to the Master.
21.
It is clear from the quoted subsection that the Master has the
authority to replace an executor who
was
not
nominated by
will, with one who was nominated by will and who is willing and able
to act as executor. In the present case the First
Respondent was
removed following the registration of the deceased’s will,
which nominated the Applicant as executor. The
Master therefore did
not act unlawfully or exceed his powers by withdrawing the First
Respondent’s Letter of Authority.
22.
Subsection (5) provides further that the
cancelled Letter of Authority should be returned to the Master
forthwith. It is clear that
the First Respondent failed to comply.
Instead, he held on to the Letter of Authority and used it to
register the N [....] 1 property
in his and his wife’s names.
23.
This does not mean, however, that the First
Respondent was deprived of a remedy. There is recourse available to
anyone who feels
aggrieved by any appointment made by the Master, or
any other decision by the Master under the Act. Section 95 of the Act
states:
Every appointment by the
Master of an executor, tutor, curator or interim curator, and every
decision, ruling, order, direction
or taxation by the Master under
this Act
shall be subject to appeal to or review by the Court upon
motion at the instance of any person aggrieved thereby
, and the
Court may on any such appeal or review confirm, set aside or vary the
appointment, decision, ruling, order, direction
or taxation, as the
case may be. (My emphasis.)
24.
The
First Respondent did not avail himself of any of the available
pathways to challenge either the termination of his Letter of
Authority or the appointment of the Applicant. Had the First
Respondent been serious about his claims of unlawfulness, he should
have brought a counterapplication in these proceedings to review the
Master’s decisions.
[8]
25.
The First Respondent alleges further that
the cancellation was unlawful because it failed to come to his
attention: “the letter
of the alleged cancellation did not
reach me at all”. He also denies receiving
a
call from the Master’s office informing him of the withdrawal
of his Letter of Authority.
26.
There is no onus on the Applicant to prove
that the First Respondent had received the call or that the letter
had reached him. There
is no statutory requirement that the letter
should have been sent by registered mail, or that the Master should
have checked with
the First Respondent that he had in fact received
the letter. This would place an unnecessary burden on the Master’s
Office.
The letter from the Master’s
Office is clearly addressed to the First Respondent and refers to a
conversation earlier that
day between the First Respondent and the
writer of the letter, in which the First Respondent was informed of
the cancellation.
The letter bears the date stamp of the Master’s
Office and is typed on official Master’s Office letterhead. It
is signed
by an official in the Master’s Office. There has been
no allegation that the letter is a forgery. It is therefore a valid
cancellation of the First Respondent’s Letter of Authority.
27.
Whatever
the First Respondent maintains, the fact remains that at the time of
the registration of the title deed, the First Respondent’s
Letter of Authority had been validly withdrawn by the Master. The
First Respondent had no authority to deal with the estate property
from the moment of withdrawal.
[9]
28.
It follows that the title deed held over
the N [....] 1 property in the names of the First and Second
Respondents should be declared
invalid, and cancelled.
29.
Section 6(1)
of the
Deeds Registries Act 47
of 1937
empowers the Registrar of Deeds to
cancel a deed, but only in terms of an order of court.
Section
6(2)
provides that
upon cancellation, the
deed under which the land (property) was held immediately prior to
the registration of the cancelled deed,
shall be revived to the
extent of such cancellation. This means that the title deed
registered in the name of the deceased, under
which the N [....] 1
property was previously held, will be revived and reinstated. It is
unnecessary for me to order that the Registrar
registers the title
deed to the N [....] 1 property in the name of the deceased estate
specifically.
30.
It has been five years since the estate was
first reported to the Master. No doubt the finalisation of the estate
has been delayed
by this application, which was necessary to
accomplish the return of a primary asset to the estate. It is unclear
whether the family
trust has been registered. Certain steps will need
to be taken to transfer the N [....] 1 property to the trust. The
Applicant
must now act diligently and with necessary haste to
finalise the estate in order to give effect to the wishes of the
deceased.
31.
It is trite that in awarding costs, a court
has a discretion, which must be exercised judicially upon a
consideration of all the
facts. This discretion is broad but not
unlimited. Established principles should be considered. As a rule of
thumb, a successful
party is entitled to his or her costs. It is also
trite that an award of attorney and client costs is the exception,
not the rule.
As the successful party the Applicant is entitled to
his costs. However, I do not think the facts and circumstances of the
case
justify costs on a punitive scale, which is what the Applicant
seeks. The Applicant is therefore awarded costs on a party and party
scale.
32.
In the result I make the following order:
32.1.
Title Deed
T
[….]., which holds the property known as ERF [....] N
[....] 1 Township, Soweto, Gauteng, also known as number [....]
M [....] Street, N [....] 1, Soweto, registered in
the names of Sam Phanyane and Mamotsokotsi Anna Phanyane,
is declared
invalid.
32.2.
The Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg, is
directed to cancel Title Deed T [....] accordingly.
32.3.
The Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg, is
directed further to revive the title deed
under
which the
property known as ERF [....],
N [....] 1 Township, Soweto, Gauteng, also known as number [....]
M [....]
Street, N [....] 1, Soweto,
was
held immediately prior to the registration of Title Deed
T
[….].
32.4.
The First and Second Respondents shall pay
the costs of this application on a party and party scale.
M
Olivier
Acting Judge of the
High Court
Gauteng Local
Division, Johannesburg
This judgment was handed
down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or parties’
representatives by email and by
upload to CaseLines. The date and
time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h00 on 11 July 2022.
Date
of hearing:
25 May 2022
Date
of judgment:
11 July 2022
On
behalf of Applicant:
B B Ntsimane (Ms)
Instructed
by:
Masina Attorneys
On
behalf of First and Second Respondents:
M
D Hlatshwayo of Hlatshwayo Mhayise Inc.
[1]
S
7(1) of the Act.
[2]
S
8(1) of the Act.
[3]
If
the value of any estate does not exceed the amount determined by the
Minister by notice in the Government Gazette (R 250 000),
the Master
may dispense with the appointment of an executor and give directions
as to the manner in which any such estate shall
be administered.
This involves the issuing of a Letter of Authority, as opposed to a
Letter of Executorship (S 18(3) of the Act).
[4]
Kunzs
v Swart and Others
1924
AD 618.
[5]
See
e.g.,
Molefi
v Nhlapo and Others
[2013] JOL 30227
(GSJ) where the court accepted the evidence of a
handwriting expert to find that the signature had been forged.
[6]
Welgemoed
NNO v The Master
1976 (1) SA 513
(T); also,
Transair
(Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission
1977 (3) SA 784 (A).
[7]
See
Kekana
v Master of the High Court
[2016] ZAGPPHC 771 (26 August 2016) at para 21.
[8]
See
Kekana
supra
where the court, in terms of
section 6
of the
Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
, set aside a decision of the
Master to appoint an executor, for failure to apply his/her mind.
[9]
S
13 of the Act: “No person shall liquidate or distribute the
estate of any deceased person, except under letters of executorship
granted or signed and sealed under this Act, or under an endorsement
made under section 15, or in pursuance of a direction by
a Master.”
sino noindex
make_database footer start
Similar Cases
Phumzile v S (A118/2020) [2022] ZAGPJHC 921 (15 November 2022)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 921High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Phahlane v Road Accident Fund (21973/2023) [2025] ZAGPJHC 706 (21 July 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 706High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Phaleng-Podile vs Dovey (28223/2020) [2022] ZAGPJHC 1038 (13 December 2022)
[2022] ZAGPJHC 1038High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Member of the Executive Council: Economic Development, Environment, Agriculture and Rural Development, Gauteng and Others (11734/2019) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1086 (28 September 2023)
[2023] ZAGPJHC 1086High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar
Phambili Services (Pty) Ltd v National Treasure of Republic of South Africa and Others (088485/2023) [2025] ZAGPJHC 117 (14 February 2025)
[2025] ZAGPJHC 117High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg)99% similar